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Abstract  
This thesis seeks to explore the effects of the neuro-turn, which is the turn away from 
predominately psychological paradigms towards neuroscientific models and 
explanations of the self. Demarcating the beginning of this turn as the 1990s, dubbed 
the ‘decade of the brain’, the thesis is particularly concerned with exploring the 
effects of the neuro-turn on the people whose identity, subjectivity, and personhood 
come to be built or formed around these novel neuroscientific ways of understanding 
or measuring brains and cognition. In particular, the thesis considers people who are 
categorised, diagnosed, or believed to have cognitive difference, particularly salient 
in this neuro-turn in regards to the myriad brain diseases, disorders, syndromes, and 
conditions present today. Underpinned by a Foucauldian theoretical framework, 
particularly the description of the nineteenth century’s ‘perverse implantation’, this 
thesis develops the concept of the ‘neural implantation’ to describe the effects of 
this biopolitical drive to classify cognitive difference. It is particularly interested in 
how the generic properties of crime fiction can elucidate both the biopolitics of the 
neural implantation, as well as how these texts can be sites through which to resist 
some of the more problematic effects of the medicalisation and politicisation of 
cognitive difference.  
Beginning with the cultural fascination with cognitive enhancement, it seeks 
to understand the kinds of subjectivities ideas of enhancement produce through 
close readings of Neil Berger’s film Limitless and Ramez Naam’s novel Nexus. It argues 
that the recent shift away from neoliberal to populist forms of politics is reflected in 
these two texts, and show how the neural implantation they imagine encapsulates 
this. It continues with an exploration of autism in society and culture, arguing that 
implantations of autism can be divided into the polar figurations of the ‘autistic 
shooter’ and the ‘autistic hacker’. It looks at Jodi Picoult’s novel House Rules as 
indicative of the ‘shooter’, describing the reading of the narrative as a ‘feel bad’ 
experience, before shifting to representations of the hacker, through readings of the 
television series The Code and Stieg Larsson’s Millennium novel series. The thesis 
concludes with a discussion of dementia, arguing that the contemporary model seeks 
only to medically pathologise and culturally demonise people living with dementia. 
To combat this, the thesis adopts a psychoanalytic reading of Emma Healey’s 
Elizabeth is Missing and Alice LaPlante’s Turn of Mind, to show how society can begin 
to ‘read’ dementia differently, and moreover begin to learn what dementia and other 
cognitive differences can teach us about the limitations of the normative paradigm.  
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Context: The Neuro-turn  
In a 2017 BBC documentary titled ‘The Truth About…Stress’, presenter Fiona Phillips 
sets out to examine the effectiveness of mindfulness, a meditative practice designed 
to focus the self in the present with the aim, for some, of reducing stress. She remains 
sceptical of its health benefits until neuroscientist Elena Antonova explains the 
differences in brain scan images of the same person both when ‘mind-wandering’ 
and when practising mindfulness.  
[Phillips:] It’s all very well being told mindfulness works but I’m still a bit 
sceptical. I’ve come to the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology, and 
Neuroscience at King’s College London to find out what the science is 
behind it. […]  
[Antonova, pointing to a brain image:] This area… are the areas that we 
call self-referencing – it’s the me-me-me experience. […] 
[Phillips:] That’s incredible! The difference is stark! We’ve just got so 
much activity going on in the mind wandering brain, and yet barely any 
in the mindfulness brain. What effect would that have? Having less 
reaction in the frontal lobe?  
[Antonova:] The experience associated with this brain state is that sense 
of openness and clarity. […] 
[Phillips:] I would love to have that brain, the mindfulness one. […] Well, 
I have to say, I was a bit cynical about mindfulness at the beginning of the 
day, and now I am definitely a convert. I’ve seen the science!1 
 
Having previously been told ‘mindfulness works’ by a group of high school children 
she describes herself as sceptical; however, after having been shown differences in 
brain scan images she describes herself as a ‘convert’. I begin with this encounter 
because it encapsulates much about the ways in which scientific ideas about the 
brain are assimilated and incorporated into popular cultural discourses in what is 
 
1 Fiona Phillips and Elena Antonova, The Truth About… Stress, BBC, 4 May 2017, online video 
recording, BBC iPlayer <https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/p04yy2n4/the-truth-about-11-
stress> [accessed 23 October 2017]. 
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referred to as the neuroscientific, neurological, or neuro-turn.2 Further, it highlights 
the nature of anecdote versus evidence, and reveals the role of the scan as the 
apparatus of truth, and vehicle of evidence and facticity. In other words, the very 
mode through which the evidence of mindfulness is conveyed is bound up with the 
technology of the neuro-turn itself. Phillips’ reaction is typical of the way in which 
material models of the brain are emerging as uncontested explanations for a vast 
range of human behaviour, action, and health. It is true that this Damascene moment 
is a stock trope of this kind of popular scientific documentary in which the presenter 
meets with apparently incontrovertible evidence and has a correlative 
transformation in understanding. However, performative tropes such as this also 
reflect the cultural interest in the brain as the final frontier of human life, whereby 
previously psychologised states of ‘openness and clarity’ come to result from ‘less 
reaction in the frontal lobe’. The brain, as this thesis explores, is a promissory organ 
of potentiality; the locus of our capacity to think our way out of the kind of diseases, 
resource scarcity, and environmental crises that threaten our future, as well as a 
means to meditate away the stress these crises produce.3 Phillips’ excitement in 
seeing the difference between the brain scans is similarly reflective of the 
enthusiastic ways such neuro-models are assimilated in culture and society.  
 
2 Broadly speaking, the neuro-turn reflects the cultural and social turn towards neuroscientific 
models and explanations regarding the self; the shift to understand the self through the workings of 
the brain rather than the depths of the psychological mind. It is also a ‘turn’ in the academic sense, 
demarcating an epistemological shift in the art and humanities towards research underpinned or 
informed by the explanatory power of neuroscience. This is reflected in emerging disciplines such as 
neurolaw or neurophilosophy. 
3 Melinda Cooper discusses this notion in Life as Surplus: Biotechnology and Capitalism in the 
Neoliberal Era (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008). 
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However, enthusiasm often masks the hollowness it represents (after all, 
Phillips has only learned that meditation might relieve stress), or more seriously 
conceals or elides the ethical concerns arising from this turn towards neuroscientific 
models and explanations. Indeed, Phillips’ claim that she ‘would love to have that 
brain, the mindfulness one’ contains the strange idea of a brain that can be 
possessed, reflecting the contemporary fascination with categorising brains and 
recognising brain difference, and highlighting a key effect of the neuroscientific turn 
in that some brain states or cognitive differences become more or less desirable. This 
thesis explores the implications of the practices of categorisation that characterise 
the neuro-turn, particularly in reference to the ways in which popular 
representations of brain diseases, disorders, syndromes, and conditions are being re-
considered through neuro-material models and explanations. Phillips wants to ‘have 
that brain’ because the mindfulness brain represents a more desirable disposition, 
an improvement upon her usual emotional and cognitive state. However, wanting to 
have a different emotional or cognitive state is not the same as being cognitively 
different.4  
Phillips’ comment may simply be a convention of this form of popular 
documentary, but it arguably reveals something deeper. Today, the speculation, 
recognition, and diagnosis of brain and cognitive difference has become a medical 
and cultural phenomenon underwritten by powerful biopolitical imperatives, to the 
extent that brain function and ability is being identified, sorted, and hierarchised. 
 
4 Throughout this thesis I refer mostly to brain and cognitive difference to refer to a wide range of 
differences in behaviours, personalities, and health, which are usually symptomatically grouped into 
a diagnostic category such as autism. However, these are used largely interchangeably with 
atypicality and neural difference. 
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Brain scanning for the effectiveness of mindfulness is harmless, but the schism 
between anecdote and material evidence is reflective of the increasing purchase of 
medicine, neuroscience, and technology in proving value and categorising difference. 
This turn to neuroscience in a primetime BBC documentary, however, inadvertently 
highlights that the narratives we turn towards to explain who and how we are, are 
increasingly found in the materiality of the brain rather than traditional psychological 
narratives and models of self-formation. This reflects the broader shift from the 
psychological mind to the materiality of the brain occurring because of the turn 
towards neuroscientific models. Psychiatrist Michael H. Stone captures this change 
in this pithy summation: ‘as the [twentieth] century draws to a close, the transition 
from focus on the individual psychology to the chemistry and physics of the soul is in 
full swing’.5 
This research looks at the cultural work particular categories of brain 
difference that are grounded in neuroscience and molecular medicine effect through 
a close analysis of contemporary news media, literature, television, and film. I 
problematise the presumption that science is reflective of a definite objective truth 
because the thesis takes as its starting point the claim that medicine and science are 
equally enmeshed in subjective and cultural narratives; neuroscience’s truth claims, 
as this thesis argues, should be examined alongside the material culture within which 
they exist. I will argue that popular narrative discourses such as novels, film, and news 
media encapsulate the ideological and ethical tensions that emerge in the encounter 
between residual psychosocial and emergent neuroscientific articulations of identity, 
 
5 Michael H. Stone, Healing the Mind (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), p.360. 
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subjectivity and personhood. I focus particularly on the crime genre because its 
historical development is entwined with the biopolitical compact between medicine, 
technology, and institutional establishments of the law and politics that, I argue, are 
crucial in creating and maintaining categories of brain difference. For instance, in 
detailing that she is at King’s College London, Phillips draws attention to the 
institutional context in which Antonova’s research takes place in order to further 
legitimate it as a form of objective knowledge or truth. 
This thesis focuses on how the imbrication of neuroscience, technology, and 
biopolitical imperatives and their assimilation into society and culture creates new 
categories of human difference and personhood predicated on supposedly 
identifiable and measurable differences in the brain. One way of thinking about these 
is as a mechanism by which personhood and subjectivity are categorised by way of 
material models of cognitive difference. In order to explore the implications of this 
shift, this thesis focusses on three key research topics. First, it begins with a 
consideration of the neuro-turn and its biopolitical underpinnings. Second, it goes on 
to consider the impact of this on those subjects whose identities and subjectivities 
are defined by these new classifications of cognitive difference. Third, it addresses 
the significance of popular cultural narratives – particularly crime fiction – in 
mediating the neuro-turn. 
At the centre of the project is the concept of the ‘neural implantation’ – the 
definition of which I discuss in greater detail below and which is indebted to Michel 
Foucault’s description of the perverse implantation in the first volume of The History 
11 
 
of Sexuality.6 I use the notion of implantation here to talk about the ways in which 
the concept of the atypical brain or cognitive difference gives rise to particular 
ontological categories or novel modes of being. To this end, chapter one looks at 
representations of cognitively enhanced humans, chapter two looks at figurations of 
autism, and chapter three examines the biomedicalisation of dementia and notions 
of “suffering” in the era of Alzheimer’s. There are many neural implantations with 
resulting subjectivities that have proliferated since the turn of the century such as 
those emerging from diagnoses of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD); attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD); eating disorders such as the classification and 
ontology of the ‘anorexic’; the ‘schizophrenic’; and more controversial figurations 
such as in neuroscientific models of the ‘paedophile’.7 Each of these to varying 
degrees reflects new ontologies following the implantation/internalisation of 
cognitive difference. I have chosen to focus on autism, dementia, and enhancement 
in particular because the first two are the most culturally and biopolitically enmeshed 
‘pathological’ models (though with autism notably recently becoming understood as 
a ‘natural’ difference), while enhancement provides a different ‘technological’ form 
 
6 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality Volume 1, trans. by Robert Hurley, 
(London: Penguin, 1998. 
7 See Gillian Tenbergen and others, ‘The Neurobiology and Psychology of Pedophilia: Recent 
Advances and Challenges’, in Frontiers of Human Neuroscience, vol. 9 (2015); see also reports of this 
in media: Ian Johnston, ‘Brains of paedophiles who abuse children are different to those who do not, 
scientists discover’ Independent, 25 October 2016 
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/paedophile-brains-difference-child-sex-abusers-
those-who-dont-study-a7378911.html> [accessed 23 July 2019]. See also Kashmira Gander ‘The man 
whose brain tumour ‘turned him into a paedophile’’, Independent, 24 February 2016 
<https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/features/a-40-year-old-developed-
an-obsession-with-child-pornography-then-doctors-discovered-why-a6893756.html> [accessed 23 
July 2019]. 
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of cognitive difference, though one which is equally enmeshed in biopolitical 
imperatives and culture.  
For Foucault, the nineteenth century saw atypical acts/perversities become 
implanted into the ‘soul’ of the person encapsulated in the birth of the figure of the 
homosexual man, whereby implantation produces distinct types of subjects and 
bodies. Through a close investigation of enhancement, autism, and dementia, I will 
show that Foucault’s model of implantation offers a vital methodology for 
understanding the medical production and cultural fascination with cognitive 
difference today. This mirrors Stone’s assessment that the turn of the twentieth-first 
century saw the locus of the self become rooted in the materiality of the ‘soul’. Such 
neural implantations are always subjective and individual because they encompass a 
person’s unique history and experience, but they are contingent on medical and 
neuroscientific models which make claims to generality and objectivity. For example, 
‘autism’ as a diagnostic category is general and widely applicable; however, because 
neural implantations concern the ‘soul’ of the individual subject they are ultimately 
unique and see general diagnoses entwine with personal histories, cultures, and 
internalised disciplinary effects to produce new ontologies and ways of being. As 
such, I will argue that neural implantations play a formative role in our thinking about 
human value and the definition and limits of meaningful life today and in the future. 
In order to set out the critical and conceptual framework that underpins the 
argument I develop in the thesis, the introduction first outlines existing discussions 
of and responses to the neuro-turn, before detailing Foucault’s understanding of 
biopolitics and his description of the perverse implantation. It goes on to discuss the 
13 
 
rationale for my decision to explore the mediation of this implantation in a range of 
examples that broadly fall within the parameters of the crime genre. It concludes 
with an account of the development of my argument across the chapters in this 
thesis, which respectively demonstrate the ontological transformations that occur. 
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Introduction: The Neural Implantation 
And no, autism (as well as ADHD, ADD, Tourette’s, OCD, ODD etc) is not a ‘gift’. 
For most it is an endless fight against schools, workplaces and bullies. But under 
the right circumstances, given the right adjustments it CAN be a superpower. 
I’ve had my fair share of depression, alienation, anxiety and disorders. But 
without my diagnosis, I would never have started school striking. Because then 
I would have been like everyone else. Our societies need to change, and we need 
people who think outside the box and we need to start taking care of each other. 
And embrace our differences.  - Greta Thunberg, 2019.8 
 
Theorising the Neuro-Turn 
 
In 1990 President George H. W. Bush designated the coming decade as the ‘Decade 
of the Brain’.9 The nineties saw new technology such as functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) and the start of the Human Genome Project initiate a social 
and cultural fascination with molecular medicine and its potential to unlock the 
mysteries of human life.10 New drugs such as Prozac, approved for treatment of 
depression in 1987, or Adderall, approved for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder (ADHD) in 1996, offered new solutions to newly framed pathologies.11 
Cruzan vs. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the first ‘right to die’ case to 
reach the United State Supreme Court was decided in June 1990. It ruled that the 
right to die, even in ‘persistent vegetative state’, is not guaranteed by the 
 
8 Greta Thunberg, 2 April 2019, < https://www.facebook.com/gretathunbergsweden/posts/today-is-
autismawarenessday-proud-to-be-on-the-spectrumand-no-autism-as-well-as-/802407010127121/> 
[accessed 24 February 2020]. 
9 See Laura Salisbury, 'Translating Neuroscience: Fictions of the Brain in the 2000s', in The 2000s: A 
Decade of Contemporary British Fiction, ed. by Nick Bentley, Nick Hubble, Leigh Wilson (London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), pp.83-113 (p.83). 
10 Amongst other things, the cloning of Dolly the sheep, the wide-scale use of DNA profiling in 
policing and law, discourse and headlines linking specific genes for a range of personality or 
behaviours, and genetically modified crops saw the integration of biotechnology into everyday life.  
11 Take as exemplar Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). Previously termed ‘minimal 
brain dysfunction’, ADHD diagnoses in children exploded from the 1980s with drugs such as Ritalin 
and Adderall liberally prescribed in USA to tackle its symptoms. See Nikolas Rose, The Politics of Life 
Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), p.119. 
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constitution, garnering significant media attention and a steep rise in advanced 
healthcare directions. The popularisation and translation of new brain imaging 
technologies, pharmaceuticals, genetic screening and profiling, and categories of 
disease into most facets of culture today marks Bush’s declaration to be correct. It is 
for this reason I argue that, emerging in the 1990s, the neuro-turn is a historical and 
cultural shift producing a set of ideas about human life that raise significant 
epistemological and ethical issues.  
This thesis looks specifically at how the neuro-turn creates new subjectivities 
and ontologies resulting from the technologies, laws, medical categories, cultures, 
and debates from the 1990s in what I term neural implantations. The above 
quotation from Greta Thunberg encapsulates this model of implantation. Thunberg, 
the young climate crisis campaigner, has become both the figurehead of the climate 
movement and a figurehead of cognitive difference today. This entwinement of 
neurological diagnosis, subjective difference, and politics will be a recurring theme 
throughout this thesis. Indeed, it is worth holding Thunberg’s message in mind whilst 
reading this work as it foregrounds many of my arguments about how difference 
articulates and works in society and culture today, as well as the belief that we, as a 
society, need to ‘embrace our differences’. 
 The academic currency of the ‘neuro’ is evident in the widespread 
consideration of new subjectivities and models of personhood. Jan De Vos argues 
that contemporary science has created a ‘full-blown “subject of the sciences”, 
16 
 
looking at itself, others, and the world, as a scientist’.12 In other words, the notion 
that increasingly we are all scientists now regardless of training or expertise. Critical 
work on the neuro-turn is varied in terms of its evaluation and approach to this new 
paradigm. Des Fitzgerald and Felicity Callard articulate three main types of response 
from the humanities and social sciences: critical, ebullient, and interactive, in order 
to highlight the vast discrepancies in how supposedly neutral brain facts can be 
analysed and adopted by different disciplines.13  According to Fitzgerald and Callard, 
critical responses hold that the practice of neuroscience needs reform and greater 
transparency in terms of its political and economic ties. What they call ‘ebullient’ 
responses ‘take experimental results and theoretical statements from the 
neurosciences as more-or-less true’ and extrapolate them for theoretical work in the 
art and humanities.14 This approach, they note, is encapsulated in the philosophy of 
Catherine Malabou whose theory of plasticity, as I detail below, forms a theoretical 
counterpoint to much work in this thesis. Interactive responses characterise neither 
a ‘desire to provincialize the pretensions of the neurosciences nor […] an uncritical 
acceptance of insights from those spaces’.15 They note that such responses are 
uncommon and represent a ‘thankless task’ given the lack of credence given to truly 
interdisciplinary work that values epistemological parity.  
I use these responses primarily as guideposts to navigate existing academic 
scholarship pertaining to the neuro-turn. Their identification of ebullient responses 
 
12 Jan De Vos, ‘What is Critique in the Era of the Neurosciences?’, in Neuroscience and Critique 
[Exploring the Limits of the Neurological Turn], ed. by De Vos, Jan and Ed Pluth (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2016), p.29. 
13 Des Fitzgerald and Felicity Callard, 'Social Science and Neuroscience beyond Interdisciplinarity: 
Experimental Entanglements', Theory, Culture, and Society, 32.1, (2015), 3-32. 
14 Ibid. p.11. 
15 Ibid. pp.9-15. 
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is paramount to my consideration of Malabou’s plasticity in chapters one and three, 
tempering what can readily become the allure of neuroscientific models and 
explanations in humanities work. Moreover, they also prove useful reminders that 
whilst interdisciplinary research is encouraged and often fruitful, it is only because of 
the distinct meaning making practices each discipline brings, which is why I 
understand this thesis as the humanities interacting with neuroscience to explore 
imaginative alternatives to the uncritical acceptance of its (often pathological) truth 
claims. Bearing Fitzgerald and Callard in mind, I now consider four influential 
responses to the neuro-turn that consider the emergence of new subjectivities, 
namely Nikolas Rose’s ‘neurochemical selves’, Fernando Vidal’s ‘brainhood’, 
Malabou’s plasticity, and the rise of the ‘neuro-novel’, in order to situate my 
theorisation of the neural implantation within existing scholarship and culture. 
Neurochemical Selves 
 
In The Politics of Life Itself, Rose uses the term ‘neurochemical self’ to identify the 
extent to which we have become ‘somatic individuals’.16 For Rose, this is a layering 
process, in which emerging biological models and explanations of selfhood attach to 
older psychological models and explanations of the self.17 Key for the emergence of 
the neurochemical self is the flattening out of psychological depth and spaces. Where 
the psychological approach concerns itself with depth models of historical mental 
trauma, in ‘this new age of personhood, psychiatry no longer distinguishes between 
organic and functional disorders’; in other words, ‘mind is simply what brain does’.18 
 
16 Rose, The Politics of Life Itself, p.188. 
17 Ibid. p.222. 
18 Ibid. p.192. 
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Referencing epistemological and discursive changes brought by new technologies 
such as brain imaging and genetic screening, Rose notes that such a view of 
personhood produces different ways ‘individuals are governed’ and different ways 
that ‘they govern themselves’.19 This shift encourages us to believe that the ‘mind 
seems visible in the brain’, effecting a reduction in the gap between person and 
organ. Indeed, since its publication in 2007, recent and relatively affordable 
technologies such as personal fitness trackers, sleep cycle monitors, and, referring to 
the introductory example, meditation monitors have become common ways of 
governing the self through the brain.20 Rose’s primary concern is how medical 
treatments respond to the emergence of the neurochemical self, and given his thesis 
that mind is reducible to material brain, he maintains that whatever the method of 
diagnosis, be it brain scan or genetic screening, all ‘seem to end in the use of 
psychopharmaceuticals’.21  
Rose cites compelling evidence for this. Industrial advertisement campaigns 
for mood and behaviour disorders such as depression and ADHD correspond to 
statistical booms in prescriptions.22 These campaigns did not market emotional 
stability, but something altogether more elusive: hope. The neurochemical self, he 
argues, is partly contingent on the irreducible relationship of bioeconomics (of which 
 
19 Ibis. p.107. 
20 The Muse2 is, as of August 2019, a £239.99 ‘multi-sensor meditation device that provides real-time 
feedback on your brain activity, heart rate, breathing, and body movements to help you build a 
consistence meditation practice’. Its tagline is ‘Meditation Like You’ve Never Imagined’, predicated on 
the belief that ‘real-time brainwave feedback’ from an EEG improve meditative response  
<https://choosemuse.com/muse-2/> [accessed 7 August 2019]; For more on the increasingly 
quotidian influence of the EEG see Melissa M. Littlefield, ‘Instrumental Intimacy: EEG Wearables and 
Neuroscientific Control’ (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018). 
21 Rose, Politics of Life Itself, p.209. 
22 Ibid. p.210. 
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the largely synonymous biotechnology, ‘big pharma’, and molecular medicine are 
central) and a particular kind of institutional ethics that pays lip service to risk factors, 
whilst simultaneously condoning and propagating influential ad campaigns.23 Indeed, 
Adriana Petryna and Arthur Kleinman theorise the ‘pharmaceutical nexus’ to refer to 
the extent to which pharmaceuticals have become a globalised industry in which 
individuals and populations in the Global South are used to produce treatments and 
drugs for use in the Global North.24 In other words, the kind of neurochemical self 
that Rose identifies is, within the larger nexus, a highly privileged position, given the 
differential global access to medicines emerging from the flattening out between 
mind and brain. However, Rose’s neurochemical self is, like the subjects my thesis 
imagines, materialised and embodied in the citizen of the Global North with easy 
access to the myriad pharmaceutical and therapeutic outputs of material models of 
cognitive difference. He briefly considers ‘neurochemical citizenship’ to refer to the 
ways in which biosociality and advocacy emerge around particular neurochemical 
differences, before writing that ‘to grasp the world in this way is to imagine the 
disorder as residing within the individual brain and its processes, and to see 
psychiatric drugs as a first line intervention’.25 This is still very much the dominant 
model; however, my concept of the neural implantation intervenes here inasmuch 
as it acknowledges not merely that the disorder exists in the brain, but produces an 
ontological transformation in which the difference in the brain produce novel 
subjectivities.  
 
23 Ibid. p.215. 
24 Adriana Petryna and Arthur Kleinman, ‘The Pharmaceutical Nexus’, in Global Pharmaceutical: 
Ethics, Markets, Practices, ed. by Adriana Petryna, Andrew Lakoff, and Arthur Kleinman (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2006). 
25 Rose, Politics of Life Itself, p.223. 
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In the conclusion to his chapter, Rose refers to Gilles Deleuze’s description of 
a control society. Deleuze develops the concept of a ‘control society’ to supplement 
Foucault’s notion of a disciplinary society and for Rose, this is a recognisable feature 
of neurochemical selfhood. To distinguish the two briefly, in a disciplinary regime, 
new modes of spatial and temporal organisation produce new modes of subjection. 
Foucault famously compares the school, to the factory, to prison and to the hospital 
in terms of the organisation of space and the demarcation of time via the bell. In 
contrast, control societies are ostensibly much freer in the sense that these 
institutions are replaced with flexibility such as remote working or flexi-time but 
through which ‘control is continuous and integral to all activities and practices of 
existence’.26 Rose ends with ideas of control to underscore the notion of a self that 
must constantly self-monitor (a process exemplified in the use of sleep and fitness 
monitors discussed above). Rose’s use of Deleuze is compelling; however, I would 
update Rose’s rationale slightly. For Rose, the pharmacological outputs are crucial to 
this distinction between disciplinary and control societies, but Deleuze’s description 
of a control society contains something other than pharmaceuticals that seems even 
more uniquely akin to today’s neuro-culture. Deleuze describes disciplinary power as 
being contingent on spaces of enclosure that are ‘distinct castings’ such as prisons 
and schools. However, controls are ‘a modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will 
continuously change from one moment to the other’.27 In other words, the 
mechanisms of control will constantly adapt. Here it is worth foregrounding 
neuroplasticity, which is a central component of the neuro-turn and the neural 
 
26 Ibid. 
27 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’, October, 59, (1992), pp.3-7 (p.4). 
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implantation today. This describes the biological process in which the brain adapts 
and changes over time and throughout adulthood. Chapters one and three in 
particular focus on different aspects and representations on neuroplasticity, but it 
seems important here to highlight neuroplasticity’s dominance as evidence that in 
the decade since Rose’s theorisation of the neurochemical self, neuro-
epistemologies have evolved in regard to how we think about personhood and 
subjectivity today. If Rose elucidates neuroscience’s hegemonic position as the 
interpreter of the self in the twenty-first century, Fernando Vidal casts a historical 
gaze to question how we arrived at this hegemony.  
Brainhood and History 
 
Vidal writes, ‘if personhood is the quality or condition of being an individual person, 
brainhood could name the quality or condition of being a brain’.28 This much-cited 
concept of brainhood, or, what he otherwise terms the ‘cerebral subject’, is an 
important theoretical concept that underpins much of the debate in this thesis in 
terms of personhood. Vidal notes the cultural inclination to reject the idea that we 
have a brain and seeks instead to trace the history of the seemingly self-evident 
truth, ‘you are your brain’.29 Vidal’s key contribution is to turn the expected answer 
on its head. For him, it is not neuroscience that proves we are our brains, rather it is 
this knowledge that is fundamental to the flourishing of this discipline. He is critical 
of the ‘revolutionary rhetoric’ surrounding brainhood, arguing that such 
exaggeration ‘has an obvious self-serving function, sustaining the cerebral subject 
 
28 Fernando Vidal, ‘Brainhood, anthropological figure of modernity’, History of the Human Sciences, 
22.1 (2009), 5-36 (p.5). Original italics. 
29 Ibid. 
22 
 
ideology, and reinforcing the alliance between the norms and ideals of individualistic 
autonomy and self-reliance on the one hand, and on the other hand the prestige of 
the advanced technology supposed to demonstrate that we are our brains’.30 Taking 
this position as a starting point, Vidal’s critique is persuasive in its delineation of two 
key themes of this thesis: that the rhetoric of potentiality maintains the norms 
alongside which neural implantations occur, and that neuro-technology is placed on 
an epistemological pedestal. Indeed, I explore the relationship between neoliberal 
modes of governance and neuroscientific models and technologies in chapter one.  
 Yet, Vidal’s tracing of brainhood from Descartes to phrenology, to cortical 
maps, and through to contemporary models of neuroplasticity, causes today’s 
cerebral subject to lose its particular historical contingency given the massive 
biopolitical changes that have occurred during the centuries Vidal considers. Vidal is 
correct in his assertion that humanity has long found the locus of the self in the brain, 
but it would be inaccurate to ignore the specific epistemologies of brainhood at 
different times. For instance, Justine S. Murison attempts to de-locate the neuro-turn 
from the twenty-first century. She cites numerous popular narratives of phrenology 
and mesmerism such as Harriet Martineau’s 1844 treatise on mesmerism or Edgar 
Allen Poe’s short story ‘Mesmeric Revelations’ as Victorian examples of public 
interest in the brain, arguing that this twenty-first century neuro-turn is in fact a 
‘return’ to frameworks that existed in the nineteenth century.31 However, it is vital 
 
30 Ibid. p.10. 
31 Harriet Martineau, ‘Miss Martineau on Mesmerism’, in Phlanx 1:3 (1844), pp.1-23; Edgar Allen 
Poe, ‘Mesmeric Revelation’ in The Collected Works of Edgar Allan Poe – Volume 3 (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1978); Justine S. Murison, ‘“The Paradise of Non-Experts”: The 
Neuroscientific Turn of the 1840s United States’, in The Neuroscientific Turn: Transdisciplinarity in 
the Age of the Brain, ed. by Melissa M. Littlefield and Jennel M. Johnson pp.29-48 (p.43). 
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not to ignore the distinct effects resulting from contemporary biopolitical 
imperatives and institutional frameworks we see today. For, where this twenty-first 
century biopolitical framework bolsters the legitimacy, security and ‘objectivity’ of 
neuroscience’s truth claims, the scientific community of the nineteenth century 
considered mesmerism and phrenology to be at best fringe sciences.32 Thus, while 
Vidal notes that the nineteenth century saw an interest in more institutionally 
legitimate brain sciences such as localisation, I argue that the holistic imbrication of 
biopolitical legitimacy, cultural representation, and the notion of the brain as locus 
of the self is a unique feature of the neuro-turn that is distinct from the historic 
contingency of brainhood. I am not alone in stressing ‘neuroscience’ to be a particular 
historical shift. In their theorisation of the ‘neuromolecular gaze’, which they define 
as a ‘common vision of life itself’ deriving from perspectives, techniques, and 
practices involved in contemporary neuroscience, Joelle M. Abi-Rached and Nikolas 
Rose cite the 1960s as its inception.33 In contrast to Vidal, they adopt a genealogical 
approach to disrupt the notion of historical continuity, and mark 1960s 
‘neuroscience’ as being a ‘break’ in the history of the brain.34 
 The primary limitation of Vidal’s approach is that, as my theorisation of the 
neural implantation will show, today’s genetic and neuroscientific models of 
brainhood create specific ethical and material effects because of the intractable and 
 
32 Jessica Pykett, Brain Culture: Shaping Policy through Neuroscience, (Bristol: Policy Press, 2015), 
p.10; Francois Magendie notes: ‘phrenology, a pseudo-science of the present day; like astrology, 
necromancy, and alchemy of former times, it pretends to localize in the brain the different kinds of 
memory. But its efforts are mere assertions, which will not bear examination for an instant’ in An 
Elementary Treatise on Human Physiology, trans. by John Revere, (New York: Harper & Brothers 
Publishers, 1855) p.150. 
33 Joelle Abi-Rached and Nikolas Rose, ‘The birth of the neuromolecular gaze’, History of The Human 
Sciences, 23.1 (2010), 11-36 (pp.12-13). 
34 Ibid. p.31. 
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historically unique biopolitical imperatives underpinning them. This is particularly 
pertinent for the new subjectivities they effect. While it is certainly true as Vidal 
claims that material and brain-based models of selfhood predate contemporary 
neuroscientific models and explanations, it bears repeating that new neuroscientific 
models and explanations produce new subjects and ontologies, partly because of 
pre-existing notions of brainhood, but crucially only because of contemporary 
neuroscience’s reliance upon institutional legitimacy. In other words, something 
specific is happening today that produces these subjects, and I argue it is the unique 
imbrication of contemporary biopolitical imperatives, including a particular kind of 
automatic faith in the models and explanations emerging from the field of 
neuroscience. As I explore throughout the thesis, what may appear to be outdated 
tropes and prejudices in fact proliferate during the neuro-turn because they find a 
renewed currency and emerge and attach to the widespread legitimacy of the 
‘neuro’. In this regard, playing on V.S Ramachandran’s popular neurological case 
study book Phantoms in the Brain, I use the phrase ‘phantoms of the brain’ to retain 
the historical contingency of brainhood – by which I mean the effects of long knowing 
that we are our brains, whilst highlighting the particular effects brought by the neuro-
turn.35  
Ramachandran’s phantoms refer to neurological conditions that cause 
phantom disorders or symptoms because of differences in the brain. Most notable is 
the phantom limb: ‘an arm or leg that lingers indefinitely in the minds of patients 
 
35 V.S Ramachandran, Phantoms in the Brain: Human Nature and the Architecture of the Mind, 
(London: Harper Perennial, 2005). 
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long after it has been lost in an accident or removed by a surgeon’.36 I adopt this 
concept to argue that cultural discourses of the brain are affective phantoms of the 
materiality of the brain proper. So, like phantom limbs, stories, narratives, 
characterisations, politics, law, brain history, and psychologies, may scratch, affect, 
or influence our twenty-first century brainhood, our sense of self, and our 
personhood. These are phantoms of the kinds of narratives elided or updated by 
today’s neuroscience, medicine, and technology. However, they are effective only 
because of the emerging hegemony of the neuro, which because of its biopolitical 
claims to truth and epistemological proliferation justifies or validates the phantoms. 
These phantoms can be damaging, as I will show in chapter two’s exploration of 
contemporary attempts to attach inexplicable societal violence to autism as a 
neurological condition, which has phantom roots in nineteenth century conflations 
of cognitive difference and crime. Or the way in which Bruno Bettelheim’s theory of 
the ‘refrigerator mother’ remains a potent and damaging trope in many autistic and 
atypical narratives.37 These phantoms can also be instructive, such as in fictional 
narratives whose plotting or characterisations address and challenge biopolitical 
ethics or lazy stereotypes of difference such as with the figure of the ‘dementia 
sufferer’ or ‘demented’. Indeed, in keeping with Vidal’s historical framing, and linking 
to Ramachandran’s explanation that a phantom is the result of amputation or 
accident, it seems pertinent to highlight that my concept of phantoms encompasses 
 
36 Ibid. p.22. 
37 In The Empty Fortress Bettelheim posits that autism has an environmental aetiology caused by 
cold parental attitudes or neglect. This is a psychological phantom which still finds cultural 
expression today in novels such as Lionel Shriver’s We Need to Talk About Kevin (2003) and 
Antionette van Heughten’s Saving Max (2010). Both novels centre on the relationship between a 
mother and an autistic son and both retain the phantom of Bettelheim’s theory which seem only to 
act as a way of castigating and punishing working mothers. Bruno Bettelheim, The Empty Fortress: 
Infantile Autism and the Birth of the Self (New York: The Free Press, 1972). 
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the psychological models that neuroscience at first appears to have superseded. I 
argue that far from being replaced, these remain phantom, as I demonstrate in my 
psychoanalytic reading of dementia fiction in chapter three, where I argue for a more 
Freudian model of elasticity over Malabou’s theorisation of the plastic subject. 
The Plastic Subject  
 
Neuroplasticity, the biological process of the brain adapting over time, has translated 
in society and culture into influential epistemologies and ontologies of subjectivity. 
If the neurochemical self and one’s ‘brainhood’ add credence to the belief that we 
are our brain, then neuroplasticity and the resulting plastic subject tells us that we 
are our brain that changes. The logic underpinning its cultural attraction is clear: if 
we increasingly understand that subjectivity results from our brain’s micromolecular 
processes, knowing these processes constantly adapt gives rise to the illusion of a 
new kind of biological potential. As an example, it has long been known that studying 
can lead to proficiency in a second language; however, experiments on mice’s brain 
chemistry are extrapolated in media headlines into possibilities of fantastical, faster 
solutions: ‘Wonder pill could help adults learn new language or instrument just like 
a child’, notably, however, only through the manipulation and extension of 
neuroplasticity.38  
 Neuroplasticty underpins Malabou’s philosophy and her work sees the 
attempt to construct a plastic subject and ontology. Her theory of plasticity breaks 
 
38 ‘Wonder pill could help adults learn new language or instrument just like a child’, Express, 29 June 
2017,  
<https://www.express.co.uk/life-style/life/822837/Wonder-pill-learning-language-instrument-
adults-children> [accessed 8 August 2019]. 
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down into two main aspects, plasticity of the brain, and plasticity of time. She 
addresses the first aspect directly in What Should We Do with Our Brain? (2008). 
According to Malabou, we have not yet realised the plastic potential of our brains. 
By this she means the brain’s ability to give and receive form, as well as its ability to 
destroy itself. Form in this context refers to the materiality of the brain and the 
central nervous system. Giving form, or rather, producing new form delineates a 
positive plasticity and includes self-directed brain changes that make breaks with 
hegemonic ideologies, which I explore in chapter one. Receiving form is a negative or 
passive plasticity and typifies the cognitive and emotional apathy resulting from 
political-economic pressure. Finally, for Malabou, diseases such as Alzheimer’s are 
exemplars of a destructive plasticity – the permanent destruction of form but with 
the capacity to re-form into something entirely different.39 She suggests that if we 
realise our brain’s potential then we would be able to enact a consciousness ‘at once, 
philosophical, scientific, and political’.40 Malabou challenges hegemonic discourses 
of ‘flexibility’ which she argues control people into submission because they only 
allow for the negative reception of form – which is to say being manipulated by 
external pressures. She refers to examples such as the need for ‘flexibility on the job, 
of one’s schedule’ as socioeconomic frameworks which mould us and inhibit more 
agential form production.41 For her, a subjectivity conceived of in terms of cerebral 
plasticity is the only one that also allows for an agential giving or production of form. 
 
39 I use these positive, negative, and destructive descriptions to describe Malabou’s theoretical aims. 
Positive implies a kind of self-willed manipulation of the brain to enact changes you want to make. 
Negative reflects a kind of Foucauldian discipline, and destructive are ambivalent neural accidents 
that cause varying degrees of brain difference. 
40 Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, trans. by Sebastian Rand (New York City: 
Fordham University Press, 2008), p.2 
41 Ibid. p.12. 
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This is important, she argues, because ‘humans make their own brain and they do 
not know that they do so’.42 Ultimately, her answer to the titular question ‘what 
should we do with our brain’ is ‘to lower our self-controlling guard, to accept 
exploding from time to time […] to visualise the possibility of saying no to an afflicting 
economic, political, and mediatic culture that celebrates only flexibility’.43  In other 
words, through plasticity, through the knowledge that we can create our own 
subjectivity though material forms, we can not only learn faster, though this notion 
is too bound up with the rhetoric of late capitalist ideology for Malabou, but also 
break through the ideological impasses from which flexibility emerges to ‘entertain 
a relation with [our] brain as the image of a world to come’.44 Malabou’s plasticity is 
thus a dynamic process of ‘metamorphosis’, by turns productive, negative, and 
destructive.45 
 This quasi-utopic vision of a world-to-come ends Malabou’s book and appeals 
to the second temporal-based aspect of her philosophy which is equally important in 
relation to the epistemology and ontology of the plastic subject. In The Future of 
Hegel (2005), Malabou theorises the concept voir venir (translated by Lisabeth During 
as ‘to see (what is) coming’), which helps account for the ways such metamorphosis 
could occur. Malabou explains voir venir as ‘the anticipatory structure operating 
within subjectivity itself’, explaining that in French the term means both ‘being sure 
of what is coming’, and ‘not knowing what is coming’.46 In other words, plasticity 
 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. p.79. 
44 Ibid. p.82. 
45 Ibid. p.69. 
46 Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality, and Dialectic, trans. by Lisabeth 
During (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), p.13. 
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represents the interplay of ‘teleological necessity and surprise’, two elements that 
are particularly central to the plastic subject.47 Ideas of futurity are thus inherent to 
the plastic subject; on the one hand, plasticity has a teleological quality in which an 
expectative anticipatory subjectivity dominates, on the other hand, plastic 
subjectivity must also be able to be surprised, and in being so be able to re-form, 
change, and metamorphosize. In his preface to the book, Jacques Derrida notes that 
voir venir  is ‘to anticipate, to foresee, to presage, to project’ and ‘means at the same 
time to anticipate and let oneself be surprised’.48 This interplay between both a 
known and surprising future is what allows for Malabou’s answer about  what we 
should do with our brains, ‘to lower our self-controlling guard, to accept exploding 
from time to time […] to visualise the possibility of saying no’.49 In short, plastic 
subjectivity is bound to that which is to come, evident through Malabou’s description 
of a teleological anticipation (albeit with some surprises), or in Derrida’s reading of a 
more active anticipation of projection in order to enable re-formations of that 
subjectivity. 
Criticism of Malabou’s plasticity comes on two main fronts. First, Fitzgerald 
and Callard consider her work to be exemplary of the ebullient mode of philosophical 
engagement with neuroscience. They note Malabou’s lack of ‘scientific nuance and 
breadth’ demonstrated by a ‘limited engagement with peer-reviewed scientific 
publications’.50 In other words, Malabou’s formation of plastic subjectivity is founded 
 
47 Ibid. 
48 Jacques Derrida, ‘Preface’, in The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporarily, and Dialectic, pp.vii-xlvii 
(p.ix). 
49 Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, p.79. 
50 Des Fitzgerald and Felicity Callard, 'Social Science and Neuroscience beyond Interdisciplinarity: 
Experimental Entanglements', p.12. 
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on limited neuroscientific data, despite the objective image of neuroscience 
underpinning its claims. The second criticism regards the ‘plasticity’ of the plastic 
subject itself. What I mean by this is that the plastic subject, far from offering 
metamorphic potential to escape hegemonic ideologies and material effects of 
contemporary economic policy, fails to escape the trappings of neoliberalism itself.51  
 The relationships between neuroplasticity and neoliberalism are explored in 
detail by Victoria Pitts-Taylor’s content-analysis of 250 media articles relating to 
neuroscience between 1999-2009.  Approximately one third of these articles focused 
on neuroplasticity, which Pitts-Taylor separated into four main subgroups: 
First, the brain is described as potentiality: it is positioned in terms of resource 
for the body/self that is both limitless and largely untapped. Second, the plastic 
brain is celebrated for its flexibility, its need for newness, and its adaptability. 
Third, brain health and performance are linked to personal responsibility, and 
discourse about brain health draws from metaphors about labor and physical 
fitness. Finally, the brain is linked to risk.52 
Pitts-Taylor argues that the biological fact of neuroplasticity has been co-opted to 
align with key elements of neoliberal ideology and its emphasis on the priority of the 
individual over communal bonds.  For example, we see the use of a dominant 
neuroscientific concept like plasticity deployed to present neuronal health as a 
matter for the individual. The four subgroups that she identifies are typical of 
neoliberal modes of subjectivity. First, plasticity is tied to potential, second to 
adaptability and a ‘need for newness’, third to self-care, and finally to a plethora of 
risk factors. The links to Malabou’s initial criticism of flexibility, which she demarcates 
 
51 As David Harvey explains, neoliberalism ‘holds that the social good will be maximised by 
maximizing the reach and frequency of market transactions’, by seeking ‘to bring all human action 
into the domain of the market’. David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), p.3. 
52 Victoria Pitts-Taylor, ‘The plastic brain: neoliberalism and the neuronal self’, Health, 14.6 (2010), 
635-652 (p.641). 
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as the passive or negative reception of form, are clear given that Pitts-Taylor finds 
the plastic brain situated alongside/between existing biopolitics, adapting around 
them rather than undermining their credibility. It is in this spirit that Pitts-Taylor 
challenges Malabou’s differentiation between plasticity and flexibility. She writes 
that Malabou simultaneously champions plasticity as a new ontology based on 
biological fact, whilst deriding flexibility as an element of neoliberal ideology and its 
attendant epistemological framework. Pitts-Taylor is rightly suspicious of this model 
arguing that plasticity ‘can’t be extracted from the epistemological’ because if the 
biological fact of plasticity is correct, brains are always already shaped by, and 
shaping, the culture and ideology in which they operate.53 A plastic ontology cannot 
be extracted from a neoliberal epistemology because, by the very logic of how the 
biological fact of neuroplasticity works, they are indivisible and shape each other.  
 As I detail in my extended discussion of the neural implantation below, 
neoliberalism with its particular biopolitical effects, and its appropriation of 
plasticity, is a constitutive feature of certain neuro-epistemologies of the subject 
today, particularly in relation to the provision of health-care and the belief that 
enhancing one’s cognition will effect an enhancement of one’s flourishing. 
Neoliberalism is important in this regard because of its extension of social freedom 
to some previously subordinated demographics. For, if one dominant consequence 
of neoliberal economics is the incursion of the market into all spheres of life it makes 
no logical sense to discriminate against economically viable groups hitherto 
discriminated against such as the LGBT+ community. To this extent, Jeffrey Weeks 
 
53 Ibid. p.648. 
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argues that Thatcherism and Reaganomics saw (against their best efforts) the schism 
between a conservative social agenda and economic liberalism close. As Weeks puts 
it in opening market access ‘there seems no logic in blocking a freedom to choose 
your sexual lifestyle, your identity, or your fantasies’.54 Weeks notes two primary 
effects of this. On the one hand, it allows an escape from ‘repressive traditions’ and 
on the other it can create ‘an ethical desert’ in which individual freedom to choose 
becomes tied to wealth and narrowly conceived notions of consumption at the 
expense of notions of community, communal obligations and social cohesion.55 
A long-standing criticism of the mainstream acceptance of LGBT+ is that it 
comes only through the subscription to heteronormative models, in other words, the 
cost of liberal ‘inclusion’ is the adoption of normative narratives, such as monogamy, 
mortgages, and suburban lifestyles. Indeed, extrapolating such arguments into 
discourses of brainhood and cognitive difference illuminates certain truths regarding 
the kinds of cognitive difference for which society makes room. Some types of autism 
or autistic expressions have become more economically viable than other categories 
of difference and enjoy a particular kind of prestige, notably regarding technological 
savvy as I explore in my reading of autism in chapter two. However, David T. Mitchel 
and Sharon L. Snyder note that neoliberal ‘inclusion’ typically demands a similar 
normative price for disabled people, arguing that inclusion should only be considered 
so ‘if disability becomes more fully recognised as providing alternative values for 
living that do not simply reify concepts of normalcy’.56 People with a range of 
 
54 Jeffrey Weeks, Invented Moralities: Sexual Values in an Age of Uncertainty (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2007), p.29. 
55 Ibid.  
56David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder, The Biopolitics of Disability: Neoliberalism, Ablenationalism, 
and Peripheral Embodiment (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018), p.5. Italics in original. 
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cognitive differences have had to subscribe to this normative paradigm, and still do. 
The central aim of this research is to contextualise cognitive differences in cultural 
discourse to understand the normalising, stigmatising, and celebratory ways they are 
represented and the kinds of subjectivities these might elicit.  
 Neoliberalism plays a central role in twenty-first century subjectivity and 
identity formation because it has, among other things, engendered a preoccupation 
with the future and turned the self and body into a site for constant improvement, 
change, and manipulation. Melinda Cooper refines David Harvey’s influential thesis 
to argue that neoliberal economic models combine with biotechnology to develop a 
state in which life, and its molecular manipulation, represents an indefatigable 
surplus value. She describes how biotechnology’s model of research and 
development aligns with neoliberal post-Fordist styles of speculative production, 
enabling ‘production to remain in a permanent state of self-transformation, arming 
it with a capacity to respond to the most unpredictable of circumstances, to 
anticipate and escape the possible “limit” to its growth’.57 Note the centrality of 
anticipation for both neoliberal biopolitics and Malabou’s voir venir, and how both 
plasticity and biotech exist as states of self-transformation in order to continue 
growing, to keep improving, and to maintain ‘progress’. Applying Cooper’s thesis of 
neoliberal biopolitics to the everyday highlights similar investments in speculation 
and promise regarding cognitive difference. Particularly notable is the promise of 
(pharmaceutical) cures in the case of dementia. However, when a seemingly endless 
stream of promises at a macro biopolitical level, combines, at a subjective level, with 
 
57 Melinda Cooper, Life as Surplus, p.24. 
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liberal ‘normative’ inclusion or differential access to healthcare, the ‘promise’ of a 
better or progressive future is untenable, as is an ontology of plasticity as described 
by Malabou, which demarcates Alzheimer’s as ‘destructive’. 
Yet, that neuroplasticity has become appropriated by hitherto hegemonic 
ideologies of individualism and speculation is unsurprising. Laura Salisbury and 
Hannah Proctor, as well as Cathy Gere, argue that the plastic brain is embedded in 
the specific (geo)politics of its time.58 Gere explains that in the USA the role of 
plasticity has increased and decreased depending on contemporary foreign policy. 
Cold War anxieties of brainwashing made behavioural models of cognition (and its 
advocacy of environmental influences) become synonymous with Stalin’s totalitarian 
politics.59 In her words, ‘in the complex welter of cold war politics, human and moral 
freedom was possible only if neural plasticity was limited’.60 Whereas, in the Soviet 
state, Salisbury and Proctor explain that neuroplasticity became the official view, 
allowing state management of external influences to control life in the hope of 
creating social prosperity for all.61 In other words, the American emphasis on 
freedom and fear of communism drove ideology away from models that emphasised 
environmental influence, whereas the Soviet state harnessed the inherent potential 
of plasticity in the hopes of creating their new vision for humanity. 
 
58 Laura Salisbury and Hannah Proctor, ‘The History of a Brain Wound: Alexander Luria and the 
Dialectics of Soviet Plasticity’, in Plasticity and Pathology: On the Formation of the Neural Subject, 
ed. by David Bates and Nima Bassiri , pp.194-218; Cathy Gere, ‘Plasticity, Pathology, and Pleasure in 
Cold War America’ in Plasticity and Pathology: On the Formation of the Neural Subject, ed. by David 
Bates and Nima Bassiri, pp.35-64. 
59 Gere, ‘Plasticty, Pathology, and Pleasure’, p.48. 
60 Ibid. p.60. 
61 Salisbury and Proctor, ‘The History of the Brain Wound’, p.178; See also how Lamarckist views of 
acquired characteristics were adopted into official Soviet policy because geneticists were seen as 
smuggling capitalist ideas into USSR, Maurizio Meloni, Political Biology: Science and Social Values in 
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Gere notes how neuroplasticity is now the accepted neuroscientific school of 
thought in America, arguing that it suggests an epistemological freedom away from 
biological determinism.62 In other words, plasticity had a politically driven volte-face: 
where it once threatened control it now paradoxically promises freedom. Above, I 
aligned this view of plastic freedom with neoliberalism, the logic of which dictates 
that discrimination along traditional signifiers of difference is economically counter-
intuitive, a logic that also extends into the social and cultural spheres. However, this 
thesis posits that such a social freedom or ‘neuronal’ freedom is limited for those 
considered to have cognitive difference. Moreover, whilst neoliberalism has hitherto 
underpinned models of subjectivity, even these liberal ‘claims’ to freedom are now 
being directly revoked. 
Populist discourses and political events emerging in response to neoliberal 
failings curtail this notion of individual freedom, choice, and self-construction. I 
explore this in detail in chapter one; however, as an example, the neoliberal mantra 
‘you can be anything you want to be’ implied in the move away from biological 
determinism is undermined by emerging biologist discourse encapsulated in 
President Donald Trump’s proselytizing about the heritability of his ‘good’ brain. He 
tweeted: ‘What my father really gave me is a good (great) brain, motivation and the 
benefit of his experience-unlike the haters and losers (lazy!)’.63 The implication is that 
his biology has uniquely determined his ability to ‘succeed’, and by proxy implies 
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those who have not ‘succeeded’, do not have a good biological makeup. This is 
diametrically opposite to the transformative, if superficial, potential offered by 
plasticity, and the belief that biology does not represent a form of destiny. Here, the 
work of Gere, and Salisbury and Proctor in underlining the specific geopolitics 
involved in plasticity’s assimilation – or not – into society and culture highlights the 
object plasticity (as a cultural discourse) to be an affecting phantom of the brain. The 
plastic subject is thus not simply indicative of being aware of one’s neuronal 
adaptability; rather, it enmeshes in a biopolitical matrix that refuses to allow the 
stable ontology Malabou compels. In other words, and to extend Pitts-Taylor’s 
difficulty with Malabou’s extraction of ontology from epistemology, Malabou’s call 
to harness one’s plasticity seems to presuppose a material neutrality that cannot and 
does not exist.  
Work such as Jonathan Metzl’s genealogies of Prozac show how 
neuroscience’s claims to objectivity are always already encoded and embedded 
within myriad cultural codes and prejudices. Metzl notes the difference between 
perception and reality regarding Serotonin, which is ‘an all-egalitarian compound’ 
that ‘functions largely the same in women and in men, in African Americans and 
Native Americans; psychotropic medications performs the same functions in 
heterosexuals, and in gay butch bottoms, and in monks’.64 Though not his frame of 
reference, Metzl’s point here is ostensibly that the kinds of categories established in 
the perverse implantation (gay butch bottoms) are meaningless and hold no 
signification for objective science, particularly at a molecular level where even 
 
64 Jonathan Metzl, Prozac on the Couch: Prescribing Gender in the Era of Wonder Drugs (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2003), p.191. 
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apparent or superficial differences of gender, race, or behaviours are removed. 
However, Metzl methodically unpicks the ways in which ‘imbalances’ of this molecule 
are not objective but are inseparable from gendered scripts.65 I use Metzl’s example 
to argue that it is not enough ebulliently and uncritically to realise the brain’s 
plasticity (however that might be achieved), rather, how the brain is discussed, 
thought of, and acts within contemporary biopolitical imperatives must be 
considered in a more critical sense in order to understand its full effects. Is this or 
that brain thought to be plastic (i.e. does it have endless potential), or is it thought 
to be biologically fixed as in Trump’s model? What does it mean to consider a brain 
as ‘healthy’, ‘normal’, or ‘different’, and what are the effects of such in a particular 
place and time? I argue that it is in cultural narratives that these tensions are best 
explored. 
The Neuronovel 
 
The fourth key iteration of the neural implantation is the interaction of neuroscience 
with cultural narratives. If the neurochemical self, brainhood, and the plastic subject 
give epistemological coherence to the ontological changes occurring in the neuro-
turn, I now look at how these are mediated in popular discourse. In 2009, Marco Roth 
 
65 Metzl notes the decline of male-directed psychoanalysis toward the end of the twentieth century 
and argues convincingly that this did not see the end of the containment and investigation of 
women’s minds but rather that this process became materialised into pharmaceuticals such as 
Prozac. These neurological pills continue the history of psychological normative containment of 
women (see Elaine Showalter’s thesis of ‘the female malady’ in terms of the rest cure, 
electroconvulsive therapy, and psychoanalysis). For Metzl, even when ‘cloaked in the novelty of the 
neurotransmitter’ women’s brains and minds still represent ‘the emotionality from which civilisation 
needs to be protected’ (Prozac on the Couch, p.193). In other words, the molecular generality of 
antidepressants offers the appearance of freedom whilst in fact reinforcing a gendered 
psychoanalytic model of repression. The material objectivity of serotonin imbalance is a wolf in 
androgynous clothing: making claims to a-gendered generality, but signifying and reinforcing a 
gendered image of feminine deficiency. Elaine Showalter, The Female Malady: Women, Madness, 
and English Culture, 1830-1980 (London: Penguin Books, 1985). 
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coined the term ‘neuronovel’ to describe of a group of recent novels ‘wherein mind 
becomes brain’ with particular focus on Ian McEwan.66 Adopting the term, Laura 
Salisbury describes how the 2000s saw the rise of the neuronovel, explaining that this 
reflects a move beyond the psychological trauma narratives dominant in the 1990s 
in favour of emerging neuroscientific models.67 In agreement with Rose’s assessment 
of neuroscience flattening psychological depth, she argues that fiction is able to 
counter this in its consideration of the schism between objectivity (through third 
person narrative) and subjectivity (first person narrative), resulting in sites where we 
can understand how our ‘contours are being retraced’ in light of the flattening 
spaces.68  
In 2015, Modern Fiction Studies published a special issue on the theme of 
‘Neuroscience and Modern Fiction’ which was introduced by Stephen Burn. His 
analysis concurs with that of Roth and Salisbury in noting that the millennium saw 
the popularisation of the neuronovel. However, he suggests that it is a form much 
more dynamic than ‘pop science rhetoric and Ian McEwan’s recent fiction’.69 The 
special edition rectifies this legitimate criticism of Roth’s account of the neuronovel 
with a more generically diverse exploration of neuroscience and contemporary 
fiction. Elsewhere, a 2008 special issue of the Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability 
Studies introduced and edited by Lucy Burke considered the theme of ‘cognitive 
 
66 Marco Roth, ‘The Rise of the Neuronovel’, Recessional, 8 (2009) <https://nplusonemag.com/issue-
8/essays/the-rise-of-the-neuronovel/> [accessed 29 July 2019]. Roth’s is not the first identification of 
a neuroscientific turn in fiction; however, it is arguably the most influential. See also Harvey Bloom, 
‘Neuro-Narratives’, The American Prospect, 9 November 2001 <https://prospect.org/article/neuro-
narratives> [accessed 21 August 2019]. 
67 Laura Salisbury, 'Translating Neuroscience: Fictions of the Brain in the 2000s'. 
68 Ibid., p.110. 
69 Stephen J. Burn, ‘Neuroscience and Modern Fiction’, Modern Fiction Studies, 61.2 (2015), 209-225 
(p.213). 
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impairment’. Burke reflects in the introduction that ‘impairment’ is not an 
appropriate term for the range of ‘cognitive difference’ in society and culture. 
Highlighting the biopolitical effects of difference, Burke notes how Alzheimer’s, 
autism, and schizophrenia are central to the biopolitical narrative of difference.70 She 
writes that such labels are ‘evoked to legitimate the ends of a range of ethically 
contested practices’ and ‘are central to the neuroscientific quest to identify genes 
and brain types in order […] to find the ever more elusive miracle cure’.71 T.J Lustig 
and James Peacock describe the ‘syndrome syndrome’ as being inherent to much 
modern fiction. Tracing the change from psychoanalytic models of trauma that 
dominated the second half of the twentieth century, they recognise an emerging 
structure of feeling in literature that ‘posits another more material realm of causality: 
the symptom here is not generated by familial, social, or historical experience but by 
physical experience; that is, our own embodiment’.72 Like Burke, Lustig and Peacock 
have critically informed my thesis; however, while Burke argues for the need to 
interrogate the ideological and political dimensions of contemporary neuroculture 
and Lustig and Peacock stress the effects of medical models of embodiment, both 
understand cognitive difference predominantly through a pathological or disability 
studies lens, and neglect the kinds of cognitive difference effected from 
neuroscientific technologies such as pharmaceutical enhancements, a critical 
intervention this thesis makes. What is more, the ‘syndrome syndrome’ arises from 
literature having emerged from a biomaterial structure of feeling, whereas the the 
 
70 Lucy Burke, ‘Introduction: Thinking about Cognitive Impairment’ Journal of Literary and Cultural 
Disability Studies, 2.1 (2008), i-iii (p.iii). 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid.  
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neural implantation provides the model for that structure of feeling in society and 
culture. 
Fernando Vidal and Francisco Ortega’s Being Brains further examines Vidal’s 
concept of ‘brainhood’ in society and culture by looking specifically at the 
representation of brains in fiction. They highlight and critically interrogate the ‘deficit 
model’ which is a common trope in analysis of neuroscience and fiction seeking to 
highlight and correct scientific inconsistencies. They argue for the use of fiction’s 
inherent ‘ambivalence’ and contradiction, stating it is here that this type of fiction 
finds and makes meaning, maintaining also that in this type, unlike science, ‘univocal 
answers are not available’ precisely because of the contradictory and interpretative 
nature of fiction.73 They also offer a critique of Roth’s conception of the neuronovel 
as representing ‘privacy without individuality’, arguing that ‘what may look like 
solipsism serves mainly to problematize the notion of the human as the cerebral 
subject’.74 This is a compelling argument; however, whilst presenting a useful 
overview of some types of cognitive difference in fiction, their work is weakened by 
a lack of sustained literary analysis. In what is essentially a whistle-stop tour of 
neuroscience and neurological disorders in narrative, it is hard to grasp how the 
specificity of fictional narrative tackles the potential solipsism of the neural subject, 
nor how its contradictions work to enable possible alternative models of meaning 
making. This thesis responds to the absence of close literary analysis in their work by 
developing sustained readings of the ways in which the figures of the enhanced 
 
73 Fernando Vidal and Francisco Ortega, Being Brains: Making the Cerebral Subject (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2017), p.191. 
74 Roth, ‘The Rise of the Neuronovel’; Vidal and Ortega, Being Brains, p.194. 
41 
 
human, the autist, and the person with dementia are written into contemporary 
cultural texts. This involves a consideration of the mediation of neuroscientific 
discourse in these texts, paying close attention to style, language, form and genre in 
order fully to understand how these texts reflect upon dominant medical models 
through my framework of the neural implantation. 
Jason Tougaw’s 2018 The Elusive Brain provides the most thorough account 
to date of the way in which fiction mediates neuroscientific concepts. Like Vidal and 
Ortega, Tougaw emphasises the inherent contradictions of narrative, arguing they 
allow for the exploration of subjectivities of brain and cognitive difference. In his 
words: ‘if writers of brain memoirs and neuronovels can tell us anything, it’s that 
mystery defines the epistemology of relation between brain and self; and where you 
find mystery, you’ll find contradiction too’.75 Tougaw also focusses some of his 
literary analysis on detective fiction, arguing that ‘neuronovels build on detective 
fiction’s speculative tendencies, weaving the hypothetical questions about the 
physiological self into the mysteries of their plots; neuronovels narrated by 
neurodivergent characters plot the social stakes of these questions and give fictional 
form to tensions between medical diagnosis and identity, without resolving those 
tensions’.76 This appraisal of detective fiction is something I want to develop and 
extend through a close reading of cognitive difference in contemporary crime fiction. 
This thesis contributes and extends Tougaw’s work on detective fiction with a 
thorough examination of how diverse forms of the genre such as thrillers, courtroom 
 
75 Jason Tougaw, The Elusive Brain: Literary Experiments in the Age of Neuroscience, (New Haven, 
Yale University Press, 2018), p.11. 
76 Ibid. p.132. 
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dramas, and mysteries can elucidate the ontological shifts various neural 
implantations produce. 
Neuromodels and Neuronovels – Emerging Tensions? 
 
Medicine, neuroscience, and diagnosis have come to be characterized by a belief that 
their models of practice are objective, ahistorical, and general. Objective in that brain 
diseases, disorders, syndromes, and conditions are predicated on quantifiable 
material differences or clinically grouped symptoms which could, theoretically, occur 
in any brain, and which are diagnosed solely on the basis of these material 
differences and symptoms. Ahistorical in the sense that, even if the diagnostic 
category was not articulated, the particular cluster of symptoms appear to exist 
throughout history and are exempt from socio-political interference. This is why 
phrases such as ‘we didn’t have a name for it back then’ follows talk of Alzheimer’s, 
or how various contemporary classifications are attributed to historical figures, such 
as the retrospective diagnosis of OCD in John Locke, or autism in Michelangelo.77 
These are ahistorical also in the sense Jonathan Metzl uses in his genealogy of Prozac 
to refer to the way in which diagnoses are primarily concerned with present 
symptomology, and are largely treated on the basis of such, as opposed to personal 
(psychological) history or trauma.78 They are general inasmuch as diagnoses flatten 
out the particularities of diverse symptoms into a unifying category, whereby racing 
heartrate, loss of concentration, dread, and dry mouth become anxiety. These 
 
77 ‘The History of OCD’, OCD UK, <https://www.ocduk.org/ocd/history-of-ocd/> [accessed 9 
September 2019]; James Burleigh, ‘Was Michelangelo’s autistic genius a symptom of autism?’, 
Independent, 1 June 2004, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/was-
michelangelos-artistic-genius-a-symptom-of-autism-756718.html> [accessed 9 September 2019]. 
78 Jonathan Metzl, Prozac on the Couch, p.31. 
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aspects imbue diagnostic medicine with a crucial image of being non-discriminatory; 
material aberrance or difference in the brain that cause these grouped symptoms are 
chances of birth, developed tumours, or ‘chemical imbalances’. As depicted in Fiona 
Phillips’ Damascene reaction to the pictorial ‘evidence’ provided by the brain scans 
with which I opened this thesis, these key attributes of medicine and science lend 
credence to the notion that neuromedical models and their claims to scientific 
objectivity are important because they collocate with the popular belief that 
neuroscience is a superior form of knowledge compared to cultural or narrative 
models and explanations. 
 Cultural narrative models of selfhood often, in contrast, concern the 
enmeshed nature of things as embodied by a person or character existing in a 
particular place and time. In narrative fiction character formation occurs as an 
aggregate of contextual circumstances, personality/character development, 
contingent events, social interaction, metaphor, history, biopolitics, the law, 
overarching plotting and so on. It is these disparate factors that in combination make 
a character or person act or be a particular way. Unlike medical diagnosis, cultural 
narrative self-construction is not ahistorical, but contingent upon specific events and 
contexts. In Liminal Lives Susan Squier foregrounds this distinction along 
objective/subjective lines: ‘science functions as the site of the construction of the 
objectively known other, while literature is the site of the construction of the 
subjectively known self’.79 Squier details the traditional distinction drawn between 
these two epistemologies of meaning making in terms of constructions of the self. 
 
79 Susan Merrill Squier, Liminal Lives: Imagining the Human at the Frontiers of Biomedicine (Durham 
NC: Duke University Press, 2004), p.29. 
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Science and medicine measure and study properties to construct objects – for the 
purposes of this thesis, categories of brain and cognitive difference; whereas culture 
reflects contingent experience, history, and character to produce largely subjective 
accounts.  
Squier rightly notes, as my critical foundation in Foucault’s perverse 
implantation attests, that this distinction is imperfect. Science and medicine play 
significant roles in the disciplinary production of Foucault’s subjects, much as they 
are foundational to neural implantations. However, considering these differences in 
such a way is useful for understanding their interaction. For, the generalising method 
of medical diagnosis will flatten out the circumstances, personal history, and 
psychological trauma that produces symptoms into a particular disease, disorder, 
syndrome or condition. Symptoms that you thought were about being a unique 
person or character in a particular time and place is in fact this widely attributable 
brain difference: Stone’s identification of the shift to the chemistry and physics of the 
general soul.  
Take for example the following passages from Elizabeth Wurtzel’s memoir 
about her clinical depression, Prozac Nation: 
So I mention the family history of depression to every new therapist when it 
finally occurs to me, and they always feel obligated to point out the genetic 
component of mental illness. But then I’ll tell them a little bit about my 
immediate family background, and sooner or later, as the narrative continues, 
they’re sure to say something like, No wonder you’re so depressed, like it’s the 
most obvious response. They react as if my family situation was particularly 
alarming and troublesome, as opposed to what it actually is in this day and age: 
perfectly normal. I mean, I think about my development and I feel like a Census 
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Bureau statistic or some sort of case study on the changing nature of the 
American family in the late twentieth century.80 
The particulars of what has driven this or that person to Zoloft, Paxil, or Prozac, 
or the reasons that some other person believes herself to be suffering from a 
major depression, seem less significant than the simple fact of it. To ask anyone 
how he happened to fall into a state of despair always involves new variations 
of the same myriad mix of family history.81 
These two quotations appear on consecutive pages and encapsulate the remarkable 
changes to self-construction medical diagnosis can effect in narrative. In the first, 
Wurtzel describes the immediate inclination of her multiple therapists to flatten out 
the particularities of her unique selfhood through a ‘genetic component’ upon 
learning about her family’s medical history. Of course, certain mental illnesses do 
statistically run in families, but this immediately separates the depression from 
Elizabeth as a self and into a more ahistorical heritable prospect. However, upon 
detailing her own ‘narrative’ and subjective history that seem pertinent to her 
depression, a tension between the cultural narrative model and the medical model 
emerges and individuality and subjective history begins taking explanatory 
precedence. However, Wurtzel adds a further biopolitical layer in that the 
particularities of her situation are extrapolated, not only into family history or a 
general medical diagnosis, but into an ever more generalising biopolitical census 
statistic of the American family. In the second quotation the diagnostic model gains 
further influence. The ‘particulars’ I note as being indicative to narrative 
understandings of subjectivity become secondary to ‘the simple fact of’ depression.  
 
80 Elizabeth Wurtzel, Prozac Nation: Young and Depressed in America a Memoir (London: Quartet 
Books, 2001), p.29. 
81 Ibid. p.30. 
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 A similar situation can be seen in the historical etiological development of 
conduct disorder across editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals of Mental 
Disorders (DSM).  The DSM is a useful historical tool because each new version 
updates or removes diagnostic labels and criteria in light of new research, 
symptomology, or prevalence, and changes to the conduct disorder category across 
the last three volumes encapsulate the neuro-turn’s shift from psychosocial to 
biomaterial explanation. The DSM-3 lists conduct disorder’s predisposing factors as: 
parental rejection, inconsistent management with harsh discipline, early 
institutional living, frequent shifting of parent figures […] being an illegitimate 
only child may predispose to the development of the Undersocialized type. 
Large family size, association with a delinquent subgroup, and an absent father 
or a father with Alcohol Dependence may predispose to the development of 
the Socialized type.82  
The DSM-4 lists similar environmental factors such as, ‘parental rejection and 
neglect, difficult infant temperament, inconsistent child-rearing practices with harsh 
discipline, physical or sexual abuse, lack of supervision, early institutional living, 
frequent changes of caregivers, large family size, association with a delinquent peer 
group, and certain kinds of familial psychopathology’.83 However, this edition also 
references material descriptions with ‘lower heart rate and lower skin conductance 
[being] noted in individuals with Conduct Disorder compared with those without the 
disorder’, with twin studies suggesting that ‘Conduct Disorder has both genetic and 
environmental components’.84 The DSM-5 lists similar psychosocial factors with 
 
82 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: Third 
Edition, (Washington DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1980), p.47. 
83 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: Fourth 
Edition, (Washington DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1994), p.88. 
84 Ibid.; Ibid, p.89. 
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additions such as ‘neighbourhood exposure to violence’.85 However, material factors 
are equally prominent in this latest edition. Most notably, ‘structural and functional 
differences in brain areas associated with affect regulation and affect processing, 
particularly frontotemporal-limbic connections involving the brain's ventral 
prefrontal cortex and amygdala, have been consistently noted in individuals with 
conduct disorder compared with those without the disorder. However, neuroimaging 
findings are not diagnostic of the disorder’.86 Here, a more generalised diagnosis 
emerges from sub-types of antisocial personality disorder into a label applicable to 
any child who displays symptoms. What is more, the increasing materiality of the 
disorder – as being located somewhere in the brain – implants the disorder into the 
material self rather than its psychological milieu, effacing sociological and 
psychological factors, history, and environmental influences in light of the neat, 
objective biological explanation. 
Wurtzel’s memoir foregrounds how the tensions between medical and 
cultural/narratives models of the self play out in literary/narrative form. Indeed, the 
diagnostic development of conduct disorder shows how material models are 
becoming equally if not more important than social family history; medical objectivity 
vies for explanatory dominance over her more messy, unique, life history. In the 
subsequent chapters, my case studies show these tensions in how medicalised 
‘autism’ becomes an ‘objective’ explanatory tool to explain the perception of 
innumerable atypical behaviours, dementia a depersonalising tool to explain 
 
85 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Fifth 
Edition (Washington DC: American Psychiatric Association, 2013), p.473. 
86 Ibid. p.474. 
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increasingly diverse facets of old age, and cognitive enhancement a kind of molecular 
shortcut to promises of the good life.  
 I conclude this section on cultural narratives with reference to the work of 
Lennard Davis who notes that the novel (reflective of cultural narrative models of the 
self) is a form whose historic development is underpinned by normalcy.87 Indeed, the 
concept of the norm is essential in effecting perverse and neural implantations and 
it is certainly true that fictional texts have a historical tendency mimetically to imbibe 
society and culture’s normative paradigms. I do this so as not to ignore the potent 
ways in which cultural narratives affect and indeed produce neural implantations 
more generally themselves, in both affirmative and problematic or, to paraphrase 
Georges Bataille, ‘guilty’ ways, precisely because it lacks objectivity and contains 
subjective biases.88 What is necessary, and what this thesis provides, are readings 
 
87 Lennard Davis, ‘’Normality, Power, and Culture’, in The Disability Studies Reader, ed. by Lennard 
Davis (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p.10. 
88 Bataille writes ‘Literature is not innocent. It is guilty and should admit itself so’. Georges Bataille, 
Literature and Evil, trans. by Alastair Hamilton, (New York: Marion Boyars, 1985), p.x. Consider the 
problematic role certain texts have played in constructing a deviant model of transgender people. 
Most famous are Jonathan Demme’s The Silence of the Lambs (1991) in which the antagonist Buffalo 
Bill kidnaps and kills women to flay them to create a new identity from their skin, or Iain Banks’s The 
Wasp Factory (1984) in which the pathologically violent protagonist Frank is revealed in a twist 
ending to have been born with a vagina. Though Hannibal Lector is emphatic in his refutation over 
Bill’s trans nature, he does in a way which retains a condemnation of trans subjectivity: ‘[Bill’s] 
pathology is a thousand times more savage and more terrifying’. The brain and its materiality is 
central in The Wasp Factory and holds an important and decided role in how both Frank and the 
reader construct his subjectivity. For instance, he explains ‘sometimes the thoughts and feelings I 
had didn’t really agree with each other, so I decided I must be lots of different people inside my 
brain’ (77). Later, Frank describes his conflicting emotions as being the vying of biological processes, 
‘I could almost feel my occipital lobe fusing. I thought of making some smart remark […] but all the 
lines to and from my brain seemed to be jammed with urgent messages coming from my guts’. (97). 
Frank also describes an abject response to food in neurological terms, ‘I was going to throw up now, 
but that same irresponsible, destructive past of my brain – just a few neurons probably, but I 
supposed there are a few in every brain and it only takes a very small hooligan element to give the 
rest a bad name – kept thinking about  those fried eggs and bacon’. (102). These highlight the 
biological models of subjectivity in this novel which form a narrative compact between deviance, 
trans subjects, and the materiality of the brain. The Silence of the Lambs, dir. by. Jonathan Demme 
(Orion Pictures, 1991); Iain Banks, The Wasp Factory (London: Abacus, 2008). 
49 
 
that challenge these normative assumptions and that challenge the normative ideal 
of the modern subject as described by Foucault. 
Foucault’s Bodies and Subjects 
 
Foucault’s elaboration of the concept of biopolitics in his lecture series Society Must 
Be Defended augment his broader analysis of power and the shift from the 
spectacular visibility of sovereign power to the hidden and internalised mechanisms 
of disciplinary regimes. For Foucault, the sword symbolises sovereign power because 
this form of power exercises only as a ‘right to kill’ or through ‘refraining from 
killing’.89 The body, and its destruction – or not – through the threat of the sword is 
central to the expression of this form of power.90 Though Foucault’s work fails to 
offer a detailed account of historical determination or causality, the transformations 
from this deductive sovereign power to disciplinary regimes and the democratisation 
into the sovereign rule of law occur in tandem with industrialisation, and the shift 
from the absolutist monarchies of the early modern period to the parliamentary 
sovereignties that emerge following the French revolution.91 He describes how the 
decline of absolute sovereign power created a framework of legal powers that 
 
89 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 1, p.136. 
90 This is what he describes as the spectacle of power and his vivid description of the public 
execution of Robert-François Damiens for attempted regicide in the introduction to Discipline and 
Punish encapsulates this form of power. Here, sovereign power is written publicly onto the body of 
the condemned in order to enact a spectacular display of power. Michel Foucault, Discipline and 
Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. by Alan Sheridan, (London: Penguin, 1991), p.3. 
91 Foucault references factors such as the French Revolution across much of his work. However, a 
thorough investigation into the cause of this shift is never fully considered. It is worth bearing in 
mind his archaeological and genealogical methodologies in this regard. For instance, in the foreword 
to The Order of Things, Foucault explains how he ‘left the problem of causes to one side’ choosing 
‘instead to confine [himself] to describing the transformations themselves’, due to the lack of stable 
and established theories of scientific change and epistemological causality. Michel Foucault, The 
Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, trans. by Alan Sheridan, (London: 
Routledge, 1997), pp.xii-xiii. 
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‘allowed the democratization of sovereignty, and the establishment of a public right 
articulated with collective sovereignty’ around which discipline regulated bodies.92 
Disciplinary regimes operate as ‘micro-physics of power’ and work to control the 
body through the training of conduct around norms, rather than corporeal 
punishment for specific crimes.93 
The disciplinary regime that Foucault describes is encapsulated in the modern 
penal system. Where sovereign power displays itself through attacks of ‘murderous 
splendor’, disciplinary powers are hidden and internalised and control through 
surveillance, normalisation, and the creation of the subject as an individual.94 For 
Foucault, the modern, self-surveilling subject is an effect of discipline; power and 
control thus become hidden, internalised, but omnipresent, typified today in the UK’s 
expansive CCTV network or the global social media phenomenon. Discipline is a 
mechanism of power that produces particular effects, one of which is a particular 
modern notion of the subject as an individual.  
In sovereign power the body is the locus of punishment; however, in 
disciplinary regimes the target is individual subjectivity. Foucault gives the example 
 
92 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collége De France 1975-1976, trans. by 
David Macey, (London: Penguin, 2004), p.37; see also, Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 1, 
p.136. 
93 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.26. 
94 In Discipline and Punish Foucault describes three types of discipline crucial in establishing power. 
First, hierarchical observation, which is a system of monitoring whereby information passes between 
various levels of authority in order to ensure thorough observation (p. 174). Second, normalising 
judgements, which is the establishment of societal norms as benchmarks against which people 
should act (p. 183). Third, examination, which replaces the occasional spectacle of sovereign power 
with quotidian objectification of the subject through processes of examination (school, hospitals, 
prisons and so on) creating the idea that subjects are individuals who can be readily compared 
against each other and the norm (pp.190-1). Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon model is the idealised 
symbol of this form of organising surveillance because of its efficiency and design in establishing the 
internalisation of the disciplinary gaze. 
51 
 
of criminal judgement. Sovereign judgement is absolute and is only concerned with 
establishing that the crime took place. Whereas, disciplinary regimes in which power 
is hidden and internalised necessitates a judgement not on the crime prima facie but 
on the individual, or what Foucault refers to as the soul. By soul Foucault means ‘the 
heart, the thoughts, the will, the inclinations’ behind the act of the crime.95 In other 
words, it is no longer the fact of the crime, but the rationale behind it that is judged.96 
New disciplinary forms of power/knowledge such as psychiatry examine criminal 
provenance and measure the individual against a norm that is itself the effect of 
descriptions and measures of deviance. Thus, judgements and punishments on souls 
rather than bodies ‘provide the mechanisms of legal punishment with a justifiable 
hold not only on offences, but on individuals; not only on what they do, but on what 
they are, will be, may be’.97 This is important for my thesis because the movement 
from punishing the body to judging the soul foregrounds the kinds of individualising 
and normalising effects I explore as neural implantations. Indeed, the ‘soul’ is the 
product of disciplinary techniques of power at the centre of which is the self-
regulating subject. This leads Foucault to argue that the soul ‘is the effect and 
instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body’.98 Thus, where 
Rose argues that mind is what brain does, Foucault argues that soul is what 
disciplinary power’s effects on bodies does.  
 
95 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.16. 
96 Ibid. p.19. 
97 Ibid. p.18. 
98 Ibid. p.30. 
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Foucault theorises another form of power, biopower, which emerges 
alongside disciplinary techniques.99 Where disciplinary power involves the control of 
individual bodies through particular institutions and practices, biopower controls 
populations through the powers of the state. Disciplinary techniques include training 
and teaching individuals (creating ideas of individualism), whereas techniques of 
biopower include birth and death rates and concern the securing of the social body 
as a mass of individuals. Because populations cannot exist without individuals, and 
individuals are part of the population, Foucault explains that disciplinary techniques 
and biopower are inherently linked. For Foucault, sexuality encapsulates this linkage 
because it is both an individual matter and a question of population. Biopower 
concerns the aggregate of disciplined individuals within a population, and ‘aims to 
establish a sort of homeostasis, not by training individuals, but by achieving an overall 
equilibrium that protects the security of the whole’.100 The introduction of biopower 
marks a shift in Foucault’s genealogy of power because where ‘sovereignty took life 
and let live’, and discipline sought to regulate individuals, biopower’s focus on 
populations is concerned with ‘making live and letting die’.101 This focus on 
populations saw the ‘growing importance assumed by the norm’, norms produced as 
an effect of the adumbration of differences and exceptions, demarcating the 
boundaries between deviant and normal, health and illness, and life and death.102 
This concept of biopower, and its interrelation with disciplinary techniques 
 
99 Thomas Lemke notes that for Foucault, disciplinary power was established in the seventeenth 
century, with biopower complementing it from the middle of the eighteenth century. Thomas 
Lemke, Foucault’s Analysis of Modern Governmentality: A Critique of Political Reason, trans. by Erik 
Butler, (London: Verso, 2019), p.136. 
100 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, p.249. 
101 Ibid. p.247. 
102 Foucault, History of Sexuality Volume 1, p.143. 
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foregrounds much of my work on brain and cognitive difference. In particular 
regarding the ways differences are simultaneously individualising, but yet also come 
to represent groups of people that statistically die younger, are indefinitely 
institutionalised or incarcerated, or who may face racial or gendered prejudice.103  
 Foucault’s later work sees the concept of governmentality focus on the power 
of the state in governing all aspects of life. He asks: ‘is it possible to place the modern 
state in a general technology of power that assured its mutations, development, and 
functioning? Can we talk of something like a “governmentality” that would be to the 
state […] what techniques of discipline were to the penal system, and what biopolitics 
was to medical institutions?’.104 In other words, the state’s instruments of 
governmentality produced subjects (as with disciplinary techniques) but through the 
level of the population (as with biopolitical imperatives). This, as Rose and Abi-
 
103 Recognising the way neuroscience and diagnostic medicine is entwined with social and cultural 
scripts such as race and gender is important, not least because they affect diagnosis. I have 
discussed Prozac’s gendering above as well as the way cultural narratives have produced damaging 
pathologically deviant models of trans subjectivity, and the same is true of race. Metzl has 
researched schizophrenia’s shift from being predominately a housewives’ disease in the first half of 
the twentieth century to its contemporary association with black men. Moreover, I have found a 
similar pattern in diagnoses of conduct disorder. A 2007 study found that African American children 
were 2.6 times less likely to receive an autism diagnosis compared to white children on the first 
medical assessment. Of the children who were initially misdiagnosed, African Americans were twice 
as likely to receive a diagnosis of conduct disorder than white children (Mandel p.1795). This exists 
in a history in which African American and Lantinx children who present similar mental disorders are 
more likely to enter the criminal justice system than their white counterparts who are more likely to 
receive treatment (Atkins p.202). In other words, there is racial distinction in the neural implantation 
of conduct disorder: implantation of objective pathology in white children, implantation of 
criminality via pathology in black and Lantinx children. Regarding this thesis, it is not difficult to 
conceive that the ontological difference between having a biologically grounded/implanted brain 
difference causing a proclivity to antisocial behaviour diagnosed in prison compared to a medical 
facility is ontologically profound. Jonathan Metzl, The Protest Psychosis: How Schizophrenia Became 
a Black Disease (Boston: Beacon Press, 2010); David S. Mandell and others., ‘Disparities in Diagnoses 
Received Prior to a Diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder’, Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders, 37.9 (2007), 1795-1802; D. Lanette Atkins and others., ‘Mental Health and Incarcerated 
Youth. I: Prevalence and Nature of Psychopathology’, Journal of Child and Family Studies, 8.2 (1999), 
193-204. 
104 Ibid. p.120. 
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Rached make clear in their account of the changing governance of anti-social conduct 
and criminality, is crucial to understanding brain difference in society and culture: 
We find arguments that one should minimise a host of social ills, including 
criminal and antisocial conduct, by governing the child through its family. In 
each generation, unsurprisingly, these arguments are made on the basis of 
whatever happens to be the current mode of objectivity about the 
development of children – habits, the will, instinct theory, psychoanalysis, and 
today the brain.105  
Here, conservative political ideologies construct a norm to maintain the importance 
of the family unit in raising a well-behaved, socialised child. Processes of 
governmentality feed into much of my research; however, it is in Foucault’s 
discussion of sexuality, as mentioned emblematic of his biopolitical compact of 
populations and individuals, that this thesis draws its primary foundation.  
The Perverse Implantation 
 
Foucault’s description of the perverse implantation offers a conceptual framework 
through which to understand the subjective effects of contemporary neuroscientific 
discourses and medical diagnosis and their enmeshing with biopolitical and economic 
agenda. Grounded in his work on power/knowledge explored above, The History of 
Sexuality Volume 1 refutes arguments that the nineteenth century repressed 
sexualities – the ‘repressive hypothesis’ – arguing instead that it witnessed a 
multiplication of atypical sexual discourses in society. Historically, Foucault argues 
power (religious, legal and so on) focused on the heterosexual couple who were 
 
105 Nikolas Rose and Joelle M. Abi-Rached, Neuro: The New Brain Sciences and the Management of 
the Mind (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2013), p.196. They also highlight, contra Vidal’s 
‘brainhood’, that ‘it is not that you have become your brain, or that you are identical with your brain, 
but that you can act on your brain, even if that brain is not directly available to consciousness, and in 
so acting, you can improve yourself – not as a brain, but as a person’, pointing to the modes of self-
governing in contemporary neuro-culture. (p.222) 
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‘under constant surveillance’, whereas other sexual practices such as sodomy 
‘remained a good deal more confused’ though the courts could condemn it.106 
Foucault’s account does not offer a clear account of causality or historical change; 
however, he notes that disciplinary normativity of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries witnessed an explosion in discourse about atypical sexuality that decentred 
the legitimate couple ‘with its regular sexuality’ as the primary focus of concern. This 
regular couple became the norm around which atypical sexualities were identifiable, 
and as I explained regarding disciplinary models of crime, the act became implanted 
into the ‘soul’ of the person. In other words, implantations of perversity produce 
distinct types of subjects and bodies: the punishable (illegal) act of sodomy becomes 
embodied in (the nature of) the homosexual man. 
 Foucault is clear that the perverse implantation did not aim to repress or ban, 
rather to magnify and proliferate for scrutiny, noting four power operations involved 
in this process. First, it affected the visibility and scrutiny of those implanted. Unlike 
longstanding taboos such as incest whereby methods to limit or eradicate were 
directly put to work, child sexuality was implanted as a perversion and proliferated 
with ever more disciplinary sciences, psychologies, and institutions anxiously coming 
to bear on this figure of the sexualised child. Second, it affected subjectivity and 
personhood. The homosexual ‘became a personage, a past, a case history, and a 
childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an 
indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology’.107 It ‘was everywhere 
present in him’ and thus explained all his actions; the mechanics of this power 
 
106 Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 1, pp.37-8. 
107 Ibid. p.43. 
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worked because ‘it was implanted in bodies, slipped beneath modes of conduct’.108 
Third, because it is ‘imbedded in bodies […] one had to try to detect it – as a lesion, 
a dysfunction, or a symptom – in the depths of the organism, or on the surface of the 
skin, or among all the signs of behavior’.109 Here Foucault explains a pleasure in the 
power of examining, as well as, conversely, a pleasure in the power of ‘showing off, 
scandalizing, or resisting’.110 Finally, the proliferation of perversions established 
suspicion within the heteronormative family, focussing attention on ‘the supposed 
dangers of masturbation, the importance attached to puberty’ and ‘methods of 
surveillance suggested to parents’.111 These discursive techniques create what 
Foucault terms an ‘instrument-effect’, through which there have never ‘existed more 
centers of power; never more attention manifested and verbalized’.112 Such 
mechanisms of power are what underlie much of my work on brain and cognitive 
difference, because they reveal, as I discuss below, the capacity both to create new 
kinds of neurological subjects, as well as means to resist aspects of this 
subjectification from within the categorisation of difference itself. 
 This discussion of Foucault’s work allows me to foreground some of the 
critical interventions I propose in the model of the neural implantation. First, he 
notes that the perverse implantation saw ‘sexual irregularity’ become ‘annexed to 
mental illness’.113 As above, this establishes atypical sexuality into medical and 
pathological epistemology; however, it is also crucial to highlight the corresponding 
 
108 Ibid. pp.43-44. 
109 Ibid. p.44. 
110 Ibid. p.45. 
111 Ibid. p.46. 
112 Ibid. p.49. 
113 Ibid. p.36. 
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ontological effects this creates, particularly around ideas about guilt and 
responsibility.114 Second, Foucault writes explicitly about the confessional aspect of 
the perverse implantation, in which the person implanted steps forwards and admits 
who and what he is.115 This is a crucial point because in producing the homosexual 
as a distinct type of identity, subjectivity and body, a more active appropriation and 
identification can take place. In other words, the proclamation and admission of 
difference enables the formation of a subcultural identity and subjectivity, but only 
due to the all-encompassing nature of the implantation.116  
The Neural Implantation  
 
Critical work on the neuro-turn is increasing; however, it lacks a cohesive framework 
through which to think about the kinds of ethical questions that contemporary 
biopolitical discourses about the brain and cognitive difference create.  As a result, it 
often fails to fully acknowledge the impact of this turn upon those who experience 
the ontological transformations that accompany categorisation and scrutiny of brain 
 
114 Havelock Ellis concludes his 1900 history of homosexuality with a relatively non-judgemental 
(particularly given the of its time of publication) suggestion for how homosexuals, or ‘sexual inverts’, 
should live. Ellis’s account is telling of the kind of societal and ontological responsibility homosexuals 
had to accept. ‘The most that the physician is entitled to do, it seems to me, is to present the 
situation clearly, and leave to the patient a decision for which he must himself accept the 
responsibility. […] The invert has the right to sexual indulgence, it may be, but he has also the duty 
to accept the full responsibility for his own actions, and the necessity to recognize the present 
attitude of the society he lives in. He cannot be advised to set himself in violent opposition to that 
society’. Havelock Ellis, Studies in the Psychology of Sex, Volume 2: Sexual Inversion (Philadelphia: F. 
A Davis Co., 1921), pp.342-343. 
115 Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 1, p.39. 
116 Writing on LGBT groups, Alan Sinfield explains that ‘the very contradictions and conflicts that 
facilitate manipulation of deviant groups by the dominant are also the points at which subordinated 
cultures find space to assert themselves. The very structures that make it hard for dissidence to 
escape the dominant also make it hard for the dominant to contain dissidence’. I will show in my 
case studies of autism and dementia that the same is true for those whose cognitive difference is a 
source for stigma. Alan Sinfield, The Wilde Century: Oscar Wilde, Effeminacy and the Queer Moment 
(London: Cassell, 1994). 
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difference as the locus of subjectivity.117 Responding to this, and taking inspiration 
from Foucault’s perverse implantation, I develop the neural implantation as a way of 
encapsulating both the disciplinary and biopolitical imperative to classify brain and 
cognitive difference through the neuromolecular gaze, as well as the ontological and 
cultural effects categorisations of difference create.  
 In theorising the neural implantation, I broadly adopt the four power 
operations Foucault describes as being central to the implantation of perversities, 
but I look at how these create ontological and epistemological shifts in relation to 
contemporary society’s unique biopolitics and technologies. First, the identification 
and subsequent implantation of cognitive difference to explain a range of atypical 
behaviours, responses, actions, and physicality made visible a range of diseases, 
conditions, syndromes, and disorders. In what Rose and Abi-Rached term the ‘lessons 
from lesions’ approach, brain difference becomes the locus and impetus behind a 
new range of scientific disciplines as well as effecting the formation of a cognitive 
norm.118 This marks the neural implantation as a historical shift, reflecting the 
historical aspect of Vidal’s ‘brainhood’, as well as the various, and famous, literal 
 
117 Work that begins this task includes David Bates and Nima Bassiri’s edited collection Plasticity and 
Pathology: On the Formation of the Neural Subject, which places ‘plasticity’ and ‘pathology’ in critical 
dialogue to consider the historical formation of the ‘neural subject’. It is an informative history, and 
as mentioned above Cathy Gere’s, and Laura Salisbury and Hannah Proctor’s work have informed my 
understanding of plasticity as a political object. Fernando Vidal and Francisco Ortega’s chapter 
‘Cerebralizing Distress’ in Being Brains: Making the Cerebral Subject gives a much fuller account of 
contemporary neurobiological models of ‘distress’ (they focus on depression and autism) and 
explore some of the major biopolitical and technological frameworks that support material models 
of these conditions. However, their approach lacks a framework through which to understand the 
range of effects diagnoses/categorisations of brain difference creates, as well as the range and remit 
of neuroscience beyond the remit of pathology, which I consider in terms of cognitive enhancement. 
There is also a plethora of individual studies, auto-ethnographies, and medical anthropologies on 
brain and cognitive differences. 
118 Rose and Abi-Rached, Neuro, pp.204-206. 
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lessons from lesions such as the split-brain experiments of the 1960s.119 This 
classificatory drive, interest, and scrutiny of brain difference has increased with brain 
scanning technology and its claims to ever more specific loci of difference. Second, 
neural implantations produce profound ontological and subjective effects. In regards 
to autism, atypical behaviours grouped under the umbrella term ‘autism’ can 
become, once implanted through diagnosis, ‘a past, a case history, and a childhood, 
in addition to being a type of life, a life form […] a mysterious physiology’.120 Talking 
about the power of the label and narratives of autism, Katherine Runswick-Cole 
writes, ‘this autism story tells of an all-encompassing label, a narrative lens that 
accounts for every aspect of my son’s behaviour and personality, so much so that 
there is nothing left of him that cannot be accounted for without reference to the 
autism story’.121 The link to Foucault’s description ‘it was everywhere present in him 
[…] implanted in bodies, slipped beneath modes of conduct’ is clear.122 
 Third, the power-pleasure interactions Foucault describes in implantations of 
perversions are similarly evident in identifications of brain and cognitive difference. 
On the one hand, the ‘pleasure that comes of exercising a power that questions, 
monitors, watches, spies, searches out’ can be seen throughout the chapters in this 
thesis, and is typical of the norm’s disciplinary surveillance of difference.123  On the 
other hand, ‘power asserting itself in the pleasure of showing off, scandalizing, or 
 
119 Ibid. Rose and Abi-Rached cite Roger Sperry and Michael Gazzaniga’s split brain experiments in 
which the two hemispheres of the brain were found to function independently as the beginning of 
contemporary brain centred lessons from lesions.  
120 Foucault, History of Sexuality Volume 1, p.43. 
121 Katherine Runswick-Cole, ‘Understanding This Thing Called Autism’ in Re-Thinking Autism: 
Diagnosis, Identity and Equality, ed. by. Katherine Runswick-Cole, Rebecca Mallett and Sami Timimi 
(London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2016), pp.19-30 (p.24). 
122 Foucault, History of Sexuality Volume 1, pp.43-44. 
123 Ibid. p.45. 
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resisting’ is evident in the neural implantation through campaigns such as the 
Neurodiversity movement, Disability Pride events, or in how medical models can be 
subjective methods for disrupting stigmatising cultural phantoms.124 Such 
implantations can in some cases offer a ‘neutral’ understanding of hitherto ‘deviant’ 
behaviours by shifting the blame from personality to pathology, it’s not me, it’s my 
brain. Simon Cohn argues that material explanations offer a chance to create a 
different account of what unusual behaviours, actions, and symptoms mean, 
(positively) disrupting ‘existing narratives of illness and experience of selfhood in 
their everyday lives’.125 Finally, the proliferation of brain and cognitive difference 
through medical diagnoses affect those not implanted, as implantations come to 
represent sites of fascination and anxiety. I detail below how certain expressions of 
brain difference come to be culturally assimilated and coveted by those within the 
norm. 
 Realising the cultural assimilation of neural implantations is crucial for 
understanding the scope and space brain and cognitive difference occupies today. 
The lessons from lesions approach is evident here inasmuch as techniques originating 
from the inspection, measuring, and scanning for atypicality or difference in brains 
are being used to create biological facts or stories for the trivia of everyday life. Such 
as in the semi-regular ‘this is your brain on X’ revelations emerging in popular 
 
124 Ibid. Neurodiversity refers both to the belief in the biological idea that cognitive difference is a 
result of natural variation, as well as its more politicised meaning which refers to the Neurodiversity 
Movement which emerged from the Autism Rights Movement. 
125 Simon Cohn, ‘Disrupting Images’ in Critical Neuroscience: A Handbook of the Social and Cultural 
Contexts of Neuroscience, ed. by Suparna Choudhury and Jan Slaby, pp.179-193 (p.188); Vidal and 
Ortega counter this claim, suggesting that by medicalising through material brain difference further 
barriers/schisms between states of health and illness emerge and that it can also increase the 
perception that mental illness equates to danger, Vidal and Ortega, Being Brains, p.143. 
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media.126 Particular effects on those in the norm – by which I broadly mean those 
considered not to have brain or cognitive difference – establish a kind of 
appropriation by way of somewhat flippant self-diagnosis of the diseases, conditions, 
syndromes, and disorders underpinning the diagnostic science of the neural 
implantation. For instance, discourses of transient chemical imbalances or neural 
cross-wiring act as explanatory appendages to normative states temporarily off-
kilter. It is the discourse of difference without the permanence of implantation. 
Moreover, speculative appropriations of diagnoses such as ‘it’s my OCD’ or ‘you must 
be on the spectrum’ by those within the norm act more like neural accessories to an 
uncontested normative subjectivity that can be worn and removed at will.127 In other 
words, dual states of neural accessories and neural implantations emerging from the 
neuro-turn. However, the flippant adoption or use of such medical categories further 
impacts the neural implantations from which they derive, not only does it diminish 
the very real ontological differences such atypicality can create and signify, but also 
it has the power to stigmatise.128 
 
126 See Robert Preidt, ‘What TV Binge-Watching Does to Your Brain’, WebMD, 12 August 2019 
<https://www.webmd.com/brain/news/20190812/what-tv-binge-watching-does-to-your-brain> 
[accessed 14 August 2019]; Suzanne Rowan Kelleher, ‘This Is Your Brain on Travel’, Forbes, 28 July 
2019 <https://www.forbes.com/sites/suzannerowankelleher/2019/07/28/this-is-your-brain-on-
travel/#1e0c8fb82be6> [accessed 14 August 2019]. 
127 Martyn Pickersgill, Sarah Cunningham and Paul Martin argue ‘We can, then, regard the brain not 
as some magnificent epicentre of subjectivity, but as an object of mundane significance, understood 
as providing a substrate for, and, in some cases, limiting, everyday life, though often far from salient 
to the subjective experience’. Although they do consider brain difference, the reference of 
‘mundane significance’ goes toward the ‘typical’ ability to choose the extent to which one considers 
oneself a neuro-subject. Martyn Pickersgill, Sarah Cunningham and Paul Martin, ‘Constituting 
neurologic subjects: Neuroscience, subjectivity, and the mundane significance of the brain’ 
Subjectivity, 4.3 (2011), 246-365 (pp.361-2). 
128 This similarly occurs in other ontological categories that demarcate difference from the norm – 
such as how ‘gay’ became a cultural description for something rubbish or bad. This exists in a long 
history that sees difference linguistically appropriated for use as a negative descriptor, such as 
‘dumb’, ‘lame’, ‘moron’, ‘lame’, and ‘retard’, which were all originally medical classifications. 
‘Autistic’ has similarly developed into an adjective which predominantly refers to a lack in emotion 
or empathy. See for example Australian politician Barry O’Sullivan telling Australian radio that ‘banks 
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 The ontological transformations resulting from neural implantations are 
difficult to overstate, a claim which I explore through my close readings of 
contemporary cultural narratives. However, as an introduction to the extent of the 
effects of neural implantations, it is worth considering the political and legal 
consequences that accompany and influence the ontological changes. For instance, 
autism is a life-long condition, the diagnosis of which in the UK means that a person 
can be sectioned or incarcerated, sometimes indefinitely, and prohibits them joining 
the armed forces.129 Diagnoses of Alzheimer’s, which has become shorthand for a 
range of dementia diseases, lead to biopolitical questions over life, death, assisted 
suicide, personal and familial economic problems due to poorly funded social care in 
the UK, evident from the 2017 uproar over the media-dubbed ‘dementia tax’, and 
even the limits of what constitutes personhood.130 It is true that the neural 
implantation encompasses a wide-range of brain and cognitive differences; however, 
 
show an almost autistic disregard for prudential regulation and law and it’s time for these people to 
have their day in court’. Barry O’Sullivan cited in Peter Ryan, ‘Banks show 'disregard' for the law, 
Government MPs may cross the floor to back inquiry’, ABCNews, 27 November 2017 
<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-11-20/banking-royal-commission-barry-osullivan-disregard-
for-law/9167818> [accessed 13 February 2019]. 
129 Such people are detained in Assessment and Treatment Units (ATUs). This detention is 
underpinned by extensive legal frameworks such as the Human Rights Act (1998) and the Mental 
Health Act (1983). A House of Commons report on this issue criticised these legal underpinnings, and 
indeed, legal injunctions carried out against parents who try to fight them. ‘It is wholly unacceptable 
that injunctions should be sought to prevent families from speaking out when they disagree with the 
way that their child is being treated. The Ministry of Justice must work with other departments to 
collect data on the number of injunctions sought by public bodies, including Local Authorities and 
Clinical Commissioning Groups, against families of those with learning disabilities and/or autism’. 
House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘The detention of young people with learning 
disabilities and/or autism’, 1 November 2019, p.31.  
130 Theresa May’s social care reform ahead of the 2017 general election proposed that people living 
with dementia would have to pay for their care up to a limit of £100000. This amount included 
property. Facing incredibly media and public backlash, May promptly u-turned and clarified that a 
cap would be agreed. Anushka Asthana and Jessica Elgot, ‘Theresa May ditches manifesto plan with 
‘dementia tax’ U-turn’, Guardian, 22 May 2017 < 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/may/22/theresa-may-u-turn-on-dementia-tax-cap-
social-care-conservative-manifesto> [accessed 19 February 2019]. 
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such a holistic formulation is critical in highlighting the pervasiveness and range of 
biopolitical, legal, and ontological effects implantations create. 
 In summary, the identification and description of the neural implantation 
offers a framework through which to think about a range of brain and cognitive 
differences and the changes accompanying them. Many of these result from the 
medical model that reduces a range of cognitive differences into pathological 
categories of behaviour and personality. However, central is that implantation of 
difference into the body, personhood, and subjectivity occurs at a neuro-molecular 
level. This is a key difference to the perverse implantation where Foucault vaguely 
discusses medical institutions in relation to ‘mysterious physiology’. Neural 
implantations are underpinned by truth claims made in relation to purported 
differences in specific areas of the brain. This is despite the fact that, as Rose and Abi-
Rached note, ‘each of the pathways that neuropsychiatry has attempted to trace 
through the brain seems to run, not into the bright uplands of clarity, but into the 
murky, damp, misty, and mysterious forests of uncertainty’.131 With two lots of 
‘mysterious’ biology it would be convenient to argue that brain scans captioned 
‘schizophrenic’ or ‘depressed’ are technologically advanced, neo-Victorian facsimiles 
of the photographs Jean-Martin Charcot produced at the Salpêtrière, but to do so 
misses the point.132 Whether or not material bases are real or phantom does not 
 
131 Rose and Abi-Rached, Neuro, p.130. 
132 See, Georges Didi-Huberman, Invention of Hysteria: Charcot and the Photographic Iconography of 
the Salpêtrière, trans. by Alisa Hartz (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 2003). 
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really impinge on neural implantations because they contain and produce powerful 
disciplinary and biopolitical truth claims nonetheless.133  
I argue that biopolitical imperatives and disciplinary techniques are central to 
the emergence of the neural implantation. Through the lessons from lesions 
approach, brain difference produces the norm and subsequently exists aside from it 
through disciplinary mechanisms of normalisation and surveillance. The neuro-turn 
in culture and society sees us become fascinated, anxious, and self-accessorising over 
the working, mis-working, and potential of the brain, typified by the introductory 
Fiona Phillips’ quotation. Thus, while neural implantations are an inherently 
individualising event, everybody shares in the power of the neural implantation 
because we collectively speculate, regulate, and recognise brain difference. 
Moreover, neural implantations are governed, and indeed govern. State services 
centre around the brain as the locus for a host of social ills, biotechnology firms 
regale its potential for enhancing ‘useful’ difference, the law decides on right-to-die 
cases, and we self-govern our brains to either prevent, navigate, or produce brain 
and cognitive difference. For those with cognitive difference, implantation refers to 
more than atypical cognition, lived experience, or subjectivity. As mentioned, the 
decreased life expectancy for autistic people stems from systemic ableism, poverty, 
poor education, and under funding of resources. Moreover, the medical and 
pathological gaze bound to and underpinning implantations reduces the uniqueness 
 
133In his medical history of the PET scan Joseph Dumit puts this kind of disciplinary power down to 
the familiarity of the imagery. He writes: ‘the visuality of these images, their apparent familiarity and 
their transparency with regard to the brain all contribute to the potency of PET claims’ (p.58). 
Extrapolating this into the model of the neural implantation, it does not so much matter whether 
the science is correct, more just that it seems to be. Joseph Dumit, Picturing Personhood: Brain 
Scans and Biomedical Identity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).  
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of individual subjectivity – effecting a flattening of those implanted into the neural 
phantom narratives associated with their diagnoses. This is what I refer to when I talk 
of a contemporary biopolitics of the brain and cognitive difference. 
With this in mind, it is imperative that other narratives prioritizing 
personhood and subjectivity over strictly biomedical models are written and 
scrutinised. This is why, existing in the neural implantation, is the space to resist and 
evade the neuromolecular gaze and its biopolitical imperatives, and a vitalising and 
life affirming pleasure in such reclamation and re-subjectification. It is because the 
neural implantation represents more than an epistemological model of pathology or 
difference, because it is also an ontological process of subjectification, because of its 
conjunction with, and formation from, cultural scripts, phantoms of the brain, 
economisation, and ideology that there is scope for re-definition and affirmative 
agency from within the implantation itself. Not through Malabou’s abstract plastic 
model of metamorphosis, but through particular discursive and cultural shifts. It is 
for this reason that I consider how the properties of crime fiction (across a range of 
media) can work to help us all think differently about brain and cognitive difference.  
Neuro-Crime Fiction134 
 
Crime fiction has a rich history of this interdisciplinary dialogue given the historical 
development of the genre correlates with developments in the biopolitical compact 
between medical and legal establishments, and the state.135 For instance, D. A 
 
134 Parts of this section have been published elsewhere; Spencer Meeks, ‘Neuro-Crime Fiction: 
Detecting Cognitive Difference’, in Crime Fiction Studies, 1.1 (2020), 79-95. 
135 See Lucy Burke, ‘Genetics at the Scene of the Crime: DeCODING Tainted Blood’, in Journal of 
Literary and Cultural Disability Studies, 6.2 (2012), 193-208 (p.200). 
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Miller’s influential reading of the police in Victorian novels highlights the intersection 
of Foucauldian disciplinary powers within the form and themes of the novel. His 
central thesis is that police power is elided in the narratives, not by the absence of 
the police, but because their disciplinary powers have become internalised into the 
plot.136 Ronald Thomas similarly argues that detective fiction developed alongside 
the modern police force and the bureaucratic state.137 He looks specifically at then 
new techniques of analysing and detecting the body (fingerprinting, profiling, and 
photography) to argue that they are specifically readerly techniques. This move 
allows Thomas to link the rise of the literary detective with the rise of new detective 
technology, in his words, such techniques ‘convert the body into a text to be read’.138 
This is important, he explains, because despite their claims to objectivity, these 
techniques are inherently politicised in the texts, in which deployment often detects 
colonial or racial otherness. Thomas’ is a useful model in linking the figure of the 
detective – bearing in mind Miller’s emphasis on internalisation of the detection – to 
the biopolitics of the social body. It thus provides a critical foundation for the ways I 
employ crime fiction to explicate the effects of neural implantations. Moreover, 
while indebted to Miller, Thomas’s move is to re-align the power structures in the 
novel, arguing that Miller’s figuration of the novel is too conservative in positing its 
discursive networks as ‘too singular and monolithic an ideological force’.139 In other 
words, Miller’s reading holds internalised disciplinary surveillance as a fait accompli; 
 
136 D. A. Miller, The Novel and the Police (Berkley: University of California Press, 1988), p.43. 
137 Ronald Thomas, Detective Fiction and the Rise of Forensic Science (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), p.4. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. p.14. 
67 
 
however, Thomas suggests that detective fiction both reinforces and resists the 
power structures that are integral to it. 
 Like the neural implantation, the crime genre’s development depends on the 
construction and critique of the norm. Reading Lennard Davis and William 
Greenslade, Burke simultaneously ties the genre’s early thematic fascination with 
‘spectacular physiological markers’ of criminality to the eugenicist works of Cesare 
Lombroso, as well as highlighting the form’s dependence ‘on the formation of a 
concept of normalcy and its putative relationship to law, order, and social 
acceptability’.140 In other words, the lessons from lesions approach adopted by 
Lombroso identified physical markers of deviance, which embedded into the 
structure of early detective novels to become the hunt for the ‘scientifically’ 
corroborated deviant. Yet, like Thomas, Burke maintains that this does not preclude 
an ideological critique of the very norms that it imbues, because to do so ‘fails to 
capture the ways in which generic conventions are expressed, manipulated, and 
played with’ in regards to challenging normative assumptions.141 This is what Heather 
Worthington notes as being the genre’s ability to ‘bring clearly into view the 
structures of power in society and the ideologies that promulgate and support’ such 
normative structures.142 I extend this theoretical vein by highlighting how the 
nineteenth century disciplinary and biopolitical shifts that informed Foucault’s 
description of the perverse implantation were similarly foundational to the crime 
genre’s evolution. I argue that where Foucault describes the proliferation of perverse 
 
140 Burke, ‘Genetics at the Scene of the Crime’, p.200; Lennard Davis, Enforcing Normalcy: Disability, 
Deafness, and the Body (London: Verso, 1995); William P. Greenslade, Degeneration, Culture, and 
the Novel: 1880-1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
141 Burke, ‘Genetics at the scene of the Crime’, p.200. 
142 Heather Worthington, Key Concepts in Crime Fiction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p.x. 
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or deviant categories in the nineteenth century, the same multiplicity is true for the 
kinds of subjects and plots crime fiction became invested in. Indeed, as I have argued 
elsewhere ‘crime fiction continues to develop alongside medicine, science, and 
technology and its texts are important tools for analysing and critiquing hegemonic 
biopolitical imperatives and the scientific truth claims underpinning them’.143 
For instance, it is possible to broadly trace the neuro-turn’s influence on some 
of the forms and interests of the genre, particularly in regard to the ‘psychological 
thriller’. On the development from Victorian and golden age generic bourgeois 
anxieties over household property, Worthington notes that ‘over the twentieth 
century, the threat to property has become more personal, and what is now at stake 
in many crime fiction novels is the ultimate property, that is, the self’.144 This is 
undoubtedly due to the influence of psychology and psychoanalysis in society and 
culture over the twentieth century.145 However, as argued, the neuro-turn has seen 
contemporary models of subjectivity and personhood become increasingly 
indivisible from the models emerging from neuroscience. Lee Horsley writes that the 
serial killer sub-genre most closely reflects the trauma culture that dominated the 
late twentieth-century and opened ‘our gaze [to] the wounded psyche of the killer 
whose aberrations are expressed in the wounds he inflicts on others’.146  
 
143 Meeks, p.81. 
144 Worthington, p.xxii. 
145 Jan De Vos uses ‘psychologization’ to refer to psychology’s influence throughout the twentieth 
century and its role in forming the subject of late modernity. Similarly, Adam Curtis’s documentary 
The Century of the Self (2002) depicts the extent to which Freud’s theories shaped the twentieth 
century. Jan De Vos, Psychologization and the Subject of Late Modernity (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013); The Century of the Self prod. by Adam Curtis, BBC (2002).  
146 Lee Horsley, Twentieth Century Crime Fiction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.118. 
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I argue that ‘what is now at stake’ in some contemporary crime fiction is not 
only the self, but more specifically, the self which is located at the site of the brain 
and its processes. Thus, I augment and update Horsley’s work by arguing it is 
decreasingly the ‘wounded psyche’ of the serial killer that forms the catalytic basis of 
such thriller narratives and increasingly differences in the brain. I posit that in crime 
fiction today, a shift from ‘psychological’ to ‘neurological’ thrillers is emerging as a 
result of the neural implantation, in which criminal action or intent arise from brain 
difference rather than wounded psyches. In other words, psychological (often 
traumatic) history is displaced as the catalyst of crime, with material differences, 
diseases, or disorders as its replacement. This is both profoundly disturbing – it could, 
like a tumour, happen to anybody – but also neutralising in its inherent ambivalence 
– it really could, like a tumour, happen to anybody. The neurological thriller is one of 
the main crime narrative forms to have emerged amongst the neuro-turn and are 
closely analysed in the rest of this thesis alongside detective/mystery narratives and 
courtroom dramas. 
It is for this reason that I coin this emerging sub-genre ‘neuro-crime’ fiction. 
As an extension to the neuronovel criticism reviewed above that demarcates the shift 
in fiction, particularly literary fiction, to the kinds of models and explanations of the 
self that encapsulate the neuro-turn, I highlight a similar shift in crime fiction. In its 
most simple terms, much recent crime fiction ‘celebrates, adapts, and critiques 
neuroscientific discourse’.147 Above I outline how the genre has and continues to 
evolve alongside biopolitical shifts; however, it is worth noting that this is not 
 
147 Meeks, ‘Neuro-Crime Fiction’, p.81. 
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epistemologically unidirectional. As I have argued elsewhere, popular neurological 
case histories have strong ties to the form of detective fiction and find their popular 
genesis in the psychoanalytic studies of Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud; their 
presentation of an initial neurosis and the subsequent explanation mirrors the 
contemporary form of Arthur Conan Doyle’s The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes.148 
This is important because it highlights how the two epistemologies are in a ‘symbiotic 
relationship […] in which the particularities of the genre are employed by science 
while science influences the forms of crime fiction’, fostering the kind of critically 
interactive praxis I adopt in the following chapters.149  
As I note, neural implantations create powerful biopolitical and ontological 
subjective effects (lower life expectancy/implanted and internalised feelings of 
otherness), as well as implanting radical opportunities to resist these. It is worth 
highlighting Peter Messent’s assessment of crime fiction which, I argue, mirrors this 
model of simultaneous normalising subjectification and atypical resistance; crime 
fiction can ‘protect and sustain the social order but […] can also (often, paradoxically, 
at one and the same time) work in a more radical and challenging way’.150 This 
generic ambivalence is important because, in much the same way that brain and 
cognitive difference implants into brains, bodies, and subjectivities, I argue that they 
implant into contemporary neuro-crime fiction. This thesis will show how the very 
 
148 Ibid. pp.81-2. I also extent this argument by looking at the Abigail Marsh’s Good for Nothing, 
which continues this adoption of the forms and style of the crime genre.  
149 Ibid. In the article I outline both how crime fiction has developed alongside neuroscience, but also 
how neuroscientific writing has been influenced by the properties and style of crime fiction.  
150 Peter Messent, The Crime Fiction Handbook (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), p.12. Many 
crime fiction scholars echo this. See also Lee Horsley, Twentieth Century Crime Fiction (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), p.158; Worthington, Key Concepts in Crime Fiction, p.ix; Nicole 
Rafter, Shots in the Mirror: Crime Films and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p.13. 
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structures and conventions of the genre can develop because of their assimilation 
with neuroscience, as well as how they are sites to resist the medical model. Quite 
simply, as ontologies and subjectivities transform in individuals because of the 
biopolitics of implantations, the same biopolitics can see the bodies of these texts 
similarly transform, which can then be put to work to critique the biopolitical 
imperatives themselves.  
It is important to foreground that the texts I consider are from the Global 
North, namely the USA, UK, Australia, and Sweden. The main reason for this is that 
the neural implantation is generally a Global North phenomenon. This is not to say 
that these kinds of ontological and epistemological implantations of difference are 
exclusive to more economically developed countries, indeed by their nature these 
kinds of brain and cognitive difference are meant to be universal. Indeed, China Mills 
makes it clear that there is an expansive global drive from the World Health 
Organisation to diagnose mental illness and distress to close the gap between mental 
and physical health, leading to a scaling up of neurological diagnoses.151 The tool they 
use is the ‘Mental Health Gap Action Programme’ (mhGAP), and is employed in local 
situations as a ready reckoner for diagnosing neurological illness. However, Mills’ 
criticism is linguistic, explaining ‘distress’, one of mhGAP’s symptoms for emotional 
disorders, means different things to different peoples and cultures. Its appropriation 
in different contexts can further a pathologising ‘‘top down’ approach that reasserts 
colonial assumptions about Western expertise and superiority’.152 This is precisely 
 
151 China Mills, ‘From ‘Invisible Problem’ to Global Priority: The Inclusion of Mental Health in the 
Sustainable Development Goals’, Development and Change, 49.3 (2018), 843-866. 
152 Ibid. p.851. 
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the problem. This is not to say that the Global North embodies a unified response to 
the neural implantation. Any glib assumption of homogeneity is belied by very 
different types of national or individual health care systems, and different cultural 
understandings of difference or illness. It is, however, to say that institutional and 
biotechnological imperatives underpinning neural implantations have become fairly 
cohesive in the Global North.  
Rose and Abi-Rached document the historical differences between US, UK, 
and French development of neuroscience, but maintain the neuromolecular gaze 
now represents ‘a common vison of life itself’.153 In 2013 the European Union and 
USA respectively launched the European Human Brain Project (HBP) and the BRAIN 
Initiative. Both share nearly identical research goals and a common ethical vision. The 
HBP will ‘ensure that the HBP’s work is undertaken responsibly and that it benefits 
society’, with BRAIN noting: ‘although brain research entails ethical issues that are 
common to other areas of biomedical science, it entails special ethical considerations 
as well. Because the brain gives rise to consciousness, our innermost thoughts and 
our most basic human needs, mechanistic studies of the brain have already resulted 
in new social and ethical questions’.154 Moreover, the West, and America in 
particular, has a more defined cultural and medical history of psychology and 
psychiatry. In other words, for much of the Global North, a recognizable history of 
psychological differences has become, following the neuro-turn, an implantation of 
neurological differences. The epistemological and ontological effects may be 
 
153 Rose and Abi-Rached, ‘The Birth of the Neuromolecular Gaze’, p.13. 
154 ‘Overview’, Human Brain Project online 
<https://www.humanbrainproject.eu/en/science/overview/> [accessed 18 February 2019]; 
‘Neuroethics Working Group’, The BRAIN Initiative online 
<https://www.braininitiative.nih.gov/about/neuroethics.htm> [accessed 18 February 2019]. 
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profound, but the relative ease at which they assimilate into society and culture is, I 
argue, in part due to the cultural interest and fascination with the mind in the 
twentieth century. This can be seen in the various psychological phantoms of 
enhancement, autism, and dementia with which crime narratives interact. 
The fictional crime forms I consider, detective, mystery, thriller, and 
courtroom drama are ubiquitous and often formulaic. By manipulating these latent 
expectations, the expectations and associations of cognitive difference can also be 
subverted. For example, that crime fiction is itself guilty of perpetuating and 
fabricating stereotypes of brain and cognitive difference is undeniable; a whole range 
of brain and cognitive difference has been used as a symbolic shorthand for 
criminality and evil. However, more recently, as explored in chapters two and three, 
brain difference does not constitute criminality as such, rather it associates with it 
and in doing so exposes ethical and legal schisms between normative and difference 
models of brain function. In such cases, brain difference become associations or 
objects that drive and produce criminal acts or investigation precisely because of the 
nature of atypicality itself. In other words, the atypical person does not commit a 
crime, but becomes a catalyst because of their unique neurobiology. This situates 
brain difference outside the commission of a crime, but inside the biopolitical 
structures that investigate crime. In doing so, comparisons can be drawn between 
the criminal operations of the law, society, science and medicine, and their 
similarities to the disciplinary techniques involved with neural implantations. In other 
words, that the stakes inherent to crime fiction are so precarious (guilty/innocent, 
legal/illegal) exposes the precarity of the biopolitical stakes involved in the neural 
implantation. For better or worse, through nuance or stereotype, in neuro-crime 
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fiction the difference and biopolitical underpinnings are the driving focus of study, 
investigation, and fascination, highlighting the ways in which difference is ‘handled’ 
and understood in culture more generally. What I identify in such crime fiction is both 
its emergence as a means for those non-implanted to understand, self-accessorise, 
probe, and surveil the social and cultural anxieties developing from the neural 
implantation, and conversely, an ideological critique of these normative anxieties 
and fascinations and a space for resistance and re-subjectification. This generic ability 
can be seen in an overview of the arguments I make across the following three 
chapters of the thesis. 
Chapter Summaries 
 
Chapter one looks at how cognitive enhancement, the idea that neurotechnology 
and pharmaceuticals can ‘increase’ the brain’s functional power, translates into 
society and culture. It takes as its starting point that these are promissory 
technologies that represent progress, at either an individual level or at a species level 
with the idea of trans- or posthuman futures. I respectively explore these through 
close readings of the film Limitless (Neil Burger, 2011) and Ramez Naam’s novel 
Nexus (2012). I argue that both texts establish neural implantations of enhanced 
subjectivity via the ingestion of a pharmaceutical pill and come to reflect different 
aspects of an ‘idealised’ brain and cognitive state representative of improvements to 
normality. Coupled with the real neuroscience and technology from which it takes its 
inspiration, it is this imagined notion of ‘going beyond’ the norm which demarcates 
the enhanced subject as an effect of neural implantation and which is paramount in 
understanding the meaning produced in these texts. To contextualize, the chapter 
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offers a timeline of enhancement fiction to explain how these have developed from 
a biopolitical focus on normalization, to this recent turn that sees the normal 
enhanced into a kind of ‘ideal’. It then makes an important intervention by 
differentiating between types of thrillers, explaining the difference between ‘neuro-
thrillers’ that focus on technology and ‘neurological thrillers’ that focus on 
pathologized states of difference. 
 The reading of Limitless is reflective of the way neuroscientific epistemologies 
have become entwined with neoliberal biopolitics as detailed above. It focusses on 
Eddie, a middle-aged white man who is given an experimental drug that causes his 
cognitive functioning dramatically to increase. I argue that Eddie’s subjectivity and 
the film imbibe a neoliberal version of enhancement at both a neuro-molecular and 
narrative level. I develop the concept of a ‘plastic narrative’ – making reference to 
the above criticism of Malabou’s plasticity – to reflect the link between Pitts-Taylor’s 
description of the plastic brain’s ‘need for newness’ with Eddie’s metamorphic 
narrative and the film’s seeming inability to come to a full stop. It highlights both the 
endemic nature of crime in the film and the playful tone in which Eddie’s criminal 
activity is rendered to mount not only a critique of this individual and neoliberal 
notion of enhancement, but, read otherwise, a reflection of the fatigue towards 
neoliberal narratives as reflective in the emergence of populist discourses today.  
 I subsequently consider Nexus, a novel similarly about the promise of 
enhancement but here imagined as ‘improving’ at a social or species wide level with 
dominant posthuman themes. The novel continues Limitless’s work by explicating 
the kind of biopolitics and ideologies involved when enhancement becomes a much 
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more quotidian technology. In this imagined future, conservative and populist US 
politics restrict the use of neuroscience and prohibit use of the drug, whereas China 
and the East more generally are imagined as much more liberal in their view of 
neurotechnology. Underpinned by Fredric Jameson’s work on utopia, it seeks to 
understand what this text tells us about enhanced subjectivity and the material 
present. Its oscillation between utopia and dystopia establishes a cautiously hopeful 
ending; however, I argue the drug’s ‘progressive’ aims of either increasing human 
empathy or as an evolutionary step-forward ultimately prove themselves to be siren 
calls whereby any attempt to enhance into a more collective/social future in fact only 
exacerbate the kind of hierarchical and prejudicial problems people with cognitive 
difference experience today. 
 Chapter two focusses on social and cultural perceptions of autism as a 
category and considers the kinds of neural implantations and subjects emerging 
alongside contemporary biopolitical imperatives. It begins with reference to the 
literary critic Stuart Murray whose seminal 2008 work on autistic representation 
sought to analyze the most meaningful and culturally resonant depictions of autism. 
I focus particularly on his notion of the ‘autism event’ by which he means cultural 
texts that have most impacted upon how we think about autism. These include Mark 
Haddon’s The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time (2003) and cultural 
legacies of the figuration of the autist as idiot-savant.155 I make a critical intervention 
by updating Murray through a sustained media analysis showing that the poles of 
representation have further refined from the idiot-savant paradigm into figurations 
 
155 Stuart Murray, Representing Autism: Culture, Narrative, Fascination, (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2008), pp. 12-13. 
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of the ‘autistic shooter’ and the ‘autistic hacker’. These contemporary figures emerge 
from the autistic phantoms of the brain that Murray analyses, and represent the 
complicated and prejudicial poles that autistic representation inhabits: violent and 
suspicious, and atypically brilliant. Online comments on the media articles play out 
like an open court in which autism is being tried; thus, the chapter looks at the 
conventions of courtroom dramas to look at the discrepancy between how real and 
fictional law comes to bear on autistic subjectivity to highlight how the fictional court 
can be a site for subjective or discursive resistance to imputation prejudice. 
 Looking first at Jodi Picoult’s House Rules (2010) as exemplary of the autistic 
shooter paradigm, it highlights how autistic subjectivity is given little agency, and 
describes the novel as a ‘feel bad’ narrative in which the court’s portrayal of autism 
as either a signifier of insanity or pathological violence elicits an ethical response 
from the reader. Ultimately, I argue this feel-bad narrative forces the biopolitical 
imperatives surrounding autism and its implantations to take the stand and answer 
for the ways in which autistic subjects are often dominated or othered in society. The 
chapter shifts to representations of the hacker, a figure imbued with much more 
agency and dynamism. It first considers Lisbeth Salander from Stieg Larsson’s 
Millennium series (2007-09 in English translation) whose autism is celebrated as a 
mode of subjective agency and escape in the face of biopolitical state mechanisms 
that seek to control her. Autism here is not guilty, but vital, in terms of both life and 
plotting. Salander is the hero whose autistic expression not only saves herself and 
her friends, but which also creates a kind of techno-hacking nemesis against the 
global hubris of political power and greed. The chapter concludes with a close reading 
of the Australian television series The Code (2014-16), in which Jesse Banks, an 
78 
 
autistic hacker on license, finds himself embroiled in a government coverup. The 
narrative establishes the viewer in the position of disciplinary spectator of Jesse’s 
autism whist simultaneously depicting Jesse’s subjectivity, effecting a 
problematization of normative and normalizing cognitive assumptions. I counterpose 
the visuals of Jesse’s narrative with that of Limitless to argue that his subjectivity 
offers a cultural antidote to the ethical void Eddie’s narrative conveys.  
 The third chapter tackles the dominant pathological or medical model of 
dementia diseases. This model frames people living with dementia as abject others; 
those who remind us of our own mortality and who represent a damaged and 
degrading life, those who are constructed as an expensive drain on an ever-
worsening health care crisis, those who are figured as a brain pathology to fight 
against. It argues that in contemporary neuro-society dementia subjects and their 
subjectivity represent for many the neurological worst-case scenario, with discourses 
of euthanasia and assisted suicide invariably aligning with dementia diseases. The 
chapter addresses this through a close reading of how the narrative of two 
detective/mystery novels – Emma Healey’s Elizabeth is Missing (2014) and Alice 
LaPlante’s Turn of Mind (2011) – adopt a generically different structure which 
emphasizes and privileges present subjective experience over the pathologizing 
medical gaze. 
 The chapter mounts a critique of Malabou’s work on Alzheimer’s which 
argues that the reality of dementia reflects the destruction of identity. Her reading 
of plasticity holds that, whether productive or destructive, once a neurological 
change occurs it cannot be reversed, hence chapter one’s theorization of the future 
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oriented plastic narrative. I challenge this through close readings of the novels’ 
narrative structures which, in difference to Malabou’s model, inherently rely on the 
ability to return to previous elements of plotting. Reading Peter Brooks’ 
psychoanalytic understanding of plots, I conceptualize the idea of an ‘elastic 
narrative’ to refer to the elliptical nature of the texts. I argue that, far from a tragic 
story of degradation and forgetfulness, Elizabeth is Missing’s protagonist Maud (who 
lives with dementia) should be read as a dynamic, investigative sleuth whose atypical 
and elliptical nature must be understood through her phenomenological atypical 
experience. In being such a starkly different first person narration, Maud’s 
perspective forces the reader to suspend normative reading expectation and travel, 
atypically, with her as she solves the historic disappearance of her sister. 
 Turn of Mind offers a different account of dementia subjectivity in that the 
reader is unsure whether the dementia protagonist is a killer. The narrative thrillingly 
explores the biopolitical machinations that come to bear on cognitive differences 
such as dementia and is a vital text for understanding the gap between how society 
views dementia and the need to recognize and prioritize individual subjective 
accounts. The middle of the novel sees a shift in perspective, whereby the 
protagonist adopts a second person narrative style, which I argue is reflective of her 
need to escape the ‘I’ that has become so tainted with prejudice and internalized and 
implanted feelings of shame and defeat. 
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Chapter One: Pill-popping Narratives of Cognitive 
Enhancement 
In 2017, news of a US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) funded 
device that could increase learning speeds by 40% circulated. The Daily Mail (online) 
ran the headline: ‘The headband that makes you smarter: US military reveals a 
bizarre device that increases learning by 40% - and it could be commonly used by 
2022’.1 Futurism ran the same story online, explaining that stimulation of the 
prefrontal cortex in macaques led to a 40% increase in learning speed. Reportage of 
the device focussed explicitly on the notion of cognitive enhancement as science 
fiction made material reality: 
The ability to increase one’s brain function almost instantaneously is no doubt 
appealing. As such, the concept has been a fixture of science fiction for decades 
(see: ‘Flowers for Algernon,’ ‘Limitless’), but advancements in technology seem 
to be bringing us closer to a future in which quickly levelling-up intelligence is 
a real possibility.2 
DARPA works with the BRAIN Initiative, a multi-billion dollar US research centre, of 
which one of their research areas is the Targeted Neuroplasticity Training (TNT) 
program. They explain: ‘the program is […] notable because, unlike many of DARPA’s 
previous neuroscience and neurotechnology endeavors, it will aim not just to restore 
lost function but to advance capabilities beyond normal levels’.3 This idea of going 
beyond ‘normal’ levels is central to this chapter’s discussion of plasticity and the 
 
1 Shivali Best, ‘The headband that makes you smarter: US military reveals a bizarre device that 
increases learning by 40% - and it could be commonly used by 2022’, Daily Mail, 23 October 2017 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-5008179/Darpa-reveals-device-increases-learning-
40.html> [accessed 26 February 2018]. 
2 Dom Galeon, ‘DARPA’s New Brain Device Increases Learning Speed by 40%’, Futurism, 26 October 
2017, <https://futurism.com/darpas-new-brain-device-increases-learning-speed-by-40/> [accessed 
26 February 2018]. 
3 ‘Boosting Synaptic Plasticity to Accelerate Learning’, DARPA, 16 May 2016, 
<https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2016-03-16> [accessed 26 February 2018]. 
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enhanced human. Three years prior to the article on DARPA’s headband, the Daily 
Mail ran: ‘The real-life Limitless pill? Drug helps adults learn as fast as children by 
making the brain more ‘elastic’’.4 Again, the blurring of reality and fiction with the 
reference to the film Limitless (2011) is evident here, but also this idea of returning 
to youth/fighting aging which is typical of the discourse surrounding the plastic 
conception of the brain.5  
 Such articles feed into a broader cultural discourse of neuroplasticity. Health, 
wealth, intelligence, expedience, success, and the future, are some of the primary 
appropriations of this glossy, marketized neuroplasticity. Neuroplasticity is the 
dynamic process in which parts of the neural system change or reorganise over time. 
Whilst the process is most active during early-years development, it has been found 
to continue throughout adulthood as well. Raz Yirmiya and Inbal Goshen call this 
ability and process ‘the most amazing and wonderful capacity of the brain to adapt 
to the ever changing environment via learning and memory’.6 The epistemological 
importance of neuroplasticity emerges in collocation with the signifying power of the 
brain scan image, so much so that Peter J. Whitehouse writes that ‘if the 
neuroimaging is the face of the neuroscientific turn, then neuroplasticity is certainly 
 
4 Victoria Woollaston, ‘The real-life Limitless pill? Drug helps adults learn as fast as children by 
making the brain more 'elastic', Daily Mail, 31 May 2014, 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2593268/The-drug-helps-adults-learn-fast-
children.html> [accessed 26 February 2018]. 
5 An opinion piece in The New York Times headed ‘Return to the Teenage Brain’ similarly celebrates 
the opportunities of neuroplasticity as a means of combatting aging. Richard A. Friedman, ‘Return to 
the Teenage Brain’, New York Times, 8 October 2016, 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/09/opinion/return-to-the-teenage-brain.html> [accessed 26 
February 2018]. 
6 Raz Yirmiya and Inbal Goshen, ‘Immune modulation of learning, memory, neural plasticity and 
neurogenesis’, Brain, Behavoir, and Immunity, 25.2 (2011), 181-213 (p.182) 
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its underlying central dogma’.7 The notion of the plastic brain is becoming a central 
element in contemporary conceptions of subjectivity and personhood, a self that is 
endlessly malleable and resilient that is able to re-form and improve even after 
material trauma, such as after a stroke. As the neuro-turn and the brain’s workings 
become more prominent in society and culture, we are encouraged to eat omega-3, 
train our brains with puzzles, exercise, and reduce stress levels, all in the name of 
neuromolecular health.8 
This chapter is particularly interested in exploring the biopolitical imperatives 
underpinning technology such as DARPA’s. It does this to understand the kinds of 
subjects such neuro-technology produce, which it will do through close readings of 
two recent cognitive enhancement thrillers, Neil Burger’s film Limitless (2011), and 
Ramez Naam’s novel Nexus (2012).9 This thesis aims to map the contemporary 
cultural representation of cognitive and brain difference, of which notions of the 
enhanced human are some of the most popular narratives today. Moreover, 
according to technological projections and media speculation neural implantations 
of enhancement are imminent.10 These subjects are unlikely to be a pathological 
matter, which is the crucial point this chapter makes; these by nature are ‘enhanced’, 
which is to say at least superficially improved or ideologically considered better than 
 
7 Peter J. Whitehouse, ‘A Clinical Neuroscientist Looks Neuroskeptically at Neuroethics in the 
Neuroworld’, in The Neuroscientific Turn, ed. by Melissa M. Littlefield Littlefield and Jenell M. 
Johnson, pp.199-215 (p.205). 
8 Chapter three’s exploration of dementia considers this in detail. Indeed, the US Alzheimer’s 
Association website lists key ways to maintain ‘brain health’, including exercise, diet, mental activity, 
and sociality. <https://www.alz.org/help-support/brain_health> [accessed 9 December 2019]. 
9 Limitless, dir. by. Neil Berger (Relativity, 2011); Ramez Naam, Nexus (Nottingham: Angry Robot, 
2013). 
10 Aside from this chapter’s case studies of Limitless and Nexus, see contemporary television shows 
such as Black Mirror (Charlie Brooker, 2011-) and Years and Years (Russell T Davies, 2019); see above 
articles speculating on the imminent availability of enhancement technologies. 
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the ‘norm’.  Following Rose and Abi-Rached, I understand ‘normal’ cognition to be a 
construction of the identification, measurement, and categorisation of cognitive 
difference (dementia, autism, schizophrenia and so forth).11  These differences have 
historically been viewed as subtractions from the very norms they establish, which is 
to say in some way as cognitively ‘deficient’, whereas I argue enhancement comes to 
be an addition to it, an ‘improvement’ on normality in the name of ‘progress’. 
Extrapolating Lennard Davis’ account of the creation of the ‘norm’ as resulting from 
the shift from an ‘ideal’ and unattainable conception of the body/self to a statistical 
set of averages is enlightening here.12 Cognitive enhancement sees a return to ideas 
of the unattainable ‘ideal’ but made (at least theoretically) materially possible. The 
unattainable ideal becomes encapsulated in the potential of a better brain. What is 
being critiqued in this chapter is not the biological fact of neuroplasticity or 
enhancement (nor its potential for therapeutic benefits), but the formation of the 
enhanced subject as a socio-political and economic construct – one that works and 
influences precisely because it is established as exclusive, ideal, and even as an 
evolutionary step-forward. The ethical problems are apparent: if enhancement is 
exclusive, what becomes of those economically, biologically, or culturally excluded? 
This chapter explores the representation of enhancement today. In Limitless, 
it is exclusive and reflects the neoliberal biopolitics in which its fictional imagining 
exists. Such biopolitics forestall the possibility of the kind of radical systemic change 
that Catherine Malabou sees in neuroplasticity, rather entrenching ideas of 
 
11 This is what they refer to as the ‘lessons from lesions’ approach. Neuro, pp.204-6.  
12 Davis explains of disability how in pre-industrial times the ‘ideal’ preceded the modern 
understanding of the norm. Lennard J. Davis, ‘Normality, Power, and Culture’ (p.2). 
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individuality, speculative futures, and the economisation of life at the site of the 
brain. Alongside this, I argue that given the new forms of populist politics emerging 
as frustrated responses to the hollow repetitions of neoliberalism, new 
representations of plasticity and enhancement are coming to the fore. On the one 
hand, there is a reaction against experts and science in the Global North, no more 
evident than in the anti-vaccination movement. In novels like Nexus, this distrust sees 
the freedom and malleability represented by the enhanced/plastic brain become 
suspect, concerning, and fearful, which marks a return to Cathy Gere’s identification 
of US Cold War anxieties over plasticity’s potential for brainwashing.13 On the other 
hand, plasticity and enhancement is finding a collective expression, one that does 
not stress individual adaptability but a more symbiotic exchange with other people 
and environments. Each of these politicised expressions of plasticity and 
enhancement will be subject to a close textual analysis.  
This chapter first sketches a brief timeline of fictional representations of 
enhancement and any evolutions in ideological and biopolitical underpinnings, 
before detailing why such fictions are useful sites through which to evaluate how we 
understand enhancement today. It develops a close reading of Limitless in order to 
argue that enhancement here represents a neoliberal subjectivity pushed beyond 
natural (the material brain) and theoretical (neoliberal ideology) limits. It does this 
by postulating the concept of a ‘plastic narrative’ which reflects the protagonist’s 
constant metamorphosis via enhancement in dialogue with Malabou’s theory of 
plasticity. It subsequently considers Nexus’s speculative future which, following 
 
13 Gere, ‘Plasticity, Pathology, and Pleasure in Cold War America’. 
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Fredric Jameson’s argument that speculative fiction speaks more to the material 
present during which they are written, imagines a speculative end-point of what our 
contemporary treatment and view of enhancement may become, with reference to 
today’s populist ideologies towards self, science, and society, as well as promises and 
fears of trans- and posthumanism. 
Fictions of Enhancement 
 
Fiction allows a space for the imagination of enhanced subjectivities and an 
evaluation of the kinds of biopolitical imperatives underpinning them. These 
imperatives and ideologies are foundational to the construction of neuro-molecular 
identities and the kind of phenomenological subjectivities these elicit. Yuval Noah 
Harari’s popular book Homo Deus - a theoretical account of the future of man, or 
what he terms, echoing Jameson’s Archaeologies of the Future, the ‘history of 
tomorrow’ - is worth quoting from at length in this regard.14 Of the future 
intersection of bioscience, society, and culture he writes:  
During the twenty-first century the border between history and biology is likely 
to blur not because we will discover biological explanations for historical 
events, but rather because ideological fictions will rewrite DNA strands; 
political and economic interests will redesign the climate; and the geography 
of mountains and rivers will give way to cyberspace. As human fictions are 
translated into genetic and electronic codes, the intersubjective reality will 
swallow up the objective reality and biology will merge with history. In the 
twenty-first century fiction might thereby become the most potent force on 
earth, surpassing even wayward asteroids and natural selection. Hence if we 
want to understand our future, cracking genomes and crunching numbers is 
hardly enough. We must also decipher the fictions that give meaning to the 
world.15 
 
14 Fredric Jameson, Archelogies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions 
(London: Verso Press, 2005). 
15 Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (London: Vintage, 2017), p.177. 
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As with medicine and diagnosis, Harari notes how biology more generally is 
considered fact up until it becomes fictionalised. ‘Raw’, ‘objective’ data quickly 
becomes enmeshed in a biopolitical haze replete with ideology, lobbyists, religion 
and so on; indeed, the very impetus for beginning such research often comes from 
the same biopolitical actors which have vested economic interests. Fiction, for Harari, 
is a powerful epistemology that could see the putatively ‘objective’ idea of science 
become re-written by social or political discourses as discussed in the introduction 
regarding Metzl’s genealogy of Prozac, or in my reading of how fictional narratives 
establish deviant pathological models of trans subjectivity.16  
 I supplement Harari’s account by noting that this objectivity is always already 
created in dialogue with such fictions, not only once it has left the neutrality of clinics 
or laboratories, but from its inception. This is why my model of the neural 
implantation takes as its starting point science and culture’s intractable 
entwinement. Harari’s account of fiction and emergent and future technology is 
important for my work on enhancement. I take his argument that ‘fiction might 
thereby become the most potent force on earth’ as a provocative epistemological 
challenge against the hegemonic belief in scientific models and explanations over 
cultural or human narratives – a belief encapsulated by Fiona Phillips’ response to 
brain-based explanations of mindfulness. 
To this extent, I argue that fictional enhancement narratives, particularly in 
the crime and thriller genre, are useful critical tools that highlight both the changing 
nature of what we mean by enhancement, and the biopolitical contexts underpinning 
 
16 See introduction, footnote 88. 
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these changes. A brief survey of some exemplary texts is useful in detailing this, which 
I divide into three groups, ‘change from deficit’, ‘change in reality’, and ‘change 
towards enhancement’. The first group refers to brain alterations made to ‘improve’ 
upon a perceived cognitive deficit or societal problem, reflective of the normalising 
effect Foucault describes in his account of biopolitics.17 Most notable among these 
narratives is Daniel Keyes’ 1966 novel Flowers for Algernon. In it, Charlie, a man 
whose childhood phenylketonuria leaves him with an ‘IQ of 68’, undergoes 
experimental surgery dramatically increasing his ‘intelligence’; however, the effects 
eventually reverse. Whilst Flowers for Algernon is not explicitly a crime narrative, its 
microbiological underpinnings and laboratory experiments prefigure the ethical 
debates that began in earnest in the 90s in relation to the neuro-turn.18 Walker 
Percy’s The Thanatos Syndrome (1987) not only encapsulates the turning from 
psychological to neuroscientific epistemologies of subjectivity in its juxtaposition of 
Freudian depth models of the mind and neuromaterial models of the brain, but 
focuses on neuro-enhancement via the biopolitical aim of population improvement 
and control. In the novel, Tom, a psychiatrist recently released from prison, returns 
to his hometown to find its population affectively dulled, but cognitively enhanced. 
 
17 Foucault writes that ‘a normalizing society is the historical outcome of a technology of power 
centred on life’, History of Sexuality Vol. 1, p.144. 
18 See popular and public debates into cloning and genetic testing during the 90s that continue the 
ethical and moral issues surrounding molecular medicine. In 1991, Robin Herman asked in the 
Washington Post, ‘Though still in its rudimentary stages, human gene therapy prompts the questions 
at once scientific, ethical, and theological: How far can scientists go in altering the genetic makeup of 
individuals before the risk changing the very nature of a person – the basic characteristic of 
“humanness?”’ Robin Herman, ‘Tinkering with the Essence of Humanity’, Washington Post, 8 
October 1991, in Proquest <https://search-proquest-com> [accessed 22 July 2019].  Six years later in 
Judy Mann wrote of cloning, ‘What is certain is that the genie is out of the bottle, and no one is 
going to put it back. […] What we have to do now is understand the new biotechnology and make it 
work for the good. My daughter’s advanced placement biology class has spent hours learning about 
this and discussing its ethical and moral implications. The rest of us should do the same’. Judy Mann, 
‘The Brave New World of Cloning’, Washington Post, 28 February 1997, in Proquest <https://search-
proquest-com> [accessed 22 July 2018]. 
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He discovers an experiment in which the town’s water supply is spiked by the 
authorities with highly concentrated sodium in an attempt to improve society in the 
existing real-world model of water fluoridation. The novel is an explicit consideration 
of the dual nature of biopolitics, at once attempting a productive normalising control 
over the population while existing under deductive threat of geriatric eugenics.19 
Gary Braver’s Gray Matter (2002) situates enhancement in class and economic terms, 
combining the kind of individual improvement seen in Flowers within a wider 
framework of middle-class suburban America. In the novel, rich, competitive parents 
pay for their children to have illegal brain surgeries to correct perceived cognitive 
differences. Here, medical interventions at the site of the brain again initially aim at 
correction, but also depict enhancement as a frequent side effect. These three texts 
are typical of a range of fictional narratives that rely on the idea that brains or 
cognition considered ‘different’, ‘deficit’, or ‘problematic’ can be improved through 
medical intervention, even if at a population level as with The Thanatos Syndrome. 
The second grouping reflects fictional medication that dramatically alters 
reality for all. For example, The Matrix (1999) originated the cultural trope of taking 
either the blue or red pill to respectively remain ignorant or to learn the truth. In The 
Matrix the truth is that the world is a simulation to distract humans from the reality 
of having been enslaved and kept alive as an energy source for robots. The 
manipulation of the brain is central here, with Morpheus, the leader of a group of 
 
19 The biopolitical enhancement in the novel seeks to reaffirm and rebuild a healthy body politics 
around the norm. For instance, the secret water spiking is celebrated by officials as a magic wand 
that overnight ‘could reduce crime in the streets by eighty-five percent [...] teenage suicide by 
ninety-five percent’, and increase a ‘healthy heterosexual libido’. On the other hand, there is a 
Quality of Life division administering euthanasia services. Walter Percy, The Thanatos Syndrome 
(New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1987) pp. 191-3. 
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humans awakened from the simulation, explaining to the hero Neo: ‘they built a 
prison out of our past, wired in to our brains and turned us into slaves’.20 The red pill 
effaces the false consciousness created by the robots, awakening those who take it 
to the harsh truth of reality. In this vein of altered-reality, Equilibrium (2002) imagines 
a future in which emotion is forcibly suppressed by the mind-altering drug Prozium. 
Where Thanatos considers the biopolitical effects of spiking a single town’s water 
supply with sodium, Equilibrium’s world is completely different to reality, in that 
whilst Prozium has successfully eliminated the biopolitical effects of war – free will, 
art, and culture have similarly disappeared, removing the kinds of epistemological 
approaches to ethics, morality, and subjectivity such forms necessarily provide.  
The final group are narratives that represent changes to brains or cognition 
explicitly as forms of enhancement, which is to say, not necessarily the ‘correction’ 
of a pre-existing cognitive difference as in Flowers, but an ‘improvement’ to what is 
considered normal. Luc Besson’s film Lucy (2014) explores pharmaceutical 
enhancement through the myth that we only use ten percent of our brains. The film 
sees the eponymous hero Lucy’s brain power increase exponentially, resulting in a 
posthuman evolution by the film’s close. The drug becomes symbolic of the 
precarious biopolitics surrounding its genesis: illegally manufactured for mass 
unregulated profit, Lucy is kidnapped and forcibly made into a drug mule. Though the 
end of the film disturbs the notion of enhancement as improvement, as least at a 
human level, the central conceit that the brain is capable of surpassing natural limits 
 
20 The Matrix, dir. by. The Wachowskis (Warner Brothers, 1999). 
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through medical intervention is typical of the kind of biological neoliberalism Cooper 
identifies as being the extraction of surplus value from life itself.21  
This chapter focusses on two texts, Limitless and Nexus, that frame 
neuroscientific and pharmaceutical intervention as a means, like Lucy, to cognitively 
enhance or improve the human. The key difference between these texts and Lucy is 
agency, where Lucy’s role as a forced drug-mule causes the accidental ingestion of 
the drug, Limitless and Nexus approaches neuro-enhancement as an act of personal 
volition. It is not a by-effect of an attempt to reverse brain damage but an intentional 
act to improve upon the constructed norm of cognition. Nexus is set in 2040, a world 
where neuroscience is vastly developed and enhancement is everywhere, but 
increasingly prohibited due to the creation of the titular Nexus 5 – a drug that 
collectively connects minds and which becomes in turn inscribed with hope, fear, and 
power.  
Both of these texts are neuro-thrillers, a term developed by Analee Newitz 
two years after Roth coined the neuronovel. Surveying recent fictional narratives she 
asks: ‘why have our minds become crime scenes?’.22 She gives three answers. First, 
‘gadget futurism’, in which new real-world technologies are filtering into imaginative 
narratives. Second, ‘Alzheimer’s terror’, which sees the memory deficits of the 
disease be symbolically compensated in films like Memento where memory loss is 
not necessarily depicted as an obstacle to heroic victory. Third, ‘your brain belongs 
to the company’, in which tech-firms are imagined as holding ultimate control over 
 
21 Cooper, Life as Surplus. 
22 Annalee Newitz, ‘The Rise of the Neurothriller’, io9, 1 March 2011, 
<https://io9.gizmodo.com/5765657/rise-of-the-neurothriller> [accessed 22 July 2019]. 
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lives and choices. Whilst a useful touchstone, I argue Newitz’s  category of ‘neuro-
thriller’ is too general in its inclusion of both technology and pathologies of the brain 
and as such attenuates the specific ontological changes implantations of brain 
difference create, as well as eliding important formal differences. To address this, I 
differentiate between ‘neuro-thrillers’ and ‘neurological thrillers’. Neuro-thrillers 
emerge from the expansive, cutting-edge, biotechnological structure of feeling that 
encapsulates the cultural neuro-turn. These reflect the fascination, threat, and 
potential neuro-technologies could bring outside of the pathological model and 
imagine the potential of trans- and posthuman futures and the kinds of enhanced 
subjectivities these may produce. On the other hand, I use neurological thrillers to 
refer to texts that centre on specific neural pathologies or states of difference 
underpinned by pathological or medical models, which I explore in the following two 
chapters. There is considerable overlap between the two; however, the distinction is 
helpful in determining the ethical and biopolitical questions their plots consider. For 
instance, do they look at the brain primarily via technology, or pathology, and are 
they concerned with populations or individuals? In doing so, the particularities of the 
kind of disciplinary techniques and biopolitical imperatives underpinning the textual 
implantations becomes clearer. (See table below for an overview of these sub-
generic differences.) 
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Both Limitless and Nexus are typical of the thriller genre’s demand for fast paced 
narratives in which the ‘scale of the threat’ appears ‘to be vast, its ramifications 
immeasurable and boundless’.23 Neither consider specific pathologies, rather they 
are concerned with neurotechnology’s ability to enhance the human condition, and 
both imagine different figurations of what a neural implantation of cognitive 
 
23 David Glover, ‘The thriller’, Cambridge Companion to Crime Fiction, ed. by. Martin Priestman 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp.135-154, p.138. 
Neuro-thriller Neurological Thriller 
Often focus on new technologies of brain 
enhancement/manipulation. The brain is 
often an economised object – where 
criminal activity on/around it can yield 
profit.  
Often focus on brain as a site of 
pathology.  The pathology/difference 
can be the cause of criminal activity, or 
more unusually a means to contain it.  
Akin to a traditional thriller, the stakes 
are global, and the narrative is fast-
paced. Crime is often endemic and wide 
reaching. 
Akin to the psychological thriller. 
Usually there is a specific deviance or 
deviant action linked to an individual 
brain’s difference. Stakes are localised 
and crime is usually specific. 
People are rarely implanted with 
neurological difference; implantation is 
more often literal – such as a means of 
biotechnology. However, such 
technology can produce ontological 
shifts in characters. 
Implantation is individual and usually 
underpinned by medical diagnosis and 
effects ontological shifts in characters.  
Ethics usually centre on problems of 
biotechnology. 
Ethical considerations consider how the 
individual is treated, or mistreated, and 
how society should deal with these 
differences.  
Containment of the ethical problems 
posed is not guaranteed. 
Containment of the ethical problems 
posed is not guaranteed. 
Examples: Inception (Christopher Nolan, 
2010), Limitless (Neil Burger, 2011), Lucy 
(Luc Besson, 2014), A Box of Birds 
(Charles Fernyhough 2012), Black Mirror 
(Charlie Brooker, 2011-present). 
Examples: Good Me Bad Me (Ali Land, 
2017), A Philosophical Investigation 
(Phillip Kerr, 1992), Paper Ghosts (Julia 
Heaberlin, 2018), Elizabeth is Missing 
(Emma Healey, 2014). 
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enhancement may be. Nexus adheres to the thriller conventions more typically than 
Limitless, with the format providing a ready vessel to explore the ethics, benefits, and 
misappropriations of enhancing the human brain through a plot of global espionage. 
Limitless works differently. Whilst retaining the faced-paced format of the thriller, it 
is also humorous and exists in a world in which crime is endemic, and because of this, 
the film is ostensibly ambivalent in regard to the ethics of enhancement. It swings 
between the hyper-real sparkle of Bradley Cooper’s character’s enhancement, which 
invites the viewer to collude in his enhanced criminality, and a narrative that does 
not allow expected closure, which, I argue, comes to act more like an indictment of 
the exhaustion of the neoliberal biopolitics Gere and Cooper note as being 
foundational to plasticity today.24 
Limitless 
 
This section seeks to show that Limitless ostensibly celebrates cognitive 
enhancement despite the void in ethical responsibility enhancement creates. Yet, 
through two key avenues of analysis, what I term the film’s incessant ‘plastic 
narrative’, and the facetious treatment of the protagonist’s criminality, I explore how 
enhancement here tacitly critiques the problems of neoliberalisation at a 
neurochemical level. 
Eddie Morra is a languishing, slovenly author who, at the start of the film, is 
dumped in a diner by his successful just-promoted girlfriend, Lindy. Afterwards, Eddie 
runs into his former brother-in-law Vernon from his earlier marriage to ex-wife 
Melissa. Vernon offers Eddie a new pill (NZT), causing his cognitive function to 
 
24 See Gere, ‘Plasticity, Pathology, and Pleasure’; Cooper, Life as Surplus. 
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increase dramatically. He rapidly writes his long-ignored book, sharpens his 
appearance, and improves his immediate problems. He visits Vernon to get more NZT 
but when he returns from running an errand he finds Vernon murdered and quickly 
steals his supply of NZT. Eddie’s ambitions grow and he decides that money is the 
only way he can make an impact in the world. He plays the stock market, befriends 
the rich, and is employed by economic titan Carl Van Loon to assist with his merger 
with fellow titan Hank Atwood. However, the drug begins to cause temporal 
blackouts during which Eddie becomes embroiled in a murder. He is also hunted by 
loan sharks and employees of Hank Atwood who are trying to steal the NZT, the latter 
successfully. Despite this, Eddie is in a position to hire the best defence lawyer, 
employ scientists to combat the negative effects of the drug, kill the loan sharks 
pursuing him, and re-steal the drug. The film ends with an epilogue set twelve 
months later in which Eddie is running for political office and wins a verbal showdown 
with Van Loon, claiming no longer to be on the drug whilst retaining its cognitive 
enhancement. However, in the final scene a collusive eye-twinkle to the camera as 
well as his retained fluency in Mandarin heavily implies that Eddie is still taking the 
drug.25  
Underpinning my analysis of the film is a close reading of its narrative, which 
I describe as ‘plastic’. In physics, if things are plastic they are mutable and not fixed. 
They are also unable to return to a prior form. This plastic property integrates with 
processes and discourses emerging from the neuro-turn. As mentioned, 
neuroplasticity refers to the neuronal system’s ability to change and adapt 
 
25 In the spin-off television series of the same name (2015-16), Bradley Cooper reprises his role as a 
guest star and explains that he continues taking NZT. 
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throughout life, a process Whitehouse describes above as being the turn’s central 
dogma. I argue that Limitless reflects a form of plasticity that is underpinned by the 
biopolitics that were hegemonic during the film’s production, and that Eddie’s 
narrative subjectivity reflects precisely this mutable plastic property because 
enhancement configures his brain to be the ultimate depiction of neoliberalism: ever 
adapting without consideration of the past. With this central argument in mind, I will 
show how narrative conflicts that are typical to thrillers are quickly overcome 
throughout the film because of NZT, resulting in a plot explicitly focussed upon 
‘progress’, with little time for retrospection, introspection, or ethical evaluation. 
Unlike typical thrillers, enhancement makes a mockery of sustained or seemingly 
insurmountable conflict because Eddie can seemingly think his way through 
anything. This results in a kind of ‘never-end’ because there is no typical resolution, 
only a continual drive towards the future and an insatiable temporal unfolding. This 
thesis’s introduction considers the figuration of the plastic subject, and Limitless 
encapsulates this figure through the film’s ‘plastic’ narrative. The plastic subject is 
one whose narrative is dictated by biopolitical imperatives that impel self-monitoring 
health, a utilisation of one’s own biological resources to extract profit (for example 
through overwork), an obsession with futurity, and increasingly an integration of 
biotechnology and molecular medicine designed to further extend natural capacity 
(as with the kind of smart drugs Limitless exaggerates). Bearing this in mind, the 
narrative is plastic, not because it breaks with temporal or spatial conventions as with 
the plots of Christopher Nolan’s Memento (2000) or Inception (2010), but rather 
because the protagonist aligns with the ideology imbibed by neoliberal plastic 
subjectivity: flexible beyond natural limits. 
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The film lacks resolution because Eddie’s plastic narrative does not allow for 
a satisfactory and generically expected instance of mea culpa. There is no 
acknowledgement of fault or recognition of the need to change. This is arguably 
indicative of its ideological affinities with the neoliberal project and its investment in 
the ultimate resilience of market forces. Rather than experiencing the hubristic 
revelation or ‘crash’ we might expect, Eddie knows best because his transhuman 
cognition  allows him to read and play the stock market. In this regard, Eddie reflects 
Pitts-Taylor’s description of the neoliberal appropriation of brain plasticity as 
depicting a ‘use-disuse hypothesis: “use it or lose it”’. This holds that one must 
maximise and maintain one’s brain in order to capitalise on the neoliberal system.26 
In sum, we can say that a plastic narrative is a narrative that reflects the driving forces 
of neoliberalisation when combined with the enhanced cognitive state of the 
protagonist: biopolitical imperatives and neuroscientific technology here beget 
plotting and narrative. 
Malabou has written extensively on the philosophical implications of 
neuroplasticity, arguing that it provides a template for the radical potential inherent 
in all of us to metamorphosize. For this to happen, life via plasticity comes to be 
understood as endlessly productive, hinging on the ability to form and re-form that 
can be used to resist the stresses of late capitalism. However, my reading of Limitless 
highlights the limitations of Malabou’s ontology, as, rather than challenging 
hegemonic narratives, plasticity as understood via enhancement is represented as a 
 
26 Victoria Pitts-Taylor, ‘The plastic brain’, pp.644-645. 
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thoroughly neoliberal subjectivity, in which Malabou’s description of radical 
metamorphosis subsumes into a reinforcement of the status quo. 
 There are numerous examples of Malabou’s putatively metamorphic model 
of plasticity in Limitless. For example, NZT affords the material brain changes 
necessary for plasticity to produce the ontological changes Malabou describes. 
However, the very premise of NZT enhancement is at odds with Malabou’s 
philosophy. This is because it does not seek to decentre the general human condition 
away from neoliberal trappings, but is a technology founded on neoliberal ideology, 
enabling instead enhancement of an individual human’s condition. As in material 
reality, the fictional biotechnology that creates Eddie’s enhanced implantation exists 
in an economy of promise and speculation. Melinda Cooper writes regarding the 
relationship between biotechnology and neoliberalism: ‘promise is what enables 
production to remain in a permanent state of self-transformation, arming it with a 
capacity to respond to the most unpredictable of circumstances, to anticipate and 
escape the possible “limit” of its growth’.27 This is what we see in Limitless’s narrative. 
Eddie’s subjectivity is reflective of an enhanced plastic adaptability, much as how 
neoliberalism is an ‘enhanced’ form of capitalism. Both are pushed to the extreme 
and find within that extreme other ways to adapt and keep expanding, reflected in 
the narrative pace and structure. This is why if Eddie’s forward momentum is 
frustrated, there is an immediate solution to return the situation toward expansion: 
a solution found through the enhancements brought by NZT. Indeed, Malabou’s 
theory of plasticity has been subject to the same criticism, with Alexander Galloway 
 
27 Cooper, Life as Surplus, p.24. 
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describing Malabou’s plasticity as a ‘voracious monster’ in terms of its expansive 
theoretical scope.28 As I outlined in the introduction with reference to the work of 
Pitts-Taylor, Malabou’s plastic ontology, like Eddie’s enhancement, is indivisible from 
the surrounding biopolitical imperatives. What the following close reading of 
Limitless shows is that enhancement and discourses of plasticity must be analysed 
with a thorough consideration of their ethical implications, particularly with regard 
to what is understood by the figure of the enhanced human. 
 The film’s beginning is key in constructing the plastic narrative. It begins with 
Eddie’s non-diegetic narration stating: ‘obviously I miscalculated a few things’, 
referring to the fact that he is standing on the ledge of his penthouse apartment, 
currently under siege by murderous loan sharks, contemplating suicide (fig. 1). He 
continues: ‘why is it that the moment your life exceeds its wildest dreams, the knife 
appears at your back?’, evoking the status, excessive power, and dramatic decline of 
Julius Caesar, before continuing: ‘I will never let them get me’ as he takes a foot off 
the ledge. Eddie sees his neighbour being killed through the window and then 
resumes his reflexive monologue: ‘for a guy with a four digit IQ I must have missed 
something, and I hadn’t missed much. I’d come this close to having an impact on the 
world and now the only thing I’d have an impact on was the sidewalk’. A tracking 
shot then assumes the perspective of Eddie as if he has fallen from the roof and 
landed on a taxi (fig. 2), before continuing into the streets of night-time New York 
(fig. 3 and fig. 4). The shot continues into a billboard of a pixelated New York skyline 
 
28 Alexander Galloway, ‘Catherine Malabo, or The Commerce in Being’, in French Theory Today: An 
Introduction to Possible Futures, (New York: TPSNY/Erudio Editions, 2010), 
<http://cultureandcommunication.org/galloway/FTT/French-Theory-Today.pdf> [accessed 9 January 
2019]. 
99 
 
(fig. 5) and fades into a brain scan image (fig. 6) before magnifying into neuronal 
visuals (fig. 7). The shot then assumes the structure of a cell (fig. 8), which fades into 
the geography of New York (fig. 9).  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Eddie standing on the ledge 
of his penthouse apartment. 
Figure 2 - The shot feigning Eddie’s suicide.  
Figure 3  - The roving shot through New 
York.  
Figure 4 - A rapid paced shot through a 
tunnel. 
Figure 5 - The shot entering a billboard.  Figure 6 - The billboard morphing 
seamlessly into a brain scan image.  
100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The film thus begins with an expansive tracking shot that cuts through the 
architecture of the city, the architecture of a brain, and the geography of New York, 
before focussing on Eddie on a Manhattan street prior to his enhancement and the 
consideration of suicide. Initially, this analeptic structure seems to negate my 
argument that the film’s plastic narrative reflects neoliberal subjectivity, by which I 
mean the indefatigable pursuit of progress and expansion with little thought of the 
past or consideration of the present. However, this technique is central to the 
meaning made by the film’s plastic narrative. Not only does the imagery through the 
city set a fast-metronomic beat, but the fact that the shot continues after the 
supposed suicide (fig. 4) foreshadows a key conceit of the film: any potential 
narrative conflict that may delay Eddie is rapidly dealt with by the abilities afforded 
Figure 7 - The brain scan magnifying into a 
collection of electrical impulses. 
Figure 8 - The shot resembling the 
architecture of a cell.  
Figure 9 - The cell structure becoming the 
geography of New York.  
101 
 
by enhancement. The plastic narrative, like neoliberalism, will mutate and adapt to 
prevent cessation. 
This incessant motion the opening scene establishes recurs throughout the 
rest of the film and becomes indicative of Eddie’s enhancement. For instance, having 
taken NZT Eddie begins to make-over his life. Lasting little over ten seconds and in 
the same type of continuous shot that opens the film (fig. 3 and 4), the viewer sees 
multiple Eddies getting his hair cut, doing multiple sit-ups (fig. 10), and trying on 
multiple new clothes (fig. 11). The make-over montage is a filmic staple, but the 
rapidity makes it almost into parody, in which superficial changes signify the birth of 
a new, enhanced subjectivity. For Eddie, time and narrative are neoliberally plastic; 
change is individual and can be instantaneous. 
 
Moreover, the enhanced and socially erudite Eddie is invited to an unnamed tropical 
beach by rich people he meets at a bar. In a scene that lasts little over a minute, we 
see a plane, high-speed driving, and Eddie jumping off a cliff into the sea. Before 
jumping, his narration explains: ‘only problem? If I wasn’t moving forward I felt like I 
was going to explode’. This is the plastic narrative made most explicit. Not only does 
it visually mimic the possible suicide jump that begins the film, thus foreshadowing 
Figure 10 - An effect showing multiple 
Eddies exercising. 
Figure 11 - An effect showing multiple 
Eddies getting a makeover.  
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that his narrative will not ‘end’ in any typical fictional understand of resolution, but 
it also mirrors my critique of Malabou’s conception of plasticity. Though she might 
critique Eddie’s adoption of neoliberal models, Malabou’s notion of plasticity makes 
room for these models in her focus on adaption and metamorphosis. Malabou 
explains that plasticity has both formative and destructive capacities, writing that 
plasticity: 
means at once the capacity to receive form […] and the capacity to give form. 
Talking about the plasticity of the brain thus amounts to thinking of the brain 
as something modifiable, “formable,” and formative at the same time. […] But 
it must be remarked that plasticity is also the capacity to annihilate the very 
form it is able to receive or create. […] We thus note that plasticity is situated 
between two extremes on the one side the sensible image of taking form […] 
and on the other side the annihilation of all form (explosion).29 
For Malabou, plasticity is a contingent process whereby form is both produced and 
destroyed (chapter three explores Malabou’s concept of destructive plasticity in 
relation to dementia diseases). Malabou hopes her plastic ontology can erode the 
modes of subjection enacted under late capitalism. However, a reading of Eddie 
through this lens only seems to compound its trappings, because through cognitive 
enhancement, Eddie is always mutating beyond new limits. Limits that would reflect 
Malabou’s destructive plasticity (in the symbolic form of narrative conflicts such as 
Eddie losing his NZT, or the reality of medical events such as a stroke) are always 
overcome by the productive plasticity of Eddie’s brain: enhancement via plasticity 
writes the narrative here and becomes its own controlling intoxicant. At each 
narrative obstacle Eddie’s brain ‘plasticises’, avoids destruction, and continuously 
propels Eddie’s narrative forwards. Again, indicative of Malabou’s model, the ‘ideal’ 
 
29 Malabou, What Should We Do With Our Brain, p.5. 
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of enhanced subjectivity proves to contain risky extremes because enhanced Eddie 
exists between the states of (plastic) explosion and expansive mutation: jump off the 
cliff and keep moving forward or risk receding back to cognitive normalcy, or worse, 
a form of cognitive difference categorised medically and culturally as brain ‘damage’. 
This worst case is reflected in his ex-wife Melissa – who lives with permanent 
neurological damage having risked enhanced status by taking NZT. 
However, if Melissa’s experience acts as a warning, Eddie refuses to be 
receptive, preferring his own individual judgement, aesthetically compounded 
through this ‘multiple Eddies’ effect that recurs throughout the film. After a 
successful meeting with Van Loon, Eddie takes a walk and his narration describes his 
metamorphosis-via-enhancement: ‘there are moments in life, moments when you 
know you’ve crossed a bridge. Your old life is over’. This brief instance of 
psychological introspection regarding the ontological shift enhancement has 
produced is immediately followed by speculative neoliberal plastic expansion. He 
asks: ‘how far could I go? CEO? A global force? Maybe President?’, with the 
capabilities brought by the compact of cognitive enhancement and neoliberal 
ideology. Moments later he notices in a shop window that he is seeing multiple 
reflections of himself in a shop window, signifying an increased temporal speed (fig. 
12), before seeing himself emerge from a different part of the street (fig 13).   
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Typical temporal rules no longer apply because Eddie’s brain is no longer typical. It is 
pushed beyond the limit through unnatural enhancement as reflected here in the 
film’s visuals. This is significant in terms of the plastic narrative because there is a 
sense that it could implode under the unnatural strain and expose what 
neoliberalism has become: a hollow system dependent on an ideology of endless 
reproduction and expansion, here symbolised by the continual ‘multiple Eddie’ 
montages and imagery. Watching the film there is a real sense of precarity, that 
enhancement could destroy everything. A sense only contained by the epilogue. 
Having successfully fought off the apartment attack in the opening scene and, 
as a result removed the need to jump off the ledge, Eddie is able to resume taking 
the NZT. This, as his narration explains re-opens the expansive future: ‘and it was all 
still possible’. The ‘and’ here typifies the plastic narrative as, with neural 
enhancement, Eddie is always chasing the next event and opportunity regardless of 
the past. The film’s actual ending comes as a filmic epilogue set twelve months later 
and plays out like the film within the film. It is a narrative ingemination in which 
everything enhancement ought to do, is done, in which everything that has gone 
wrong is erased by the forward march of the plastic narrative. It begins with the 
camera passing over Eddie’s published book ‘Illuminating The Dark Fields: Mapping 
Figure 12 - Eddie seeing himself 
temporally ahead of his reflection. 
Figure 13 – Eddie seeing himself out of 
temporal harmony. 
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the American Psyche’, an ironic title given enhancement has flattened Eddie’s 
psychological depth.30  Where Eddie was about to lose his book deal before he 
enhanced through NZT, here, that the camera briefly passes over signifies that his 
being a published writer is now the minimal benchmark of his success. Further, 
directly mirroring the scene in which he sees multiple selves in the shop window (fig 
12), here the viewer sees Eddie walking past multiple Eddies in the guise of political 
promotion signs (fig. 14). However, where this effect previously symbolised precarity, 
now it reflects certainty. 
 
 
 
 
Similarly, Eddie’s confession during the suicide that is constructed as a 
possible narrative end: ‘obviously I miscalculated a few things’, is corrected in this 
epilogue when he precisely calculates the physics of a van crashing into a car. He is 
successfully running for senate and the only narrative obstacle, necessary, I argue, 
for the ingeminate structure to highlight its ability to remove or efface past mistakes 
and conflicts, is that Van Loon is waiting unannounced in his office. Van Loon informs 
Eddie that he has bought Eiben-Chemcorp Pharmaceuticals, who unofficially 
manufacture the NZT, and that he has destroyed Eddie’s private laboratory. Thinking 
he has leverage over Eddie, he offers Eddie a ‘limitless supply’ of NZT in return for 
 
30 This is a reference to Alan Glynn’s original novel The Dark Fields (London: Faber and Faber, 2001). 
Figure 14 – Eddie walking past his campaign posters. 
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political favours. Van Loon then offers to take them to lunch, and there is a brief close 
up shot of Eddie’s face in which his moving eyes seem to signify his enhanced brain 
rapidly calculating his next move. Moments later, in front of Van Loon’s limo, Eddie 
says that he is off NZT to which Van Loon replies: ‘on it or off it there’s no scenario 
you’re not working for me’. Unperturbed, Eddie says: ‘you think I didn’t learn 
anything? That my synapses didn’t change?’, at which point he calculates the car 
crash saying to Van Loon that if he worked for him: ‘you’d end up as my bitch’. It ends 
with Eddie ordering his lunch in fluent Mandarin sitting across from Lindy who had 
dumped him at the start of the film. Not only does the sparkly hyperreal blueness of 
his eyes, a motif used throughout the ‘enhanced’ periods of the film, imply he is still 
taking the drug, but in a mirror image of the beginning of his narrative he is back with 
his girlfriend, not in a lowly diner, but commanding attention in a restaurant. This 
ending is not a return to a status quo, but an enhanced departure from normalcy. 
The film ends with the high energy ‘da da da da da’ chant from The Black Keys’ 
‘Howlin’ for You’, in order to continue the expansive plastic beat that pulsates 
throughout the film into the credits. The lyrics continue: ‘I must admit, I can’t explain, 
any of these thoughts racing through my brain’.31 Through different mediums, then, 
the plastic brain both opens and closes the narrative: with the visual kaleidoscopic 
mutating brain in the opening (fig. 6,7,8), and the vivacious aural brain reference as 
the scene cuts to black and the film comes to a ‘close’, if not a typical ‘end’ because 
there lacks any characteristic resolution, only superficial expansion. Indeed, the lyrics 
are important here as they are indicative of the lack of psychological subjectivity; 
 
31 The Black Keys, ‘The Black Keys - Howlin’ For You [Official Music Video’, YouTube, 11 February 
2011, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TLSpj7q6_mM> [accessed 22 July 2019]. 
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Eddie cannot explain his thoughts or action because this kind of neoliberal 
enhancement has seen his selfhood become only a means of neurochemical 
production, re-production, and progress. 
 It is the plastic narrative form that precludes any typical ‘moral’ of the story 
or a subjectivity that looks beyond the central theme of progress. The moral, here, is 
of complete individuality, that by enhancing your brain you cannot be dictated to 
even by economic titans, indeed, you get to dictate: it is the moral of the self-made 
all-American man, but instantaneous through wonder-drugs. The final showdown 
between Van Loon and Eddie is key. Van Loon symbolises an older-guard of post-war 
capitalism: privileged, laissez-faire, enduring, and more representative of 
psychological paradigms; Eddie represents a contemporary neoliberal caste: 
necessarily flexible, prospective, precarious, and more representative of 
neuroscientific paradigms.32 That Eddie’s enhanced subjectivity is seen to 
subordinate Van Loon is starkly different to the novel on which it is based. In the 
novel, enhancement leaves Eddie in a motel, pursued and close to death; in fact, the 
possible suicide beginning the film aligns much more closely to the novel’s ending. 
There are two main ways of reading this difference. First, as being reflective of the 
increasing purchase neuro-models have regarding subjectivity and personhood in 
 
32 By a psychological I refer to Freud’s ‘city of Rome’ analogy from Civilisation and its Discontents 
(1961, 1930 in original German). Freud briefly describes the many changes to Rome throughout 
history (settlements, republic, modern day) before writing, ‘suppose that Rome is not a human 
habitation but a psychical entity, that is to say, in which nothing that has once come into existence 
will have passed away and all the earlier phases of development continue to exist alongside the 
latest one’. (p.17). Freud’s argument is that once formed in the mind, things (memory, trauma) do 
not decay or disappear with past and present layering somewhat chaotically atop each other. Hence 
the enduring nature of Van Loon’s style of long-standing, slow growth narrative. Neurological 
reflects the flattening of the psychological ‘city’. Unlike Freud’s psychic city in which nothing 
properly destroys, plastic subjectivity and the plastic brain hold that material destroys and reforms – 
not an enduring narrative but a series of re-forming palimpsests; Sigmund Freud, Civilisation and Its 
Discontents, trans. by James Strachey, (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1962). 
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society and culture. Alan Glynn’s The Dark Fields was published in 2001, engaging 
with the hype and fear of genetics and neuroscience that dominated science and 
culture in the 90s. By the film’s release in 2011, the neuro-hype/fears around 
biological manipulation had become much more of a neuro-normal.33 Second, as 
being an indictment of the prosperity and good-life gap between the baby-boomer 
and millennial generation that has come to define generational differences in the 
twenty-first century. In other words, traditional and generically expected 
redemption/retribution narratives that would usually punish or rebuke a character 
as ethically corrupt as Eddie (as I explore below) is elided by the potential of 
enhancement. Eddie is the lovable, flawed protagonist not because his criminal 
activity is excused, but because it fits the contemporary narrative of the generational 
underdog. This gives rise to a celebration of Eddie’s neuro-domination over Van Loon 
in a pseudo David versus Goliath narrative in which the viewer imagines themselves 
as Eddie in succeeding against economic odds. 
However, in many ways this is an ideological trap and does nothing to 
decentre the neoliberal subjective mode, rather it becomes a fictional fantasy of 
overcoming it.34 I argue that this can be read otherwise as a tacit critique of the 
hollowness of the plastic narrative and the neoliberal biopolitics underpinning it. 
Between 2001 and 2011 there was the 2008 global recession. If, in 2001, novel 
 
33 Consider again the above brief timeline of enhancement fiction. Until recently, enhancement 
represented a site of anxiety; either in terms of a ‘problematic’ brain that was to be fixed or cured or 
in terms of the need to biopolitically improve persons and groups. Enhancement has only recently 
become an opt-in decision. 
34 See Fredric Jameson’s concept of the fantasy bribe. For Jameson, popular narratives ‘cannot 
manipulate unless they offer some genuine shred of content as a fantasy bribe to the public about to 
be so manipulated’. Fredric Jameson, ‘Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture’, Social Text, 1 (1979), 
130-148 (p.144).  
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Eddie’s enhancement narrative ended in death, in 2011 when neoliberalism had 
survived its own expected destruction through a Lazarus move with the bailing out 
of the banks, the narrative expectation of an end point had become simultaneously 
so saturated yet unfulfilled it had disappeared as a possibility. Tied with other aspects 
of disaster capitalism, such as ecological crises and the shifting demands of aging 
populations, the text becomes imbued with a kind of nervous wish-fulfilment aligned 
with age-old humanist ideas that we can think our way out of anything, though made 
literal through Eddie’s superhuman intelligence. In other words, when everything is 
precarious and at stake, what is scarier than it stopping, but stopping without an 
answer? 
To this extent it is noteworthy that a critique of America present in the novel 
is absent in the film. In the novel, the murder Eddie becomes embroiled in is not that 
of a socialite as in the film, but Donatella Alvarez, wife of a famous Mexican painter. 
They have a conversation: 
‘That’s ironic,’ the salt-and-pepper guy was saying to someone, ‘the 
choosing of a better future.’ 
‘What’s so ironic about that?’ I heard myself saying, and then sighing 
impatiently. ‘If you don’t choose your future, who the hell’s going to do it for 
you?’ 
‘Well,’ said Donatella Alvarez, smiling across the table – and smiling 
directly at me – ‘that is the North American way, isn’t it, Mr Cole?’ 
‘I beg your pardon?’ I said, a little taken aback. 
‘Time,’ she said calmly. ‘For you it is in a straight line. You look back at 
the past, and can disregard it if you so wish. You look towards the future…and, 
if you so wish, can choose it to be a better future. You can choose to become 
perfect…’ 
‘For us, in Mexico […] the past and the future… they co-exist’.35 
 
 
35 Alan Glynn, Limitless (first publ. in 2001 as The Dark Fields, p.154. 
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Alvarez’s assessment sums up not only the problems of American neoliberalism 
but also the problems of the neuro-turn and the discourse of enhancement-as-
route-to-improvement. Despite its absence, her critique is even truer of the film; 
Eddie does not contend with the past, rather the plotting thrusts forward and 
enables Eddie to ‘disregard’ it at will. In the book, as in the film, Eddie is similarly 
able ‘to look to the future with such energy’, but this unbridled futurism is 
ultimately contained in the novel by Eddie’s self-destructive ending.36 This is 
completely absent from the film. As with the media headlines that begin this 
chapter the discourse of neuroplasticity promises the ability to re-wire the past 
(through the childlike ability to adapt) and choose your future (through the 
potential of cognitive enhancement). This kind of ideology is reflected most clearly 
in the film’s ambivalent response to crime and criminality, which I argue creates 
an ethical void in criminal responsibility barely concealed by the sparkling veneer 
of enhancement. 
That the plastic narrative of Limitless demands expansion is in keeping with 
Lee Horsley’s summation of contemporary crime narratives: ‘the sheer 
proliferation of goods to accumulate and the excesses of individual self-
enrichment have fed a growing body of crime literature satirizing contemporary 
society and elaborating the relationship between crime, commercialism, and 
consumption’.37 As with Martin Scorsese’s The Wolf of Wall Street (2013), 
Limitless explores this consumerist self-enrichment, but as much through neuro-
biology as money and power. The Wolf of Wall Street is a useful comparison for 
 
36 Ibid. p.145. 
37 Lee Horsley, Twentieth Century Crime Fiction, p.184. 
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two main reasons. First, both films share the same facetious tone with regards to 
criminality. Second, though only receiving a reduced sentence after testifying 
Jordan Belfort does serve time in prison, Eddie does not. In Limitless, there is 
illegal drug use, theft, murder, violence, insider trading, obstruction of justice, and 
racketeering. There is a systemic quality to criminality here that depicts a vision of 
society as being unable to make distinctions between the legitimate and the illicit, 
the lawful and the unlawful, and the ethical and the unethical under the 
commercialism and consumption the drives the capitalist narratives Horsley 
describes. Further, Limitless goes beyond the cultural purchase of satire. Nothing 
or nobody is shamed because the endemic nature of criminality and the centrality 
of Eddie’s rapid paced subjective narrative places much of the plotting beyond 
ethical reproach. As such, the film’s criminal activity trades more on caricature 
and farce than containment and punishment. Driven by both the plastic narrative, 
and the cheeky, collusive nature of Bradley Cooper’s star-vehicle role in the film, 
criminal activity is quickly rendered humorous.  
 The film uses visual counterpoints to significant and humorous effect. For 
instance, when police question Eddie after being found in the apartment where 
Vernon had been killed, the colours in the police station are in the darkened grey-
scale that associate with the instances where Eddie is not enhanced (fig 15). Sitting 
at a level below the detective, nervously wringing his hands, and fumbling his 
explanations with excessive fillers, Eddie is depicted as being at the mercy of the 
disciplinary power of the detective. The detective’s phone rings and it is Melissa, 
Vernon’s sister and Eddie’s ex-wife, the detective then passes Eddie the phone and 
he begins speaking to her (fig. 16). Eddie’s brow is noticeably sweating, his face is half 
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concealed by shadow and his eyes are dull. In stark contrast, when enhanced-Eddie 
notices the same detective sitting nearby during a business meeting later in the film, 
Eddie approaches him in a cavalier manner and says: ‘I thought we’d straightened 
this out, detective’ (fig. 17). Here, Eddie remains standing whilst having his back 
turned to the detective and checking his phone. There is none of the previous 
nervous fear, in fact, that Eddie is blasé, sparkly-eyed (fig. 18), and this time framed 
by the warm background colours invites us to collude in his flippant treatment of his 
criminality, despite the fact he is being linked to the murder of socialite Maria 
Winberg. 
 
During a blackout, Eddie sleeps with Winberg and discovers the next day that 
she has been found murdered in her hotel room, he is unable to remember the 
nature or extent of his involvement.  The detective tells Eddie that a witness 
Figure 15 – Unenhanced Eddie being 
interviewed by a detective in shadow. 
Figure 16 – Eddie furtively talking to 
Melissa in the detective’s office. 
Figure 17 – Enhanced Eddie 
nonchalantly talking to the detective. 
Figure 18 – Enhanced Eddie 
confidently facing the detective. 
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identified him as the man leaving Winberg’s hotel room. This contrapuntal style 
continues when the above scene (fig 17, 18) cuts to the outside of a police precinct 
with Eddie’s narration explaining: ‘I couldn’t keep this quiet on my own. Enter Morris 
Brandt, the most lethal lawyer in New York’. The pair enter the precinct and then 
immediately leave again, as if stuck in a revolving door. This elliptical editing not only 
has the effect of bolstering the hastening plasticity of the narrative, but also renders 
the possible criminal involvement at the level of plot. The moment Eddie recognises 
the officer staring at him to Eddie and Morris leaving the precinct lasts only fifty-
three seconds.  
 Eddie is later called into a police line-up. He enters the precinct and Brandt 
makes clear he has stacked the odds in Eddie’s favour by arranging that the other 
men closely resemble him, in his words: ‘it’s gotta be just one big handsome blur’ to 
the witness. Mimicking the window reflection before the blackout during which 
Winberg’s murder occurs (fig. 12) and his political success in the epilogue (fig. 14) we 
again see ‘multiple Eddie’s’ positioned inline (fig. 19). Framed in a wide shot between 
two similarly looking men, Eddie stands in the line-up and, as the shot becomes a 
close-up of his face, his narration asks: ‘was this how it was all going to end?’. It is 
not. Instead, the revolving door policy where the stakes of liberty are never actually 
in question is little more than a humorous farce. Brandt comes out explaining that 
the witness had not the ‘dimmest clue’ and compliments Eddie’s suit jacket before 
Eddie leaves free of charge. He is in the precinct for sixty-five seconds. Each of these 
two scenes stall the plastic narrative’s pace, but only as if little more than tedious 
errands, and combined, Eddie’s formal and legal involvement in the murder of 
Winberg is wrapped up in just under two minutes.  
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However, it cannot be ignored that Eddie’s involvement in murder remains 
unexplained and possible. I argue the blackouts work to conceal the void in Eddie’s 
ethical and moral responsibility. In the Winberg blackout scene, the forward-
momentum tracking shot seen in the opening (fig. 20), is repeated at a much faster 
speed (fig. 21) but here lasts for the entire scene. Through the effects of NZT the 
plasticity of the narrative itself seems concerned with concealing Eddie’s misdeeds, 
eliding the crimes within the incessant pace.  
 
 
 
 
 
This repeated tracking shot fits into a broader motif of doubling. Arguably, 
doubling is more typical of the exploration of psychological/psychoanalytic depth 
models in films such as in Alfred Hitchcock’s oeuvre, than neuro-thrillers such as 
Figure 19 – Eddie standing in a police line-up. 
Figure 20 – The opening tracking shot 
roving through New York. 
Figure 21 – Subsequent repetition of 
the tracking shot in the same location.  
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Limitless that have a neuroscientific underpinning.38 However, I argue the 
multiple/double images of Eddie and the accelerated blackout passages are signifiers 
of Carl Jung’s conception of the shadow self. These, I argue can be read as phantom 
symbols of a psychological model of subjectivity which repeatedly and momentarily 
reveal voids in Eddie’s ethical responsibility. For Jung, the shadow is the ‘dark aspects 
of the personality’ that remain unconscious but affective until such aspects are 
recognised ‘as present and real’.39 However, Eddie’s enhanced plastic subjectivity 
does not recognise these, opting instead for metamorphosis and expansion into the 
future via NZT, rather than introspective psychological paradigms that would see him 
repeat to learn from the past. NZT allows him a subjectivity that can disregard the 
past and his own ethical responsibility providing he remains in an enhanced 
expansive state: this is a neoliberal implantation of enhancement.  
This is why NZT enhancement and the film’s plastic narrative are allergic to 
inertia, both requiring momentum to keep expanding forwards. By reading these 
blackouts as neurological attempts to conceal the unethical aspects of his 
subjectivity, not only from himself but from others (including the viewer), and by 
reading the colour, humour, pace, and plotting of the film as veneers concealing his 
misdeeds, it is notable that his shadow-self becomes apparent when he subsequently 
undergoes one of the longest periods off NZT. In this period, Eddie recedes, not to a 
non-enhanced self and subjectivity (because this previous self has ‘plasticised’ 
beyond return), but to an even baser self, bearing no resemblance to the hyperreal 
 
38 Hitchcock uses doubling in many of his film, most famously in Vertigo (1958) whereby doubling 
and repetition visualise and narrativize Freud’s ideas of uncanniness and the compulsion to repeat. 
Vertigo, dir. by Alfred Hitchcock (Paramount Pictures, 1958). 
39 C. G. Jung, Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self, trans. by R. F. C. Hull (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1959), p.8. 
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colour of enhanced Eddie’s eyes. The scales fall and the viewer briefly sees behind 
the cognitive curtain, much as the world briefly saw the destructive emptiness of 
neoliberal economics during the recession. However, it is only ever temporary, as 
Lindy, who is herself now high on NZT, manages to revive Eddie with a new dose. 
They check into a hotel and enhanced-Eddie wakes up blue-eyed, smiling, and bathed 
in light (fig. 22). Lindy looks concerned, and Eddie apologises and tries to reassure 
her and says: ‘I’m back, ok?’ Lindy asks: ‘Who’s back’ stating that she was not the 
same person when she was on NZT because ‘she did things [she] would never do’. As 
with Melissa, this marks the difference between the two; though she felt ‘invincible’, 
the lack of control and ontological risk scared Lindy away from NZT in a way in which 
Eddie refuses to grasp. She recognises the dark (unethical) aspects of enhanced 
subjectivity in a neoliberal mode; Eddie does not.  
 
 
 
 
This difference, in that Lindy is immediately scared of the invincible fearlessness 
brought by NZT where Eddie is spurred on by it, manifests most dramatically in the 
apartment fight/massacre that takes place after Eddie’s opening suicidal summation 
that he had ‘miscalculated a few things’. By usual generic conventions this scene 
should mark the end to Eddie’s enhancement narrative. In it, murderous Russian loan 
sharks hound him in his newly bought and barely unpacked apartment, an apartment 
Figure 22 – Enhanced Eddie basking in morning sunlight. 
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in which the only actions the viewer sees are near-suicide, murder, and blood 
drinking.  
After a misstep on the ledge, Eddie retreats and his narration advances 
beyond the film’s opening discussion of suicide, explaining: ‘but we’re instinctive 
creatures. We want to live. So my foggy brain tried to remember where one tablet of 
NZT might be. It was possible. And possible was enough’. This idea of possibility goes 
to the root of the neural implantation of enhancement in this film, which is 
underpinned by the promise of a neoliberal potential to better yourself at a 
neuromolecular level. Indeed, after successfully escaping the apartment and stealing 
back the NZT, Eddie repeats this mantra of potentiality stating: ‘and it was all still 
possible’, before cutting to his successful twelve months later. However, much like 
Eddie’s question when he asks himself, ‘was it possible? Could I have killed 
someone?’ in relation to Winberg’s murder, the lengths Eddie goes to in this scene 
in securing the potential offered by NZT highlights the extremely problematic ethics 
of a neoliberal implantation of enhancement.  
 I focus on the blood-drinking because it is truly abject in a film otherwise 
rendered so vibrant and facetious in its treatment of crime and immorality. The only 
other abject instance is when Eddie receives a severed hand in a box, which is itself 
parodied immediately after the blood drinking scene when a loan shark opens Eddie’s 
safe and finds it posed, middle finger up. Having found a single remaining NZT pill, 
Eddie is startled into dropping it down the a grate when the loan sharks burst through 
Eddie’s door. He makes for the ledge again (thinking suicide by pavement to be better 
than torture) but is caught. Beaten and placed on a chair, Eddie grabs a wrapped 
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kitchen knife whilst the loan shark is distracted and thrusts it into the enhanced 
Russian’s stomach. In fig. 23 the difference between enhanced-Eddie (fig. 22) and 
basic, withdrawing Eddie is evident. Wild-eyed, blood-spattered, and pallid, the 
hyper-real sparkle indicative of enhanced Eddie is replaced by something akin to 
Dorian Gray’s picture, his face fills the screen and is one of absolute desperation as 
he brutally kills the loan shark. 
 
 
 
 
 
With two remaining loan sharks searching his bedroom for NZT, Eddie sinks 
to the floor parallel to the dead Russian. As with the previous instances in which 
Eddie’s plastic narrative could stall (suicide, police line-up, temporal blackouts), Eddie 
is not particularly self-reflective but regretful only that he will not be able to continue 
progressing and enhancing: ‘not much of a triumph, was it? Because I would die here, 
too. Only NZT could help me and the last of it was in this fuck’s blood stream’. The 
suggestion of ingestion initially seems an unsurmountable hurdle even for Eddie’s 
desperate situation as he immediately flinches away from any contact with the body.  
 
However, as the loan shark’s blood slowly pools towards him (fig 24), we see 
again the same doubling effect as seen in the shop window (fig 12) and elsewhere 
Figure 23 – Unenhanced Eddie killing the loan shark. 
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(fig. 14 and fig. 19). However, here both Eddie and his reflection are static with the 
implication being that Eddie’s choice is drink or die, if he does not ingest the blood 
his plastic narrative will remain static and inert, whilst the expansive, pooling NZT 
riddled blood will pass him by along with the promise of enhancement. This scene in 
which Eddie lies flat on the floor, with the blood inching horizontally towards him is 
a visualisation of the ‘flattening’ effect Nikolas Rose describes as indicative of the 
turn toward bio-material models of subjectivity.40  
 
 
 
 
 
Living in a penthouse apartment, diving off a cliff, and working in skyscrapers are 
trompe-l'œils that only highlight the superficiality of Eddie’s personal depth; there is 
no psychological complexity to traverse in what may be his death scene. Here the 
epistemological distinction between cultural/psychological models of self-formation 
that are a messy imbrication of past, present, and future self as Alverez remarks in 
the original novel, as well as the kind of ‘personal manifesto’ pre-enhanced Eddie 
describes his book to be, is effaced by only the chemical ‘instinct’ to survive. Being so 
close to death, Eddie is only able to mourn that which has not yet come to fruition. 
Indeed, newly enhanced-Eddie explains this point earlier in the film. Talking to a man 
 
40 See my discussion of Rose’s ‘neurochemical selves’ in the introduction. 
Figure 24 – The loan shark’s blood pooling towards Eddie’s 
face. 
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about the stock-market, the man says that there are safeguards that prevent stock 
devaluation, Eddie replies, ‘Against over-expansion? There aren’t. Because there are 
no safeguards in human nature. We’re wired to overreach’. 
With little reluctance, he inches his mouth towards the blood in an image 
reflecting a grotesque narcissistic kiss, and desperately ‘overreaches’ by slurping up 
the blood (fig. 25). There are many reasons this act is abject. For one, while drinking 
blood may be a mainstay of contemporary gothic and supernatural stories, any 
explanation or association with vampirism here is unsupportable. Eddie may have 
sparkling eyes but he is no contemporary vampiric figure; here, he is a drug-addicted 
man near death unless he ingests NZT through drinking somebody’s blood. 
Moreover, it is difficult not to associate HIV/AIDS with this scene for two key reasons. 
First, the most prominent antiretroviral medication used to combat the virus is 
Zidovudine, more commonly known as AZT. Second, thousands of recent deaths, 
multiple high-profile lawsuits, and institutional cover-ups have been witnessed on 
both sides of the Atlantic regarding ‘contaminated blood’. This is a biopolitical 
scandal that began during the 1970/80s which saw typically higher-risk demographics 
such as drug-users paid in the USA for blood donations, which were then used to 
make blood-clotting agents to treat haemophilia in the USA as well as being sold to 
the UK’s NHS.41 Though it is undoubtedly true and commendable that since this time 
the stigma of the disease has dramatically decreased, this phantom but affecting 
history of contaminated blood, when coupled with the aurally similar drug names, 
 
41 Nick Triggle, ‘What is the contaminated blood scandal?’, BBC, 14 June 2019 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-48596605> [accessed 12 February 2020]. 
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renders this blood scene (problematically) abject and is an indictment of the lengths 
Eddie will go to retain enhanced subjectivity. 
 
 
 
 
 
Further, given the discussion about the theoretical use of Jung’s shadow self 
in relation to the blackouts, typical drug-narratives would ordinarily fork at this 
moment. Either the protagonist would die or subsequently have some kind of turning 
point/anagnorisis. Neither happens because he lacks both framework and real 
psychological depth. Rather, the presence of enhanced subjectivity in the narrative 
alters generic expectation: the enhanced transhuman abilities afforded by NZT 
continually prevent the biological threat of death. According to Jung’s theory, Eddie 
cannot make the necessary ‘moral effort’ to change because he is afforded no real 
moral depth.42 Unable to recognise ‘the dark aspects of [his] personality as present 
and real’ or challenge his enhanced ethical shortcomings, Eddie’s shadow self that is 
both caused and concealed by NZT – as reflected in the blood – remains both a 
psychological phantom and a symbol of plastic potential to be imbibed. The reflection 
is the immaterial dark psychology he needs to address but no longer can because 
enhancement has now evacuated his morality, while the blood is the material 
 
42 Jung, p.8. 
Figure 25 – Eddie slurping the loan shark’s blood. 
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promise of enhancement that is still available. The intimacy between the two Eddies, 
the near-death Eddie, and the enhanced ‘possible’ Eddie that exists in the reflective 
blood, here is equally abject. Despite Eddie’s almost novelistic narrative voice guiding 
the film’s narrative, a device usually employed to highlight mistakes, regret, or foolish 
choices the film refuses the typical models through which ethics are explored in 
cultural narrative. There is no introspection, self-awareness, or historical flashbacks 
of the problems that enhancement has produced, just more metamorphosis, 
expansion, and here literalised self-absorption. 
In the baseness of drinking another’s blood to survive, any superior status 
that the enhanced-Eddie believes he possesses momentarily disappears. As 
mentioned with reference to Jeffrey Weeks in the introduction, the neoliberal project 
works by way of ostensible liberal inclusion with its putative promise of not mattering 
who or what you are providing you are economically viable. Indeed, this idea is 
intensified in the blood scene in that biological parity is found at a molecular level, 
blood, it seems, is blood, and NZT is NZT, and Eddie chooses to drink. However, 
Weeks also highlights that the individual (and neoliberal) promise of free choice 
threatens to create an ‘ethical desert’, and the immediate aftermath of this blood-
drinking agrees with this completely. The ingestion of NZT returns Eddie to an 
enhanced state that is vastly superior to the Russian loan shark’s (who being Russian 
retains stereotypical broken English despite Eddie’s polyglot ability on 
enhancement). In other words, as with other neural implantations, Eddie’s is 
predicated on prejudice, but stacked in his favour as a white, heterosexual, middle-
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class American man.43 Further, the blood drinking becomes visually excused as a 
horrible necessity, given the expansive plastic narrative will not permit a full stop 
which is evident as soon as the fight is over. Eddie picks up his suit jacket and leaves 
his body-strewn apartment (fig. 26), mirroring the scene in which he avoided being 
picked in the police line-up (fig. 27). As before, there is no time for introspection or 
ethical recognition only the continued march towards expansion, to over-reaching, 
despite that fact he has just killed people and considered suicide. 
 
 
 
 
There is no ethical or moral lesson for Eddie. He leaves the apartment, finds Atwood’s 
henchman in the hospital and informs him that Brandt (both Eddie’s and Atwood’s 
attorney) kept the NZT pills to himself. The scene then cuts to Atwood’s henchman 
watching the tied up (and presumed dead) Brandt in his apartment, whilst Eddie 
rummages through the safe to find the NZT pills (fig. 28). This mirrors the initial scene 
in Vernon’s apartment that set this plastic narrative into action. There, Eddie returns 
from running errands to find Vernon dead and manically tries to find the NZT pills 
stashed in Vernon’s oven; here he re-finds the pills and is again surrounded by a body. 
 
43 It is worth remembering here the idea that material and ‘objective’ scientific models of selfhood 
are always enmeshed in social and cultural narrative scripts. In belonging to this privileged political 
category, and in being the one character who can maintain enhancement is indicative of the ethical 
problems enhancement could create: an entrenchment of privilege at the site of the neuromolecular 
brain.  
Figure 26 – Eddie leaving his body-
strewn apartment. 
Figure 27 – Eddie leaving the police 
precinct. 
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This would mark the usual desperate ending to a typical drug narrative: the 
suggestion of endless illicit desperation until rehabilitation or death.44 However, this 
narrative is neither reflexive nor properly cyclical but plastic, which therefore does 
not make room for an elliptical ending because in such a model there is no real 
narrative past to return to because it has plastically changed form. Instead, we hear 
Eddie’s narrative state: ‘and it was all still possible’. The scene then cuts to the glossy 
colour of Eddie’s continually enhanced future, in which he has political influence, his 
girlfriend, his transhuman enhancement, and zero comeuppance. With such lofty 
examples of destruction delivered by himself during the film, such as the fall of 
European empires or his symbolic alignment with Caesar, the epilogue is testament 
to enhanced-Eddie’s ability to buck the trend of human nature itself; he continues to 
over-reach with impunity. 
 
 
 
 
In the timeline of enhancement narratives, Limitless already represents 
something that is of its time. While neoliberalism is still the hegemonic model, 
Eddie’s incessant forward march and his endless reforming to overcome hurdles, 
plays like a final death knell to the vision of enhancement and plasticity it portrays. 
Indeed, though the viewer is at times entranced by Eddie’s enhancement, his single-
 
44 Irvine Welsh’s Trainspotting (1993) and Danny Boyle’s film adaptation (1996) of the same name 
encapsulate these narratives. 
Figure 28 – Eddie re-finding the NZT a wardrobe. 
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minded focus on futurity becomes wearing. With no narrative break or real conflict, 
the epilogue can be read as an endless eulogy of this ideological and ontological 
neoliberal mode. 
As a different period of politics emerges, in part because of the ideological 
fatigue of neoliberalism, different biopolitical imperatives and ideologies may come 
to bear on how we understand enhancement and enhanced implantations. For one, 
if neoliberal enhancement prioritizes the self as individual and constructs 
enhancement to be an internal process as with Eddie, other narratives look outside 
of the self and are reflective of a collective understanding of plasticity. In other 
words, this is neuroplasticity as referring to changes in the brain that result from the 
social or environmental that lead to ontological shifts. For another, as enhancement 
becomes increasingly possible more insidious forms of biological elitism in terms of 
who deserves cognitive enhancement, and debates about the personhood status of 
those who do, and do not, may emerge. Finally, new forms of biological scepticism 
or misrepresentation, deployments or withdrawals of science for ideological use, 
such as in racialised Trumpian politics or the scepticism towards vaccination, could 
impinge on the kinds of neural implantations of cognitive enhancement produced. 
Thus, in a timeline of fictional enhancement there is first the non-agential 
‘improvement’: a superhero bitten by a spider, a pathology cured by a rogue scientist, 
or biopolitical improvement of a population. Second the neoliberal caste: the DIY 
agential choice to improve such as through pharmaceuticals of brain training (that is 
as far as agency is available in a wholly neoliberal society), to take the pill, to train 
your brain. More recently, enhancement narratives seem to oscillate between three 
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oppositional ideologies, one that is social, one that is elitist, one that is protectionist. 
These types of enhanced subjectivities I now explore in the posthuman narrative of 
Nexus. 
Nexus 
 
Ramez Naam’s cyberpunk/neurothriller trilogy explores the fictional drug Nexus 5, 
which alters brain chemistry and enables humans to link together at a 
cognitive/psychic level. Nexus offers insight into some key questions of cognitive 
enhancement and the ontological and subjective changes neural implantations elicit. 
Eddie’s plastic subjectivity and narrative is not present here; rather, Nexus imagines 
a world in which the idea of general human life and the concept of humanism is an 
evolving narrative in its own right. My focus is on the first book, Nexus, because it 
foregrounds debates about neuro-enhancement and ideas of posthumanism before 
they become overly naturalised in the speculative world. Naam himself is a computer 
scientist and post-humanist, writing in 2005 the non-fiction book More than Human: 
Embracing the Promise of Biological Enhancement. I note above that Eddie 
represents a transhuman by means of his cognitive enhancement. Transhumanism 
and posthumanism are slippery terms, but, there is a common and key difference 
that runs between the two in critical theory. Transhumanism does not do away with 
the notion of the human or its values or position in the world, seeking instead to 
enhance and improve upon it through science and technology.45 In contrast, 
posthumanism does seek to go beyond/replace understandings of the human, 
 
45 See Francesca Ferrando , ‘Transhumanism/Posthumanism’, in Posthuman Glossary, ed. by Rosi 
Braidotti and Maria Hlavajova (London: Bloomsbury, 2018), pp.438-9 (p.439). David Roden, 
Posthuman Life: Philosophy and the Edge of the Human (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), p.13. 
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collapsing its long-standing and self-appointed biological dominance, removing its 
individualism in favour of interconnection to others, and understanding information 
patterns over corporeal materiality. Eddie’s enhancement does not efface humanist 
values or its hierarchical position in the world, but rather intensifies what is already 
there. While transhumanism seeks to improve upon the human condition through 
enhancement, the problem in Limitless is that what is already there is a world in 
which crime is endemic and neoliberal tenacity is rewarded. So, while his intellect is 
heightened, so too are the politics and ramifications of neoliberal individualism. In 
Limitless, neurobiological technology and political stakes expand together into a 
transhuman compact.  
Posthumanist thought rejects this continuation and enhancement of the 
human. In Rosi Braidotti’s words, posthumanism is a ‘vital materialism’ that ‘contests 
that arrogance of anthropocentrism and the ‘exceptionalism’ of the Human as a 
transcendental category. It strikes an alliance with the productive and immanent 
force of zoe or life in its non-human aspects’.46 It seeks to use technology to 
undermine the era of the Anthropocene and level out the biological playing field 
across all forms of life. Less philosophically, posthuman can also refer to a threshold 
state of technological enhancement that renders the human no longer recognisable 
as such, whereby they have become post-human. Theoretically, this type of 
posthuman can be arrived at through originally transhuman enhancement, as is the 
case in the film Lucy.47 Braidotti is acutely aware of the technological problems facing 
her posthuman aims. Not only does my analysis of Eddie’s plastic narrative show that 
 
46 Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), p.66. 
47 Ferrando, p.439. 
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enhancement only intensifies existing biopolitical imperatives of individualism (thus 
nullifying posthuman collectivism), but common cultural representations of man-
melded-to-machine act often only to re-affirm man’s ontological superiority, in 
Braidotti’s words ‘reasserting transcendence via technological mediation’, and 
nullifying the rejection of human exceptionalism.48 
Braidotti explains that posthuman thought must neither wed itself to ‘hyped-
up disembodiment and fantasies of trans-human escape’ nor human ideals of liberal 
individualism.49 She calls for ‘radical relationality, including webs of power at social, 
psychic, ecological, and microbiological or cellular levels’ but stresses that these 
cannot spring from the ‘current state of the terrain’, but through  ‘embracing an 
ethics of experiment with intensities’.50 For Braidotti, posthumanism is ‘a unique 
opportunity for humanity to reinvent itself affirmatively, through creativity and 
empowering ethical relations, and not only negatively through vulnerability and 
fear’.51  
Whilst partially guilty of ‘hyped-up disembodiment and fantasies of trans-
human escape’ Nexus considers many of these affirmative posthuman themes. Nexus 
5 is the name of an illegal nano-drug that makes the brain receptive to other brain 
signals, enabling the sharing of communication and experience. Kade is a budding 
neuroscientist who illegally experiments with the drug, believing in its capacity to 
change the world through enhancing the interconnectedness of emotion and 
empathy. Sam, an enhanced Emerging Risks Directorate (ERD) agent, busts Kade and 
 
48 Braidotti, p.102. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid.; p.195; p.190 
51 Ibid. p.195. 
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his friends in an undercover sting. The ERD is a branch of the scientifically 
conservative US-government policing posthuman technology. Kade’s bust allows the 
US government to intervene in the more scientifically liberal China, particularly in 
regards to prominent neuroscientist Shu, who they suspect of involvement in 
assassinations and illegal posthuman technology. To save his friends from 
prosecution, Kade agrees to help the ERD and travels with Sam – newly implanted 
with permanent Nexus 5 – to a neuroscience conference in Bangkok. Kade meets 
with Shu who discovers his true motives through the enhancement afforded by 
Nexus 5. She offers him a position in her lab and implants false memories so Sam and 
the ERD do not find out. As the plot develops, Sam’s certainty regarding her disgust 
of Nexus-like drugs wanes, and through ambushes, fights, and chases, she and Kane 
learn more about the possibilities and dangers of the drug. In the end, the ERD invade 
a Thai monastery to recapture Kade and Sam and neutralise the threat of Nexus 5. 
Shu is killed, Sam and Kane escape, and Nexus 5’s pharmacological makeup is 
released online.  
It is crucial to highlight that Nexus is speculative. In Archaeologies of the 
Future, Fredric Jameson argues that speculative fictions actually do greater cultural 
work to ‘defamiliarize and restructure our experience of our own present’ than the 
presentation of images of what the future might be.52 In Nexus, the reader glimpses 
a ‘utopian’ future which is, as suggested in Naam’s author note ‘the science of Nexus’, 
grounded in present scientific reality. However, it is not the sketched utopian 
possibilities that inform our understanding regarding cognitive enhancement, so 
 
52 Fredric Jameson, Archelogies of the Future, p.286 [italics in original]. 
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much as what these inform us about present reality. This is because speculation is 
produced in the foundations of real contemporary biopolitics. Thus, following 
Jameson, speculative fiction like Nexus is useful for analysing neural implantations of 
enhancement because it offers an inverse model to that which typifies neuroscience 
and medicine. Contemporary neuroscience and medicine are narratives built on 
general promises of technology, cures, and pharmaceuticals, and thus are less 
invested in narratives that imagine possible subjective effects. On the other hand, I 
argue that fiction imagines futures to understand the biopolitical imperatives and 
ideologies that produce the enhanced subject to be such a common and powerful 
discourse in contemporary society. As a result, I argue that Nexus highlights the 
ideological crossroads at which we find ourselves today. In an age where what we 
are, how we think, and what we are classified as are increasingly informed by 
materiality of the brain, real world shifts in ideologies and biopolitics could have 
dramatic impacts.  These contemporary concerns are reflected in Nexus’s 
explorations of reactionary populism in the ERD, Kade’s hopes that his drug will 
create a collective, empathetic world, and through posthumanism and the problems 
of hierarchy. 
In the novel, the USA is now (far more) scientifically conservative after a series 
of shocking misuses of science and technology. 2028 saw the Yucca Grove cult 
maintained by the Communion virus, which causes mind-control/enslavement; in 
2029 there was a deadly computer attack; and in 2030 there was the Aryan Rising, 
an attempt to destroy humanity through the Marburg virus and repopulate the world 
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with ‘genetically engineered neo-Nazi transhumans’.53 Many people died, 128 
Marburg-resistant clones were discovered, and public mood shifted towards 
restriction of scientific research on ‘genetics, cloning, nanotechnology, artificial 
intelligence, and any approach to creating “super-human” beings’.54 The outcome 
was the passing of the Chandler Act in 2031 establishing the ERD – part of Homeland 
Security who supersede regular legal rights and brand persons or organisations 
‘emerging threats’ without protection of speech or trial by jury. The Act also paved 
the way for the 2035 Copenhagen Accords on Global Technological Threats, a treaty 
designed to restrict and closely monitor biotechnology and molecular medicine.  
Nexus’s imagined China, and the East generally, is more liberal. The novel’s 
Thai neuroscience conference typifies this, with many of the banned subjects in 
America, such as AI, on proud display. Hence Kade’s summation: ‘no wonder the 
international meeting trumps the US neuroscience meeting these days […] The 
cutting edge stuff isn’t legal at home any more’.55 Shu marks the difference more 
clearly in her meeting with Kade. Through their Nexus 5 connection, Kade asks: ‘why 
not come to the US?’, Shu replies: ‘I’d be even less free in your country. My 
government doesn’t object to posthumans, so long as the first posthumans are 
Chinese. They want control. Fools. As if such beings will be bound by nationality’.56 
The parallel is clear, like the Space and Arms races that dominated much of the latter 
half of the twentieth century, in this novel this century’s race is speculated as a race 
 
53 Naam, Nexus, p.85. 
54 Ibid. p.86. 
55 Ibid. p.155. 
56 Ibid. p.226. 
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to human enhancement, certainly not entirely stranger than fact given DARPA’s 
research interests such as their headband to increase learning speeds. 
What both restrictions and the conference proceedings highlight is that, in 
the future, enhancement has become discursively and materially proliferate. The 
ERD enhance officers like Sam into transhumans in order to fight fire with fire and 
prevent similar or more powerful technologies spreading in public. Moreover, a 
chapter titled: ‘The Bazaar of the Bizarre’ sees Kade and Sam walking through a 
Bangkok street that is essentially bio-enhancement:  
The first few stalls were reproductive services. Sex selection. Ova selection to 
make a child from two mothers, no father necessary […] Reprogeneics gave 
way to bio-cosmetics […] Fat cutters. Fat boosters. Nordic cheekbones. Square 
jaws. Almond-eye shapes. Golden eyes. Cat-slit eyes. Hair curling viruses. Hair 
strengthening viruses [...] Bio-cosmetics gave way to bio-erotics. Booths 
offered viral gene injections to deliver enlarged or firmed “natural” breasts, 
larger pansies […]. Bio-neurals followed bio-erotics […] Sexual orientation 
shifters in temporary and permanent varieties. Savant drugs to put the 
customer in a hyper-productive or hyper-creative trance. […] The modifications 
on offer become progressively more extreme as they neared the end of the 
market. Muscle grafts […] Genetic gender reassignment. Supercharged 
haemoglobin.57 
The enhancement options appear limitless, and though Kade and Sam are told that 
some may be fake, most are effective. However, because ‘there’s no FDA on this 
street’ certain treatments are dangerous, ‘sometimes they miss the gene they want, 
you know? Break something else. Cancer, maybe’.58 Cosmetic surgery has given way 
to cosmetic swallowing, sexual orientation has become a biological choice, savant 
drugs (akin to Eddie’s first use of NZT where he is able rapidly to write his book) are 
commonplace, gender is re-assignable at a genetic level, and muscles and molecules 
 
57 Ibid. pp.243-6. 
58 Ibid. p.244. 
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can be enhanced far beyond natural biological capacity. In other words, not only have 
the neuro-turn and neuro-enhancement become a new normal in this future, but so 
too have new classifications of neural implantation. It is no longer the splitting and 
differentiation between humans, but the splitting and differentiation of human. 
Though the novel does account for the subjective changes brought by enhancement, 
its main concern regard categories of personhood because the ontological shifts 
brought by enhancement have produced not only new subjects and bodies, but new 
parameters of personhood. 
The novel clearly details this speculative future’s definitions of trans- and 
posthuman by fictionalising results from the 2036 Oxford English Dictionary: 
Transhuman – noun – 
1) A human being whose capabilities have been enhanced such that they now 
exceed normal human maxima in one or more important dimensions. 
2) An incremental step in human  evolution 
Posthuman – noun –  
1) A being which has been so radically transformed by technology that it has 
gone beyond transhuman status and can no longer be considered human 
at all. 
2) Any number of species that succeeds humans, whether originated from 
humanity or not. 
3) The next major step in human evolution.59 
Naam’s decision to fictionalise dictionary results (that are notably like contemporary 
definitions) allows the novel’s technical definitions to seem to be objective, which 
has two main effects. First, the definition’s general nature allows the reader to 
consider these terms from a distance; the definitions puncture the narrative, are 
outside of the plotting, and come between the first and second chapters under the 
 
59 Ibid. p.26. 
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heading ‘Briefing’. This puncturing style recurs throughout the novel in order to detail 
important (speculative) historical events, meanings, and legal cases, to mediate the 
gap between the readerly present and the fictional future. These are briefings to the 
reader, and act like guides for this fictional world. Second, and extending this, the 
objectivity reads diagnostically as much as definitional. Here, it is worth 
remembering the kind of phantom objectivity I explore in the introduction that 
underpins the legitimacy of neuroscience, medicine, and diagnosis today, and the 
kind of biopolitical ‘fictions’ Harari describes above. Indeed, subsequent briefings 
detail legal cases and events that seem ideologically to stem from proponents and 
opponents of enhancement/modification. As with other neural implantations, what 
appears to be objective and neutral (as this recourse to dictionary definition 
symbolises), are in fact intractably linked to a range of biopolitical imperatives and 
ideologies. Here, designations of personhood in relation to enhancement are not 
material or even based on some arbitrary threshold, but are politically and socially 
motivated, largely based on perspectives of fear and hope respectively.60 
 Enhancement is commonplace if illicit in Nexus, with proponents of 
posthuman development via Nexus 5 heralding it in evolutionary terms, as ‘a 
quantum step in human cognition’, and opponents prophesising misuse via ‘suicide 
 
60 See for example the recent speculative hope associated with artificial intelligence that Jesus 
Mantas details in the World Economic Forum website. His hope for ‘empathetic AI’ aligns very 
closely with Kade’s and is typical of the critical model of speculative fiction Jameson details. Jesus 
Mantas, ‘Empathetic AI could be the next stage in human evolution – if we get it right’, World 
Economic Forum, 2 July 2019 <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/07/empathic-ai-could-be-
the-next-stage-in-human-evolution-if-we-get-it-right/>  [accessed 12 March 2020]. Compare this to 
the recent Western concerns over the UK’s decision to allow the Chinese telecom firm Huawei to 
build the infrastructure for the 5G network, which is reflective of the novel’s imagining of China’s 
technological dominancy over a more sceptical West.  
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troops? Sex slaves? Worshippers?’.61 The dividing lines are evident, with each side 
understanding the fracture as a battle for or against humanity. The 2038 Posthuman 
Manifesto proclaims that ‘war between those who accept the limitations of 
“humanity” and those who embrace the power of the possible is inevitable’, whilst a 
2035 ERD position paper explains that they will grudgingly use transhuman 
technology on their own agents in order to maintain ‘supremacy on the battlefield’.62 
I term this the ‘posthumanhood wars’. In a 1999 journal review article, Theodore 
Fleischer coined ‘personhood wars’ to describe the tensions between ‘personalism’, 
where a claim to life is based primarily on cognitive abilities, and ‘physicalism’, where 
every human being is entitled to life.63 My reading of Nexus and description of neural 
implantations of cognitive enhancement update this debate; it is no longer about the 
right to human-hood, but the right to posthuman-hood, that is to say the right to 
exist as something beyond the definition and capacity of human. It speaks to a 
growing body of cultural and academic work on the subject, and reflect the potential 
paradigm shifting end point of the neuro-turn and the neural implantation in which 
biotechnology and molecular medicine potentially see Rose’s ‘lessons from lesions’ 
incrementally evolve into lessons from normality.64  
 In Nexus, pro-enhancement group Free the Future explicitly aligns the new 
‘War on Science’ characterised by the formation of the ERD, with the history (our 
present) War on Drugs and War on Terror. They argue that like drugs and terror, a 
 
61 Naam, p.169, p.66 
62 Ibid. p.198. 
63 Theodore E. Fleischer, ‘The Personhood Wars’ Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 20.3 (1999), 
309-318 (p.309).  
64 See this culturally speculated in Black Mirror and discussed in popular academic texts such as 
Harari’s Homo Deus. 
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war on science will cause far more damage than the supposed threat could ever do.65 
Across the ideological barricades, legal action is quickly taken to enshrine US 
constitutional human rights to humans only, through which a 2036 Supreme Court 
ruling finds non-humans, by means of genetic manipulation, technological 
enhancement, or ‘significant deviation from the existing spectrum of human 
characteristics’ to be unprotected by the constitution.66 In a contemporary reality in 
which 2017 (eighteen years after Fleisher’s article) saw the United Nations condemn 
the UK government for failing to uphold disabled persons rights, the fictional 
speculation that neuro-typical, non-disabled humans will be forced to scramble to 
reaffirm their own protection (nineteen speculative years after the UN 
condemnation) seems unimaginable.67 However, this is precisely the point. The 
privileged humanist who is able-bodied, neuro-typical, white, self-sufficient, can 
barely conceive of a narrative in which humanism is decentred, in much the same 
way as it has hitherto been difficult to imagine/conceive of anything but normative 
models of ‘typical’ cognition.68 
As seen in Limitless, neoliberal biopolitics and ideology has entrenched this 
humanist belief, in which neoliberal man is the lone centre who decides what and 
who are his margins. Whilst NZT provides no means to move collectively beyond 
humanity, only to enhance and intensify its capacities and limitations on an individual 
 
65 Naam, p.241. 
66 Ibid. p.330. 
67 Patrick Butler, ‘UN panel criticises UK failure to uphold disabled people’s rights’, Guardian, 31 
August 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/aug/31/un-panel-criticises-uk-failure-to-
uphold-disabled-peoples-rights> [accessed 22 July 2019]. 
68 The neuro-turn and neural implantations have been instructive in this regard as neuroscience’s 
focus on the atypical brain has seen cognitive difference proliferate in society and culture. 
Moreover, my argument that neural implantations contain capacity for resistance provides spaces 
whereby normative cognitive models can be challenged.    
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basis, Nexus 5 does, establishing a tension between ‘types’ of enhancement: 
individual or collective. The concern of those non-enhanced is reductions of status, 
hierarchy, and control. Traditional humanism considers rational man at the top, 
agential and a god unto himself. The US ERD deputy director Becker and the US 
President in Nexus are typical of this. Upon seeing evidence of people born with 
enhanced qualities, Becker panics and asks himself how this new ‘subspecies’ would 
‘treat the rest of humanity’ and whether ‘these freaks would turn his daughters into 
a new underclass’.69 What is more, given the legal precedence against posthuman 
forms of life, the President is free to make ‘the elimination of transhuman and 
posthuman threats one of his top national security priorities’.70 The difference 
between the enhancement pills NZT and Nexus 5 is clear. The two drugs are 
metaphors for different kinds of ideology and their ingestion different kinds of 
enhancement implantations. The former works in line with neoliberal humanist 
tenets of individualism in which reason and purpose comes from within the self. 
Nexus 5 is a collective drug in which reason and purpose comes from without; indeed, 
with Nexus 5 the threat to the body politic is figured as a threat to the subject’s 
political right to individualism and freedom that encapsulates the modern history of 
liberal ideology. 
 However, it is precisely on these same grounds that its proponents make its 
posthuman claims. The novel concludes with one of Kade’s friends explaining that 
‘every attempt through history to limit the definition of humanity has been a prelude 
to the subjugation, degradation, and slaughter of innocents’, citing the examples of 
 
69 Naam, pp.414-5. 
70 Ibid. p.442. 
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slavery, female subjugation, and Jewish persecution.71 If the posthumanhood war 
theme oscillates between the extremes of evolution and destruction throughout the 
book, this final section advocating for enhancement has the last, decisive word: ‘fight 
for what’s right. Fight for your right to decide who and what sort of person you’re 
going to be tomorrow, no matter what anyone else thinks’.72 Braidotti may be right 
that successful posthuman development can only be secured away from the 
biopolitics of contemporary society; however, Nexus makes clear that in such a 
technological world, countries, ideologies, and leaders are powerless to contain 
single-minded and tech-savvy individuals. Here, the utopia of collectivity seems 
doomed to repeat the individual nature of man, whether human or supposed 
posthuman. 
 The specific subject of the posthumanhood wars in the novel centres on the 
drug Nexus 5. The reader first encounters the drug’s effects at one of Kade’s parties, 
which revolve around the recreational use of enhancement drugs. Titled the ‘Don 
Juan Protocol’, the opening has Kade ‘immersed’ in the Nexus operating system 
before engaging his ‘body-control software’, porn-bot Peter North, to improve his 
sexual prowess with a party guest called Frances. Likely intended to be humorous, 
the technology malfunctions and causes Kade to ejaculate prematurely and 
uncontrollably ‘in bliss and confusion and hilarity’.73 However, the situation is much 
more sinister: ‘neither Peter North nor Kade were in control’ as ‘[interference ERROR. 
. . ]’ messages display while Kade’s ‘hands eased on Frances’s head’.74 Horrified, 
 
71 Ibid. p.513. 
72 Ibid. p.515. 
73 Ibid. p.16. 
74 Ibid. 
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Frances says: ‘next time you wanna play rough, you ask first, asshole’, before leaving. 
The implications are concerning, had Kade not ejaculated would he have raped her? 
Could we really say that Kade raped her? Was it ‘Peter North’? Or the malfunction? 
This is but a fraction of the ethical dimensions Nexus 5 brings. Worryingly, Kade, a 
posthumanism advocate, thinks of the incident only mechanically: ‘that didn’t work 
so well’.75 
 In this imagined future, previous models of Nexus have each been classified 
illegal, similarly, Nexus 5 is an underground drug, developed illegitimately outside of 
biopolitical institutions by idealistic scientists such as Kade and his neuroscientist/DJ 
partner Rangan. In their eyes it is a social and collective drug, not a military weapon 
or lucrative market-stock. To overly simplify, if NZT and Eddie equate to cocaine and 
Wall Street, whereas Nexus 5 and Kade equate to LSD and parties.76 This is most 
evident when Sam goes to Kade’s illegal Nexus party, surrounded by tight pants, 
leather, tattoos, and ‘biomorph’ body art, she feels ‘them all in her mind. Gay, 
straight, and bi; singles, couples, triads, more complex networks still. This boy-
scientist has brought her into the heart of the counterculture. And the counterculture 
was dosed with Nexus’.77 The countercultural origins are crucial to understanding the 
different enhancement narratives the novel is trying to create. Nexus 5 works 
antithetically to NZT, both physiologically and culturally. NZT is an extreme neoliberal 
stimulant that forces singlemindedness to the point of ethical bankruptcy, Nexus 5 is 
 
75 Ibid. p.17. 
76 These two reflect the two aspects of pharmacology and fictional representation today. On the one 
hand, Limitless reflects the need to enhance in order to beat the competitive race to the top. Whilst 
Nexus’s collective aim, its countercultural opting-out, falls more in line with representations of 
micro-dosing such as in The Good Fight (King, 2017-), a legal TV drama, which, throughout its series 
conveys an entropic degradation reflecting the state of Western politics. 
77 Naam. p.43. 
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an extreme social relaxant that enables connectivity to the point of empathetic 
nirvana. It is in these enhancements that Kade and his friends make their claims (and 
stake their freedom) regarding the drug’s posthuman possibilities. 
 Indeed, when Sam tells Kade during the bust that Nexus 5 can be abused to 
hurt people, Kade disagrees, explaining instead ‘it’s a way of bridging the gap 
between people. It makes us smarter together than we could be apart. It can raise 
our collective empathy’.78 Kade’s vision is one of networks, of a species-wide 
cognitive conversation replete with collective responsibly and respect. Nexus 5 here 
reflects technological forms of communication in present reality, such as Instagram 
and Twitter.79 However, Sam’s true ERD motive is revealed, and the collective bliss is 
ruined by the fact that Kade can coerce Sam into submission through Nexus 5, 
proving that there is a hierarchy of control. Kade continues his vision, stating that 
safeguards will be put in to ensure people do not hack the neuro-software, arguing 
people can already control planes and phones, so any argument about hacking 
should not be valid in terms of technological development. Kade’s argument is 
difficult to accept; not only has Nexus 5 malfunctioned to the point of sexual assault, 
it has been used to coerce Sam’s will: an action fundamentally oppositional to its 
stated aims.  
 However, the novel allows for a perspective that views these as teething 
issues in a much greater journey towards positive neuro-enhancement. Wade, an ex-
military friend of Kade who has the Nexus 5 implant feels the bigger picture 
 
78 Ibid. p.65. 
79 A similar theme of neural connectivity/collectivity can be found in the Sense8 (Wachowski, 2015-
17), a television series about eight multinational strangers who become connected mentally and 
emotionally. 
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personally. He is wracked with empathetic guilt over his actions in war and through 
Nexus 5 has come to understand war’s futility. After escaping Sam’s raid, Wade 
makes it his mission to recapture Kade and ‘keep Nexus 5 alive. He could hope to 
somehow get it out into the world. And if it got out into the world… It could change 
people. […] The way the touch of another’s mind through Nexus had changed him’.80 
This is a form of plasticity without neoliberalism; it is Malabou’s hope of a 
giving/receiving of (neural) form without the co-option of endless expansion and the 
creation of selves-as-self-projects. However, throughout the novel, war (US ERD 
military division) continually destroys the collective moments in which Nexus’s 
positive posthuman potential is explored. Sam’s narrative arc encapsulates this, she 
goes from disgust and fear of Nexus’s effects to a treacherous turn towards 
protecting Kade (and Nexus 5) at all costs, having grown to appreciate the hope, 
collectivity, and shared experiences of pain, which displaces her longstanding 
suspicion of enhancement.  
Despite these moments of empathetic harmony, Nexus 5 is also terrifying. 
Shu, the posthuman neuroscientist who is integrated with Nexus 5 and other 
biotechnology hopes for posthuman revolution. Working to entice Kade to join her 
lab she details her three scientific goals: brain-to-brain communication, boosting 
human intelligence, and uploading minds to machines, aspects of which are currently 
being researched by DARPA.81 For Kade, Shu ‘would change the world. She would lift 
 
80 Naam, p.138. 
81 In 2019, DARPA released a report titled ‘Six Paths to the Nonsurgical Future of Brain-Machine 
Interfaces’. One of DARPA’s funded research divisions – dubbed the N3 teams – hope that success 
will result in ‘wearable neural interface systems that can communicate with the brain from a range 
of just a few millimeters, moving neurotechnology beyond the clinic and into practical use for 
national security’. DARPA website, 20 May 2019 <https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2019-05-20> 
[accessed 12 February 2020]. 
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the human mind to new heights. He could be part of it. A posthuman, upgraded 
through her knowledge. It was intoxicating’.82 The problem is that Shu, for all her 
collective aims, is even more problematic than Eddie in Limitless. She is a complete 
megalomaniac bent on posthuman domination. Sam comments on Kade’s naivety 
throughout, and it is most clear in his Nexus 5 enabled conversations with Shu. He 
says Nexus 5 can enhance everybody, that ‘this is about choice and freedom right? 
About everyone’s potential’. She replies: ‘the world needs new leaders, Kade. […] 
After we tear down the old order, there will be a vacuum. Who will rule? Giving full 
power to everyone would be like putting guns in the hands of children’.83 She further 
explains that in time some will be ‘uplift[ed]’ but that she and Kade will always be the 
‘elite’. A great irony of Shu’s is that whilst she attempts to move beyond the human, 
which is to say both beyond older ideas of fatalism and beyond the liberal limits of 
the individual conception of the self, she returns to older notions of god-like 
supremacy in the form of Nietzsche’s Übermensch. God is dead and humanism is 
dying; as the 2038 Posthuman Manifesto states: ‘they will fear us for our greatness 
just as Nietzsche said they would fear the Übermensch. […] We will triumph, 
whatever the cost’.84 The problem is that Shu seeks a hierarchical posthuman future, 
one that by its nature makes the Übermensch a god not just of itself, but of others 
too. 
 In Nexus, mind-altering drugs are steeped in a horrific past of tyranny and 
murder. Two main catastrophes dominate biotechnological cultural history in the 
 
82 Naam, p.224. 
83 Ibid. p.306. 
84 Ibid. p.198. 
143 
 
novel, Yucca Grove in 2028, and the Aryan Uprising in 2030. Yucca Grove was a white-
collar commune of lawyers, designers, technologists and so on. It was blissful until 
the Communion virus designed to enhance empathy and ‘put people closer to God’, 
turned people into slavish acolytes.85 Some people were immune, and one man 
became prophet and seized control through fear and violence. Sam was an immune 
twelve year old at Yucca Grove but her family were infected. Sam was repeatedly 
raped, until one day she slipped out of a leader’s bed and called the police. An FBI 
siege lasted for three days, Sam survived but her family, and many others, were 
killed. Whilst perhaps utterly alien to contemporary reality, technologies and 
knowledge that bear similar implications have long been of interest to the USA. One 
need only think of the history of the 1960s MKULTRA, which is usually considered a 
military experiment into mind-control and brainwashing, was in fact, as Naomi Klein 
more correctly describes, ‘a scientifically based system for extracting information 
from “resistant sources”’.86  
More recently, Malcolm Dando notes how DARPA has researched the 
properties of the hormones oxytocin, which plays large roles in sociality and bonding. 
Dando cites a 2013 DARPA solicitation that explains, ‘oxytocin also affects behaviours 
relevant to national security. Oxytocin can impact behaviours ranging from whether 
two individuals trust each other [or] how someone reacts to stress’.87 Notable for this 
thesis is Dando’s identification of DARPA’s interest in narrative. He cites DARPA’s 
acknowledgment that understanding ‘how stories inform neurobiological processes 
 
85 Ibid. p.350. 
86 Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine (London: Penguin, 2008), p.39. 
87 DARPA Solicitation: SB132-001: Oxytocin: Improving measurement sensitivity and specificity’, 
quoted in Malcolm Dando, The Future of Chemical-Biological Weapons (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015), p.132 [emphasis in the original]. 
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is critical if we are to ascertain what effects stories have on the psychology and 
neurobiology of human choices and human behaviours’.88 Indeed, a central thread 
running through this thesis’s articulation of the neural implantation is how cultural 
stories, discourse, and narratives are epistemologically potent both in 
producing/implanting ideas of cognitive difference/normalcy, and as being a 
resistance to it. Nexus is no exception, deliberately fence-sitting between stories of 
enhancement’s potential and warnings of dangers such as its imagining of the Aryan 
uprising.  
This was ‘an ideologically driven plot to wipe out “inferior races” and replace 
them with ethnically pure Übermenschen’.89 The neo-Nazi group murdered 90% of 
their town with an airborne virus, and eugenically bred clones intended for 
repopulation. As seen above, this is not the only reference to Nietzsche’s 
Übermensch. In the Posthuman Manifesto, it is a call to arms: accept us or die; during 
the Aryan Uprising it is used in the same terms as the Nazis, as a counterpoint to the 
“inferior races” or Untermenschen. Here, reading Braidotti’s argument in relation to 
Nexus, that true post-humanism cannot be built on the foundations (or ashes) of 
contemporary neoliberal biopolitics becomes little more than the utopian 
transhuman idealism she rallies against, and follows the same impractical rationale 
of Malabou’s plasticity that compels us to realise and harness the potential of our 
brain. Nexus plays with contradictory stakes here; some humans welcome the 
potential of enhancement; some humans fear the effects to humanhood. Where 
Nazism stripped personhood status for some groups, posthumans such as Shu 
 
88 Ibid. p.134. 
89 Naam, p.86. 
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similarly hierarchize who or what can be granted posthuman status. Nexus shows us 
that rather than questions of the subjective changes brought by enhancement (which 
manifested in a disregard of ethics for Eddie in Limitless), biopolitical questions such 
as status, classification, protection will be immediate concerns should similar 
technology become realised. 
The end of the novel sees the release of the Nexus 5 blueprint into the world 
via the internet. Despite the best efforts of global security agencies, the blueprints 
are uncontainable and spread at an alarming rate. Indeed, a hacker ‘Mutat0r’ is an 
aptly named catalyst akin to the type of narrative plasticity depicted in Limitless. 
Mutat0r, ‘had taken the original package and mutated it into a plethora of new 
variants, adding new and irrelevant files, reordering the existing files, padding out 
the beginning or end with texts from the Bible, the Congressional Register, random 
sites from the web’.90 With some human help, Nexus becomes plasticity itself 
endlessly forming, re-forming, and mutating, and indeed, spreading monstrously, at 
least in the eyes of the ERD. Details of nascent usages of Nexus such as a psychiatrist 
increasing empathy with patients; a porn director creating realistic ‘adventures’; an 
Islamist imagining its use in furthering jihad; a mother hoping to ‘break through’ to 
her autistic son close the narrative.91  
Though Naam himself advocates for posthumanism, and the novel makes use 
of definitional ambivalence and objectivity, it is here, in the idealistic usage for autism 
that Nexus highlights the inherent danger of neuro-enhancement. Standing 
 
90 Ibid. p.497. 
91 Ibid. pp.499-500. 
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synecdochally for neuro-atypical persons, this latterly detailed potential benefit acts 
much like the rest of the neuro-turn. Not only is it founded on possibility, ‘was it even 
possible? Could it break through the walls between them?’, but it is steeped in 
problematic normative discourse. Coupled with the wish to ‘break through’, the 
mother wonders what it would ‘be like to touch his mind?’, propagating, as the next 
chapter considers, increasingly outdated images of autistic children as being locked 
in a shell, not to mention a non-informed invasion of private thought. In other words, 
Nexus 5 is figured as a ‘cure’ to the expressions of subjectivity that categorise 
cognitive difference, in an antithetical manner to the way in which this thesis argues 
difference should be represented in society and culture. Moreover, given that Nexus 
5 and its related enhancement drugs have so easily been co-opted for hierarchical 
and fascist use in the novel, how could Nexus 5, despite its collective intention, be 
expected to benefit those historically considered other, even Untermensch.92 
Likewise, the possibility of it becoming a paradise for neuro-technologists able to 
manipulate it is as concerning as the possibility of a new neuro class-system, the 
enhanced and unenhanced.  
Of course, Nexus and its enhancement technology are entirely speculative. 
However, the stated aim of this thesis is to explore subjectivity and personhood 
through representations of neural implantations of brain and cognitive difference. 
 
92 It is important to highlight here the historical links between Autism and Nazism. Hans Asperger, 
the name now famous because of Lorna Wing’s description of Asperger’s syndrome, was an Austrian 
physician who in 1938 classified children displaying particular psychological and behavioural 
symptoms as ‘autistic psychopaths’. Recent work such as Edith Sheffer’s Asperger’s Children, 
however, highlights that Asperger was directly involved in sending children with cognitive difference 
to the Viennese Am Spiegelgrund clinic where children were killed under the Nazi’s Aktion T4 
euthanasia policy. Edith Sheffer, Asperger’s Children: The Origins of Autism in Nazi Vienna (New 
York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2018). 
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Enhanced subjects in this book oscillate between utopia and dystopia. Writers such 
as Harari and Naam suggest we are teetering on the edge of trans- and posthuman 
subjects – bolstered by the huge cultural and economic industry vested in marketing 
and commodifying posthumanism.  
* 
This chapter has explored two fictional accounts of what a neural implantation of 
cognitive enhancement might look and feel like. Limitless envisions an enhanced 
subject whose narrative comes to align with the contemporary compact between 
neoliberalism and biotechnology, creating an enhanced subject who is ethically 
corrupt, criminally unimpeachable, and only invested in the future. Nexus looks at 
neural implantations of enhancement at a larger scale and considers posthuman 
possibilities. Though Nexus 5 aims at utopia via an increased and shared 
understanding of empathy, the novel imagines a world which sees only further 
division between cognitive ability with the parameters of normalcy, whereby ideas 
of what constitutes a person are scaled up in the image of an idealised brain state. 
What both texts highlight is biotech’s role in manufacturing these new ontological 
states and categories. However, it is crucial also to understand that these 
technologies are not objective but enmesh with ideological and cultural scripts 
surrounding them. To this extent, and like the ‘pathological’ case studies of 
difference the next chapters consider, these two texts highlight that neural 
implantations of enhancement and debates surround their legitimacy or actuality 
must be less about specific technologies and how effective these might be in 
achieving cognitive enhancement, and more about the power of the ‘fictions’ and 
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biopolitics underpinning their discursive claims of progress, anti-aging, or their ability 
to castigate difference through normative models of plasticity or idealised 
transhuman capability. 
 
 
 
149 
 
Chapter Two: The Shooter and the Hacker: Autism, 
Courtrooms, and Justice 
As a diagnostic category, autism has developed from being a label for childhood 
schizophrenia to its contemporary and much more generalised use in categorising of 
a range of cognitive and learning differences (still predominantly associated with 
childhood).1 It has become a relatively common diagnosis and, crucially for this 
thesis, a widely represented and translated ‘thing’ in society and culture. Autism is a 
powerful explanatory and classificatory diagnostic discourse that creates ontological 
effects with an authority that implies certainty to that which it signifies and attaches. 
It creates medical identities and informs and underpins subjectivity, reflected in the 
growing shift towards identity-first language (autistic person) over person-first 
 
1 Autism originally aligned with childhood schizophrenia, later developing into a range of 
communication disorders, before becoming the relatively commonly diagnosed 
neurological/developmental condition we understand it as today (Evans). This modern meaning 
emerged from epidemiological studies in the latter half of the twentieth century conducted by 
researchers like Lorna Wing and Judith Gould. They not only found that autism is much more 
common than previously thought, but also began the change from sub-grouping types of autism, 
such as the disappearance of Leo Kanner’s influential description of ‘infantile autism’ or their 
resurrection of Hans Asperger’s forgotten work on the subject, stressing instead the spectrum 
model. Wing’s move was to widen the parameters of autistic diagnosis by focussing on three key 
elements, the ‘triad of impairments in social interaction, communication, imagination, and 
behaviour’ (Wing). In so doing, the scope of autism significantly expanded, ranging from ‘general 
learning disability to average or even superior cognitive skill in areas not directly affected by the 
basic impairments’ (Wing). Indeed, the latest model of the DSM removed Asperger’s as a distinct 
type of autism, preferring the generalised diagnosis Autism Spectrum Disorder (APA). Though the 
meaning of ‘autism’ as a diagnostic category has changed throughout the twentieth century, what 
this example illustrates is the decreasing specificity and increasing generality of the diagnosis. The 
narrative here is of specific and often disparate symptoms grouped together into a diagnosis, the 
parameters of which are themselves subsequently widened out. Bonnie Evans, ‘How autism became 
autism: The radical transformation of a central concept of child development in Britain’, History of 
the Human Sciences, 26.3 (2013), 3-31; Lorna Wing, ‘The Autistic Spectrum’, The Lancet, 350, 13 
December 1997, 1761-1766 (p.1); American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders Fifth Edition (Washington DC: American Psychiatric Association, 2013), 
p.xlii. 
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language (person with autism), indicative of neural implantations, where, as the 
National Autistic Society notes: ‘autism is seen as integral to the person’.2  
Stuart Murray makes this cultural resonance clear in his book Representing 
Autism: Culture, Narrative, Fascination, in which he theorises ‘autism events’, 
meaning ‘fictions that almost achieved the status of sociological documents in the 
ways in which their presentation of the condition was received’.3 He refers 
specifically to Rain Man (Levinson, 1988) and Haddon’s The Curious Incident of the 
Dog in the Night-Time (2003). Indeed, Murray’s own work has become, if not a 
cultural ‘autism event’, then certainly an academic one through its exploration of 
autism narratives, something this chapter continues to explore. Murray explains the 
narratives he chose were the most ‘revealing and pertinent’ of the time (2008).4 The 
book unpicks the long-standing idiot/savant paradigm and considers the narrative of 
‘witnessing’ which Murray coins to explain how autism interacts with general culture, 
ultimately arguing we are all ‘witnesses’ to autism, from experts to lay persons.5 This 
agrees with the idea running throughout this thesis that the neuro-turn is so 
enmeshed with how we construct and understand the self to the extent that ‘we are 
all scientists now’ given the proliferation of neuro discourse in society and culture. 
Murray considers gender and autism and how autism has come to be associated with 
traditionally masculine traits, before finally looking at autism and the family. In this 
final chapter, Murray begins with the murder of autistic persons by parents or carers. 
This task is continued and furthered by Anne McGuire in her 2016 book War on 
 
2 ‘The language we use to describe autism’, National Autistic Society, 
<https://www.autism.org.uk/about/what-is/describing.aspx> [accessed 4 December 2019]. 
3 Stuart Murray, Representing Autism: Culture, Narrative, Fascination, pp. 12-13. 
4 Ibid. p.23. 
5 Ibid. p.114. 
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Autism. She begins her book with news reports relating to the murder of autistic 
persons, primarily in Canada. The ripples of Murray’s book can be clearly seen in 
McGuire’s own interest in narrative. She writes ‘what autism is and can be today has 
everything to do with the ways in which stories appear against a cultural backdrop 
that privileges the telling of some stories over and against others’.6 Like this thesis, 
McGuire is keen to highlight the specific contemporary biopolitics underpinning what 
she deems the ‘cultural logic of normative violence’, which is the notion that autism 
is framed as a pathological issue to be contained, cured, or corrected most 
worrisomely by certain autism advocacy groups. I subscribe to this argument, and 
her focus on the privileging of certain narratives and stories as underscoring this 
normative violence is crucial for my understanding of the neural implantation of 
autism. As I will maintain, in being implanted into the soul, body, and subjectivity of 
a person, autism creates significant biopolitical constraints as well as particular 
narrative modes of resistance and reclamation against these. Indeed, like Yuval Noah 
Harari’s expectation that the future will see ‘fiction’ be the most effective discourse 
in shaping our perceptions of truth, challenging this normative violence and getting 
alternative models of autism into cultural consciousness is critical.7   
Narratives of autism are constantly evolving. Murray argues that the autistic 
savant ‘has the same absence of coherence that marked ‘the idiot’ figure of an earlier 
era’, and that in a time of ‘rationality and scientific knowledge’ autism still allows 
 
6 Anne McGuire, War on Autism: On the Cultural Logic of Normative Violence, (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 2016), p.13. 
7 Ian Hacking similarly discusses the importance of fictionally storytelling in relation to what and how 
both autistic and non-autistic persons think about autism. Ian Hacking, ‘How we have been learning 
to talk about autism: a role for stories’, Metaphilosophy, 40 (2009), 499-516 
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01607.x> [accessed 17 May 2018]. 
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space for ‘wonder and awe’ through the remarkable talents of savants.8 However, 
Murray is quick to highlight a problem; in maintaining a magician-like air, savant 
narratives make it easier to disavow the social realities of autistic adults. 9 Taking both 
media and fictional narrative into consideration, this chapter extends and augments 
Murray’s work and argues the contemporary ‘autistic savant’ as considered by 
Murray is today most fully represented in the figure of the autistic hacker, who is 
able to achieve justice and effect structural change through atypical abilities. To an 
extent, the autistic hacker comes, as discussed below, to share properties with the 
enhanced brain. Fictional representations of savant-like ability feed into cognitive 
enhancement’s cultural purchase, especially regarding ideas of plastic potential. 
 Building on Murray and McGuire, this chapter intervenes in critical autism 
scholarship to argue that the figure of the autistic person today falls between two 
problematic and prejudicial representations of the ‘violent shooter’ and the ‘savvy 
hacker’. It tracks these figures in contemporary media culture, before exploring these 
two figures in contemporary crime narratives. Jodi Picoult’s House Rules (2010) 
enfolds as a US courtroom drama deliberating on Jacob Hunt, an autistic eighteen 
year-old who is accused of killing his mentor Jess. Though not a ‘shooter’, Jacob’s lack 
of agency in the fictional trial offers a useful exploration of how biopolitical and legal 
imperatives come to bear on cognitive difference. The remainder of the chapter looks 
at fictional figurations of the hacker, through Steig Larsson’s character Lisbeth 
Salander in his Millennium trilogy (2007-9 in English translation) and Jesse Banks in 
the Australian television series The Code (2014-16). Though representing different 
 
8 Murray, pp. 98-9. 
9Ibid. 
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narrative forms and geographic locations, the characters encapsulate both the 
widespread prejudice an implantation of cognitive difference brings, but also the 
inherent space for subjective resistance from within the implantation itself. Through 
hacking, they find imaginative ways not only to bring self-justice, but justice for those 
whose lives are similarly underpinned by biopolitical imperatives and technology. 
The Autistic Hacker 
 
In 2002 Briton Gary McKinnon was accused of ‘the biggest military hack of all time’, 
having hacked into US Defence in the hope of finding the truth about UFOs.10 
Depressed and taking Prozac, McKinnon found himself in limbo waiting for, and 
fighting against, extradition to the US.11 In his words: ‘things started to change’ when, 
during a 2008 television interview, ‘a woman who had Asperger’s syndrome […] 
thought that I was displaying classic signs of the condition’.12 McKinnon was formally 
diagnosed by psychologist and autism researcher Simon Baron-Cohen, which coupled 
with his depression and suicide risk, persuaded the then Home Secretary Theresa 
May to block his extradition in 2012 under the Human Rights Act. Since then, 
McKinnon’s diagnosis has played a central role in public discussion and has featured 
in a string of subsequent news stories.13 The autistic hacker has become a 
 
10 Will Dunn, ‘Autistic hackers: the teenagers who “get carried away”’, New Statesman, 20 October 
2017, Cyber section <https://www.newstatesman.com/microsites/cyber/2017/10/will-prison-deter-
autistic-teenager-hacking> [accessed 15 May 2018]. 
11 Gary McKinnon, ‘Theresa May saved my life – now she’s the only hope for the Human Rights Act’, 
Guardian, 15 November 2016, Opinion section 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/15/theresa-may-saved-my-life-human-
rights-act> [accessed 21 May 2018]. 
12 Ibid. 
13 See for example, ‘Gary McKinnon profile: Autistic ‘hacker’ who started writing computer programs 
at 14’, Telegraph, 23 January 2009. USA section 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/4320901/Gary-McKinnon-
profile-Autistic-hacker-who-started-writing-computer-programs-at-14.html> [accessed 18 May 
2018]. 
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recognisable figure of the contemporary moment, appearing frequently in recent 
news media. Such is the case with teenager Kane Gamble who appeared in the 
Independent in this headline: ‘teenager with autism on Leicestershire housing estate 
took classified information by fooling people into thinking he was FBI boss’.14 These 
international, political, and legal incidents and actions often go to the heart of 
national security, and as I will show throughout this chapter, share thematic 
characteristics with the thriller genre. Perhaps most notable among such hackers is 
Lauri Love. In 2013 US authorities attempted to extradite Love for a 2012-13 ‘hacking 
spree’ in which he was accused of stealing classified data.15 He was said to have 
hacked the US Federal Reserve, the Department of Defence, NASA, and the FBI.16 The 
similarities to the McKinnon case are striking; Love was fighting extradition on the 
grounds of mental health and suicide-risk and was also subsequently diagnosed with 
Asperger’s by Baron-Cohen in 2015.17 During the 2016 hearing, Baron-Cohen testified 
that Love should not be extradited due to his mental health, severe eczema, and 
autism, but the prosecution challenged the validity of his diagnoses and the 
extradition was granted.18 He appealed, and on the 5th February 2018 the Court of 
Appeal blocked his extradition. Headlines ran thus: ‘‘Hacker’ says victory against US 
 
14 Nina Massey, ‘Kane Gamble: Teenager with autism on Leicestershire housing estate took classified 
information by fooling people into thinking he was FBI boss’, Independent, 21 January 2018, Crime 
section <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/us-intelligence-cia-fbi-american-
government-john-brennan-mark-giuliano-crackas-with-attitude-latest-a8170561.html> {accessed 21 
May 2018]. 
15 David Gilbert, ‘Autistic U.K. hacker who stole U.S. secretes won’t face trial in U.S.’, Vice, 5 February 
2018, News section <https://news.vice.com/en_ca/article/pamy9b/autistic-uk-hacker-who-stole-us-
secrets-wont-face-trial-in-us> [accessed 15 May 2018]. 
16 Martin Evans, ‘Autistic man accused of computer hacking could kill himself if extradited, court is 
warned’, Telegraph, 28 June 2016, News section 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/28/lauri-love/> [accessed 15 May 2018]. 
17 Simon Parkin, ‘Keyboard warrior: the British hacker fighting for his life’, Guardian, 8 September 
2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/sep/08/lauri-love-british-hacker-anonymous-
extradition-us> [accessed 15 May 2018]. 
18 Ibid. 
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extradition is a big win for people with autism’; ‘Lauri Love: Autistic hacking suspect 
wins US extradition appeal’; ‘Autistic U.K. hacker who stole U.S. secrets won’t face 
trial in the U.S.’.19 
 After winning his appeal, Love said ‘I’m hoping that this outcome can 
contribute to the discussion we are having as a society about how to accommodate 
people that have neurodiversity, whose brains are made up in a slightly different 
way’.20 This idea of different accommodations for different brains has garnered 
debate. That Love and McKinnon were deemed at risk of suicide was a result of a mix 
of health problems, particularly depression; however, it is equally clear that their 
autistic behaviours and expressions were liable to cause intense distress if the 
extradition went forward. If these immediate life-threatening concerns blocked their 
extraditions – and, as McKinnon explains, saved their lives – subsequent questions 
have arisen regarding the relative culpability of autistic persons who hack. Gary 
McKinnon’s defence barrister Ben Cooper frames the debate succinctly: ‘generally 
[autistic hackers] are not really thinking consequentially. They get carried away, in 
the middle of the night, on their computers. Most of them are extremely lonely guys 
[…] and so this is their one opportunity to have a community’.21 This is echoed by Ami 
Klin, director of the Marcus Autism Center: ‘there are individuals with Asperger’s 
syndrome whose only window into the social world is their computer screens, and 
 
19 Tom Herbert, ‘‘Hacker’ says victory against US extradition is a big win for people with autism’, 
Metro, 5 February 2018 < https://metro.co.uk/2018/02/05/computer-hacker-wins-hearing-
extradition-us-7287823/> [accessed 15 May 2018]; Alexandra J Martin, ‘Lauri Love: Autistic hacking 
suspect wins US extradition appeal’, Sky, 5 February 2018 <https://news.sky.com/story/lauri-love-
autistic-hacking-suspect-wins-us-extradition-appeal-11237738> [accessed 5 May 2018]; David Gilbert, 
‘Autistic U.K. hacker who stole U.S. secrets won’t face trial in the U.S.’. 
20 Laurie Love quoted in Herbert, ‘‘Hacker’ says victory against US extradition is a big win for people 
with autism’. 
21 Ben Cooper quoted in Dunn, ‘Autistic hackers: the teenagers who “get carried away”’. 
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they bring their naivety and gullibility to that medium’.22 This notion that autistic 
people are generally isolated and find a community online is one facet of the rise of 
the ‘autistic hacker’. They, so the argument goes, ‘get carried away’, having found a 
skill and community in which to flourish.  
Despite its illegality, such unique skills have unsurprisingly emerged into a 
form of work/productivity. In 2017, The Times ran: ‘Autistic hacker Jack Chappell ‘had 
been exploited’’, referring to the fact that he was paid only £1500 by the 
underground company he worked for despite amassing £600,000 from the hacks.23 
Moreover, such narratives that turn deviant-hacker into productive-helper are not 
rare. Will Dunn reports that Adam Mudd, an autistic hacker jailed for two years 
whose malware amassed over £386,000, was offered a job at a security firm in 
Newcastle before he was sentenced, with McKinnon’s lawyer Cooper noting that 
such opportunities would offer the best kind of rehabilitation.24 Similarly, Jake Davis, 
the person behind the 2011 Daily Mail headline: ‘Autistic Shetland teen held over 
global internet hacking spree 'masterminded from his bedroom’supported Love, 
explaining during the extradition process  that ‘the word that keeps coming to mind 
throughout this whole ordeal is ‘waste’. It’s such a waste of time, money and effort 
to attempt to extradite him, and an even bigger waste of talent’.25 Such sentiment is 
 
22 Ami Klin quoted in Gerry Smith, ‘Is Having Autism a Defense for Hacking?’, Huffington Post, 23 
September 2011, Technology section <https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2011/09/22/hacking-
autism_n_976392.html> [accessed 15 May 2018]. For more on autistic persons and online sociality 
see Victoria Henderson, and others, ‘Hacking the master code: cyborg stories and the boundaries of 
autism’, Social & Cultural Geography, 15.5 (2014), 504-524 
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14649365.2014.898781> [accessed 25 May 2018]. 
23 Gabriella Swerling, ‘Autistic hacker Jack Chappell ‘had been exploited’’, The Times, 19 December 
2017 <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/autistic-hacker-jack-chappell-had-been-exploited-
kx8vwh829> [accessed 20 May 2018]. 
24 Dunn, ‘Autistic hacker: the teenagers who “get carried away”’. 
25 Chris Greenwood, ‘Autistic Shetland teen held over global internet hacking spree ‘masterminded 
from his bedroom’’, Daily Mail, 31 July 2011 <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
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also present in public reactions to online articles relating to the autistic hacker; 
opinion seems to cluster into two groups, either reinforcing the illegality or 
celebrating the talent. For instance, in reference to a Daily Mail article on Kane 
Gamble, ‘Anonymous’ wrote ‘clever boy, give him a job’; ‘mill1989’ wrote, ‘Hire 
him!’; and ‘stc6’ wrote ‘A talented kid! We should put him to good use but keep him 
on a tight leash!’.26  
Clearly, this form of ‘deviant’ hacking has a productive worth at both 
institutional and cultural levels.27 This seems particularly pertinent today given the 
increased threat hacking poses, bolstered recently through accusations of Russian 
interference in the 2016 US presidential election and concerns over the 2020 
election, as well as the technological reality of modern war.28 Simon Perkins notes in 
the Guardian, ‘hacking, once viewed as a kind of prank carried out by wayward geeks, 
is now seen as a crucial weapon by foreign governments and organised crime’.29 In 
other words: a sense that we had better have them working for the geopolitical ‘us’. 
Indeed, as the Telegraph article ‘I spy with my little eye…someone on the spectrum’ 
reports, ‘espionage is a haven for people with dyslexia, dyspraxia and Asperger’s’ 
 
2020942/Autistic-Shetland-teen-held-global-internet-hacking-spree-masterminded-bedroom.html> 
[accessed 21 May 2018];.Jake Davis quoted in Parkin, ‘Keyboard Warrior: the British hacker fighting 
for his life’. 
26 Commenters in Fionn Hargreaves, ‘British schoolboy, 15, posed as a CIA director to access secret 
military reports and taunted FBI agents with chilling threats’, Daily Mail, 19 January 2018 
<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5290787/Boy-15-posed-head-CIA-secret-files.html> 
[accessed 21 May 2018]. 
27 For more on the usefulness of this ‘deviant’ hacker, see Paul A. Taylor, ‘Hackers: Cyberpunks or 
microserfs’, Information, Communication & Society, 1.4 (1998), 401-419. 
28 Ken Dilanian, ‘U.S. election czar says attempts to hack the 2020 election will be more 
sophisticated’, NBC, 14 January 2020 <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/u-s-
election-czar-says-attempts-hack-2020-election-will-n1115346> [accessed 8 March 2020]. 
29 Parkin, ‘Keyboard warrior: the British hacker fighting for his life’. 
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with 100 of GCHQ’s 5000 employees categorised as neurodiverse.30 Note the very 
diagnoses and categorisations typical of neural implantations here are viewed as 
necessary, even coveted.  Moreover, Julian Assange, perhaps the most (in)famous 
hacker-turned-leaker writes: ‘I am – all hackers are, and I would argue all men are – 
a little bit autistic’.31 This notion that ‘all men are a little autistic’ is an increasingly 
old-fashioned phantom of the brain; however, Assange’s claim that all hackers are 
autistic is typical of the strong association between hacking and autism and reflective 
of the modern vision of certain types and expressions of autism as being productive 
and cutting-edge. Indeed, if employees at GCHQ work to ensure the smooth running 
of governmentality, Assange represents the other side of the coin, the view that 
autistic hackers given their talents are uniquely, or so it is framed, able to reveal 
secrets and hold power to account. Commenting in the Leicester Mercury, Kane 
Gamble’s regional paper, ‘LeicsMerc’ writes: ‘the lad has a talent! He might uncover 
all the governments lies!’32 However, as ‘stc6’’s comment above shows, fascination 
and talent do not make for an agential subject, but, as this chapter argues, often 
someone to use and surveil – to be put to work on a ‘tight leash’. The legal status of 
these cases is not the focus of this chapter, rather my concern is to examine the ways 
in which such high-profile cases work to establish the figure of the ‘autistic hacker’. I 
argue that such cases highlight how autism is ‘handled’ in court and more generally 
 
30 Peter Stanford, ‘I spy with my little eye…someone on the spectrum’, Telegraph, 23 September 
2014 <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/educationnews/11113540/I-spy-with-my-little-
eye...-someone-on-the-spectrum.html> [accessed 21 May 2018]. 
31 Julian Assange quoted in Smith, ‘Is Having Autism a Defense For Hacking?’, Smith notes that he is 
quoting from Assange’s autobiography published without consent.  
32 Commenter on Suzy Gibson, Hacker Kane Gamble was just 15 when he targeted CIA, FBI and 
advisor to Obama’, Leicester Mercury, 6 October 2017 
<https://www.leicestermercury.co.uk/news/leicester-news/hacker-just-15-targeted-cia-588770> 
[accessed 15 May 2018]. 
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how autism, hacking, and contemporary biopolitical imperatives coalesce in society 
and culture. 
The Autistic Shooter 
 
If, despite its illegality, the hacker represents a relatively positive/productive form of 
action, a parallel figure is emerging in the form of the autistic shooter whose roots 
can be traced to phantoms of the brain that attach cognitive difference to violence.33 
On the 16th April 2007, Cho Seung-Hui shot and killed thirty-two people and wounded 
sixteen others at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech), 
the deadliest campus shooting in US history. Cho’s mental health was debated in the 
media and just one day after the shooting ABC News ran this headline: ‘Cho Likely 
 
33 This aspect of the neural implantation mirrors Foucault’s description of the perverse implantation 
which describes the effects of ‘implanting’ irregular sexuality, mental illness, and criminality. 
Phantoms of this historic association between mental illness/cognitive difference and criminality 
remain today. These phantoms are the product of both prejudicial cultural representation and 
disciplinary techniques such as the sometimes indefinite detention of autistic persons. As a cultural 
example, some reviews of the filmic adaptation of We Need to Talk About Kevin (Ramsay, 2011) 
construct Kevin to be an autistic shooter. For instance, Marlow Stern interviewed ‘renowned child 
and adolescent psychiatrist Alan Ravitz’ to ask whether ‘inherently evil kids exist’. Ravitz suggests, 
‘Maybe [Kevin] has Asperger’s or something on the autism spectrum because he has very superficial 
relationships, but there was a passion to the kid in his vindictiveness. Autistic kids are just 
disconnected’. Marlow Stern, ‘‘We Need to Talk About Kevin’: Do Inherently Evil Kids Exist?’, Daily 
Beast, 10 December 2011 [updated 13 July 2017] < https://www.thedailybeast.com/we-need-to-
talk-about-kevin-do-inherently-evil-kids-exist?ref=scroll> [accessed 5 December 2019]. In a similar 
review of the film Mary Corliss writes, ‘[Kevin] may fit some definition of autism or Asperger’s, in 
that he cannot access an ethical sense that would force shame upon him. But the simpler 
explanation is that he’s evil’. Mary Corliss, ‘We Need to Talk About Kevin: The Face of Pure Evil’, 
Time, 16 May 2011 <http://entertainment.time.com/2011/05/16/we-need-to-talk-about-kevin-the-
face-of-pure-evil/> [accessed 5 December 2019]. Similarly, replies to the question ‘Did Kevin respect 
his Mum after all?’ (Claire, 7 May 2012) on the novel’s Goodreads webpage contains arguments for 
and against an autistic reading of Kevin. ‘Linda’ writes, ‘I’m […] convinced that Kevin was on the 
Autism spectrum’ suggesting that he ‘could easily meet enough criteria on DSM-IV or V’ (8 
November 2012). ‘Davida’ agrees, ‘From very early on I was convinced Kevin was on the Autism 
spectrum’ (10 November 2012). In difference to ‘Linda’ and ‘Davida’, ‘Shay’ writes: ‘Kevin was 
nowhere NEAR the autism spectrum’ (23 February 2014). ‘Tracy’ agrees with ‘Shay’ that Kevin in not 
autistic, but ‘felt from the moment Celia [Kevin’s sister] was born that she was on the spectrum’ (2 
June 2014). <https://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/887622-did-kevin-respect-his-mum-after-all> 
[accessed 5 December 2019]. 
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Schizophrenic, Evidence Suggests’.34 Two days later Dave Cullen captured what 
became a zeal for folk diagnosis: 
television analysts have Cho deconstructed already: He's a madman, he's a 
psychopath, a schizophrenic, a psychotic—or maybe just an angry depressive. 
Experts have rendered definitive diagnoses on every network—and they are 
wildly contradictory. The Today show alone has made a grand tour through the 
diagnostic manual. Thursday morning Matt Lauer proclaimed Cho ‘clearly a 
psychotic individual.’ Lauer described psychosis as an evolution from his 
previous diagnosis of depression. ‘We should make the differentiation there,’ 
Dr. Lauer advised.35 
Here the discursive power of diagnosis to explain and flatten-out contingent 
circumstances without real knowledge of personal history is evident. Indeed, the 
next day FOX reported: ‘Relative Says Virginia Tech Shooter Was Autistic’, with Cho’s 
great aunt telling the reporter ‘when they went to the United States, they told [his 
parents] it was autism’.36 Formal diagnosis of his autism remains debated, uncertain, 
and reliant on descriptions from his overseas family; yet despite this, the Telegraph 
described Cho through the headline ‘Cold-hearted loner diagnosed as autistic’.37 
Moreover, Michael H. Stone, a psychiatrist who specialises in evil, writes that 
although ‘autistic persons are rarely violent’ in exceptional cases their inability ‘to 
sense what others feel’ or form friendships can lead to extreme violence, which ‘was 
certainly the case with the mass murderer on the Virginia Tech campus in 2007’.38 
 
34 Michael Welner, ‘Cho Likely Schizophrenic, Evidence Suggests’, abcnews, 17 April 2007 
<https://abcnews.go.com/Health/VATech/cho-schizophrenic-evidence-suggests/story?id=3050483> 
[accessed 22 May 2018]. 
35 Dave Cullen, ‘Psychopath? Depressive? Schizophrenic?’, Slate, 20 April 2007, Technology section 
<https://slate.com/technology/2007/04/was-cho-a-psychopath-a-depressive-or-a-psychotic.html> 
[accessed 20 May 2018]. 
36 ‘Relative Says Virginia Tech Shooter Was Autistic’, Fox News, 20 April 2007 
<https://www.foxnews.com/story/relative-says-virginia-tech-shooter-was-autistic> [accessed 9 May 
2018]. 
37 Richard Spencer, ‘Cold-hearted loner diagnosed as autistic’, Telegraph, 21 April 2007 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1549284/Cold-hearted-loner-diagnosed-as-
autistic.html> [accessed 9 May 2018].  
38 Michael H. Stone, The Anatomy of Evil (New York: Prometheus Books, 2009), p.299. 
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Autism provides Stone with a framework through which to ‘envision’ likely biological 
pathways leading to this contemporary evil, such as a ‘genetic impairment of 
empathy’ caused by ‘insufficient orbitofrontal inhibition’.39 In other words, the 
possibility of autism is enough to flatten out the particularities of Cho’s history: 
violence becomes framed as a pathological deficit. 
In 2012, the Sandy Hook shooting saw Adam Lanza kill twenty-seven people 
at a local elementary school, as well as his mother. Where Cho’s link to autism was 
largely speculative, Lanza’s was formally diagnosed before the shooting at age 
thirteen.40 Echoing Cho’s case, CNN’s Piers Morgan Tonight booked psychologist 
Xavier Amador who reinforced this discursive link between autism and violence, 
stating: ‘something’s missing in the brain, the capacity for empathy, for social 
connection’.41 Elsewhere, Fox News and the New York Times came under scrutiny for 
over-representing such a link.42 More recently, news emerged that ‘FBI files reveal 
mass killer Adam Lanza had paedophilic interest in children’.43 The same article 
reported that Lanza’s mother refused treatments for his anxiety and other mental 
health conditions, but did note that reports concluded his autism did not contribute 
 
39 Ibid. p.300. 
40 Alice Park, ‘Don’t blame Adam Lanza’s violence on Asperger’s’, Time, 11 March 2011 
<https://time.com/19957/adam-lanzas-violence-wasnt-typical-of-aspergers/> [accessed 22 May 
2018]. 
41 Xavier Amador cited in in Simon J. Bronner, ‘The Shooter Has Asperger’s: Autism, Belief, and ‘Wild 
Child’ Narratives’, Children’s Folklore Review, 36 (2014), 35-54 (p.42). 
42 Tommy Christopher, ‘Fox News And The New York Times Abet Media Effort To Falsely Link Autism 
With CT Shooting’, Mediaite, 16 December 2012 <https://www.mediaite.com/print/fox-news-and-
the-new-york-times-abet-media-effort-to-falsely-link-autism-with-ct-shooting/> [accessed 22 May 
2018]. 
43Dave Collins, ‘Sandy Hook shooting: FBI files reveal mass killer Adam Lanza had paedophilic interest 
in children’, Independent, 25 October 2017 
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/sandy-hook-massacre-adam-lanza-
paedophilia-fbi-files-mass-shooting-newtown-elementary-school-a8018566.html> [accessed 22 May 
2018]. 
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to the shootings. In 2014, news broke of research undertaken at the University of 
Glasgow looking into neurodevelopmental and psychosocial risk factors that may 
contribute to serial killing and mass murders.44 The Daily Mail reported the research 
as: ‘Recipe for a serial killer? Childhood abuse, autism and head injuries are more 
common in murderers, study claims’, while the Washington Post published the same 
news in relation to Lanza, further entrenching the link between autism, violence, and 
shootings.45 
In 2015 Malcolm Gladwell analysed school shootings in The New Yorker 
through the case of John LaDue. LaDue was apprehended prior to his planned 
shooting taking place as his suspicious activity led to the police being called.46 He was 
making Molotov cocktails, pressure bombs, and had an SKS assault rifle in his 
bedroom. Like many school shooters before him he was fascinated by his 
predecessors, buying a black duster jacket to emulate Columbine murderer Eric 
Harris, and deriding Lanza for his cowardice in attacking an elementary school. 
Gladwell notes that beyond the fact that most school shootings are carried out by 
young white men ‘the great puzzle is how little school shooters fit any kind of 
pattern’.47 His argument is compelling, detailing the differences in backgrounds, 
 
44 Clare S. Allely and others, ‘Neurodevelopmental and psychosocial risk factors in serial killers and 
mass murderers’ in Aggression and Violent Behaviour 19.3 (2014), 288-301.   
45 Victoria Woollaston, ‘Recipe for a serial killer? Childhood abuse, autism and head injuries are more 
common in murderers, study claims’, Daily Mail, 21 May 2014, Science section 
<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2634865/Recipe-serial-killer-revealed-Childhood-
abuse-autism-head-injuries-common-murderers-study-claims.html> [accessed 1 January 2017]; 
Terrence McCoy, ‘‘Significant’ statistical link between mass murder and autism, brain injury’, 
Washington Post, 21 May 2014 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2014/05/21/study-finds-significant-portion-of-mass-murderers-and-serial-killers-had-
neurological-disorders-including-autism/?utm_term=.da280d2b7472> [accessed 20 May 2018].  
46 Malcolm Gladwell, ‘Thresholds of Violence: How School Shootings Catch On’, New Yorker, 12 
October 2015 <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/10/19/thresholds-of-violence> 
[accessed 8 May 2018]. 
47 Gladwell, ‘Thresholds of Violence’. 
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abuse, affluence, and, mental illnesses. In the LaDue case for instance, a forensic 
psychologist found that LaDue ‘wasn’t violent or mentally ill […] He was simply a little 
off […] The conclusion of all three of the psychologists who spoke at the hearing was 
the LaDue had a mild-to-moderate case of autism’.48 However, Gladwell’s argument 
loses credence when he ultimately leaves the link between autism and 
violence/shooting undisturbed and tacitly associative. The suggestion is that LaDue’s 
autism created obsessive and looping thoughts in an otherwise non-violent person. 
Gladwell’s final sentence, that the problem is not a generation of young violent men 
but rather that ‘young men no longer need to be deeply disturbed to contemplate 
horrific acts’ leaves a reading that being ‘a little off’ – synonymous here with degrees 
of cognitive difference – is enough to cause a propensity for mass violence.49 
Regarding 2018’s Long Branch New Jersey shooting of the Kologi family the 
Daily Mail ran: ‘Autistic Boy, 16, is arrested after ‘shooting dead his mom, dad, sister 
and family friend with a semi-automatic rifle’ just minutes before midnight in New 
Year’s Eve massacre’.50 Here ‘autistic’ is the defining feature of this person and comes 
to act as an implicit explanation for the proceeding violence in the remainder of the 
headline. Elsewhere, in February 2018, Nikolas Cruz was arrested for shooting dead 
seventeen people and injuring seventeen others at Stoneman Douglas High School in 
Parkland, Florida. Reports quickly emerged that Cruz has a myriad of mental health 
problems, with CBS News noting that he ‘avoided eye contact during [the] hearing’ 
 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Emily Crane, ‘Autistic boy, 16, is arrested after 'shooting dead his mom, dad, sister and family 
friend with a semi-automatic rifle' just minutes before midnight in New Year's Eve massacre’, Daily 
Mail, 1 January 2018 <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5226757/New-Jersey-teen-
arrested-shooting-dead-family.html> [accessed 12 May 2018]. 
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that he ‘had depression, ADHD and autism’ and that he ‘cut his arms in a Snapchat 
post’.51 Likewise, the Chicago Tribune explained that ‘Cruz had been diagnosed with 
autism, a neurological disorder that often leads to social awkwardness and isolation, 
and attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder, or ADHD’.52 
As discussed in the introduction, in much the same way as Jonathan Metzl 
challenges the profiling of schizophrenia in The Protest Psychosis, it is crucial to note 
there has been immense backlash against these casual, rather than causal, 
associations between autism and mass violence.53 Andrew Solomon wrote an op-ed 
piece for the New York Times titled: ‘The Myth of the Autistic Shooter’, making clear 
that autistic people are statistically ‘far more likely to be attacked than to attack’ and 
that ascribing violence to autism ‘is an insidious form of profiling’ akin to presuming 
most Muslims are terrorists.54 He echoes much critical autism scholarship writing 
that in cases where autism and psychopathy co-exist, it is predominantly the former 
that is diagnosed which has the effect of blinding or ‘distracting’ professionals and 
carers by means of ascribing any aberrant behaviours to being a product of autism.55 
 
51 Manuel Bojorquez, ‘Missed warning signs emerge in Florida school shooting’, CBS News, 19 
February 2018 <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nikolas-cruz-florida-school-shooting-new-details-
emerge-dcf/> [accessed 16 May 2018]. 
52 Jason Dearen, Allen Breed and Tamara Lush, ‘Florida school shooting suspect was investigated by 
state after self-harming’, Chicago Tribune, 28 February 2018 < 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-florida-school-shooter-nikolas-cruz-
20180217-story.html> [accessed 16 May 2018]. 
53 See introduction, footnote 163. See also Metzl and Kenneth T. MacLeish’s work on the discursive 
effects of medical narratives and prejudices in the aftermath of mass shootings. Metzl and MacLeish, 
‘Mental Illness, Mass Shootings, and the Politics of American Firearms’, Journal of Public Health, 
105.2 (2015), 240-249. 
54 Andrew Solomon, ‘The Myth of the ‘Autistic Shooter’, New York Times, 12 October 2015, Opinion 
section, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/12/opinion/the-myth-of-the-autistic-shooter.html> 
[accessed 1 December 2017]. 
55 Ibid. Sami Timimi and Brian McCabe note how problematic diagnoses of autism can be because of 
its extensive symptomology. They rightly ask how an autistic lack of empathy can be ‘differentiated 
from the lack of empathy found in conduct disorder or, indeed, the ‘personality disordered criminal’. 
Sami Timimi and Brian McCabe ‘What Have We Learned From The Science of Autism?’ in Re-thinking 
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Lanza’s father, Peter, has similarly been vocal in expressing he does not believe 
Asperger’s was the cause of his son’s actions.56 Yet, such associations have become 
so typical that the Autism Society of America published a statement on their website 
asking reporters not to ‘suggest or imply any linkage of autism and violence’ shortly 
after the Parkland shooting.57 What is clear is that highlighting autism in such cases 
adds very little in terms of tangible explanation. For instance, the Daily Mail article 
about the Long Branch shooting sees ‘autistic boy’ and ‘he did not attend regular 
public school’ tacitly filling the explanatory void despite its admission that ‘a motive 
for the shooting is not yet known’.58 
What the above accounts show is that these two figures, the hacker and the 
shooter, come to represent the two extreme poles of autistic representation in 
culture and society: atypically brilliant, or pathologically violent. This in no way 
suggests that such a dichotomy is accurate, nor that other figurations within these 
poles are not equally representative or evocative. For instance, Greta Thunberg has 
become the figurehead of the climate emergency and named Time magazine’s 
person of the year.59 Yet, as seen in this media analysis, in each of these depictions 
of shooters and hackers there is an uncomfortable discrepancy between power, 
cognitive difference, and subjectivity. Thunberg in particular has come under attack 
 
Autism: Diagnosis, Identity and Equality, ed. by Katherine Runswick-Cole, Rebecca Mallett and Sami 
Timimi (London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2016), pp. 30-48.  
56 Park, ‘Don’t blame Adam Lanza’s violence on Asperger’s’. 
57 Cheretta Clerkley, ‘Autism Society Statement on Parkland, Florida School Shooting’, Autism Society 
[online], 15 February 2018 < https://www.autism-society.org/news/autism-society-statement-
parkland-florida-school-shooting/> [accessed 8 May 2018].  
58 Crane, ‘Autistic boy, 16, is arrested after 'shooting dead his mom, dad, sister and family friend 
with a semi-automatic rifle' just minutes before midnight in New Year's Eve massacre’. 
59 Charlotte Alter, Suyin Haynes and Justin Worland, ‘2019 Person of the Year: Greta Thunberg’, Time 
<https://time.com/person-of-the-year-2019-greta-thunberg/> [accessed 17 December 2019]. 
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for her indefatigable criticism of the international community and industry’s failure 
to reduce carbon emissions, attacks often directed at her difference and diagnoses. 
For instance, in 2019 Piers Morgan (now co-hosting the UK news show Good Morning 
Britain) launched this sustained criticism of Thunberg during a debate titled ‘Is Greta 
Thunberg a Force for Change or Inciting Fear?’: 
Let me start by saying, the message she is delivering, very important and I agree 
[…] my issue with Greta and I read a column about this yesterday. She’s not just 
a regular 16 year old kid – she has Asperger’s syndrome and she has a history 
through her childhood of depression, of OCD – all diagnosed by doctors – 
mutism, she went two months without eating, she went months without 
talking to anyone but her family, and so on and so on. So she’s clearly quite, 
you know, there’s a damaged background there to what’s going on which 
should not be, I don’t think, ignored. When I watched her the other day, it 
looked to me like she was now displaying, and you can correct me if you think 
this is wrong, one of the characteristics of Asperger’s is you get a very 
obsessional interest in a narrow focus issue and you then also can suffer things 
like pain and fear far more intensely than people who don’t have Asperger’s 
syndrome. Put all this together and I saw a vulnerable kid up there, preaching 
a good message, but doing it now in a way that made me feel uncomfortable. I 
did not feel comfortable watching her in that condition knowing what I know 
about her life. […] Isn’t she also terrifying millions of young children to the 
extent that eco anxiety is now massively on the rise, which is a genuine stress 
condition now.60 
Morgan’s problem is not her message, but her mode of delivery, as his response 
came after Thunberg gave an impassioned, angry speech. Noteworthy is the extent 
to which Morgan feels Thunberg’s medical history is an acceptable thing to include 
in a televised debate as to whether Thunberg is a force for change or an inciter of 
fear. Framed as concern for her welfare, Morgan lists depression, OCD, mutism, and 
eating disorder in addition to her autism, encapsulating how neural implantations 
are not only medically diagnostic, but folk and culturally too: Morgan sees a clearly 
 
60 Piers Morgan, ‘Is Greta Thunberg a Force for Change or Inciting Fear?’, Good Morning Britain, 25 
September 2019 (YouTube) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8fYQGQSqzrw> [accessed 17 
December 2019]. 
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‘damaged background’ bolstered by her medical history. Moreover, that Thunberg 
makes Morgan ‘uncomfortable’ and that he apportions blame for the rise in the new 
stress condition ‘eco anxiety’ on Thunberg’s mode of activism, turns the heavily 
vilified sixteen-year old Thunberg into the perpetrator of Morgan and others’ 
discomfort. Here, neural implantations of cognitive difference are used to deny 
Thunberg any subjectivity and identity besides a facet of her othered brain and 
reducing her remarkable success and talent to being a problematic cause of distress. 
With this in mind, the chapter now situates itself among existing critical work on 
autistic representation, in order to foreground how fictional narratives challenge this 
tendency to put autism on public trial, with particular reference to how generic 
conventions of courtroom dramas and thriller narratives work in order to reclaim 
autistic subjectivity from diagnostic and or public criticism and normative violence.  
Autism (Re-)represented 
 
As outlined, the representation and perception of autism has changed dramatically 
in the decade since Murray published his work on autistic narratives. Autism has 
become much more culturally mainstream, it has become marketable (in certain 
expressions), and it has also increasingly become naturalised, which is to say that in 
line with the neuro-turn it is increasingly considered a facet of brain difference 
(neurodiversity). This brings with it the problematisation and deconstruction of 
‘autism’ as a useful or meaningful diagnostic category in itself: cultural and 
theoretical shifts that are effacing long-standing narratives advocating for cures.61 As 
 
61 Recent television shows that celebrate/highlight autistic differences and behaviours like 
Parenthood (NBC, 2010-15), Atypical (Netflix, 2017-), and The A Word (BBC 2016-), make it 
increasingly difficult to imagine the ending of Elizabeth Moon’s Speed of Dark (2002) being published 
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a result etiological and causal ideas about autism are evolving. A common 
contemporary move sees traditional deficit or pathological models of autism shifting 
into an understanding of ‘difference’.62 Leading this shift is the decline of the 
dominance of Theory of Mind as an explanatory tool for autistic behaviour and 
modes of subjectivity. According to Baron-Cohen having a ‘Theory of Mind’ is the 
ability to ‘infer the full range of mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions, 
imagination, emotions, etc.) that cause action’, which is also ‘one of the 
quintessential abilities that make us human’.63 Until recently, this theory has 
dominated the ways in which autism is ontologically understood; however, it is now 
being thoroughly questioned in terms of its efficacy.64 David Smukler summarises the 
problem with this model succinctly, noting that Theory of Mind is ‘in effect 
“mindblind” with regard to autistic perspectives’.65 This move towards biological 
models is typical of the neuro-turn and the neural implantation as the psychological 
‘mind’ loses explanatory favour in light of brain based materialism, founding the 
biological basis upon which difference models flourish in keeping with the 
contemporary cultural logic of being ‘born this way’. However, if this shift to 
considering autistic personhood is celebrated, it is also cautioned against. Dan 
 
today. In the novel autism is congenitally cured and the remaining autistic adults are offered a cure, 
with the protagonist undergoing treatment at the end of the novel.  
62 See Murray, p.xvi; Kim Davies, ‘How Rude? Autism as a Study in Ability’, in Re-thinking Autism, ed. 
by Runswick-Cole, Mallett and Tamimi, pp. 132-145; Runswick-Cole, Mallett and Timimi 
‘Introduction’, in Rethinking Autism, pp.7-18 (p. 7); and the Neurodiversity movement, which argues 
that cognitive differences are the expressions of natural and expected variation. 
63 Simon Baron-Cohen, ‘Theory of Mind and Autism: A Review’, in International Review of Research 
in Mental Retardation, 23 (2000), 169-184 (p.169). 
64 See Morton Ann Gernsbacher and Melanie Yergeau, ‘Empirical Failures of the Claim That Autistic 
People Lack a Theory of Mind’, Archives of Scientific Psychology, 7.1 (2019), 102-118. After a 
thorough review of pertinent literature they find ‘the claim that autistic people lack a theory of mind 
is empirically questionable and societally harmful’ (102).   
65 David Smukler, ‘Unauthorized Minds: How “Theory of Mind” Theory Misrepresents Autism’, in 
Mental Retardation, 43.1 (2005), 11-24 (p.22). 
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Goodley notes that if difference becomes understood in strictly biologist terms, then 
all behaviours can come to be explained as such; in other words, personhood and 
subjectivity become the sum of a neurological categorisation.66 
On the one hand neurodiversity movements broadly agree with popular calls 
to ‘own’ your difference, typified in anthems such as Lady Gaga’s ‘whether life’s 
disabilities left you outcast, bullied, or teased, rejoice and love yourself today, cause 
baby you were born this way’.67 On the other hand, plasticity represents the mantra 
that biology is not destiny. This is a difficult and contested schism to navigate and is 
argued differently in critical autism studies. For instance, in my discussion of 
Limitless’s plastic narrative, cognitive enhancement and neoliberal appropriations of 
plasticity form a compact rendering Eddie an ethically impoverished character whose 
sole interest becomes continual self-improvement and expansion of power. This 
belief in improvement typifies a dominant cultural logic that insists that there must 
be something we can do to correct, improve, and repair ourselves, with the brain 
being the ultimate locus of this ideology and underpinning the kind of biopolitics 
seeking to normalise difference. This is why Vidal and Ortega argue that whilst the 
mutability inherent to neuroplasticity allows for the concept of neurodiversity (and 
material cognitive difference), ‘neurodiversity advocates tend to minimize the 
differences among brains within the autistic spectrum so as to support their claims 
for the existence of a brain-based autistic identity’.68 In other words, neuroplasticity 
creates something of a contradiction: it can be seen to explain the range of cognitive 
 
66 Dan Goodley, ‘Autism and the Human’ in Re-thinking Autism, ed. by Runswick-Cole, Mallett and 
Tamimi, pp.146-158 (p.152). 
67 Lady Gaga, ‘Born This Way’, YouTube, 27 February 2011 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wV1FrqwZyKw> [accessed 12 March 2020]. 
68 Fernando Vidal and Francisco Ortega, Being Brains, p.185. 
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types across society as a whole, but when this logic is applied more specifically within 
the autistic community this same range widens the spectrum to the extent that an 
autistic ontology is diluted into disappearance. McGuire notes that the introduction 
of neuroplasticity is effacing ideas of fixity or hard wiring in regard to the brain and 
self, noting that the ‘the normal mind/brain is framed as something that can be 
eventually achieved’.69 For her, certain forms of autism advocacy could harness this 
new understanding to update and displace older understandings of deficit, citing the 
decline of Theory of Mind as evidence.  Yet, it seems also true that this vision of a 
possible idealised mind/brain can also further castigate cognitive difference or 
entrench cognitive hierarchies as explored in the previous chapter. 
Elsewhere, Rebecca Mallett and Katherine Runswick-Cole highlight how the 
use of ‘autism’ is itself contentious; indeed, much as I highlight plasticity’s mutable 
associations and meanings in the introduction and chapter one, they argue ‘autism’s 
ability to be flexible is part of its success’.70 In other words, because autism means 
many different things to many different people, it has become a flexible implantation 
in its own right: mutable, developing, and indeed, often ultimately hollow in 
signification.71 Today’s mix of cultural purchase, by means of capital and 
commodification;72 historical associations or misrepresentations;73 debates over 
 
69 McGuire, War on Autism, p.50.  
70 Rebecca Mallett and Katherine Runswick-Cole, ‘The Commodification of Autism: What’s at Stake?’ 
in Re-thinking Autism, ed. by Runswick-Cole, Mallett and Tamimi, pp.110-131 (p.121).  
71 In his review of Mallet and Runswick-Cole’s Re-thinking Autism, Damian Milton rightly 
problematises their criticism and dismissal of neurodiversity and material paradigms, as well as the 
lack of exploration into ‘phenomenological accounts of people post diagnosis’, something my 
framework of the neural implantation argues is crucial. Damian Milton, ‘Re-thinking autism: 
diagnosis, identity and equality’, Disability & Society, 31.10, 1413-1415 (p.1414). 
72 Mallett and Runswick-Cole, ‘The Commodification of Autism: What’s at Stake?’ in Re-thinking 
Autism, pp.110-131 (p.121). 
73 See my concept of ‘phantoms of the brain’ in the Introduction, referring to the way in which older, 
often deviant and pseudo-scientific/psychological ideas attach to neuro-material models and 
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personhood and subjectivity;74 and biomaterial models and explanations,75 makes 
autism an ever-evolving object of scrutiny, biopolitical intervention, and fascination. 
On the one hand, ‘autistic’ and ‘on the spectrum’ have become colloquial as much as 
medical terms and form neural accessories acting as casual explanations for odd 
behaviours in others and the self. Moreover, ‘productive’ representations of autism 
such as mathematics (Rain Man, Levinson 1988), hacking (Girl with the Dragon 
Tattoo, Larsson 2007), detection (Sherlock, Gatiss 2010-17), or medicine (The Good 
Doctor, Shore 2017-present) become coveted abilities. On the other hand, despite 
the above arguments pertaining to more nuanced narrative representation less 
 
explanations in contemporary culture and narrative. See also Fernando Vidal and Francisco Ortega’s 
claim (to which brain phantoms supplement) that ‘the cerebral subject as an anthropological figure 
is not attributable to the contemporary prominence of the brain, nor is it anything “natural,” but 
exactly the other way around: the cerebral subject was enabled by an early modern 
reconceptualization of personal identity, independently of any naturalistic knowledge about the 
brain’. In other words, fascination and brain based ontology pre-date the neuro-turn. I have no 
disagreement with this; however, as I maintain throughout this thesis, to place today’s brain-culture 
in an uninterrupted timeline evacuates some of the specific effects brought by the neuro-turn. Vidal 
and Ortega, Being Brains, p.21. 
74 See debates over person first language, Lorcan Kenny, and others, ‘Which terms should be used to 
describe autism? Perspectives from the UK autism community’, in Autism, 20 (2016), 442-462. Note 
also the shocking revelations that autistic persons die younger suggesting a public and 
institutionalised apathy towards autistic personhood, ‘People with autism are ‘dying younger,’ warns 
study’, NHS [online], 21 March 2016 <https://www.nhs.uk/news/neurology/people-with-autism-are-
dying-younger-warns-study/> [accessed 16 July 2019]. 
75 On behalf of the Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee (IACC) The Office of Autism 
Research Coordination (OARC) part of the US National Institute of Health (NIH) published a 
breakdown of how all US autism funding is split into six  research ‘questions’, with the overwhelming 
majority of the money spent on biomedicine. 1) Screening and diagnosis – ‘Children at risk for ASD 
will be identified through reliable methods before ASD behavioural characteristics fully manifest’ 
(11%). 2) Biology – ‘Discover how ASD affects development, which will lead to targeted and 
personalized interventions’ (30%). 3) Risk factors – ‘Causes of ASD will be discovered that inform 
prognosis and treatments’ (17%). 4) Treatments and interventions – ‘Interventions will be developed 
that are effective for reducing both core and associated symptoms, for building adaptive skills, and 
for maximizing quality of life and health for people with ASD’ (19%). 5) Services – ‘Communities will 
access and implement necessary high-quality, evidence-based services and supports that maximize 
quality of life and health across the lifespan for all people with ASD and lead to prevention/pre-
emption of the challenges and disabilities of ASD’ (7%). 6) All people with ASD will have the 
opportunity to lead self-determined lives in the community of their choice through school, work, 
community participation, meaningful relationships, and access to necessary and individualized 
services and supports’ (1%). Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee, 2011-2012 Autism 
Spectrum Disorder Research: Portfolio Analysis Report [online] 
<https://iacc.hhs.gov/publications/portfolio-analysis/2012/portfolio_analysis_2012.pdf> [accessed 
17 July 2019]. 
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focused on cures, autistic people experience a reality of lower life expectancy and 
exponentially higher incidence of depression.76 Despite this, they ‘may be less likely 
to be diagnosed with depression and have support networks in place to help them 
with mental illness’ meaning ‘they may be more likely to take their own lives rather 
than be successfully treated’.77 Additionally, UK employment statistics show that only 
sixteen percent of autistic people are in full-time work.78 Thus, while cultural 
narratives may be improving, social realities are not. Though certainly useful in 
effecting more nuanced representations of autism, ‘feel-good’ autism narratives like 
the television series Atypical (Rashid, 2017-present) work for neurotypicals similarly 
to the hollowness of neoliberal identity politics: being an armchair ally happily 
conceals the dramatically lower life expectancy or reality of indefinite incarceration 
some autistic people endure simply because you are engaging with a representation 
of autism that is ultimately made to feel-good. Therefore, crime fiction that casts 
autism as a guilty implantation can be useful because these are rarely ‘feel good’ (at 
least until the resolution). This is not to suggest that these crime narratives are 
somehow more mimetic, or that one should always ‘feel-bad’ reading or viewing an 
autistic narrative experience; it should go without saying that cultural representation 
that aims to ‘normalise’ autistic difference in culture is also vital. Rather, I argue that 
crime narratives are often ‘feel bad’ in that they highlight the ways in which 
 
76 A 2018 study found that autistic people were four times more likely to have depression in their 
lifetime than neuro-typical people. Chloe C. Hudson and others, ‘Prevalence of Depressive Disorders 
in Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder: a Meta-Analysis’, Journal of Abnormal Child 
Psychology, 47.1, 165-175 (p.165). 
77 ‘People with autism are ‘dying younger, warns study’, NHS. 
78 ‘Our Employment Campaign’, National Autistic Society, <https://www.autism.org.uk/get-
involved/campaign/employment.aspx> [accessed 18 December 2019]. 
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contemporary biopolitics and phantom narratives misrepresent, castigate, and 
subordinate autism and autistic people.  
To this extent, contemporary autism narratives are at something of tipping 
point. In today’s culture, long-established (and increasingly scrutinised) 
understandings of the ‘deficit’ model are still invoked to explain aberrance such as 
social withdrawal and lack of eye contact (both of which appear in the above articles 
pertaining to the ‘autistic shooter’). Alongside this is the fascination and celebration 
of difference: extraordinary talents, self-justice, and technological ability. In other 
words, it is no longer sufficient to argue that the neural implantation of autism today 
acts only to ‘other’ people through deficit or pathological models. McGuire’s work 
aligns with my formulation of the neural implantation in that today’s neoliberal 
culture ‘is increasingly engaged in the process of organising various non-normative 
thoughts, behaviours, responses, movements and affects into graded pathological 
spectrums anchored by oppositional poles of life and death’.79 These are the extreme 
poles of vital worth (hacker) and violent deviance (shooter). However, what is 
emerging is that it is not only within the normal/atypical paradigm that biopolitical 
oscillations between life and death exist (as is traditionally understood), but within 
neural implantations themselves. In terms of cognitive difference, a fundamental 
failing of the hegemonic neoliberal view of health is that certain pathologies, or 
rather, certain persons with certain ‘levels’ of pathologies, are seen as useful, which 
is to say economically viable as in the Jeffrey Weeks model explored in the 
introduction. With autism, for instance, the hacker is represented as a highly 
 
79 Anne McGuire, ‘Life without Autism: A Cultural Logic of Violence’, in Re-thinking Autism, ed. by 
Runswick-Cole, Mallett and Tamimi, pp.93-109 (p.106). 
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productive figure, a techno-vigilante far beyond the capacity of neuro-typical 
persons. Autism here does not represent a pole of death, but modern techno-life, 
providing they are kept ‘on a tight leash’ - eerily similar to the arguments of the ERD 
in Nexus.80  Autistic shooters, on the other hand, represent the complete opposite; 
their actions suggest that they deserve death because they bring death. They are the 
corrupted child, the child with which the plastic brain and its discourse of flexible 
productivity cannot help. Like conduct disorder their pathology is an implanted mark 
of Cain and the presence of ‘autism’ in reportage of such events remains 
problematically sticky and associative.  
Both the hacker and the shooter are pathologised through their behaviours 
and actions. The autistic hacker’s single-mindedness to the point of obsession 
becomes an essential component to their technological craft. Elsewhere, the autistic 
shooter’s ‘autism’, though often categorically meaningless, acts as an 
explanatory/demonising/containing tool for heinous actions. The autistic shooter has 
such currency now because discourse pertaining to the ‘epidemic’ of mass shootings 
runs parallel to similar discourse framing an autism ‘epidemic’.81 Likewise, the 
hacking ‘epidemic’ runs parallel to the fear/need of the autistic hacker to both 
 
80 Commenter in Fionn Hargreaves, ‘British schoolboy, 15, posed as a CIA director to access secret 
military reports and taunted FBI agents with chilling threats’. 
81 Writing in the Atlantic, Derek Thompson argues that ‘if it seems like the shooting are becoming 
more frequent, it might be because mass murder can catch on like an epidemic’. Derek Thompson, 
‘Mass Shootings in America Are Spreading Like a Disease’, The Atlantic, 6 November 2017 
<https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/11/americas-mass-shooting-epidemic-
contagious/545078/> [accessed 8 March 2020]. This discourse of contagion is similarly applied to 
autism, see Sharon Kirkey, ‘Is the ‘autism epidemic’ real? Researchers say over-diagnosis to blame 
for spike in number of cases’, National Post, 22 August 2019 
<https://nationalpost.com/health/autism-epidemic> [accessed 3 March 2020]. 
175 
 
explain the occurrence of the outbreak, and contain it.82 Murray was right to include 
‘fascination’ in the title of his book; however, as this chapter makes clear the 
narratives he chose have, naturally, somewhat developed into ‘characters’ in their 
own right. This chapter’s literary analysis is therefore framed around the two current 
poles of the hacker and the shooter in contemporary literature, film, and television. 
House Rules 
 
House Rules is a sentimental legal drama revolving around Jacob, an eighteen-year-
old with Asperger’s syndrome, a form of autism which the most recent Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual collapsed into the more general Autism Spectrum Disorder. 
For this reason, I will refer mainly to Jacob as being autistic, rather than having 
Asperger’s. Jacob is described as ‘intelligent’ but struggles in certain social situations. 
He also has some difficulty communicating, but this is mostly due to his literality. 
Finding his friend and assistant Jess dead in the house she is sitting, and recognising 
his brother Theo’s footprint in the house, he follows the ‘house rules’ to always look 
after your brother and frames the scene by moving her body to try to protect Theo. 
Behaviours that typify his autism diagnosis, including flat affect and poor eye contact, 
as well as his obsession with forensic science, come to bear in police detective Rich’s 
belief that he is guilty. His mother Emma is equally unsure whether Jacob killed Jess, 
but after the trial the truth emerges that voyeuristic Theo saw Jess fall and hit her 
head, leaving his footprint when he ran away from the scene. Though Jacob is not 
guilty, nor accused of ‘shooting’, the social and cultural assumption of autistic 
 
82 Jefferson Graham, ‘We're in a hacking epidemic, and it's user beware’, MSN, 19 March 2017 
<https://www.msn.com/en-nz/money/topstories/were-in-a-hacking-epidemic-and-its-user-
beware/ar-BBymddz> [accessed 30 May 2018]. 
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violence underscoring the narratives and discourse constructing the ‘autistic shooter’ 
are foundational to the assumption of Jacob’s guilt. In the reading that follows I argue 
that ‘autism’ is treated as a guilty object in this novel’s fictional courtroom, one that 
reduces Jacob to the workings of his atypical brain by both the prosecution, who seek 
to align it with deviant psychopathy, and the defence, who seek to secure insanity, 
in order to problematise the damaging assumptions neural implantations of autism 
can create.  
The biomolecular nature of Jacob’s autism is a dominant theme in House 
Rules. Not only does this reflect the materiality brought by the neuro-turn, it also 
necessarily sets up the debate surrounding his guilt and culpability during the trial. 
This highlights some of the difficulties that arise from neural implantations of autism 
because of the normative biopolitical imperatives underpinning it. The novel takes 
the form of a series of first-person accounts, presented from each main character’s 
perspective. Emma’s narrative opens the novel and she quickly establishes that 
‘Asperger’s is a label to describe not the traits Jacob has but rather the ones he lost’, 
in other words, subscribing to the deficit model of autism.83 For Emma, autism is not 
a matter of natural difference, but a material condition with often debilitating 
effects. In fact, when a blogger from ‘Neurodiversity Nation’ approaches Emma on 
her driveway, she treats them like religious zealots handing out tracts. ‘Since’, Emma 
notes, ‘there’s no cure yet for Asperger’s, we treat the symptoms, and for some 
reason, if I regulate his diet his behaviour improves […] binding and removing toxins 
that Jacob’s body can’t do itself’.84 For her, such toxins are the causes of the autistic 
 
83 Jodi Picoult, House Rules (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2010), p.5. 
84 Ibid. p.43. 
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expressions she dislikes, the ones that make her son at times a ‘monster’.85 Emma is 
unable to understand Jacob’s autism as anything but negative: and constantly fights 
against the belief in it being a permanent implantation. Indeed, in terms of the 
ontological effects, Emma, ironically, seems less able to empathise with Jacob’s 
autistic subjectivity than mourn what she considers she has lost (normality) and what 
she has gained (an occasionally autistic monster). Emma has a level of distrust 
towards science, which highlights a contradictory tension that seems to typify many 
aspects of the neural implantation.86 On the one hand, ‘yet’ suggests she is holding 
out for a cure which would be created by neuroscience and medicine, on the other 
hand she is suspicious of vaccinations despite institutional science discrediting the 
link. She is certain of a ‘connection’ between vaccinations and autism based on 
Jacob’s experience, claiming her ‘son looked like any other two-year old until he had 
a round of shots’.87  
Jacob explains his autism in similarly material terms. He is obsessed with 
forensic science to the extent that ‘watching [CrimeBusters] daily is as important to 
[him] as taking insulin would be to a diabetic’.88 This immediately aligns his obsessive 
actions as being expressions of his autistic brain. There is little subtlety in the novel, 
but it does reflect the ontological and discursive effects of neural implantations of 
autism. For instance, there is no suggestion that he watches CrimeBusters daily 
(granted, to an exacting timeframe) simply because forensics personally fascinates 
him. It is always the autistic explanation, echoing Goodley’s concern about catch-all 
 
85 Ibid. p.175. 
86 Consider the different ways I argue autism is presented in contemporary culture, as well as the 
debate between for example, identity first or person first descriptions of cognitive difference. 
87 Picoult, p.47. 
88 Ibid. p.20. 
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biologism and concerns of the elision or erasure of unique subjective character 
formation in  the wake of neuro-models as discussed in the introduction in relation 
to possible epistemological tensions brought by the imbrication of cultural and 
medical narratives. In other words, subjectivity becomes neurobiology, and to 
paraphrase Rose and Abi-Rached: atypical person is what atypical brain does.89 
Similarly, as we see with the neuro-turn’s flattening of psychological models, Jacob 
explains that unexpected contact makes him scream ‘not out of fear but because it 
sometimes feels like [his] nerve endings are on the outside’.90 However, Jacob’s 
comic suggestion that he knows a peer ‘has a little bit of Asperger’s in him’ because 
‘it’s like gaydar; I can tell’, brings Foucault’s identification of the perverse 
implantation into harmony with this thesis’s identification of the neural 
implantation.91 In other words, where the perverse implantation saw perversities 
implanted into bodies and subjectivities, Jacob recognises the same model in regards 
to his and other cognitive differences. It is a recognition of ontological subjective 
effects of the implantation, which, though imposing a material model, conversely 
fleshes out his characterisation. Jacob is also fluent in the explanatory models being 
produced in the neuro-turn; for him, intangible ‘love’ ‘doesn’t have the right 
receptors in the brain’, dopamine, however, has a material grounding from which he 
can make sense.92  
 
89 Rose and Abi-Rached use the phrase ‘mind is what brain does’ to explain the shift toward brain-
based conceptions of the self; Neuro, p.3.  
90 Picoult, p.293. 
91 Ibid. p.65. 
92 Ibid. p.418-19. See the discursive presence of certain neurotransmitters and hormones such as 
serotonin and oxytocin today. These chemical compounds are effecting the flattening effect that 
encapsulates much of the neuro-turn. Psychological states and feelings become reducible to the 
presence and concentration of these chemicals. See, Sandee LaMotte, ‘Are you in love or just high 
on the chemicals in your brain? Answer: Yes’, CNN, 14 February 2020 
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Police detective Rich also offers a narrative perspective that understands 
Jacob through neuroscientific models. If Emma eschews the born this way narrative 
in the hope of piecemeal change or a future cure, Rich thinks antithetically. He 
explains Jacob ‘can’t exercise himself into a new personality. He can’t move to 
another school district and start over. He’ll always be the kid with Asperger’s’.93 In 
suspecting guilt, Rich allows phantom stereotypes of cognitive difference and 
violence to dictate his understanding of action: as rigid, fixed, and dramatically 
opposite to plastic potential and notions of ideal and limitless cognitive ability. These 
are examples of the neuromolecular gaze dominating autism and difference in the 
novel. They are crucial in foregrounding the trial’s dual stances of guilty by 
biomaterial insanity (defence), or guilty by neuropsychopathological criminal 
deviance (prosecution). The narrative conceals the reality of Jess’s death until the 
end, and this narrative device not only furthers the ambiguity surrounding violence 
and autism but compounds the credibility of the argument that Jacob’s autism could 
in some way have caused him to kill Jess.  
David T. Mitchell and Sharon Snyder coin ‘narrative prosthesis’ to explain 
narratives that use disability as plot devices to build sentiment or tension.94 House 
Rules’ plotting employs this throughout; indeed Michelle Jarman points out how 
ridiculous it is, given how close Emma is to Jacob (and the trial), that she never 
directly asks Jacob what happened.95 There is little doubt that autism is primarily a 
 
<https://edition.cnn.com/2020/02/14/health/brain-on-love-wellness/index.html> [accessed 8 
March 2020]. 
93 Picoult, p.247. 
94 David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder, Narrative Prosthesis: Disability and the Dependencies of 
Discourse (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000). 
95 Michelle Jarman, ‘Disability on Trial: Complex realities Staged for Courtroom Drama – The Case of 
Jodi Picoult’, Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies, 6.2 (2012), 209-225 (p.216). 
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narrative prosthesis for Picoult, a writer who has seen considerable commercial 
success dealing with dramatic legal and ethical stories pivoted on contemporary 
issues, from school shootings to child sexual abuse, to medical emancipation, yet the 
crucial consideration is what this prosthesis tells us about neural implantations of 
autism. Primarily it shows how mutable and fickle attitudes are to the object and 
discourse of ‘autism’. In House Rules, autism is Janus-faced and represents different 
cultural facets to different characters. Firstly, in a comparison to Eddie Mora, Jacob 
is repeatedly referred to as being ‘limited’; his diet is limited, his bail is limited, school 
is off-limits, he is legally defined as limited through the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, and his interpersonal relationships are described as limited. For Emma, and 
despite her reasoning that autism is a material condition, ‘autism’ also has a moral 
dimension, explaining that ‘there are some teachers who see the greater good in 
Jacob’.96 This is typical of the autism advocacy McGuire derides as furthering the logic 
of ‘normative violence’ against autism, because it suggests that a special moral 
dispensation is necessary to see beyond the problems of autism. Emma’s point is that 
Jacob’s maths teacher wrongly assumed he would be teaching an exciting savant, 
only to be disappointed by a messy, literal student. These stereotypical protheses 
drive detective Rich’s suspicion. 
Jacob uses a police radio to intercept discussions and locations of crime 
scenes due to his interest real crime. When Rich first notices Jacob in a different 
crime scene to Jess’, he thinks ‘there’s something just the tiniest bit…well…off about 
him. His voice is too flat and high; he won’t make eye contact’.97 This links to the 
 
96 Picoult, p.73. 
97 Ibid. p.36. 
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discussion of Gladwell’s article in which professionals find that there was simply 
something ‘off’ about LaDue. This relatively neutral impression of Jacob’s difference 
becomes much more infected with stereotypes of autism in a later meeting between 
the two of them; for Rich, Jacob’s voice now ‘seems almost computerised, it’s that 
mechanical’.98 Indeed, knowledge of diagnosed ‘autism’ allows Rich and others to 
depersonalise Jacob into the sum of his supposedly defective parts. Jacob becomes 
the object of ‘autism’ which undermines his personhood and subjectivity to the 
extent that Rich abuses this knowledge during his interrogation. He tricks Jacob into 
thinking he might be able to help with the case; however, the questioning quickly 
becomes impossible for Jacob to navigate without guidance. He is arrested and 
Emma, now outside the office, shouts to Rich ‘you wouldn’t interrogate someone 
deaf without an interpreter!’99 While these examples reflect the novel’s need to build 
suspense pre-trial, they also show the range of injustices that occur alongside neural 
implantations of autism. From the fact that Jacob was fired shortly after revealing his 
autism diagnosis, to the institutional prejudice Jacob receives from the police, autism 
provides an open space for abuse in society, and it is through the conventions of 
fictional courtroom drama that these are rendered most clearly, as the next section 
will show. 
The fictional courtroom holds particular cultural resonance in America. From 
The Crucible (Miller, 1953), Twelve Angry Men (Lumet, 1957) and To Kill a 
Mockingbird (Lee, 1960; Mulligan, 1962), through to the legal dramas of the 90s– 
Matlock (Hargrove, 1986-95), Law & Order (Wolf, 1990-2010), JFK (Stone, 1991), A 
 
98 Ibid. p.144. 
99 Ibid. p.195. 
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Few Good Men (Reiner, 1992), Philadelphia (Demme, 1993), The Practice (Kelley, 
1997-2004), Ally McBeal (Kelley, 1997-2002), and the twenty-first century’s Erin 
Brockovich (Soderbergh 2000), Damages (Kessler, 2007-2012), The Good Wife (King, 
2009-2016), and Suits (Korsh,2011-2019), courtroom drama has been a mainstay of 
fictional, as well as real legal narratives (the trials of OJ Simpson and Michael Jackson) 
and the quotidian dramatics of Judge Judy (Switzer, 1996-present). The courtroom, I 
argue, is a near perfect microcosm of society. There is the public (represented by 
both passive attendees and active jurors), judgement, experts, witnesses, morality, 
ethics, journalism, narratives, disciplinary powers, and motive. As such, courtroom 
dramas are employed to tackle or highlight injustice and have produced long-lasting 
social and cultural effects in terms of, among others, racism (To Kill a Mockingbird) 
and homophobia (Philadelphia). However, it is perhaps with issues of disability 
(including atypicality) that the fictional courtroom can best be employed to highlight 
systemic prejudice and indifference, particularly given the fact that in reality, 2017 
saw 10,000 people die in America waiting for their disability legal cases to be 
resolved.100 There is a sense that the human narratives that are being damaged in 
real courts can be held to scrutiny in fictional counterparts. This is because the 
fictional courtroom is a space in which the biopolitical imperatives, disciplinary 
powers, and poles of life, personhood, and death underpinning the neural 
implantation are laid bare and tacitly put on trial themselves. This is what happens in 
House Rules: as much as autism becomes cast as the guilty object, the imperatives 
 
100 Terrence McCoy, ‘597 days. And still waiting’, Washington Post, 20 November 2017, 
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that enable/will this to happen are similarly laid bare. This is established through the 
courtroom’s mimetic reflection of stories and narratives circulating under the 
neuromolecular gaze of ‘autism’. 
 Writing in 1999 on the courtroom in popular culture, David Ray Papke 
describes a contradiction in that while fictional courtrooms dominated in culture, 
particularly television, a survey found that 47% of people thought courts to be racially 
biased, and 90% thought corporations to have an unfair advantage. In his words: ‘is 
the courtroom trial dead as a civic institution? Perhaps, but interestingly enough, pop 
cultural courtroom trials continue to inspire confidence and proffer encouraging 
lessons about law in American life’.101 Papke’s reading at the turn of the century is 
optimistic. However, I argue his understanding holds that fictional trials act like 
Fredric Jameson’s conception of the ‘fantasy bribe’. For Jameson, popular narratives 
‘cannot manipulate unless they offer some genuine shred of content as a fantasy 
bribe to the public about to be so manipulated’.102 Here, disillusionment with the 
reality of court proceedings represents some form of crisis in a country whose legal 
constitution is heralded above almost everything else. These fictional courtrooms, 
then, which echo societal unease with unethical legal practices as well as 
contemporary concerns such as bioethics, are ultimately contained by the tight knit 
friendliness and veracity of the fictional law firms, which tend to succeed against 
structural prejudice often in a David versus Goliath format. In short, the real 
problems of the legal system are forgotten among the more palatable fictional ‘case-
 
101 David Ray Papke, ‘The American Courtroom Trial: Pop Culture, Courthouse, Realities, and the 
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of-the-week’ courtroom dramas typical of the 90s and turn of the century. It is also 
clear that fictional legal dramas are hyperreal and unfold in courtrooms that do not 
and cannot exist in today’s society given the reality of systemic prejudices against 
certain groups and individuals. In the Disneyland of courts, somebody always has 
your back: be it plucky lawyer, researcher, juror, or family member.103 
Papke concludes: ‘the real trial has been supplanted ideologically by the pop 
cultural trial […] The pop cultural trial not only contributes mightily to the popular 
understanding of law but also transports us to the dream world of justice’.104 Though 
many of the problems associated with this utopian bribe remain typical of the generic 
format today, suggestions that the fictional courtroom seems to hold more narrative 
and discursive power and trust than its real counterpart makes the fictional 
courtroom a particularly fertile ground for analysis of neural implantations of autism. 
For instance, in The Good Fight (King, 2017-), the spinoff of the acclaimed The Good 
Wife, justice is not always seen to be done because it is working against the backdrop 
of a Trumpian politics of which it is highly critical. In a country in which the propelling 
force of hitherto hegemonic neoliberalism is being challenged by reactionary and 
protectionist politics there is decreasing appetite for the flippant or facetious 
attitudes to criminality and unethicalness (Limitless), or utopian, idealistic 
containment of the case-of-the-week format (Ally McBeal). Put simply, social and 
political injustices have become too mainstream and frankly too non-liberal for too 
long to contain ‘a dream world of justice’; the fantasy bribe has lost its appeal and its 
 
103 This concept of hyperreality and example of Disneyland is taken from Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra 
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ability to contain. Much is the same in House Rules, in which the expectations of a 
sentimental ‘disability’ drama are not met; there is no expected fight for justice in 
court, there is only a court in which ‘autism’ is almost automatically made guilty and 
put unfairly on trial. 
Before returning to House Rules, it is worth examining research undertaken 
regarding the ways in which real courts view autism. Christine N. Cea writes that 
autism should be made evident to the jury to avoid ‘the effect of negative demeanour 
evidence’.105 For example, if an autistic defendant seems remorseless, lacks eye 
contact (as reported in the case of Nikolas Cruz above), or is overly repetitive, and 
the jury is not aware of an autism diagnosis to ‘explain’ these atypical expressions, 
then jurors may be biased against the defendant. Contra to this, in her interview 
study with Californian judges, Colleen M, Berryessa found that, while ‘on the whole 
[…] judges were firm in their beliefs that their attitudes and decisions are not affected 
by the media coverage surrounding the Sandy Hook shooting […] judges vocalised 
that they believe the Sandy Hook coverage has negatively affected, frightened, and 
misled the public, especially surrounding the likelihood of violent behaviour of 
individuals with hfASD’.106 In other words, placing ‘autism’ on the docks takes place, 
given the figuration of the autistic shooter, in a Catch-22: if you do not mention it 
people will find behaviours suspect, if you do, people may automatically find you 
suspect. That such problems occur in reality goes towards Murray’s description of 
‘witnessing’ autism. With such prejudice and predisposition it is likely only through 
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narratives challenging or highlighting these problems that such witnessing will cease, 
hence the importance I place in the meaning produced in fictional courtroom 
narratives.107 
 House Rules places autism on trial and establishes Jacob to be a violent killer 
encapsulating the figure of the ‘autistic shooter’. In doing so it rejects the fantasy 
bribe of an idealistic and safeguarding legal process because Jacob’s innocence is 
eventually confirmed. Reflecting the plasticity of ‘autism’ as discussed above, both 
the defence and the prosecution take autism and mould it into different narratives, 
the former builds a case for insanity, the latter weaves a picture of sociopathic 
violence. Jacob’s defence lawyer Oliver is young and inexperienced and in this 
sentimental legal drama the expectation may have been that Oliver works tirelessly 
and creatively to successfully prove Jacob’s innocence (in the cultural vein of Erin 
Brockovitch), but the novel, reflecting a verisimilitude to the societal figuration of the 
violent autistic shooter, does not allow this. Rather, Oliver remains utterly out of his 
depth and succumbs, perhaps realistically, to pleading Jacob’s insanity. The case 
against him is not good. Jacob has admitted to moving Jess’s body and to staging the 
crime scene, he has previously visited crime scenes, and has journals that say in 
regards to the particulars around Jess’s death ‘SOLVED:ME’.108 The initial hope that 
Jacob’s autism will render him incompetent to stand trial is problematic enough in 
terms of autistic subjectivity and agency; however, Oliver realises that autism alone 
is insufficient, telling Emma, ‘I, uh, think we need to plead insanity’.109 In other words, 
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autism is enough of a neural implantation to make him guilty, but not sufficient to 
absolve him in its own right. Subsequently, autism becomes a matter of spin; having 
first ‘flattened’ the particularities of Jacob’s unique autistic subjectivity with the 
general description of autism to the court, new false medical narratives and identities 
are attached to make him appear legally and convincingly insane. When he tells Jacob 
the plan, Jacob replies ‘I’m not crazy!’.110 Oliver counters saying it is a legal not 
medical term, but Jacob is aware of the legal meaning reciting ‘a person isn’t 
responsible for criminal conduct if, as a result of mental disease or defect […] I don’t 
have a mental disease or defect. I have a quirk. Right, Mom?’.111 Exasperated, Oliver 
replies, ‘Well, Jacob, either I run the insanity defence or you can take that mental 
quirk right back to prison’.112 
 The result is that Jacob effectively is guilty until a performed autism proves 
him insane. The defence strategy seeks to magnify autism and put it firmly on the 
stand so that the jury can plainly see how ‘different’ Jacob is ‘from the rest of us’.113 
Not only does the novel’s narrative use autism as a prosthesis, but more specifically, 
being a societal microcosm, the trial’s narrative does too. Autistic myth becomes 
more important than truth, than Jacob himself, providing it can show itself to be an 
insane sideshow. In Oliver’s words: ‘if I’m playing the disability card, they have to see 
Asperger’s manifesting itself in its full glory’.114 Oliver makes a series of 
 
110 Ibid. p.277. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. p.380. 
114 Ibid. p.377. 
188 
 
accommodating requests to the judge, including sensory breaks, Emma’s presence 
on the defence table, and not using the gavel, which are all granted. 
 The sensory break room is erected at the back of the courtroom. Jacob almost 
immediately uses it when he begins screaming after the prosecutor scrunches up a 
piece of paper and drops it on the floor. Indeed, Rich explains that such 
accommodation has become a joke among those participating in the trial; however, 
his main concern is one of precedence:  
If the court was willing to bend over backward for Jacob Hunt’s Asperger’s 
syndrome, how long will it be before this is used as a precedent by some career 
criminal who insists that going to jail will inflame his claustrophobia. I’m all for 
equality, but not when it erodes the system.115 
However, the system already does not work for everybody, which is precisely why 
the judge approves the allowances in the first place. The judge says ‘that’s the nature 
of America – we make room for everyone’ which mirrors some of Berryessa’s findings 
that the judiciary acknowledge difference, while worrying that the public cannot.116 
Oliver’s strategy is to force this difference into plain sight. During his opening 
statement he purposefully puts his hand on Jacob’s shoulder to make him flinch 
before telling the jury ‘that a person with a neurological disorder like Asperger’s who 
commits a crime – a person like Jacob – can’t be held responsible’.117 Indeed, it 
becomes clear that Oliver is playing a very specific kind of disability card: the 
pathological neural implantation. He bluntly explains that Jacob does not act 
atypically because he is sociopathic (with psychological undertones), but rather 
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‘because his brain simply doesn’t function that way’.118 Yet playing fast-and-loose 
with labels comes at a loss of Jacob’s subjectivity and agency. Oliver tells Jacob: 
‘you’re not crazy […] I’m just trying to get the jury to see you as legally insane’.119 
However, given everything that happens during the trial (and throughout his life) 
Jacob tells him that he is ‘not a big fan of labels’. There seems to be little 
consideration for the ease with which everybody expects Jacob to sidestep his legal 
status of sanity because everybody unquestionably accepts a guilty fiction as fact: 
that Jacob who has little substantial history of violence could have killed his mentor 
Jess.  
 The defence hires a forensic psychiatrist who builds a story to explain how 
Jacob’s autism contributed to killing Jess, albeit as part of an insane break from 
reality. She tells the court Jacob ‘might know that people with tears in their eyes are 
sad, but he’d be making a cognitive judgement, not an emotional one. For someone 
with Asperger’s, this lack of empathy is a neurobiological deficit, and it affects 
behaviour’.120 All this material explanation bolsters Oliver’s closing remarks, in which 
he asks the jury to consider ‘whether [Jacob] understood right from wrong in that 
moment the way you understand right from wrong’, bolstering his trial-long strategy 
of divide and conquer between normal and different cognition.121 Indeed, in this 
moment the reader assumes the role of the jury, a role the reader/viewer often 
tacitly takes when reading/viewing fictional courtroom dramas. However, unlike the 
jury, who are simply told what is, or is not, going on in Jacob’s mind the reader has 
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access to Jacob’s first-person narrative. For the jury, Jacob’s guilt is already 
established, the only question remaining is whether he was insane and not culpable, 
or deviant and blameable. For the reader, the certainty of neither guilt nor innocence 
has been established, in fact, despite the ‘feel bad’ narrative of the courtroom, the 
sentimental genre which Picoult is famous for retains the expectation that Jacob’s 
innocence will be revealed and acknowledged, which it is in the final pages.  
 Where the defence harnesses medical models of autism to build a case for 
material causes of insanity, the prosecution fronted by Helen Sharp aims to reduce 
autism to a psychological trait. In her cross-examination of Dr Murano, the defence’s 
medical authority, Sharp strikes a mocking tone: ‘being the center of his own 
universe. Self-preservation is the one inviolable rule. Temper tantrums and anger 
management issues . . . Sounds to me, Dr Murano, like Asperger’s is the new 
selfish’.122 She continues her attack asking Murano how she arrived at Jacob’s 
diagnosis. Murano replies that she administered a series of tests such as IQ and social 
interaction. Sharp now establishes her psychological argument, asking if there is any 
material test (bloods, toxicity, brain scans) to identify autism. This is not incidentally 
a criticism shared by many who are sceptical about the use of autism as a diagnostic 
category in its own right.123 Murano concedes and Sharp continues: ‘the diagnosis 
you make and the assumptions you have about Jacob are not based on anything 
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other than your own opinion’.124 This kind of psychological profiling allows Sharp to 
argue that Jacob’s Asperger’s traits and expressions, which Murano agrees include 
poor social skills and lack of empathy, are ‘also the traits you find in cold-blooded 
killers’.125 The prosecution is creating a story of a deviant psychology, harnessing 
existing phantom associations between autism and violence to make her case. 
During the case, Sharp aligns Jacob’s ‘obsession with violent crime’ with an 
incident in which he ‘assaulted a girl’ in school.126 Sharp’s intention is to attach autism 
to psychopathy through a series of clever debates. A different psychiatrist attempts 
to correct Sharp, saying that the differences in autistic persons ‘usually makes them 
the prey for psychopaths, rather than the predators’.127 Sharp returns to the 
documented instances of Jacob’s aggression and forces the psychiatrist to admit that 
an insanity case cannot be simultaneously built on instantaneous ‘snapping’ if such a 
snap continues long enough to set up a crime scene. This is in many respects fair, 
dramatic, legal game; however, what House Rules highlights in its courtroom is 
precisely that the legal system does not work for everybody, and nor does society as 
a whole. People believe Jacob to be guilty because they are willing to assume the 
glove will fit. The troubling associations between deviance, violence, and autism 
Sharp spins in the courtroom reflect a verisimilitude people recognise. This is the crux 
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of the problem. Jacob’s cognition is simply Jacob’s cognition and the 
phenomenological present narrative of autism as experienced by Jacob is his, he does 
not imagine life as negative or deficient because it is just his way of life. However, 
this subjective experience – the formation of which involves the biopolitical 
imperatives underpinning neural implantations, disablism, and prejudicial phantoms 
– is made other by these external factors.  
To this extent, I argue that there is a feel-bad autism narrative in the novel 
that goes against the grain of the expected feel-good sentimentalism of the genre. 
By ‘feel-bad autism’ I do not seek to imply a response that elicits bad-feeling for the 
mere fact that Jacob is autistic. Rather, it is feel-bad in the sense that the legal 
trappings and autistic phantoms of the brain that see Jacob turned into a guilty 
autistic object become overt and recognisable as everyday actions that the reader 
themselves may propagate and experience narratively through Jacob. Of course, 
Picoult returns to generic convention in the final pages by refusing to let such bad 
feelings close the narrative; however, it is notable that the belief in a hyperreal 
safeguarding legal system does not save Jacob. He only avoids prison or the legal 
implantation of insanity by finally explaining how he had been protecting Theo. Now, 
in a catch-all umbrella term like autism, which includes persons who are non-verbal, 
how can the reader feel good about such an ending? The narrative establishes this 
feel-bad complicity between reader and narrative because, despite the legal setting, 
there is no moment of cathartic confession or reveal other than by Jacob himself. 
This might seem agential, as in the autistic narratives considered in the next section, 
but this reading is quickly negated by the preceding events in which Jacob has little 
agency during the trial, and more specifically that his brother Theo did not confess 
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or volunteer his knowledge: that he saw Jess fall and hit her head while he was spying 
on her. Moreover, Jacob’s act is utterly selfless, carried out to protect his brother. 
When one considers the readiness of those closest to him in presuming guilt, any 
feel-good sentimentality of the ending is diminished. 
Indeed, whilst as Jarman argues it is somewhat ridiculous to imagine that 
nobody directly asks Jacob (who is verbal) what had happened, I argue the narrative 
is constructed to reflect Jacob’s increasing loss of agential voice during the trial. Not 
only does his time on the stand end disastrously given the adversarial nature of the 
legal system, but also his first person sections diminish as the novel climaxes. Further, 
Oliver takes Jacob’s pencil, his only sanctioned communication, away from him whilst 
ironically telling the jury ‘the legal system in America works very well if you happen 
to communicate a certain way, a way Jacob doesn’t’.128 When Jacob does finally get 
a chance to ‘tell the truth’ to the jury, which is to say, the truth about him creating 
the crime scene, Oliver reflects that one upside is that he looks more insane than 
ever. The title of the novel is revealed as being the reason why Jacob could not tell 
the truth about seeing Theo at the scene, because the house rule is ‘take care of your 
brother’.129 This is a sentimental and convenient narrative trick. However, it proves 
essential in establishing the way in which the novel portrays the myth of the autistic 
shooter in the microcosm of court. Nobody allows ‘Jacob’ to be on the stand. What 
is put on trial is autism, and House Rules shows its cultural, social, medical, and legal 
mutability. Mallett and Runswick-Cole consider diagnostic labels such as autism as 
being akin to ‘essential tourist information for those travelling to or through the land 
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of impairment’.130 Indeed, in the claustrophobic land of the trial the signposts point 
towards deviance: obsessive, insane, asocial, violent, no empathy, and erratic. As 
readers and judges of this courtroom that places autism on the stand the situation is 
clear, the discourse pertaining to the figuration of the autistic shooter is infectious, 
problematic, and misleading. 
House Rules is not alone in its treatment and use of autism as a guilty set of 
codes and discourses for plot purposes. Antoinette van Heugten’s Saving Max (2010) 
reflects a similar story in which an autistic teenager, Max, is incorrectly put on trial 
for the murder of a friend he makes at a specialist care facility. However, what is 
interesting with Max is that the lines between the two figures of the shooter and 
hacker become blurred when he hacks into the hospital computers trying to obtain 
evidence for his mother, who is desperately trying to save him by more traditional 
detective means. Max thus joins a league of autistic hackers who use their abilities 
to help themselves and others. The difference perhaps is perspective and agency, 
where Max is always having to be ‘saved’ by his mother, the autistic protagonists in 
The Millennium Series and The Code are radically more agential.  
Autistic Retribution; Autistic Justice - Lisbeth Salander 
 
House Rules and texts such as Saving Max prove to be largely feel-bad narratives of 
autism in which the reader comes to feel badly not only about injustices associated 
with autistic people, but about prejudices towards cognitive difference. 
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Compounded by a trial devoid of any meaningful agency for Jacob, autism is evoked 
in a series of false and prejudicial stories in which autism comes to be linked with 
deathly violence, stories that lack any of the assumed authority of legal ‘truth’. 
However, this section considers how the ‘feel-bad’ experience of narrativised autism 
in House Rules transforms into the ‘feel-badass’ formulations depicted in the figure 
of the autistic hacker. Here, autism is central not only to self-justice, but also justice 
and retribution against some of the damaging biopolitical machinations affecting the 
way autistic people live; it is a reclamation of the false or silenced narratives that 
contribute to the figuration of the autistic shooter. 
 The media articles beginning this chapter portray the ‘autistic hacker’ as an 
emerging figure of cultural preoccupation. High profile legal cases such as those of 
McKinnon and Love detail the extent of individual hacking, and, like with the texts 
this chapter considers, highlight their dealings in court. Most interesting about these 
cases is public response, as these deviant actions by autistic hackers are viewed as 
having productive worth. I argue above that this is likely due to the fear of global 
cyber-attacks, and if America has come to be understood as the bastion of 
democracy, reports of Russian interference in the 2016 American election, and the 
reports of Cambridge Analytica working to influence both US elections and Brexit 
were represented as political crises.131 Democracy itself is under cyber threat, 
something we see in the Millennium series where Lisbeth Salander and her criminal 
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father Zala come to represent a ‘constitutional crisis’.132 With such global threats, 
and indeed, mistrust of our own governments as reflected by ‘LeicsMerc’’s comment 
‘[Gamble] may uncover all the governments lies!’, the criminality of these hacks often 
loses focus in the urgency of their talent, talent ‘typical’ people in the novels can 
scarcely comprehend.  
 However, the idea of fetishization/fascination Murray considers remains 
fundamental to this emerging figure of the autistic hacker. They are at once 
celebrated and praised, and othered and ogled for their preternatural technological 
skills. In other words, and as is seen in the Australian TV show The Code, they are 
considered simultaneously useful and dangerous. Such is Salander’s position. She is 
fluent in computer technology, able to solve crimes, steal billions, bring down 
corporations, and kill. Her hacking talents are also crucial in saving herself from 
injustice. Such ability is also present though to a lesser extent in House Rules, where 
Jacob’s obsessive understanding of forensics and the law allows him to intervene 
successfully in his trial when Oliver is struggling. However, Salander is far more 
agential and is undoubtedly the badass hero of the series, and unlike Jacob she is not 
bound by ‘house rules’. In this section, I look at how Salander is initially at the mercy 
of a pathologizing biopolitics before exploring how her neuro-difference becomes a 
way for her to fight back and to achieve justice and reclaim identity. 
 The first novel in the series is a standalone mystery that sees Salander help 
disgraced journalist Mikael Blomkvist solve an historic mystery for the powerful 
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Vanger family through her extraordinary hacking abilities. The final two novels of the 
trilogy explore Salander’s subsequent manhunt. She is the prime suspect in the 
murder of a young couple who were working with Blomkvist, as well as her rapist and 
legal guardian Nils Bjurman. It is understandable that Salander quickly becomes a 
suspect because her fingerprints are found on the murder weapon. The murdered 
couple and Blomkvist were working to expose an illegal sex-trade threatening to 
unearth the truth about criminal mastermind and Russian defector Zalachenko. 
Initially unaware that Zala is her father, Salander hacks Blomkvist’s computer and 
reads his research into Zala and the illegal trade, subsequently beginning her own 
investigation. Zala was given citizenship in Sweden by the state run ‘Section’. Though 
he beat Salander’s mother the state decided he was too much of an intelligence asset 
so his criminal activities became state-sanctioned secrets (by rogue members of the 
Section) in the hope that his knowledge would pay off. When Salander was twelve, 
she threw a Molotov cocktail at Zala and was institutionalised, and thus controlled 
by the state for the following years of her life. Upon release she was placed under 
the strict control of a guardian. Under guardianship, ‘the client is relieved of the 
authority to handle his or her own money or to make decisions […] the guardian 
[takes] over all of the client’s legal powers’; in other words, the Section’s secrets were 
safeguarded by her ‘safeguarding’.133 
 The signification of this strict form of biopolitical legal control, even more 
than the material fingerprint evidence, is what leads Salander into being the prime 
suspect. Throughout the trilogy reference to Salander’s case history is prevalent. In 
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the first novel we learn ‘her casebook was filled with terms such as introverted, 
socially inhibited, lacking in empathy, […] psychopathic and asocial behaviour’, and 
after Bjurman forces Salander to perform oral sex he tells her there is little point 
going to the authorities because ‘there are documents stating you’re non compos 
mentis’.134 Likewise, the second book sees the police explain she ‘was declared 
incompetent by the district court, and [is…] documented as having violent 
tendencies’.135 Moreover, when the police interview Salander’s loyal boss Armansky 
the inspector explains she has a ‘record’ stating that she is ‘deeply disturbed’, to 
which Armansky replies ‘files are one thing. People are something else’.136 These 
mark the crux of Salander’s biopolitical position. She is held to ransom, not as a 
person, but as a fabricated neurological history created by the Section’s Dr 
Teleborian when she was twelve. 
 Biopolitical power bears down on Salander through ‘medical’ incarceration 
and psychiatric diagnoses. She is both monitored and legally bound to the state under 
guardianship. She is understood through a falsification of medical records, and her 
very being is a threat to ‘national security’.137 The final novel is an attempt to 
problematize these controls, culminating in a courtroom scene in which the facts are 
finally laid bare. As in House Rules, the prosecution use Salander’s diagnoses to 
attempt to discredit her, arguing ‘it is also my duty to remind the court that Lisbeth 
Salander has been diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic’.138 This is countered by 
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Salander’s lawyer who plainly explains that ‘from the time she was a child she tried 
[…] to talk to police and social workers […] The result in every instance was that she 
was punished because government civil servants had decided that Zalachenko was 
more important that she was’.139 This reflects a different autistic narrative to House 
Rules. Punished by a biopolitical system that ostensibly protects, Salander protects 
herself. 
 The courtroom drama occurs following a long media campaign against 
Salander depicted through newspaper headlines that puncture the final two books. 
Uncannily echoing aspects of the media articles beginning this chapter, ‘sometimes 
she was described as psychotic and sometimes schizophrenic or paranoid. All papers 
subscribed to the view that she was mentally handicapped’.140 The difference 
between the real articles and the fictional ones is that Salander’s do not mention 
autism. In fact, in many ways autism is an object which works at odds with House 
Rules – here it is not a guilty diagnosis, but a logical explanation for atypical behaviour 
and a useful set of skills. This marks the dual role of autism today – at once dangerous 
(shooter) and useful (asocial hacker). Above I discuss Murray’s concept of 
‘witnessing’ autism. However, if House Rules trades on the colloquial and diagnostic 
witnessing of autism, in this series it is less ‘autism’ that is publicly witnessed and 
instead a more psychological profile akin to Foucault’s perverse implantation. 
Salander, whose coded autism is revered by the reader, is thought to be a prostitute, 
 
139 Ibid. p.640. 
140 Ibid. p.351. 
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‘retarded’, a ‘PSYCHOPATH’, and a member of a ‘LESBIAN SATANIST CULT’ by the 
public in the novel.141 
 Salander’s autistic expressions are rendered benign relative to her perverse 
appearance. It is not her ‘lack of emotional involvement’ that most upsets Armansky, 
but her image.142 At work she was known as ‘the girl with two brain cells’ who acts 
like a ‘stray cat’.143 We are told that ‘she was simply not very good at establishing 
contact with other people’, but that this ‘was not a matter of shyness. For her, a 
conversation had a straightforward function’.144 Moreover, her former guardian 
Palmgren explains ‘she has an extremely hard time relating to other people. I thought 
she had Asperger’s syndrome or something like that’.145 Here autism is used to 
explain her asociality and extraordinary hacking abilities, rather than to compound 
deviance. At the end of the first novel, Blomkvist repeats this thinking, ‘Asperger’s 
syndrome […] Or something like that. A talent for seeing patterns and understanding 
abstract reasoning where other people perceive only white noise’.146 While Salander 
realises that her lack of imagination ‘was evidence enough that there was something 
wrong with her brain’, the way in which ‘autism’ diffuses the stains of deviance and 
perversity caused, not by neuro but by psychological lenses, is notably different to 
how it is used to compound deviance and violent behaviour in Jacob.147 In the final 
novel, Dr Jonasson, the doctor who successfully removes a bullet from Salander’s 
 
141 Larsson, Dragon Tattoo, p.143; Played with Fire, p.311; p.334. 
142 Larsson, Dragon Tattoo, p.33. It is an interesting comparison here that the countercultural 
neuroscientists who created the mind-altering drug in Naam’s Nexus are described in similar 
aesthetic terms to Salander. 
143 Ibid. p.35. 
144 Ibid. p.210; Played with Fire, p.26. 
145 Ibid. p.502. 
146 Larsson, Dragon Tattoo, p.454. 
147 Larsson, Hornets’ Nest, p.710. 
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brain, becomes an ally of Salander’s and the good double of evil Teleborian. The two 
doctors have a heated discussion in which Jonasson refuses to grant Teleborian 
access to Salander. Teleborian tries to pull rank, explaining his intimate history with 
Salander’s (fabricated) ‘pathology’, ‘clinical condition’ and ‘deterioration’.148 He 
claims Salander has a ‘serious mental disorder’ but ‘would hesitate to confine 
[himself] to an exact diagnosis’.149 His meaningless psychobabble is countered by a 
cool Jonasson, who asks if he has ‘ever considered a significantly simpler diagnosis 
[…] For example Asperger’s syndrome’.150 Of course, Teleborian is quite right that 
Asperger’s does not cause people to throw Molotov cocktails; however, the way in 
which autism in the series re-writes deviant readings of autism as in House Rules is 
refreshing: Salander is not deviant, she is autistic. What is more, she is an autistic 
hero, she is for many, as Sheng-Mei Ma writes, ‘my Aspergirl’.151 
 Salander’s autism is more than just witnessed, it is written into her character. 
In each of the novels her thought processes are intermittently described as a series 
of ‘clicks’. Ma suggests that in one particular instance such a ‘click’ likens her to a 
camera, doubtless a comment on her photographic memory.152 I agree, but these 
‘clicks’ do more than this and symbolise her brain’s computational and hacking 
alignment. Throughout the series ‘click’ occurs in moments of revelation, confusion, 
or pressure.153 ‘Click’ is the verb of attack and defence for Salander. It represents the 
 
148 Ibid. p.226-7 
149 Ibid. p.227. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Sheng-mei Ma, ‘My Aspergirl: Stieg Larsson’s Millennium Trilogy and Visualisations’, Journal of 
American Culture, 37.1 (2014), 52-63. 
152 Ibid. p.56. 
153 In Dragon Tattoo ‘click’ is often associated with Salander’s cognitive processes and becomes a 
sign of her cognitive difference. For instance, whilst reading old press cuttings her mind goes ‘Click. 
Click. Click’ (p.388). Later, her brain works ‘at top speed’ whilst trying to piece fragments of memory 
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mechanics of her brain in high-pressure situations, but also the literal act of ‘clicking’ 
when she hacks. For instance, ‘she clicked copy, wrote the name ArmanskyMiltSec 
and clicked OK. The computer instantly began copying Armansky’s hard drive’; she 
‘clicked on the bubble and wrote Wasp’, which allows her entry to the Hacker’s 
Republic.154 She clicked on image after image of child pornography on Teleborian’s 
computer – allowing her to turn the tables on his history of implanting perversions. 
Finally, she finds a crucial clue ‘clicking through one after another’ of Teleborian’s 
emails, allowing Blomkvist and her friends to identify a member of the Section.  
 As well as brain process, self-defence, and hacking, clicking also allows 
Salander a form of sociality. Unable to cope with seeing Blomkvist in reality after he 
broke her heart, but ‘curious about what he was up to’, she ‘double clicked and 
opened a copy of Blomkvist’s hard drive’.155 Later, she and Blomkvist talk through his 
hard drive, double-clicking on the document ‘[To Sally]’ and conversing through it.156 
More poignantly, it is through a click on the handheld computer Jonasson smuggles 
into her hospital room that she is finally able to tell her story. In the first novel 
Salander’s life is arranged for her; we read that she ‘was somewhat bewildered by 
the exchange that had gone back and forth over her head all day […] no-one had 
asked for her opinion. She […] nodded once’.157 In the final novel, this single, passive, 
 
together, ‘Mamma – click – sister – click – Mimmi – click – Holger Palmgren. Evil Fingers. And 
Armansky. The job. Harriet Vanger. Click’ (p.501). This is repeated in Played with Fire when she is 
being attacked by Zala. ‘She took two steps towards the undergrowth when out of the corner of her 
eye – click – she saw Zalachenko raise his arm’ (550). Moreover, emerging from the ground after 
being shot and buried, ‘She swayed like a drunk. […] Click. Wood. Click. Fire’ (p.558). In Hornet’s 
Nest, again whilst being attacked the click motif return, ‘Her brain was working at high speed. Click, 
click, click. She still held the crowbar in her hand but she knew that it was a feeble weapon against a 
man who could not feel pain’ (pp.704-5). 
154 Larsson, Played with Fire, p.94; Larsson, Hornets’ Nest, p.311. 
155 Larsson, Played with Fire, pp.149-50. 
156 Ibid. pp.364-5. 
157 Larsson, Dragon Tattoo, p.145. 
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nod is replaced by an agential click. ‘She clicked on New Document, took out the 
stylus and began to tap on the letters on the digital keypad. My name is Lisbeth 
Salander […]’.158 This begins a long document recounting her life, a document which 
is submitted as evidence in the murder trial.  
 Salander’s subcultural status and subjectivity is in no small part tied to her 
hacking abilities. A member of ‘Hacker Republic’, a group of elite hackers initiated 
only through existing member introduction, she and her other online citizens are 
‘adversaries’ of the ‘idiots’ who spread computer viruses, working to clean the net to 
ensure they remain able to hack.159 However, they are powerful too, bringing justice 
in the form of liquidation to a Californian CEO who stole a patent from an employee, 
and offering to help Salander ‘shut down the Swedish government’.160 This is her 
subcultural milieu. As established with her discussions with Blomkvist, she can 
‘blithely reveal her most intimate secrets’ to fellow citizens, which she is unable to 
do ‘with people of flesh and blood’.161 Writing about autism and the internet, Victoria 
Henderson explains ‘the Internet makes possible the reconfigurations of spatialities 
by nurturing a sense of proximity among a geographically dispersed and socially 
alienated population’.162 In other words, that citizens of the Republic do not ‘feel any 
kind of loyalty to any state’ (whose biopolitical machinations often attack rather than 
protect cognitive difference) is crucial to their emotional closeness.163 Traditional 
 
158 Larsson, Hornet’s Nest, p.347. My italics to portray the novel’s font change signifying Salander’s 
writing. 
159 Ibid. p.313. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. p.314. 
162 Victoria Henderson, and others, ‘Hacking the master code: cyborg stories and the boundaries of 
autism’. 
163 Larsson, Hornets’ Nest, p.313. 
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boundaries are removed and bounds of computer fluency and loyalty are introduced 
mirroring the subcultural neuroscientists in Nexus. 
 The series is full of ‘productive’ hacking, but I want to look at three instances 
in particular; how Salander saves herself, how she saves Blomkvist, how she saves 
Erika. Blomkvist makes it clear that Salander is the only person who can reveal the 
truth of the state conspiracy. He knows that ‘Salander’s being isolated [in hospital] 
presented one other acute problem. She was a computer expert, also a hacker 
[and…] he had great need for her skills in that field’.164 This is made even more explicit 
when he is convincing Jonasson to smuggle Salander’s handheld computer into 
hospital. Blomkvist tells him that ‘this is the most important weapon Lisbeth has in 
her arsenal – she has to have it. […] Lisbeth is the only one who knows how to get at 
the evidence’.165 Here it is only through hacking that justice can be brought, entirely 
at odds with the typical workings of disciplinary biopolitics,  where the individual is 
monitored by machinations of power, not monitoring them. This is the position of 
the figure of the ‘autistic hacker’ today. They, like Salander, can expose corruption. 
Indeed, with the help of her fellow citizens, the truth is exposed in court and Salander 
is exonerated.  
 That Salander’s hacking exonerates herself and exposes state corruption is 
remarkable, but her work as online Nemesis also saves Blomkvist and Erika. When 
we first meet Blomkvist he has just been to prison for printing libellous claims about 
tycoon Hans-Erik Wennerström. The rest of the novel considers the Vanger mystery, 
 
164 Ibid. p.235. 
165 Ibid. p.278. 
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which Blomkvist undertakes because Henrik Vanger offers him information that 
would substantiate his rubbished claims against Wennerström. Upon solving the 
mystery (with Salander’s help) he realises that this promised information is useless. 
However, Salander hacks Wennerström’s computer and shares the information with 
Blomkvist. This act fully vindicates Blomkvist and his magazine Millennium becomes 
a major player in Swedish journalism. Similarly, in Erika’s subplot in the final novel 
she is now working as editor at a national paper (helped, of course, by Millennium’s 
reputation after breaking the Wennerström scandal), but is the victim of gross online 
harassment, theft, and home-invasion by an unknown member of her staff. 
Salander’s offer to help her reflects an aspect of her character people are unable to 
see in the flesh. Salander dislikes Erika because of her romantic links to Blomkvist, 
but this offer of help from her hospital bed is Salander’s online olive branch. She 
reduces the suspect list to eighteen members of staff, before giving the task to fellow 
hacker Plague to finish. Plague sums this gesture up by writing, ‘<You’re beginning to 
exhibit signs of a social conscience.>’166 Indeed, it is Erika who best understands the 
fantastic scope of Salander’s role of the autistic hacker describing her as ‘an oddly 
resourceful young woman’.167 Her resourcefulness is certainly ‘odd’, and whilst Erika 
still does not grasp that it is not ‘despite’, but ‘necessarily because’ of her physical 
social isolation that allows her the freedom to research, she does recognise her role 
as hacking nemesis.   
 Sonya Freeman Loftis’s critique that the series uses autistic stereotypes, such 
as Salander’s lack of emotional investment, asociality, and its repeated alignment of 
 
166 Ibid. p.477. 
167 Ibid. p.489. 
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her brain as being a computer, which establish Salander to be a puzzle to be solved, 
is a valid reading.168 Yet, by looking at her as an autistic hacker, and in comparing the 
fact that ‘autism’ is not constructed as explicitly ‘guilty’ as in House Rules, her 
narrative does much to celebrate implantations of difference. However, Salander is 
also dangerous, she, unlike Jacob, does violently attack people though only because 
of the precarious biopolitical situation in which she exists. Salander is justly violent in 
the same way that she justly hacks. She abides by her own set of ethics and morals 
that prove far superior to many of those around her. Indeed, where enhancement 
voids Eddie of ethics, Salander’s atypical logic provides her with a neutral sense of 
justice. She is a hero not for celebrity or recognition but to right personal wrongs. 
Indeed, the fact that she can detect the secrets but has either no will or public forum 
to discuss them makes Blomkvist a natural partner. She is the judicial brain and he is 
the public mouthpiece. This narrative combination which sees the retributive autistic 
hacker and savvy journalist tackle injustice is employed again in the Australian 
television series The Code. 
Autistic Retribution; Autistic Justice: The Code 
 
This section focusses on season one of The Code. It is divided between remote 
Lindara in New South Wales and Canberra, the seat of Australian government. In 
Lindara, two aboriginal teens Clarence and Sheyna are involved in a collision. 
Clarence survives and returns to his temporary carer and teacher Alex, covered in 
blood and incoherent. The next day Alex and the local police discover Sheyna’s body 
 
168 Freeman Loftis, 2015, p.142. In regards to Salander’s computational characterisation note the 
mathematical and technological names given to the parts comprising Played with Fire and Hornets’ 
Nest. In Played with Fire there is ‘Irregular Equations’, ‘Absurd Equations’, and ‘Terminator Mode’. In 
Hornets’ Nest there is ‘Hacker Republic’, ‘Disk Crash’ and ‘Rebooting System’. 
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as well as a corrupted video file on Clarence’s phone. In Canberra, Sophie, 
communications director for the government, gives her former journalist boyfriend 
Ned an official leak containing a reference to Clarence’s collision. Ned pursues it, 
getting in contact with Alex who eventually sends him the video file, which his autistic 
brother Jesse, a computer hacker released on licence, is able to recover. Jesse 
investigates further. Noticing a number plate he hacks the biotech company 
Physanto and downloads encrypted data. He triggers a warning and both Jesse’s 
computer and Ned’s journalism office are counterattacked with malware. The series 
then becomes a fast-paced techno-thriller in which Jesse is kidnapped, escapes, 
further hacks, and falls in love. At the end, Jesse, Ned, and Jesse’s new girlfriend Hani 
hack Deputy Prime Minister Ian Bradley’s computer and steal the evidence he is 
trying to delete pertaining to his involvement in Physanto’s illegal dealing in enriched 
uranium, the substance being transported in the truck that collided with Clarence 
and Sheyna. In this section I show how the materiality of Jesse’s implanted autism is 
continually referenced throughout the series before analysing how his being 
institutionally framed to appear dangerous is countered by his unique skills as an 
autistic hacker, which not only bring justice and retribution within the series, but 
which problematise the plastic narrative I theorise in chapter one.  
The viewer first meets Jesse being driven to work by his brother, agitated 
because he is going to be late because Ned must cover a government press 
conference. As if talking to a child, Ned repeatedly tells Jesse to ‘stay in the car’.169 
Jesse becomes increasingly restless and walks with a parcel of pills towards the 
 
169 ‘Episode 1’, The Code, series 1, Playmaker Media and the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 21 
September 2014. Netflix <https://www.netflix.com/watch/80003075> [accessed 4 November 2019]. 
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government building. Inside, Ned is told that Jesse has been stopped and is 
surrounded by police (fig 29). Jesse is kneeling in the corner with his head down and 
arms raised in protection, whilst police are reaching for weapons as they shout at a 
clearly distressed and confused Jesse to put his hands on his head. This is not a 
protest kneel, nor a kneel of reverence, but a kneel of fearful submission; Jesse’s 
frame is diminutive and helpless. The shot changes and Jesse’s upper body now fills 
the screen. He is shouting and crying and remains defencelessly bent forward (fig. 
30). The perspective changes, this time to an aerial CCTV shot in which the potential 
danger Jesse posed has subsided, police stand-down and Ned begins to pick up the 
pills spilled after ripping open the parcel to prove it is not a weapon (fig. 31). This 
opening sequence sets the tone regarding the biopolitical and disciplinary power 
surrounding and affecting brain and cognitive difference in the series. Jesse is holding 
his medication surrounded by police in the heart of government whilst being 
watched and monitored by CCTV. This kind of surveillance is supposed to work 
invisibly and individually because surveillance is internalised. However, here we are 
all made to confront our quotidian role of normative voyeur in an uncomfortable and 
unsubtle manner: this perspective shows us not to be just witnesses as Murray 
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describes, but the guard in the panopticon, influencing and forming subjectivities of 
those with cognitive difference through internalisation of the normalising gaze. 
 
 
 
 
 
If the above scene renders Jesse’s autism visually and aurally, it subsequently 
becomes an object of discussion for his brother Ned. While in House Rules the court 
attempts to debate the legitimacy of autism’s neuro-materiality, and hence open the 
door to phantom readings of psychological otherness or deviance, Ned discusses 
Jesse’s autism in either medical or metaphorically material terms. During the 
exchange when Sophie leaks the documents, Ned tells her as way of explanation for 
Jesse’s behaviour outside the government building, ‘you know he has a condition’, to 
which she replies, ‘selfish, manipulative, pain in the arse-itis is a condition now?’ 
Figure 29 –Jesse kneeling surrounded 
by police (Season 1, ‘Episode 1’). 
Figure 30 – Jesse’s screaming face 
filling the frame. 
Figure 31 – CCTV shot of Jesse surrounded 
by police. 
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echoing the flippancy of the prosecutor’s remarks in House Rules.170 Later, Ned tells 
Hani a fellow hacker and subsequently Jesse’s girlfriend that Jesse ‘isn’t put together 
like other people’.171 Jesse also discusses himself in neuro-material terms. A scene in 
which Hani visits Jesse at home sees a continuation of the visual signifiers of Jesse’s 
cognitive difference as it opens with an image of Jesse’s pillbox (fig. 32). While 
showing Hani the garden he says:  
I’m not that into plants, but the idea that you can hack off what is effectively 
one of its limbs and, on a cellular level, messages crank into action and a whole 
new plant grows a perfect biological replication of the original. That is pretty 
kick arse. I wish sometimes I could cut off my pinky and see if it would grow a 
new me. I don’t tell many people that. It makes me sound like a psycho. Which 
I’m not, by the way. But if I did grow a new me, I wonder whether there’d be 
the same kink in the wiring. I don’t know if you’ve noticed, I’m a little 
different.172 
 
 
Here Jesse is speaking in strictly bio-material terms. This idea of self-replication, 
however, should not be read as indicative of him wanting to correct atypicality. 
Jesse’s tone is entirely speculative and curious evidenced through the modals ‘would’ 
and ‘could’. Indeed, if it were possible, he does not hope to grow a typical brain, but 
 
170 ‘Episode 1’, The Code. 
171 ‘Episode 4’, The Code, 12 October 2014. Netflix <https://www.netflix.com/watch/80003078> 
[accessed 4 November 2019]. 
172 ‘Episode 1’, The Code.  
Figure 32 – A pillbox in Jesse’s 
apartment (‘Episode 1’). 
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only wonders ‘whether there’d be the same kink in the wiring’, he is, after all, ‘a little 
different’.  
Having established trust Jesse tells her about the documents he found 
hacking Physanto. He says: ‘I found some stuff last night that, well, I’ve not 
encountered it before so I have no way of describing it’, Hani replies, ‘so show me’.173  
This exchange perfectly encapsulates many of the narratives of ‘autism’. More than 
anything this shows how mutable and categorically diverse ‘autism’ is as a 
categorisation and ontological implantation. Jesse’s characterisation is atypical; he 
responds, acts, and thinks differently to normal expectation as evidenced in Figure 
29; yet Jesse’s metaphorical-science makes much more sense than the diagnostic 
label ‘autism’ especially when you place in in the context of this chapter as a whole. 
Jesse is utterly unlike Salander, who is utterly unlike Jacob, who is unlike the ‘autistic 
shooters’ reported in the press, who, as Gladwell describes are unlike each other, 
and yet each of these are linked by ‘autism’ – indicative of the oft-repeated phrase 
within autistic discourse: if you’ve met one person with autism, you’ve met one 
person with autism. Berend Verhoeff titles an article ‘What is this thing called 
autism?’, and Runswick-Cole titles a chapter ‘Understanding this thing called autism’ 
in which Runswick-Cole argues that this ‘thing’ is a ‘powerful story’, indeed the 
repeated use of ‘thing’ in such research is extremely apt. In everyday speech we use 
‘thing’ as a filler if we have forgotten the correct word or lack a specific word to use. 
Linguistically, ‘autism’ works in the same way; what ‘thing’ is to an unknown object 
on a table, ‘autism’ is to cognitive differences in society and culture – it is the 
 
173 Ibid. 
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medicalised narrativisation of unmeasurable and indefinable perceptions of many 
types of cognitive difference. Thus, when Jesse says of the stolen documents, ‘I have 
no way of describing it’ and Hani replies ‘so show me’, we can read it as the medical 
unknowability of the thing ‘autism’ as well as the need to try to comprehend it 
through different more imaginative forms, to be shown the thing. Hence Hani’s 
brilliant play on the words autistic/artistic when she shows Ned just how talented 
Jesse is with computer technology; ‘do you get how good he is, at what he does? […] 
He’s an artist […] Anyway, what he’s done here, your wonderfully artistic brother’.174 
Yet, though The Code remains unclear as to what this thing, this depiction of cognitive 
difference, is, Jesse’s autistic expressions are centred on exposing the corruption. 
The Code depicts a society in which criminality lies at the heart of 
contemporary biopolitics, with the Australian deputy prime minister covering up 
illegal associations between a giant biotech firm and the government. To this extent, 
links to the endemic criminality of Limitless and the illegal collusion between 
medical/social services and government in the Millennium series are clear to see. 
However, Jesse’s hacking abilities are ultimately employed to contain the kind of 
criminality that drives Eddie’s narrative in Limitless. There is a distinctive, frenetic, 
and sometimes manic quality to Jesse’s hacking scenes that allows me to argue that, 
where Salander proves to be online nemesis to her personal adversaries, Jesse is 
nemesis not only to the specific villains in the series, but also to the empty ideology 
of the plastic narrative itself.  
 
174 ‘Episode 2’, The Code, 28 September 2014. Netflix <https://www.netflix.com/watch/80003076> 
[accessed 4 November 2019]. 
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 The first time we see Jesse hack is when he steals the encrypted files from 
Physanto. Introducing this scene is a frequently used motif of a time-lapse shot of 
sky, in which a fast-edit of moving clouds signify an increase in speed. What follows 
is Jesse, clicking and tapping his finger absent-mindedly, whilst trying to hack the 
company without any real directed intention. At first, Jesse’s face is notably 
indifferent and his finger tapping conveys an aimless repetitive quality (fig. 33, 34) as 
composite images from the computer invade the shot.175  
 
 
 
 
 
This time-lapse shot is used throughout the series, notably in the instances when 
Jesse hacks. Hacking thus represents a dynamic and temporal agency for him, 
whereby he moves through time, beginning, and throughout the series continuing, 
to uncover a heinous official cover-up of the murder of a young girl. By the safety of 
his computer, time moves at a faster pace, and if this initial hack begins as a listless 
fishing expedition, the narrative pace rapidly increases as shortly after the scene and 
having successfully hacked the biotech firm’s server, Jesse is kidnapped for stealing 
the files. He is held and psychologically tortured in a secure unit by a man who tells 
 
175 ‘Episode 1’, The Code. 
Figure 33 – Jesse attempting to hack 
into Physanto (‘Episode 1’). 
Figure 34 – Jesse’s finger listlessly 
tapping the keyboard (‘Episode 1’). 
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him, in stark contrast to the temporal dynamism hacking offers that ‘time is no object 
here’.176  
 Yet, if time is no object while Jesse is tortured, his dynamic fast-paced agency 
returns once he resumes hacking. His next major hack occurs in an internet café 
service station. Here, stroking his neck, Jesse has a nervous manic edge looking down 
at the computer with an almost fervent, addict like quality (fig. 35). He sits at the 
computer promising himself he will ‘just be five minutes’ online.177 The shot then 
slowly zooms in on his face, with the window outside showing a time-lapse fast-edit 
of pedestrians walking by, again signifying an intensity of focus and loss of time (fig. 
36), and as with Figure 33, Jesse’s hacking activity compositely fills the frame (fig. 37). 
Noteworthy here are the similarities to Eddie’s plastic narrative in Limitless. In the 
film, NZT allows Eddie to write his book, a scene in which Eddie rapidly types on his 
laptop as letters fall and form around him signifying both increased speed and 
productivity (fig. 38), in much the same way as Jesse’s hacks. The visual differences 
are clear. Eddie is bathed in the hyperreal light signifying both his enhancement and 
ethical void, whereas Jesse is in the greyscale that comes to represent the instances 
in the film when Eddie is unenhanced. Where Eddie is using his (enhanced) ability for 
personal gain, Jesse is using his (autistic) ability for justice, both politically (‘a threat 
to democracy’ fig. 37), and personally (he changes the images of most wanted 
criminals to the man who tortured him). What is more, like Eddie’s blacked out time, 
 
176 ‘Episode 2, The Code. 
177 ‘Episode 3’, The Code, 5 October 2014. Netflix <https://www.netflix.com/watch/80003077> 
[accessed 4 November 2019]. 
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the five minutes Jesse expected to spend in the service station become two hours 
without realisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Having left the service station, Hani asks Jesse if he should decrypt the files 
considering their danger. While red letters and code superimpose upon his face Jesse 
says, ‘what they have done to me, those men in the white van, is force something 
into my brain which makes no sense to me. I have no way of filing what happened 
because I don’t understand why it happened. And so until I know why, I will have the 
splinter in my brain that I can’t stop touching’.178 Again, Jesse’s material 
understanding of his brain and cognitive difference is evident. Unable to make sense 
 
178 Ibid. 
Figure 35 – Jesse looking desperately at 
a computer in a service station (‘Episode 
3’). 
Figure 36 – Jesse focussed on hacking, 
with the background street in a fast edit. 
Figure 37 – Jesse re-writing a website 
through hacking.  
Figure 38 – Enhanced Eddie writing his 
novel on his laptop (Limitless). 
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of what has happened because his brain cannot comprehend it, he immediately 
begins hacking to try to find comprehension in a way that makes sense to him, by 
decrypting the files and solving the more tangible mystery.   
 Jesse later spends a night in a motel trying to crack the code whilst waiting 
for Ned. Here, the fervent look of Figure 35 becomes a fully realised visualisation of 
addictive mania. The time-lapse recurs; however, where in the initial hacking scene 
(fig. 33) the time-lapse sky introduces the scene, and where in the service station the 
external pedestrians are time-lapsed while Jesse remains seated (fig.36), here, in the 
motel it is an elliptical shot and the entirety of the scene occurs in rapid pace.179 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
179 ‘Episode 4’, The Code. 
Figure 39 – Eddie hacking in a motel 
room in darkness (‘Episode 4’). 
Figure 40 – Eddie looking exasperated 
in the motel room in daylight. 
Figure 41 – Red screen projecting from 
the laptop, symbolising hacking. 
Figure 42 – The motel room returned to 
darkness, with Jesse still hacking. 
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As seen in Figures 39-42, the room goes from dark, to light, and back to dark as Jesse 
moves frantically around with his laptop, which visually emits his hacking as 
composite images. There is a growing sense of urgency here depicted through both 
the rapid pace time-lapse as well as Jesse’s exasperation (fig. 40). In Limitless, the 
tunnelling effect visually propels the viewer into taking Eddie’s plastic narrative with 
him, whereas in the motel with Jesse the camera remains static and only Jesse and 
the light move. There is no sense of complicity; it is down to Jesse alone to bring 
justice through his unique abilities because the viewer is prefigured as complicit in 
the introductory disciplinary CCTV perspective. Indeed, I argue in chapter one that as 
Eddie’s appearance improves his ethics decrease, made most explicit during the 
Dorian Gray inversion during the apartment stabbing. However, The Code sees Jesse 
and his narrative fully degrade in this motel scene. Jesse eventually falls asleep 
unsuccessful in his endeavour. He wakes up and realises that the time stamps on 
photographs are the key to cracking the code and to bringing justice against the 
pharmaceutical company. Jesse’s face is obscured by text and is only half illuminated 
by morning light (fig. 43), compare this to Eddie’s hyperreal face when he wakes up 
in a hotel having been rescued by his girlfriend Lindy. That Eddie wakes enhanced, 
Figure 43 - Jesse’s face fervent and 
erratic illuminated only by morning 
light. 
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beautiful, and ethically corrupt, whilst Jesse wakes manic, bedraggled, and fervent 
for truth, highlights an important difference between ideals of neural identity and 
subjectivity today. Eddie is so because Limitless trades on a neuromolecular narrative 
of late capitalism: consume, refigure, surpass. Jesse is so because his vigilantism 
reflects an illegal opposition to the neoliberalism exemplified by the biotech 
company he is challenging, and thus his hacking is necessarily in the shadows. His 
hacking actions mirror the position of his cognitive difference here: marginal but 
productive. Read this way, Jesse’s increasingly fast-paced and desperate hacking 
scenes come to act as an inverse of Eddie’s plastic narrative, mirroring its pace and 
mutability but towards an altogether more ethical and reparative narrative, one that 
comes to an expected narrative close. Indeed, it is because Jesse has apparent 
limitations which he confronts throughout his life that the narrative can find its own 
limit, unlike the never-end of the plastic narrative in Limitless.  
 This ending is an online faceoff between Jesse, aided by Hani, Ned, and 
Sophie, and the corrupt deputy prime minister Bradley and workers at Physanto.180 
Jesse hacks into Bradley’s parliamentary computer and has Ned’s journalism office 
record everything through his webcam. Jesse then establishes a link from Lindara, 
where the dead children’s parents are waiting to face Bradley via webcam. It is a 
tense denouement, in which obscured faces, rapidly typing fingers, and cyber 
networks dominate the screen. First, Bradley begins to delete the Physanto files from 
his staff computer. It is a desperate act in which files are individually dragged into the 
laptop’s recycle bin in rapid succession (fig. 44). Note how this mirrors the initial 
 
180 ‘Episode 6’, The Code, 26 October 2014. Netflix <https://www.netflix.com/watch/80003080> 
[accessed 4 November 2019]. 
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instance in which Jesse hacked and stole the Physanto documents at the beginning 
of the series (fig. 34). Jesse’s listless fishing expedition with monotonous clicking 
becomes a frantic clicking and dragging of a disgraced politician trying to hide 
evidence. Indeed, Jesse is now online nemesis, no longer staring listlessly at the 
screen (fig 33), but fervent with the purpose of bringing justice (fig. 45). As seen, the 
pace of Jesse’s narrative increases throughout the series as his desperation to crack 
the code deepens, much as Eddie’s plastic narrative in Limitless continually increases 
and expands. However, this final scene proves Jesse to be the full stop lacking in 
plastic neoliberal narratives of greed, expansion, and enhancement. That Jesse 
attacks a biotech firm – a bastion of late capitalist biopolitics – is crucial to 
understanding the significance of The Code’s cultural work in translating the effects 
of the neural implantation, as well as frustrating the dominant (though, as chapter 
one argues, waning in the wake of populist challenges) neoliberal understanding of 
plastic potential and idealistic enhancement.  
* 
Through a sustained media analysis, this chapter has argued that the representation 
of autism today is problematically encapsulated in the figures of the autistic shooter 
Figure 44 – Bradley desperately 
deleting evidence (‘Episode 6’). 
Figure 45 – Jesse focussed and 
determined whilst proving Bradley’s 
guilt through hacking. 
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and the autistic hacker. These two figures represent the dual poles of autistic 
implantations in contemporary society and culture: antisocial deviance, and asocial 
brilliance. Standing synecdochally for a range of cultural representations, these two 
figures are cultural constructions resulting from the kind of logic McGuire derides as 
being the normative violence against autism. Though I celebrate the increase in more 
nuanced narratives of autistic subjectivity, this chapter maintains that these two 
polar figures stand in a discursive foreground removed from a biopolitical reality that 
sees autistic people systematically devalued to the extent that their sometimes 
indefinite incarceration under section or lower life expectancy is increasingly 
normalised. This chapter challenged this schism through readings of these two 
figures in contemporary crime narratives. My analysis of the shooter figure was 
facilitated through a cultural history of the conventions and cultural meaning of the 
courtroom drama. I was able to show how biopolitical and phantom associations of 
autism as a floating category came to eradicate Jacob’s unique subjective history and 
argued that this ‘feel bad’ courtroom drama ultimately places the biopolitics and 
normative assumptions society has of autism on the stand.  
My reading of the hacker figure turned the ‘feel bad’ narrative of the shooter 
into the ‘feel badass’ reading of vital autistic subjectivity and agency. Through 
Salander, autistic implantation is rendered a positive ontological shift, whereby her 
damaging psychological case history is made meaningless in relation to the material 
understanding of autistic difference, difference that enables her alone to bring 
justice. My reading of The Code furthers the notion that autistic subjectivity can 
enable justice otherwise ignored. I compared the aesthetics of Jesse and Limitless’s 
narrative to argue that autism is not only rendered accepted as different, but more 
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importantly, an ethical counter to the kinds of ideologies that underpin neoliberal 
enhancement, a task the next chapter’s close readings of dementia detective fiction 
continues. 
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Chapter Three: Sleuthing and Suspecting the Dementia 
Subject1 
‘All Alzheimer’s disease is dementia, but not all dementia is Alzheimer’s disease’ 
begins Anne M. Lipton and Cindy D. Marshall’s The Common Sense Guide to Dementia 
for Clinicians and Caregivers.2 That this reads as a logical puzzle highlights the 
slipperiness of this thing called ‘dementia’. Dementia itself is not a disease, but an 
umbrella term acting as a clinical and cultural shorthand for a range of cognitive 
impairments due to specific brain diseases.3 Alzheimer’s is the most common disease 
under this umbrella term and amounts for approximately 60% of dementia cases.4 
Hannah Zeilig sums up these definitional problems succinctly:  
Dementia and AD [Alzheimer’s disease] cannot easily be defined because both 
have been subject to subtly changing psychiatric, biomedical, and 
social/cultural stories. This is not to deny that they both represent biological 
mental illnesses. However, on a conceptual level, the terms are open to 
interpretation and subject to historical and cultural mores.5 
Indeed, the role that biotechnology and molecular medicine has had in changing the 
medical and cultural perception of dementia diseases cannot be overstated. To this 
extent, Lucy Burke writes that ‘the way we talk and think about dementia today is 
inseparable from the assimilation of a disease model that is produced […] across a 
range of sub-disciplines and emergent medical technologies: neurology, genetics, 
 
1 Parts of this chapter have been published elsewhere. Meeks, ‘Neuro-Crime Fiction’.  
2 Anne M. Lipton and Cindy D. Marshall, The Common Sense Guide to Dementia for Clinicians and 
Caregivers (New York: Springer, 2012), p.1. 
3 Bernard Coope, ‘Dementia in the UK’ in ABC of Dementia, ed. by Bernard Coope and Felicity A. 
Richards (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons Ltd., 2014), pp.1-4 (p.1). 
4 Georgios Theodoulou, ‘Causes of Dementia’ in ABC of Dementia, ed. by Bernard Coope and Felicity 
A. Richards, pp.5-9 (p.5). 
5 Hannah Zeilig, ‘Dementia as Cultural Metaphor’, The Gerontologist, 44.2 (2013), 258-267 (p.260). 
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geriatric medicine, neuro-psychology, and psychiatry’.6 Moreover, she notes that this 
bio-medicalisation means dementia ‘is no longer perceived to be a natural 
consequence of aging’.7  
 This inability to see such cognitive impairment – ‘dementia’ – through 
anything other than the neuromolecular gaze is bolstered by a continuous stream of 
dementia-centric headlines pertaining to, amongst others, the ‘disease of the 
century’, the naturalisation of medical terminology and promise of cures, and the 
proliferation of brain scan images.8 Much as I argue for in the introduction, Burke 
does not seek an automatic reaction against neuroscientific epistemologies. Rather, 
she aims to consider the problems these produce in relation to our understanding 
and definition of personhood and subjectivity particularly in reference to those 
whose very personhood and subjectivity become dictated by their cognitive 
impairments. Following Burke, this chapter considers how medical models of 
dementia are translated in culture, particularly in relation to the fact that the ways 
in which we talk about dementia today have become inseparable from a disease 
model. More specifically, this chapter extends work by Burke, and Sarah Falcus and 
Katura Sako that looks toward detective fiction to explicate the schisms between 
biopolitics and pathological models of dementia. In doing so, it argues that in such 
narratives, protagonists living with dementia produce meaning, agency, and 
ideological critiques of the limitations of the neuromolecular gaze and a reality that 
 
6 Lucy Burke, ‘The locus of our dis-ease’, in Popularizing Dementia: Public Expressions and 
Representations of Forgetfulness, ed. by Aagje Swinnen and Mark Schweda (Bielefeld: Transcript 
Verlag, 2015), pp.23-42 (p.24). 
7 Ibid. 
8 Rebecca Anna Bitenc, ‘Representation of Dementia in Narrative Fiction’ in Knowledge and Pain, ed. 
by Esther Cohen, and others (Amsterdam: Radopi, 2012), pp.305-330 (p.305). 
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seeks futurity and biotechnological potential ahead of solving present injustices for 
those living with dementia.  
Throughout this thesis, the theorisation of the neural implantation considers 
the epistemological hegemony of neuromolecular models of identity, subjectivity, 
personhood, health and cognitive difference that has emerged out of hitherto 
psychological depth models of the mind, person, and subject. As seen with plasticity 
and enhancement, which I have shown through my reading of Limitless inherently 
ties to neoliberal models, or autism, which has seen ‘success’ in models of difference 
valuing a productive worth, neoliberal cultures that ostensibly celebrate diversity 
that exist in health models that marketize bodies, brains, and cells are foundational 
in propagating neural implantations. Regardless of whether neoliberal ideologies are 
receding in a new age of populist isolationism, dementia, and in particular 
Alzheimer’s, is no differently enmeshed in neoliberal marketisation. As Burke writes: 
Alzheimer’s is ‘a very neoliberal condition’.9 It is certainly true that the neuro-turn 
and the neural implantation are epistemological and ontological shifts open to and 
experienced by many. Returning to the thesis’s introductory quotation from Fiona 
Phillips, this goes towards the idea of the natural and automatic belief in science and 
material explanations and the notion that we are all scientists now. To borrow Stuart 
Murray’s term in relation to autism, we all become ‘witnesses’ to the various cultural 
and societal neural implantations, including dementia diseases, and my interest is 
how this supposedly omniscient and omnipresent medical model underpinned by 
biopolitical imperatives is contested in fiction.  
 
9 Burke, ‘Locus of our dis-ease’, p.27. 
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‘Dementia’ is everywhere and is often phantom in effect. Unlike 
enhancement which is striven for, or autism which increasingly is understood 
through the ‘born this way’ paradigm, dementia is viewed as a potential outcome to 
avoid at all costs. The combination of medical and cultural representation and desire 
to avoid it creates these phantom effects and leads to dementia being ‘implanted’ in 
two ways. The first is through the individual diagnosis and lived experience of 
dementias as with autism. The other is the implantation of dementia as a phantom 
prospect, one framed as increasingly inevitable that is to be fought and protected 
against. This is to some extent evident in other categories of neural implantation, 
such as the parental fear that vaccination may cause autism or normative anxieties 
that may lead to phantom assumptions that a child may have ADHD. However, this 
phantom implantation of dementia is much more widely attributable because it 
reflects the subjective potential/anxiety of implantation without any symptoms or 
external factors (such as vaccination); a young person who does not have any brain 
or cognitive difference associated with dementias can become psychologically 
implanted due to anxiety and fear. Building on work by Sarah Falcus and Katsura 
Sako, I argue that such phantom implantations derive from biopolitical and statistical 
levels as well as cultural levels, whereby general diagnostic rates and ‘horror’ stories 
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come to impinge on the subjective self.10 Knowing others who have it and wishing to 
avoid this fate becomes internalised and productive.11 
This societal implantation of dementia affects in the form of a latent fear, the 
ghost of cognitive difference yet-to-come. This is born out of the neoliberal condition 
Burke describes as encapsulating Alzheimer’s and reflects the biopolitical and 
disciplinary drive to protect and monitor heath around ‘dementia crises’ and the fight 
against the aging brain. Denise C. Park highlights this issue: 
Based on the public's recognition and fear of pathological age-related cognitive 
decline, the issue of whether one can combat this decline has become a highly 
salient issue. A casual perusal of print, electronic, and broadcasting media 
would seem to give reason for optimism. Pills and elixirs are guaranteed to 
keep the brain healthy and sharp. Brain-training programs promise even more 
— these programs are purported to enhance and “rewire” the brain to make it 
better than ever. There are popular books with amazing titles that promise to 
reveal the simple secrets of improving the mind and preventing dementias, 
including Alzheimer's disease. Nearly all of these claims are, at best, overly 
optimistic, and, at worst, blatant charlatanism. Nevertheless, the public's keen 
interest in this topic is matched by that of scientists, who have become deeply 
engaged in understanding how to improve the aging mind, or at least prevent 
its decline into dementia. In order to improve cognitive function, the aging 
brain must have plasticity — that is, the ability to change structure or function 
in a sustained manner in response to some type of external stimulation.12 
 
10 In Contemporary Narrative of Dementia, Falcus and Sako’s description of ‘the ethical need for the 
representation of dementia and the ethical dangers of such representations’ encapsulates both the 
ways in which cultural narrative can resist damaging models of dementia, as well as compound them 
(6). Moreover, what I term the phantom implantation of dementia augments their description that 
‘this situation and statistical panic and shared precarity is discernible in public discourse of 
dementia’ (11). Sarah Falcus and Katsura Sako, Contemporary Narratives of Dementia: Ethics, 
Ageing, Politics (London: Routledge, 2019).  
11 This links to Foucault’s genealogy of sexuality in which he challenges the notion of the ‘repressive 
hypothesis’, arguing rather that anxieties over sexuality (and sexual difference) in the nineteenth 
century led to the proliferation of its discourses. The same is true of trans subjectivities today. In 
particular, trans women are vilified (often by parents) as a potential source of difference that could 
affect normative structures (often the child’s normal sexuality). Regular television and media 
debates heighten these phantom implantations, and the more trans subjects are framed as 
different, the more hysteria and numerous are the phantom implantations.  
12 Denise C. Park, ‘The aging mind: neuroplasticity in response to cognitive training’, in Dialogues in 
Clinical Neuroscience, 15.1 (2013) pp.109-19, p.109-10. 
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Park notes how ‘pills and elixirs’ and ‘brain training’ promise the chance to not only 
stave off the aging of brain and its related diseases but enhance and improve normal 
or possible brain capacity. As chapter one explored, this gives credence to neoliberal 
ideas and attempts to think our way out of ‘problems’ such as aging that is 
ideologically constructed as being an economic burden, and the hope that 
technology can extend the ‘natural’ limits of life as Melinda Cooper explores in Life 
as Surplus.13 Though Park explains these claims are the product of exaggeration and 
charlatanism, the fact that medical, biotech, and governmental institutions zealously 
explore these avenues conceals that the pathologisation of the elderly via diagnostic 
categories of dementia works explicitly to castigate certain older subjects through 
such narratives. In this biopolitics there are right and wrong ways to age and 
dementia is figured as the worst kind of aging and older person.  
 One of the crucial claims made in Park’s piece is that ‘the aging brain must 
have plasticity’. Indeed, like other neural implantations, dementias are also 
associated with neuroplasticity. Like my work in chapter one, Park aligns plasticity 
with being a means to self-care, longevity, and as being reflective of flexible 
constructions of a ‘healthy’ brain. In many respects, enhancement via plasticity and 
cognitive decline via dementias are discursive polar opposites. For one, if plasticity 
comes to represent a new normative state then it reflects the norm as being imbued 
with vitality and potential; dementias on the other hand align with old age and 
redundancy. For another, enhancement via plasticity, especially as considered in 
chapter one, increasingly aligns with enhanced abilities often manifesting as 
 
13 Cooper explains how biotechnology in the neoliberal age seeks ways to push beyond natural limits 
to create surplus value. Cooper, Life as Surplus. 
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exceptional memory, whereas dementias conversely reflect a reality of, and a 
dysphemism for, forgetfulness. Moreover, where the plastic brain reflects a site for 
improvement, and where autism is seeing a cultural shift from quests for cures to 
acceptance of material difference (in part because of its own coveted and often 
stereotyped abilities as depicted through the figure of the hacker in chapter two), 
dementias remain only diseases to be cured and feared. To be clear, it is not simply 
the medical model of dementia that I contest – like autism, there is no point trying 
to discursively argue it away – but rather the easy and uncontested adoption of it 
being a problematic or damaging disease. For instance, Alzheimer’s Research UK 
released a peculiar donations campaign in 2018, depicting a baby floating through a 
fluid body-like substance replete with brain-like electrical impulses. A voiceover 
informs: ‘we come into this world with a single instinct – survive, and it never leaves 
us whatever the challenge. No one has survived Alzheimer’s, but it’s a disease and 
that means it can be cured. We will find a way’. 14  Initially, it is the baby that seems 
peculiar given that dementia is predominantly understood today at least as a disease 
that affects older people. However, it goes towards arguments I make in detail below 
that cultural discourses around the dementias are now framed around the seeming 
potential that anybody could succumb to them: phantom implantations. Moreover, 
it furthers the recurring image that people living with dementia return to childlike 
states through behaviour and dependence on others. Ultimately, the advert makes 
for anxious viewing and reflects a simple narrative that it is a pathological disease to 
 
14 AlzheimersResearch UK, Make breakthroughs possible [online], YouTube 20 September 2018, 
<https://www.alzheimersresearchuk.org/makepossible/?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIhOmw8qvT3QIVk-
R3Ch0e0gUPEAAYASAAEgJCvPD_BwE> [accessed 18 July 2019]. 
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be fought and cured – a simple narrative underpinned by a complicated welter of 
biopolitics, big pharma, technology, and cultural representation.  
‘The public’s recognition and fear of pathological age-related cognitive-
decline’ as Park puts it, is certainly apt. Notably absent from Park’s article is an 
interrogation of where this fear comes from, which is crucial. I argue that we need to 
reframe the debate: that phantom fears are not based so much on the reality of 
cognitive difference, but rather how this cognitive difference is regarded in society 
and culture and the biopolitical decisions that make living with or caring for 
somebody with dementia difficult. Put simply, in cognitive pathology terms, 
dementias have come to represent the end game nobody wants; indeed, dementias 
represent the race against the cognitive bottom, with neuroscience racing to cure it. 
An article in Science News headed ‘Autism may carry a benefit: a buffer against 
Alzheimer’s’, reports that ‘earlier studies have shown that the brains of people with 
Alzheimer’s have low brain plasticity, while people with autism seem to have high 
brain plasticity’.15 In short, the suggestion is autistic people’s hyperplasticity may 
‘protect them from dementia’.16 It seems then that even other cognitive differences 
and implantations link discursively to the fight against dementias, with the tone of 
the article establishing a kind of hierarchy in which a benefit of autism may be that it 
prevents dementia. It is also a reflection of the neural implantation in its most 
materially basic terms in which people are the sum of their atypical brains. 
 
15 Laura Sanders, ‘Autism may carry a benefit: a buffer against Alzheimer’s’, Science News, 2 July 
2014, <https://www.sciencenews.org/article/autism-may-carry-benefit-buffer-against-
alzheimer%E2%80%99s> [accessed 12 August 2018]. 
16 Ibid.  
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Park’s argument is that we should seek opportunities to enhance our 
plasticity to safeguard our brain; however, in focussing solely on the science, Park 
ignores the cultural scripts and biopolitical imperatives underpinning the fear of the 
aging brain. Indeed, given my critique of plasticity in chapter one this chapter looks 
at how dementias link to plasticity and the fight against aging, in order, through 
detective fiction, to re-frame this from protective, prospective fear to a situation 
more reflective of reality, in which there is no cure and so non-medical narratives of 
acceptance, difference, and empathy ought to proliferate alongside rather than 
epistemologically secondary to the pathological model. With this in mind, it is first 
worth highlighting some of the dominant cultural figurations and discourses 
emerging around the pathology of dementias today, and the ways in which 
constructions of this disease align with other states of cognitive or brain difference, 
particularly autism. In doing so, my articulation of the neural implantation becomes 
apparent, that the representation of brain diseases, disorders, syndromes, and states 
is far from the specific diagnostic it claims to be in medicine, rather, once popularised 
and implanted into person, society, and culture, what are thought to be discrete 
categories blur into a more general understanding of ‘cognitive difference’, of those 
implanted with difference at a neurological level with various subjective and identity 
effects, and those whose selfhood is understood as cognitively normal. 
Figures and Fear 
 
In terms of cultural representation, diagnostic rates, social fear and fascination, 
autism and dementia lead the discourse of cognitive difference. Despite their 
complete medical differences, they share many cultural and discursive properties. 
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For instance, despite the extremely pathological nature and discourse of dementias, 
a disease such as Alzheimer’s is only able to be neuro-materially diagnosed post-
mortem. In other words, for all the neuro-turn’s focus on molecular material 
difference ‘dementia can’t be diagnosed from a brain scan’.17 Similarly, despite the 
shift towards material models of autism, finding or testing for autism is behavioural 
rather than through imaging or genetic testing. Furthermore, the way in which 
dementias and autism are discussed in popular media and culture is often strikingly 
similar. For example, in 2018 the Guardian’s Polly Toynbee wrote of fellow journalist 
Katharine Whitehorn’s Alzheimer’s: ‘surely the real Katharine Whitehorn, the one in 
her right mind, is custodian of herself, arbiter of what or who is her real self and when 
to discard an empty husk?’.18 This is typical of narratives surrounding what 
constitutes worth in regards to dementia, but it is specifically her reference to ‘husk’ 
that links dementia and autism here.19 Chapter two in part examined the way in 
which autistic characters remain aligned with stereotypical autistic phantoms of 
withdrawal, of being what Bettelheim described as the subjective retreat into an 
‘empty fortress’.20  
 
17 Bernard Coope, ‘Dementia in the UK’, p.1 
18 Polly Toynbee, ‘The writer Katherine Whitehorn would rather die than live like this’, Guardian, 29 
May 2018, Opinion section, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/29/assissted-dying-katharine-
whitehorn-alzheimers> [accessed 16 July 2018]. 
19 Regarding the societal ‘worth’ of persons living with dementia, Burke writes, ‘persistently 
described as catastrophic threat and unsustainable burden, dominant cultural representations of 
dementia associate the condition with the worst kind of aging (vulnerable, dependent, fragile) and 
present it as the greatest potential drain on economic and emotional resources’. Lucy Burke, 
‘Imagining a future without dementia: fictions of regeneration and the crises of work and 
sustainability’, Palgrave Communications, 21 December 2017, 1-9 (p.4) <DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-
0051-y> [accessed 19 July 2018]. 
20 Bettelheim, The Empty Fortress. 
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However, there is a crucial distinction in representation too. Chapter two 
concluded with a more nuanced and contemporary reading of autism, explaining that 
with the figuration of the hacker a form of sociality, agency, and self-justice is 
achievable through aspects and expressions of their cognitive difference. This is a 
discursive shift from Murray’s witnessed ‘fascination’ to more personal, fully 
characterised representations of subjectivity and agency. Though still problematic, 
this shift allows for a cultural translation and redefinition of the pathologising neural 
implantation of this thing called ‘autism’ into a mode of being, characterisation, and 
identity that resists and repairs the cultural phantoms and biopolitical models that 
render autism a stigmatising or problematic entity, or which only ‘accept’ it when 
economically viable. Hence the symbolic importance of Salander and Jesse holding 
political and economic powers to account. As this chapter highlights unlike autism, 
dementia is not afforded these readily apparent alternative and emerging readings 
against ingrained notions of fear and otherness. This chapter explores this through 
the properties afforded by crime fiction, particularly at a subversive narratological 
level. 
 Chapter two begins with a media content analysis of autism in relation to 
figurations of the shooter and the hacker, ultimately arguing they represent the 
extreme poles of autism in culture and society today. We similarly see a dual 
representation with the dementia diseases which, like autism, are a media mainstay. 
On the one hand, tragic but important stories emerge highlighting the gross 
mistreatment and abuse some people living with dementia suffer in care homes.21 
 
21 BBC’s flagship investigative journalism programme Panorama has produced a series of undercover 
documentaries exposing the shocking treatment in care homes, of which people living with 
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On the other hand, reports linking dementia and violence are not uncommon and 
externally imbue dementia subjects with a kind of abject violence. For instance, In 
2011, CNN ran an article headed: ‘when Alzheimer’s turns violent’, which begins ‘one 
minute, Sam Cohen, 80, points to photos of his kids […] The next minute, he 
unravels’.22 This reads like a tagline to a fictional thriller. Elsewhere, questions of 
dementias and US gun control arise with reports like that of Dee Hill who told 
emergency services: ‘my husband accidentally shot me’.23 She was given 30 pints of 
blood and survived, with her husband Darrel found with a discharged gun oblivious 
to the fact that he had nearly killed his wife. Hannah Zeilig’s research into 
metaphorical uses of dementia tells a similar story. She finds popular references to 
dementias as being a ‘“millennium demon” and the need for a “crusade” to 
overcome it’.24 She notes that here ‘religion and war are neatly juxtaposed […] an 
emphasis on faith and battle and on something that not only is metaphysical but can 
also be “won”’, linking back to the Alzheimer’s UK advert.25 Likewise, Megan-Jane 
Johnstone notes that, among others, the ‘epidemic’ and ‘military’ metaphors 
associated with the dementia ‘crisis’ promote euthanasia as a possible solution to 
the challenges posed by the disease.26  
 
dementia are regularly featured as being among the worst affected. See, ‘Panorama: Crisis in Care’, 
BBC, 29 May 2019 <https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/m0005jpf> [accessed 12 February 2020]. 
22 Madison Park, ‘When Alzheimer’s turns violent’, CNN, March 30, 2011, 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/03/30/alzheimers.violence.caregiving/index.html> [accessed 
18 August 2018]. 
23 Kaiser Health News, ‘Families Confront Dementia and Guns’, U.S. News and World Report, 27 June 
2018, <https://www.usnews.com/news/healthiest-communities/articles/2018-06-27/unlocked-and-
loaded-families-confront-dementia-and-guns> [accessed 18 August 2018]. 
24 Zeilig, ‘Dementia as Cultural Metaphor’, p.260. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Megan-Jane Johnstone, ‘Metaphors, stigma and the ‘Alzheimerization’ of the euthanasia debate’, 
Dementia, 12.4 (2011), 377-393 (p.390). 
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 However, these cultural metaphors of violence extend into images of the 
material brain itself. In 2018, Nature ran a feature headed: ‘Is “friendly fire” in the 
brain provoking Alzheimer’s disease?’ with ‘scientists want to combat dementia and 
neurodegeneration by keeping the brain’s immune system from going rogue’ as its 
subheading.27 This eerie likening of the dementia brain as existing as a ‘rogue’ case 
of ‘friendly fire’ not only calls to mind the discourse surrounding the lone-gunmen of 
the USA, (who, as analysed in chapter two, problematically aligns with autism), but it 
militarised the brain to the extent that the very brain itself is at war with the self – 
especially when considered alongside the warlike rhetoric used in narratives that 
seek to ‘fight’ dementia. It seems that as much as we read that people living with 
dementia suffer at the hands of abusive carers, we read that biological deficits in the 
dementia affected brain cause persons to become and act more violently 
themselves, creating a fear of not only the disease as a problem that may affect you, 
but a fear of those currently living with the disease.28 
 This latent fear that it may affect you is often the ultimate fear, becoming 
implanted into those without a diagnosis of dementia, in a way that, unlike neural 
accessories adorned but easily removed, represent utterly abject possibilities. This is 
because hereditary and potentiality discourse surrounding dementia is widespread 
as seen in media reports such as the Express’s: ‘Dementia risk: Will I one day SUFFER 
 
27 Alison Abbott, ‘Is ‘friendly fire’ in the brain provoking Alzheimer’s disease?’ Nature, 24 April 2018, 
News feature < https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-04930-7> [accessed 18 August 2018]. 
28 Madeleine Liljegren, Maria Landqvist Waldö and Elisabet Englund, ‘Physical aggression among 
patients with dementia, neuropathologically confirmed post-mortem’, International Journal of 
Geriatric Psychiatry, 33 (2017), 242-248 <DOI: 10.1002/gps.4777> [accessed 18 August 2018]. 
235 
 
from Alzheimer’s disease if my parents do?’.29 Despite the capitalised ‘SUFFER’ the 
article briefly explains that dementia diseases are generally not heritable, before 
noting that the ‘rare types’ that are heritable begin to show ‘signs’ in people in their 
thirties. The article neglects to mention any specific tell-tale signs of heritable 
dementia, but does note that ‘high-blood pressure, being over-weight or under-
weight, high cholesterol, excessive alcohol consumption and a general unhealthy 
lifestyle can increase your risk of dementia’.30 This confusion has the effect of 
suggesting that, if you are already susceptible, you are in danger of making your brain 
a self-fulling prophecy. This is typical of the needless scaremongering around the 
potentiality of dementia given that vast swathes of today’s population fall into one 
or more of the listed health situations or thresholds. In other words, this is indicative 
of associative leaps that sees ‘friendly-fire’ against the self emerging because of a 
failure to follow the steps suggested to maintain a healthy brain: as Burke notes, this 
truly is a neoliberal condition. The Daily Mail details these risk factors, writing ‘how 
you socialise and how much sleep you get each night affects a person’s risk of 
developing dementia’.31 It becomes a fight against the aging brain, and the article 
includes a lifestyle quiz (sleep, five-a-day consumption, omega-3, aspirin, reading 
challenging books, stress) and marks your score, for instance ‘0-11: You have a high 
 
29 Lauren Clark, ‘Dementia risk: Will I one day SUFFER from Alzheimer’s disease if my parents do?’, 
Express, 21 September 2017, <https://www.express.co.uk/life-style/health/856994/dementia-
alzheimers-disease-symptoms> [accessed 19 August 2018]. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Lucy Elkins, ‘What’s YOUR brain age? Take this test to find out and discover how simple lifestyle 
changes can knock years off’, Daily Mail, 5 November 2014, 
<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-2821157/Try-test-reveals-brain-age-read-knock-years-
it.html> [accessed 19 August 2018]. 
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risk of Alzheimer’s’.32 At best this can be described as misguided, with inflammatory 
and scaremongering arguably more accurate.  
 Running parallel to this popular media narrative of fear and self-prevention 
(of which plasticity is key) is the task of addressing the reality of lived, implanted, and 
embodied dementia, rather than the phantom prospect of developing it. This task is 
left largely to neuroscience and the flagship of neoliberal bio-economics, the 
pharmaceutical industry, in a narrative running thus: if dementia is a crisis, one 
usually framed in economic terms, molecular medicine and big pharma are working 
to contain it. This is not something that this thesis necessarily contests, for if there 
are potential successful treatments these should be sought to combat the more 
debilitating, frightening, and painful symptoms grouped under the umbrella label 
dementia. Yet, a Guardian article titled: ‘Dementia is too big a problem to walk away 
from – for Pfizer or any of us’highlights the prejudices entrenched in this narrative.33 
In it, Bart De Stooper notes that despite the efforts of ‘big pharma, biotech, 
government, universities, charities’ – the royal flush of institutional research – ‘there 
is currently no cure for any of the neurodegenerative conditions that give rise to 
dementia’.34 However, he argues this should not deter the search for a cure. Perhaps 
rightly so, but not under the reasons he sets out. He makes two main arguments, one 
biopolitical: ‘the economic burden of dementia’; and one emotional: ‘the gradual loss 
of everything that makes us human’.35 This chapter takes as its starting point a re-
 
32 Ibid. 
33 Bart De Strooper, ‘Dementia is too big a problem to walk away from – for Pfizer or any of us’, 
Guardian, Opinion section, 11 January 2018, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jan/11/dementia-pfizer-alzheimers-research-
big-pharma> [accessed 11 January 2018]. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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figuration of this pharma logic. It maintains that while biomedical models of 
dementia are necessary to understand it pathologically in the hope that painful 
symptoms may be lessened, these models should not dictate the economic worth, 
social and cultural narrative, or subjectivity and personhood of somebody living with 
dementia. Entrenched ideas such as ‘burden’ and ‘loss of humanity’ have no place in 
such media rhetoric, not only because they are categorically false, but also because 
they are fuelled by fear be it of cost, or the effects of living with dementia. If, as is 
presently true, we have no immediate prospect of a successful treatment, why is 
everything invested in the neuromolecular gaze, and why is this search for answers 
propelled by fear?  
 The dementia diseases, and those living with them, represent an intense 
anxiety and fear which drives the need to find a solution in the form of a cure. I argue 
in this chapter that contrary to the more positive discourses we see in the guise of 
the autistic hacker, both real and fictional, which are emerging slowly beyond the 
mere ‘fascination’ Murray identifies into complex subjectivities, persons, and 
characterisations, with dementia there is little change in attitude. If there is a 
‘fascination’ with dementia it is in the way in which we monitor its scientific progress 
and the narratives around prevention. It is the detection and monitoring of the 
disease through molecular models that preoccupies us: ‘dementia’ is suspect and we 
need to unlock its mysteries is a frequent media narrative.36 However, dementia is 
 
36 See, Paul Cullen, ‘Irish research is unlocking the dark secrets of dementia’, Irish Times, 9 February 
2016, <https://www.irishtimes.com/life-and-style/health-family/irish-research-is-unlocking-the-
dark-secrets-of-dementia-1.2520727> [accessed 31 October 2018]. Katie Kindelan, ‘Will people with 
Down syndrome unlock the mystery of Alzheimer's disease?’, ABC News, 22 June 2018,  
<https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Wellness/people-syndrome-unlock-mystery-alzheimers-
disease/story?id=55942847> [accessed 31 October 2018].  
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not just a medical condition, it is a phantom construction of prejudice and fear, with 
a corresponding neural state of DEFCON1 in the form of military and battle 
discourses. Indeed, such fear propels the search for a cure and consolidates the 
pathological model’s hegemony, because if dementias are a mystery, objective 
scientific deduction and logical problem solving are key to overcoming it. This is 
precisely why crime fiction, particularly those working to solve a central mystery are 
ripe for mounting an ideological critique of this model. The generic expectation is 
that mysteries will be solved, and a status quo of some kind will return. However, I 
argue that in taking the neuro-turn and becoming implanted with dementias 
themselves – recent crime novels such as Elizabeth is Missing and Turn of Mind reject 
this quest narrative completely, and rather translate ‘Alzheimer’s patients’ back into 
complex, agential, and subjective people through a resistance of generic 
expectation.37  
Searching for the Plot 
 
I argue that in terms of resisting the pathologizing biopolitical narrative of fear and 
waste (both of subjectivity and economic), it is the structure of detective and mystery 
fiction rather than theme that best suits this task.38 Inherent to crime fiction is a 
narrative investment in meaning making and explanation, moving from disparate 
 
37 Crime and mystery novels are far from the only narrative representations of dementia diseases. 
Burke notes that many dementia narratives focus on the strain it places on the immediate family. 
(Burke, 2015, p.33). Dementia is often also used as a sentimental device as in the popular film The 
Notebook (Cassavetes, 2004). The form of the crime/mystery genre demands action and requires  
that its protagonists have agency. With this in mind, I have found that it is in these narratives that 
characters living with dementia are most agential, often framed in some way through their own 
present perspective, as opposed to being passively discussed or existing only in memory.  
38 This is not to say that themes typical to crime fiction are irrelevant. For instance, though it goes 
beyond the scope of this chapter there is rich thematic comparison to make in that (the threat of) 
the care home replaces the isolated country house in much contemporary dementia detective 
narratives. 
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disorder to orderly containment; a structure bound to question and answer and the 
uncovering of history and fact. That these are the typical structures of 
crime/detective fiction makes it apparent why the form is so appealing and useful in 
discussing atypical brain states, particularly those as othered as dementia. The 
narratives surrounding dementia depict it as an evil to contain, a disease to 
overcome, a disease to stave off, as well as aligning the development of dementia as 
punishment for an immoral past, much like the narrative enterprise of containing, 
rehabilitating, and punishing criminals.39 Moreover, media discourses that pertain to 
economic drainage, irritable violence, and depersonalisation, make the detective 
structure’s inherent need to articulate, problematize, and answer, an ideal site for 
critical analysis. This chapter’s literary analysis takes inspiration from the colloquial 
phrase ‘lost the plot’, referring to an inability to act within expected parameters or 
an action that belies sense, one not uncommonly associated with cognitive 
difference that represent seeming breaks from reality. This and others like it are 
euphemisms for a range of cognitive diseases and differences usually associated with 
the elderly, which GP Simon Atkin makes clear in his guidebook First Steps to Living 
with Dementia: ‘patients frequently come to me in surgery saying that they are losing 
their mind or their “marbles” or have “completely lost the plot”’.40 However, a 
productive tension arises when this genre typified by central plotting driving towards 
resolution and explanation – towards finding the plot – is implanted with a cognitive 
difference constructed as lacking plotting and cohesion as its central lived narrative 
 
39 There is fictional trend in which dementia serves as a punishment for the sins of the past. See, 
Andrea Capstick, John Chatwin and Katherine Ludwin, ‘Challenging representations of dementia in 
contemporary Western fiction film: from epistemic injustice to social participation’, in Popularizing 
Dementia, ed. by Aagje Swinnen and Mark Schweda, pp.259-251 (p.237). 
40 Simon Atkin, First Steps to Living With Dementia (Oxford: Lion Books, 2013), p.22. 
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feature. It is through this tension that this chapter makes its claims to agency, 
subjectivity, and a celebration and necessity of a slowed-down plotting contra the 
plastic narrative of cognitive enhancement, progress, evolution, and the fight against 
the aging brain as explored in chapter one.   
 In his influential Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative, Peter 
Brooks argues that ‘plots are not simply organising structures’ –  what usually 
distinguishes them from the ‘story’ which is the chronological order of events –  ‘they 
are also intentional structures, goal orientated, and forward moving’.41 Indeed, this 
can be read as the structure that underscores the plastic narrative theorised in 
chapter one; goal orientated and forward moving reflect enhanced-Eddie’s personal 
narrative, as well as the cultural work my reading of the film provides in highlighting 
the trappings of neoliberalism. Brooks attaches his theory of plot to Freudian 
psychoanalysis, enabling him to argue for plot’s inherent links to mortality by tying 
the repetitive qualities of fiction to the Freudian death drive’s compulsion to 
repeat.42 In short: we read to end much as we live to die. However, as I outlined in 
my reading of Limitless the enhanced plastic narrative does not follow a death drive 
model, but a never-ending forward march. This is structurally different to typical 
thriller narratives in which ‘death’ (closure, containment, capture and so on) does 
occur. Limitless eschews this in part because cognitive-enhancement itself heavily 
invests in the fight against mortality, made evident in contemporary neuroscience’s 
 
41 Peter Brooks, Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative, (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2003), p.12. 
42 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. by. James Strachey, (London: Hogarth Press, 
1950), p.47. 
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fight against the aging brain.43 Limitless does not fit Brooks’ formulation, because the 
pill popping does not end as is expected in drug narratives. It does not end so because 
Eddie’s cognitive difference creates the ultimate flexible neoliberal. In Limitless, as a 
neural implantation, neoliberal enhancement demands a re-writing of expected 
plotting, narrative is atypical because the subject is too. 
 Similarly, most striking regarding the plotting of crime fiction centring on 
dementias is how differently it works from expectation. Quoting Brooks at length 
here will allow me to properly contextualise this argument: 
If I emphasise plotting even more that plot, it is because the participle best 
suggests the dynamic aspect of narrative that most interests me: that which 
moves us forward as readers of the narrative text, that which make us, like the 
heroes of the text […] want and need plotting, seeking through narrative text 
as it unfurls before us a precipitation of shape and meaning some simulacrum 
of understanding of how meaning can be constructed over and through time. 
[…] 
Plot as we have defined it is the organising line and intention of narrative, thus 
perhaps best conceived as an activity, a structuring operation elicited in the 
reader trying the make sense of those meanings that develop only through 
textual and temporal succession. Plot in this view belongs to the reader’s 
‘competence,’ and in his ‘performance’ – the reading of narrative – it animates 
the sense making process […].44 
These two quotations emphasise the idea that both protagonist and reader are 
invested in the organising beat of plotting in order to achieve meaning making out of 
what could be otherwise a static or inaccessible collection of events. Plot also 
crucially ties to the performance of reading, placing an emphasis on the 
interpretative powers of the reader. Specifically regarding detective fiction, Brooks 
argues that the construction of meaning is achieved through the plotting of 
 
43 See for instance dedicated research programmes such as The Aging Brain Initiative at MIT, which 
seeks to tackled ‘the burdens on the aging brain’ through neuroscience and technology. 
<https://picower.mit.edu/about/aging-brain-initiative> [accessed 12 February 2020]. 
44 Brooks, pp.35-37. 
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repetition, which ‘results in both the detection and apprehension of the original 
plotmaker, the criminal’.45 
 Many contemporary crime novels in which dementia plays a central role work 
differently to this. For instance, Paul Cleave’s Trust No One (2015) sees a New Zealand 
crime writer living with dementia absolve his guilt in the murder of his wife, only to 
forget the details of the real killer before he could make them known to the 
authorities; in short, justice and containment is not served as typically expected from 
detection. Julia Heaberlin’s Paper Ghosts (2018) is an American crime travelogue in 
which a woman kidnaps a man who may or may not have dementia, and who may or 
may not have killed her sister. This novel trades on uncertainties and the ending 
retains a sense of unresolvable mystery due to the nature of cognitive decline and 
memory, in other words, answers and history remain buried. In Alice LaPlante’s Turn 
of Mind (2012), Jennifer, a surgeon living with dementia is suspected of killing her 
best friend Amanda and is ultimately held in a secure facility despite the fact that the 
reader knows she is protecting the real culprit, her daughter. Emma Healey’s 
Elizabeth is Missing (2014) casts Maud, an elderly woman living with dementia, into 
the role of forgetful sleuth as she looks for her friend Elizabeth, who is hospitalised 
after a stroke, and who eventually comes to solve the historic disappearance of her 
sister Sukey. Much like Trust No One, however, Maud is unable to remember the 
details of her success, and at the close of the novel continues to search for her now 
dead friend Elizabeth.  
 
45 Ibid. p.25. 
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These novels are playing with generic expectation. They are the opposite of 
the sometimes melodramatic exposition that typifies detective and mystery 
narratives in which opaque details and clues are rendered clear.46 The ‘wow’ moment 
here comes not so much when the reader realises the truth, but when the reader 
realises (while the protagonist with dementia does not) that the traditional ending is 
not coming after all. Therefore, through analyses of Elizabeth is Missing and Turn of 
Mind this chapter explores how the reader is forced to quickly recalibrate the sense 
of the ending, which effects how we might read or understand the lived experience 
of dementia. 
 Elizabeth is Missing features a ‘detective’ who solves a mystery but who 
cannot remember having done so. In this novel, the medical model of dementia as 
representing cognitive decline becomes a deficiency of expected plotting. Maud’s 
written notes become disjointed ‘events’, which can be thought of as clues without 
conjunctions, that propel her with varying success to uncover the mystery. This does 
not happen as a forward-marching plot, but an altogether more atypical and 
meandering form of detection and resolution. Whereas in Turn of Mind, the fact that 
Jennifer remains viewed as guilty at the close of the novel forces the reader, as 
Brooks argues of endings, to retrace the middle. In doing so, the expected point of 
the detective structure becomes something of a red herring; it is not about finding 
the killer or even exposing the truth, but about finding the meaning made from 
fictional perspectives of somebody living with dementia. The remainder of this 
 
46 Detective novels in the style of crime fiction’s golden age employ this exposition at the end of the 
narrative. Similarly, viewers of detective television series such as Murder She Wrote (Fischer, 1984-
96) watch in the knowledge that the perpetrator will always be revealed, often dramatically, at the 
end of the episode. 
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chapter looks at how notes and journals work as catalysts for plotting in these novels, 
before reconsidering Catherine Malabou’s plasticity. I argue these novels offer 
something different to Malabou’s plasticity and neoliberal investment in the brain, 
and theorise what an ‘elastic’, rather than plastic, narrative might mean. 
Notes and Journals 
 
A common motif running through much dementia crime fiction is the objectification 
and externalisation of memory. Past events are recorded in journals, notes, and 
photos and become dynamic and shaping clues and directions in the narrative.47 
Elizabeth is Missing is exemplary in this regard. It is a first-person mystery novel told 
from the perspective of Maud, an eighty-two year old woman living with dementia. 
In it, she is convinced that her friend Elizabeth is missing. The reality is that Elizabeth 
is in hospital following a stroke, with Maud constantly unable to remember visiting 
her. Maud’s belief that she is missing is obsessive and the majority of the present 
narrative is concerned with her sleuthing work. Running parallel to this is an historic 
narrative, in which Maud remembers the unsolved disappearance of her sister Sukey 
whose body is found near the end of the novel. I wish to look at Maud’s use of note-
making to argue it is through this she finds a unique form of agency in the form of a 
forgetful sleuth.  
Despite forgetfulness running against the grain of typical modes of detection, 
Maud’s technique echoes the classical deductive methods of Sherlock Holmes: 
 
47 Aside from the two novels this chapter considers, drawings made by a woman living in a care 
home with dementia drive the plot of Helen Fitzgerald’s The Exit (2015). The culprit in Julia 
Heaberlin’s Paper Ghosts (2018) is a photographer living with dementia whose photos are the clues 
to a historic disappearance. Paul Cleave’s Trust No One (2015) centres on a middle-aged crime writer 
living with dementia whose journals are the only proof that he did not kill his wife. 
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The thing is to be systematic, try to write everything down. Elizabeth is missing 
and I must do something to find out what’s happened. But I’m so muddled. I 
can’t be sure about when I last saw her or what I’ve discovered. I’ve phoned 
and there’s no answer. I haven’t seen her. I think. She hasn’t been here and I 
haven’t been there. What next? I suppose I should go to the house. Search for 
clues. And whatever I find I will write down. I must put pens into my handbag 
now. The thing is to be systematic. I’ve written that down too.48 
Maud employs the hallmarks of detective work here, but her ‘systematic’ approach 
is confused by her inability to remember coherently. Writing is key to establishing 
her personal (detective) narrative, and the extensive and muddled notes she makes 
throughout become her ‘paper memory’.49 The above quotation reflects the present 
narrative in microcosm; Maud cannot remember what she has already discovered, 
she knows she has to continue searching, and makes notes accordingly from the pen 
and paper she keeps in her handbag and pockets. There are two types of notes in the 
novel. The ones Maud writes for herself, and the ones written for/about her, such as 
by her daughter Helen: ‘the plate has a note attached: Lunch for Maud to eat after 
12 p.m.’; ‘I’ve got a note here telling me not to go out’; and by her doctor who ‘writes 
and writes on his notepad. He writes and writes. He doesn’t look up and he doesn’t 
speak’.50 Where the former provide a means of agency, the latter are directive. 
Maud’s personal notes are this chapter’s focus. 
 Given the narrative is told through Maud’s first-person perspective, and given 
she explains how much she dislikes the neuromolecular gaze, which we know 
because the word ‘plaque’ makes her ‘angry’, as well as her dislike of ‘the sight of 
squiggly lines spidering over the brains’, it is unsurprising that literal neuro-discourse 
 
48 Emma Healey, Elizabeth is Missing (London: Penguin, 2015), p.22. 
49 Ibid. p.14. 
50 Ibid. p.5; p.6; p.156. 
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is largely absent from the novel.51 Society largely only sees dementia at a biopolitical 
level and through the disease model, reflected much more apparently through 
Jennifer’s medical gaze in Turn of Mind; however, Maud eschews this model and 
forces the reader to as well. To this extent, instead of literal brain materiality, Healey 
writes Maud’s brain through metaphor. Her notes are not only her ‘paper memory’ 
they are also a literary rendering of her brain. This material externalisation of 
memory that preoccupies much dementia fiction is a simple metaphor with two 
strong messages. First, the classification of a ‘dementia’ brain deems one’s 
independence and privacy annulled. The degenerative brain is no longer considered 
up to the task of independent agency and is interfered with and monitored. There is 
a degree of this in Elizabeth is Missing through the directive notes her daughter and 
doctor write; however, this is more explicit in Turn of Mind where Jennifer’s journal 
is written in by others. Second, text and image perform actions the brain can no 
longer do. These go to the very core of the crisis surrounding the dementia brain, in 
that they force the question, how much of the crisis is actually about deficiencies of 
the brain? Maud’s cognitive decline does not stop her from detection, rather her 
notes create an alternative mode of narrative and self-plotting. Removed from usual 
thought processes, she adapts – not in Malabou’s sense of radical metamorphosis – 
but into a narrative of alternative cognition: different not other. 
The link between paper and brain is evident throughout as ‘brain’ often 
accompanies the instances when the notes direct Maud into detection. For example, 
after surveying her notes and suspecting that he has been violent to Elizabeth, Maud 
 
51 Ibid. p.160. 
247 
 
decides she must call Elizabeth’s son. ‘I rest the receiver […] and flick through the bits 
of paper on my lap […] The drone of a car somewhere in the distance is like a fly 
buzzing under glass, like a memory flinging itself at the surface of my brain. I pick up 
the phone and hold the next note under the lamp: Where is Elizabeth?’.52 There is a 
sense that the notes are surrogate to that which the brain is no longer able to 
articulate. She needs the external notes because words ‘slip, easily, through the gaps 
in my brain’.53 Moreover, when searching Elizabeth’s house Maud’s ‘brain is 
unreasonable’ in its inability to understand conflicting sensorial messages.54 
However, she is able to articulate this clearly in writing: ‘Elizabeth’s house searched 
– DEFINITELY not there’, and then ‘tuck the note away’ as if filing a memory in her 
‘unreasonable’ brain.55 Similarly, when her doctor tests Maud’s memory ability he 
asks her to repeat three words, but Maud can only remember one and then almost 
instinctively reaches for her notes.56  
 Towards the end of the novel the link between brain and note becomes 
indelible and desperate: 
I feel in my pockets for notes, but there’s nothing there, just a few threads and 
emptiness. I’ve no notes at all. The lack makes me feel sick; I’m cut loose and 
whirling about in the wind. I wring the fabric of my coat, scrunching up and 
down in panic. And then, inside the ripped lining, I find one small blue square 
with my writing on it: Where is Elizabeth? ‘Elizabeth is missing!’ I shout. I shout 
so the part of my brain that forgets will stop forgetting.57 
 
52 Ibid. p.49. 
53 Ibid. p.108. 
54 Ibid. p. 115. 
55 Ibid. p. 116. 
56 This automatic searching for her notes reoccurs later, as Maud explains, ‘I peer through the 
window and scrabble in my bag for something, anything’. Healey, p.208.  
57 Healey, p.236. 
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Realising how much Maud relies on the notes and how they come to represent a 
different cognitive function, the ‘few threads and emptiness’ is terrifying. These 
pockets, which along with her bag store her notes, are now empty. Previously, the 
pockets had been full, if not with notes, but tissues ‘twisted like the limbs of trees 
and fraying into dust at the edges’.58 This twisted material fullness represents a 
neuronal image of a brain beginning to fray at the peripheries, yet among the 
tissue Maud still finds her continuous self-plotting: ‘Where is Elizabeth?’. 
However, now the pockets are threadbare and empty and an almost addictive 
quality takes over Maud – ‘lack’, ‘whirling’, ‘scrunching’, ‘panic’ – as she 
desperately searches for any note. Then, Maud experiences a euphoric mania 
upon finding one and with it re-finding her agency though atypical narrative, as 
she shouts aloud to her forgetful brain as if rejoicing over surpassing the limits 
imposed (biological and socially) by her dementia. This mirrors my close reading 
of Jesse in The Code, whose need to hack – to make use of the atypical narrative 
that most suits him – similarly manifests as a lack and as an addictive quality.59 
This is why when Maud previously throws the notes away because ‘they think 
[she’s] a dotty old woman’ (an explicit criticism of her atypical mode of cognition 
and self-narration), she is later ‘digging a whole lot of [her] notes out of the 
wastepaper basket’ having realised their importance in enabling and signifying a 
different though acceptable mode of life narrative.60 Moreover, this is why she 
 
58 Ibid. p.125 
59 There are considerable links between the dementia and autism crime and thriller narratives. For 
instance, in The Code, Jesse describes the need to solve the code as being a ‘splinter’ in his brain, 
which is precisely how Maud’s semi-conscious detection of her sister also seems to occur. She 
explains, ‘an ancient noise, like a fox bark, makes an attempt at the edges of my brain’. Healey, 
2015, p.2. 
60 Healey, p.81, p.86. 
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makes sure to keep the notes ordered ‘in neat piles’ and why it is painful as a 
reader to read Helen’s demand: ‘give me the rest of the notes […] I’ll put them 
somewhere safe’.61 This echoes the same loss of agency Jacob feels when his 
pencil is confiscated during his trial in House Rules, or that Jesse feels being unable 
to go online, or how Salander feels in hospital before somebody smuggles in her 
tablet. 
 That Maud is viewed as a person living with dementia is an unavoidable 
fact. However, her first-person narrative avoids the typical representation of a 
diseased brain. Of course, reading the novel is at times painful, claustrophobic, 
and even terrifying in its narrative unsurety, and under no uncertain terms is living 
with dementia presented as a wholly enjoyable narrative. Reading the novel as 
agential through note taking is not intended to argue for a positive reading of 
dementia, but rather an acceptance of a different form of lived narrative, and of 
different dementia narratives than those pertaining to dependence and senility. 
Thus, her notes provide a personal re-figuration of what living with dementia 
means; if she is neurologically implanted with a defective brain, she established a 
new ontology resisting this through writing. Her family, carers, doctor, police, and 
public see an inability to narrativize presence coherently, but Maud solves this 
inability through her notes. Neurological deficit is translated into a metaphor and 
an enacting of agency and she is ultimately able to solve the historic 
disappearance by finding her sister’s body, even if she cannot remember having 
done so herself. 
 
61 Ibid. p.136; p.60. 
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 Turn of Mind’s protagonist similarly lives with dementia but is a sixty-four 
year old (former) hand surgeon named Jennifer White, who is the prime suspect in 
the murder of her closest friend and neighbour Amanda. Where Maud is 
characterised as the forgetful sleuth, Jennifer is characterised as a forgetful suspect 
and represents the articulation of dementia as having a propensity to violence as 
seen in the above news articles. At the end of the novel she is incarcerated in a facility 
for the murder of Amanda, but we learn that it was in fact her daughter Fiona who 
killed Amanda, with Jennifer amputating her fingers in order to release the medallion 
Amanda had snatched from Fiona’s neck just before she was killed.  Continuing the 
theme of writing I will look again at how and note making is employed in this novel. 
If notes establish a sleuthing agency for Maud, Jennifer’s notebook acts somewhat 
antithetically, much more in accord with a sense of an annulment of privacy and 
independence.  
It is immediately apparent that the instinctual directive properties of Maud’s 
notes are rendered more philosophically in Jennifer’s: 
The notebook is a way of communicating with myself, and with others. Of filling 
in the blank periods. When all is a fog, when someone refers to an event or 
conversation that I can’t recall, I leaf through the pages. Sometimes it comforts 
me to read what’s there. Sometimes not. It is my Bible of consciousness.62 
Like Maud’s ‘paper memory’, Jennifer’s notebook is her ‘Bible of consciousness’, and 
like Maud’s explanation that with notes ‘the thing is to be systematic’, Jennifer 
explains ‘I have a system. I take a sheet of lined paper. I write down notes’.63 
However, the key difference is that where Maud’s detective narrative is repeatedly 
 
62 Alice LaPlante, Turn of Mind (London: Vintage, 2012), p.5. 
63 Ibid. p.3. 
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spurred on by her re-finding the ‘Elizabeth is missing’ notes, Jennifer is the prime 
suspect, she is being detected and suspected and her dementia implantation centres 
around the possibility of deviance: she cannot seem to remember the truth because 
of her dementia. The notebook’s signification in this novel is confusing. On the one 
hand, it does seem to shape and order Jennifer’s narrative; the notebook is present 
only in the first and largest section of the novel, which is the most cohesive and 
orderly narrative to read. In Part One Jennifer is at home and narrates in the first 
person. Part Two remains in the first person but is much more fragmentary as 
Jennifer is confined to a care facility, whilst Part Three is predominantly written in 
the second person, and Part Four is a confusing mix of first, second and third person 
narrative voices. Initially, this seems to suggest that like Maud’s writings, Jennifer’s 
notebook helps to establish an alternative but present narrative, with its 
disappearance after Part One indicating a loss of narrative stability. On the other 
hand, a close reading of the novel shows the notebook to be an object for 
manipulation and prejudice. Those around her write in the notebook and so the 
simple self-directing sanctity of Maud’s notes is lost; like the Christian bible, 
Jennifer’s bible of consciousness is written by multiple sources with multiple stories. 
  To this end, Peter Hühn’s suggestion that there are always two stories within 
detective fiction is informative. The first, he argues, is the story that culminates in 
the revelation of the crime restoring ‘the coherence of social reality’, while the 
second is ‘the progressive reading of the first story of the crime’ that also presents as 
an act of writing.64 By this he means the story read by the reader as written by a 
 
64 Peter Hühn, ‘The Detective as Reader: Narrativity and Reading Concepts in Detective Fiction’, 
Modern Fiction Studies, 33.3 (1987), 451-466 (p.457). 
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chronicler within the text, a technique made most famous by Dr Watson’s chronicling 
of Holmes’ success. However, Hühn also suggests that because the Watson/writer 
figure does not always understand the complexities of how the case is solved, the 
reader is placed in the role of the detective too. In other words, in order to read the 
clues/writing for meaning ‘we are confronted by a signifying “surface” whose 
signified meaning we are meant to find out by reading’.65 As explained, writing does 
not play a unifying or cohesive role in Elizabeth is Missing, rather, it is instinctual and 
directive offering a form of atypical narrative and plot largely exclusive to Maud: the 
reader does not fully understand the links because they remain unwritten by the 
forgetful detective herself. However, where writing for Maud provides agency, 
writing for Jennifer is confusing and is neither a means to solve the mystery as with 
Maud, or to chronicle as with Watson. Rather, as I argue below, writing becomes 
tainted for Jennifer and so sheds it in order to experience life momentarily, in a 
happy, atypical, narrative style.  
Unlike Maud’s more simplistic directive memos, Jennifer explains that her 
‘notebook lately has been full of warnings’, and there is an ominous thread that runs 
through the notebook’s entries as past and fraught encounters with Amanda are 
remembered and recounted.66 However, the notebook is used by everybody close to 
her, and it is this which prevents it from providing the simple narrative direction we 
see with Maud; rather, it becomes a receptacle for interference from her carer 
Magdalena as well as her squabbling children Fiona and Mark. This is the reason for 
Jennifer’s suspicious tone towards Magdalena: ‘I catch her writing in my notebook’, 
 
65 Ibid. p.458. 
66 LaPlante, p.8. 
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which is understandable given the infantilising school report comments Magdalena 
leaves in her journal, ‘Jennifer you are having a bad day. Jennifer you have had a bad 
week’, which becomes downright dehumanizing: ‘what has been lost? Your poor, 
poor mind. Your life’.67  
 Despite its use in ordering her memories and thought, Jennifer cannot trust 
the notebook any more than the reader ultimately can upon learning the truth of 
Amanda’s murder. We realise that it is an obfuscation of the truth. A key difference 
between Maud and Jennifer is that Maud’s notes constantly remind her of Elizabeth 
and her sense of self, of her purpose, whereas Jennifer’s notebook despite its 
frequent references to Amanda fails to remind her of the truth of her death because 
‘the details won’t stick’.68 The relative degrees of trust the two protagonists have 
towards writing is made clear here. For Maud, words slip easily out of her brain and 
are stored on paper. The relationship is inverse for Jennifer, in which the paper holds 
the information but the brain will not receive it. In Turn of Mind, writing is not 
invested with the same ability to order the truth of detection (as with Dr Watson and 
Holmes), or uncover the true history (as with Maud’s Elizabeth notes that lead her to 
Sukey’s body), but rather the opposite. For one, as mentioned the notebooks are 
obfuscatory and do not contain the truth of the initial crime; this is in part because 
 
67 Ibid. p.27; p.54. 
68 Ibid. p.34. This word recurs in reference to Jennifer’s memory. For instance her long-time friend 
Peter tells Jennifer ‘Some things stick’, in the hope she remembers their conversation (p.117 original 
italics). Jennifer later explains ‘Some things do stick. I do what my neurologist friend Carl Suggests 
and scan my memory’ (p.128). Carl subsequently visits her to try to help smooth the relationship 
between she and her son Mark, telling Jennifer ‘Sometimes things stick. Promise?’ (p.213, original 
italics). When her son Mark visits he tells Jennifer ‘I’m actually sorry you won’t remember this one. 
Because I want it to stick’ having detailed his father’s previous sexual misconduct with his girlfriend 
(p.226). Finally, during the confession to the police office Jennifer repeats ‘Some things stick’ 
(p.291). 
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of the forgetful nature of dementia, but also because in ceasing to write – and 
therefore following Hühn in ceasing to attribute explanation and meaning making – 
Jennifer is able to protect her daughter’s guilt. However, there is a second crucial 
signification of the notebook’s subsequent absence in that it reflects how her brain 
has become an object for suspicion and interference, reflective of the way dementia 
is treated by contemporary biopolitics.   
At first glance the shift from the first person to a mixture of narrative voices 
could be read as indicative of a loss of personal narrative coherence and agency, 
particularly given the importance placed on the first-person in Elizabeth is Missing.69 
However, under scrutiny it is in these two sections that Jennifer’s narrative and 
subjectivity is, because of the shift in person, most fully realised. That she escapes 
the facility at the end of Part Two is crucial in developing this reading. While Part Two 
is mostly in the first person there are instances of second person narration, for 
example when describing the facility Jennifer uses language more typical of precisely 
written instruction manuals or recipes: ‘there is colored tape on the rich carpet […] 
This is a linear world. You go straight. You make right turns of left turns’.70 This sense 
of strictly ordered confinement for a person so used to personal autonomy is key to 
understanding the subsequent Part’s shift in narrative voice. In the typical linear 
world everything is ordered, everything makes a temporal sense. This mirrors the 
Mexican artist Donnatella Alvarez’s assessment of America and Eddie (and the ideals 
 
69 Burke writes that the first person narration ‘interpellates and engages the reader’ creating an 
‘ethics of relationality’ that encourages the reader to grapple with what it means to live with 
cognitive difference. Lucy Burke, ‘Missing pieces: trauma, dementia and the ethics of reading in 
Elizabeth is missing’, in Dementia and Literature: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. by. Tess Maginess 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), pp.88-102 (pp.98-9). 
70 LaPlante, p.153. 
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of plastic subjectivity) in The Dark Fields as only looking towards the future, in her 
words: ‘for you [time] is in a straight line’.71 However, Jennifer’s subjectivity, like 
Eddie’s, is not typical.72  
The ‘I’ she uses in the first two parts is de-personalised through the 
biopolitical scrutiny and confinement that leaves her viewed as diseased and 
deviant.73 Moreover, Jennifer’s loss of agency is cemented in a letter written by her 
son outlining and asserting his power of attorney over her. In it he writes: ‘you gave 
me this power. I didn’t ask for it. But, having been given it, I intend to fulfil my duties. 
You could take it away, of course. You could do what Fiona is trying to convince you 
to do (yes, I read through your notebook last time I was there) and strip me of this 
power. But I think you know it would be a mistake’.74 This letter claims power over 
her medical and legal autonomy as well as admitting that her journal (her attempt at 
subjective plotting) is being read and written in. Additionally, the agency of her ‘I’ is 
delegitimised by the facility directing her into a strict linear routine. To compensate 
and reclaim, she takes a ‘turn of mind’, a turn of perspective, a turn of narrative 
person. After all, Magdalena previously suggests: ‘if it helps, write in the third person. 
Tell me a story about a woman who happens to be named Jennifer White’.75 This 
move allows her space to self-plot where she is not just seen as a ‘forgetful suspect’, 
 
71 Glynn, The Dark Fields, p.154.  
72 Jennifer makes continued reference to her diseased brain. For instance, ‘This half state. Life in the 
shadows. As the neurofibrillary tangles proliferate, as the neuritic plaques harden, as synapses cease 
to fire and my mind rots out, I remain aware. An unanesthetized patient’. LaPlante, p.8. 
73 This reflects the kind of problematic phantoms which see cognitive difference annex to criminal 
deviance, as explored in the previous chapter in reference to autism. 
74 LaPlante, p.71 
75 Ibid. p.34. 
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but a space in which her particular and unique subjectivity of dementia comes to the 
fore, rather than the generic diagnostic lens she is seen through.  
 This is made clear by the shift to second-person in Part Three. It would be 
easy, but I argue inaccurate, to suggest that the shift from first, to second, to third 
person signifies Jennifer’s increasing dissociation from selfhood as her Alzheimer’s 
worsens. Rather, I argue the opposite happens, if only we begin to look, not from the 
hegemonic neuromolecular disease model, but a more phenomenological one. As 
mentioned, Jennifer’s notebook (and by extension her use of the pronoun ‘I’) is 
tainted by interference. Where Maud’s trust in ‘I’ remains mostly constant 
throughout in ‘guiding’ herself and the reader through the narrative, Jennifer’s is 
abandoned. Not, as a result as Magdalena thinks of her loss of ‘life’ through 
dementia, but to escape being an object to be handled because of society’s 
construction of dementia. Indeed, the care facility encourages ‘wandering’, but 
Jennifer explains that this wandering is not free-range and agential as with Maud, but 
rather strictly ordered. ‘They’ve set up a kind of trail. A labyrinth for the mentally 
deficient. On any given hour, there might be two or three of us traversing the loop. 
If someone tries to wander more randomly, they are stopped and firmly put back on 
trail’.76 The narrative shift to the second-person allows Jennifer a different kind of 
freedom to explore, not a strictly ordered loop, but an agential elastic subjectivity, 
and it is here that we see Jennifer happiest, at times revelling in her atypical reality.  
 She finds herself in a bar at first thinking herself to be a medical student. 
Jennifer, now in a present second-person narrative voice explains: ‘you love it here. 
 
76 Ibid. p.159. 
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You will come back every night’.77 She then strikes up a conversation with two young 
people and her enjoyment intensifies as historic student experience mixes with 
present dementia, creating a clarity for herself and us as readers. ‘You are laughing. 
It has been so long since you have enjoyed yourself so much. These fresh young faces, 
their ease, no trepidation around you. You realise that you have been frightening 
people. That thing you see in their eyes, it is fear. But what have they to fear from 
you?’.78 Not only is this the first time the reader sees Jennifer truly enjoy herself, but 
this ‘you’ gestures towards the reader, making them complicit in the experience and 
aligning them with Jennifer; however, the ‘you’ also carries a significant amount of 
shame when read: exactly what do we readers have to fear from Jennifer, or from 
people living with dementia more generally? This more carefree and relatable 
‘you/Jennifer’ continues into a parade where she sees ‘people everywhere, holding 
hands, linking arms […] It is a party. It is a fairyland. You plunge deep into the festive 
night’.79 Here we see the ‘neuromolecular gaze’ dissolve into phenomenological 
experience. It is a beautiful example of the worth Laura Salisbury places in the 
neuronovel; for Salisbury they do not simply ‘duplicate […] neurobiological accounts’ 
but instead show how the flattened psychological ‘contours [can be] retraced’ 
through narrative fiction.80 Indeed, returning to Hühn helps further elucidate 
Salisbury’s point. As noted above, he argues that in reading crime fiction ‘we are 
confronted by a signifying “surface” whose signified meaning we are meant to find 
 
77 Ibid. p.242. 
78 Ibid. p.245. 
79 Ibid. p.252. 
80 Laura Salisbury, ‘Translating Neuroscience: Fictions of the Brain in the 2000s’, in The 2000s: A 
Decade of Contemporary British Fiction, ed. by Nick Bentley, Nick Hubble, and Leigh Wilson (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2017), pp.83-113, p.110.  
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out’, and this is precisely what happens here. Given the nature of the genre, readers 
are primed to read for clues and meaning, just as doctors and neuroscientists are 
primed to ‘read’ the ‘signifying “surface”’ of the brain.  
Thus, the alterity of this phenomenological experience in a novel that 
otherwise trades on the uncovering of secrets and deception is noteworthy and 
signifies a different mode of being. That this section follows Jennifer as being a first-
person ‘forgetful suspect’ is crucial as a study in relief. The reader sees the difference 
between how the same person living with dementia can be framed in two distinct 
ways: violent lunacy or confused contentment. Here Jennifer is not read through a 
prejudiced dementia lens, but as a person simply experiencing, always in the present 
participle. Indeed, much like how my reading of Maud takes to task the necessity of 
the incessant forward march of plot, Jennifer’s simple presence in this section acts 
differently to Brooks’ examination of the present participle in plotting; for him it 
reflects how readers and characters ‘want and need plotting’ as a simulacrum ‘of how 
meaning can be construed over and through time’.81 Maud and Jennifer reject this, 
adapting to a much more elliptical and present conception of lived narrative, one in 
which the detective genre’s preoccupation with ‘uncovering’ comes in the form of 
uncovering an atypical narrative subjectivity. 
Elastic Bands or Pleistocene? 
 
Underpinned by central mysteries, writing allows implantations of dementia to be 
understood differently. In Elizabeth is Missing writing sees Maud become an agential, 
though often confused, sleuth. In Turn of Mind, a reclaimed perspective through the 
 
81 Brooks, p.35. 
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second person radiates in relation to the biopolitical suspicion read in Jennifer’s 
journal or the loss of agency typified by the letter her son writes. However, these 
novels do more than challenge the perception of dementia as leading to de-agential 
cognitive decline; they challenge the limits of normal or typical cognition, which is to 
say those that make claims to potential, to the plastic subject; indeed, those 
exaggerated in Eddie’s plastic narrative which proves itself to be limitless only in the 
forward direction. 
 The alignment of the plastic brain with limitlessness is typical of the neoliberal 
discourse that permeates society and culture. Eddie’s narrative in Limitless cannot 
and does not look backwards in any ethically reflective way; rather, it continually 
pushes forward, endlessly reforming in the model of formative plasticity considered 
by Catherine Malabou. Malabou attempts to harness the theoretical implication of 
plasticity to underscore a new mode of being, one that harnesses the plastic potential 
of our brains in a radical, self-adaptive way.82 However, the fact that this discourse 
has become aligned with one of the things she argues against, the trappings of late 
capitalism, makes it hard to read the plastic brain and the plastic narrative of Limitless 
as anything other than an indictment of the problems of such modes of being. Neural 
enhancement through the brain’s latent plasticity makes Eddie a super-human, but 
at the cost of ethical responsibility. At the end of Limitless there is no criminal justice 
despite, or rather because of, the fact that crime is endemic in Eddie’s world, a world 
in which plastic neoliberalism is excused as perhaps the only remaining viable mode 
 
82 In the introduction to What Should We Do with Our Brain?, Malabou repeatedly informs the 
reader that they do not realise their latent plastic potential. ‘Our brain is plastic and we do not know 
it’ (p.4); ‘we are living at the hour of neuronal liberation and we do not know it’ (p.8); ‘humans make 
their own brains, and they do not know they do so’ (p.12). It is a compelling rhetorical device seeking 
to impress upon the reader their ability to harness their brain’s potential. 
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of self-production. Burke has critiqued Malabou’s work on plasticity and dementia in 
a reading of Elizabeth is Missing, taking to task Malabou’s theorisation of neural 
subjectivity in regards to people living with dementia. For instance, in The New 
Wounded Malabou argues that ‘it is entirely possible that there will be no relation 
between the identity that comes before a lesion or trauma and the identity that 
comes after, that, once again, the new identity will be unprecedented’ using 
Alzheimer’s as an exemplar.83 Burke counters this through an ethical lens writing that 
in Malabou’s work ‘dementia is figured as a voided (yet paradoxically productive 
space) in which the particularities of individuals are lost and recast in the image of 
Alzheimer’s disease; all difference becomes indifference, all actions and behaviours 
become Alzheimer’s’.84 
Extending this, I wish to argue that ideas of ‘plastic time’, such as the narrative 
we see in Limitless, as well as Malabou’s own conception of ‘le voir venir’ (the 
inherent futurity involved in ‘to see what is coming’) are problematic.85 I argue that 
there is a different message emerging from recent fictional dementia narratives, one 
that does not stress destruction or degeneration, but perhaps more positively, and 
to continue the biological metaphor, offer a necessary ‘antidote’ to the ethical 
limitations of Limitless’s plastic narrative.86 When extrapolated, such limitations are 
 
83 Catherine Malabou, The New Wounded: From Neurosis to Brain Damage, trans. by. Steven Miller, 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), p.19. 
84 Burke, ‘Missing Pieces’, p.93. Original italics. 
85 Malabou argues ‘voir venir’ is the ‘anticipatory structure operating within subjectivity’. Catherine 
Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality, and Dialectic, trans. by Lisabeth During, 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), p13. In his introduction to The Future of Hegel, Jacques Derrida 
supplements this definition. It is ‘to anticipate, to foresee, to presage, to project […and] means at 
the same time to anticipate and to let oneself be surprised’. In other words, inherent to plasticity is 
both being sure and not knowing what is coming. Jacques Derrida, ‘Introduction’, in Malabou, Future 
of Hegel, p.ix. 
86 David MR Orr similarly uses the word ‘antidote’ in reference to Elizabeth is Missing’s cultural work. 
He argues the novel’s narrative antidotes against the prevalence of neuro-models in contemporary 
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evident in the seeking of cognitive enhancement as a means of dealing with major 
contemporary problems: the notion that we will ‘think’ our way out of these messes. 
For instance, the climate emergency continues, like Eddie’s narrative, with no full 
stop, but with the latent expectation that somehow scientists, will think, adapt, or 
invent our way out of the problem, much as how Eddie has a scientist produce a drug 
to combat the negative expression of NZT enhancement.87 In other words, rather 
than slowing down or stopping, we simply adapt to the changes through new 
technolgy. If Eddie’s plastic narrative encapsulates this hubris perfectly, and Nexus’s 
speculative world remains cautiously optimistic towards enhancement technology 
despite the social and cognitive hierarchy it intensifies, then alternative narratives 
need to emerge. Narratives that orient away from futurity, ‘progress’, and the 
assumption that our brain (the signifier here for biopolitical imperatives, institutions, 
medicine, technology, and neuroscience) will solve everything. These dementia 
novels offer such alternative narratives. Such a claim does not refute that dementia 
can be a painful experience; rather, it destabilises the problematic narrative of plastic 
enhancement by offering a different understanding of time and narrative, in much 
the same way that Jesse symbolically rights the wrongs of Eddie’s lawlessness and 
unethical nature in The Code. 
 
society, rather ‘staking a claim for the continuing significance of care, family and friendship’. David 
MR Orr, ‘Dementia and detectives: Alzheimer’s disease in crime fiction’, Dementia, 28 May 2018, 1-
14 (p.8), <https://doi.org/10.1177/1471301218778398> [accessed 18 June 2018]. I agree with this, 
but I offer an alternative ‘antidote’ against the neoliberal biopolitical structures surrounding and 
propagating the neuro-turn. 
87 See Dani Ellenby, ‘The Five: Genetic Fixes For the Climate Crisis’, The Guardian, 14 July 2019 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/14/the-five-genetic-fixes-for-the-climate-
crisis> [accessed 13 February 2020]; Anne Freier, ‘How CRISPR can Help Combat the Effects of 
Climate Change’, Medium, 16 August 2016 <https://medium.com/@anne_f/how-crispr-can-help-
combat-the-effects-of-climate-change-3478ea2ff27e> [accessed 13 February 2020]. 
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 Burke notes that Malabou’s conception of neural-damage breaks with 
psychoanalytic understandings of history.88 Broken down in basic terms, Malabou’s 
plasticity offers a dual ontology; on the one hand, formative plasticity is future 
looking and articulates the ability to harness latent neural potential. On the other 
hand, destructive plasticity, of which Alzheimer’s is exemplary for Malabou, 
represents the breaking from the past through the formation of a new 
person/subject after the material destruction of a prior state of self. However, these 
dementia narratives do not fit into either of these categories. They show dementia 
to be oppositional to plastic narratives, but almost in a reparative, rather than 
subtractive way by repairing the ethical void endemic in Limitless. In other words, 
these characters living with dementia neither detangle from the past through a 
destructive plasticity nor strive toward an endlessly forming future; in fact, how 
narrative works in these texts is succinctly captured by Maud as being precisely non-
plastic: ‘time is so elastic now’.89 
 In The New Wounded, Malabou establishes her idea of destructive plasticity 
in opposition to Freud’s ‘elastic’ formulation of the death drive. For Freud, life seeks 
to return to an inorganic state. There is a latent pressure, ‘a kind of organic elasticity’, 
which is the ‘expression of the inertia inherent in organic life’.90 However, Malabou 
notes that ‘elasticity is the exact opposite of plasticity!’.91 Crucial for Malabou is the 
distinction between the formal properties of plastic and elastic; the former ‘holds its 
form and cannot return to its initial state’, while the latter ‘does return to its initial 
 
88 Burke, ‘Missing Pieces’, p.91. 
89 Healey, p.24. 
90 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p.47. 
91 Malabou, New Wounded, p,177. 
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form and loses the memory of the deformations that it has undergone’.92 Malabou is 
attempting to explain the irreversible material changes to personhood and 
subjectivity as a result of brain damage, what she refers to as ‘destructive plasticity’; 
however, in addition to the ethical problems Burke examines, I do not find this a 
particularly useful or reflective framework of how dementia narratives unfold. In 
itself, Freud’s elasticity is not particularly helpful either. However, when read 
alongside Brooks’ formulation of the death drive in fictional narratives, Freud’s 
elastic concept become more useful in analysing how neuroscience is translated and 
considered in fiction than Malabou’s uncritical uptake of contemporary neuroscience 
as reflecting a new/different subject in the wake of cognitive change, something that 
is particularly dehumanising and damaging in relation to dementias.  
 This is where the tension between detective plotting and atypical cognition 
proves particularly enlightening. Brooks reads narrative and plotting through Freud’s 
conception of the death drive. Like the death drive, the ‘baseline of plot’ in a text is 
‘the drive towards the end’.93 Any deviations, repetitions, and subplots that forestall 
its arrival prevent ‘short circuits’, which is to say any (reader) dissatisfaction of an 
early or ‘improper’ ending.94 These deviations and repetitions mirror the death 
drive’s compulsion to repeat, which in a text ‘can take us both backwards and 
forwards because these terms have become reversible: the end is a time before the 
beginning’.95 Hence, Brooks’ ultimate point is that ‘the desire of the text is ultimately 
 
92 Ibid. 
93 Brooks, p.102. Franco Moretti similarly argues that in detective fiction ‘the weight gravitates 
towards the ending’. Franco Moretti, Signs Taken For Wonders, trans. by Susan Fischer and others 
(London: Verso, 1988), p.148. 
94 Brooks. p.104. 
95 Ibid. p.109. 
264 
 
the desire for the end’ and that recognising this marks ‘the death of the reader in the 
text’.96 To a certain extent, this drive towards the end is the raison d’etre of crime 
fiction. With them, we read to read the ending. However, Brooks makes the point 
that this ‘recognition […] does not annul the middle which, in its oscillation between 
blindness and recognition […] is the truth of the narrative’.97 What I argue works 
along similar lines. If Freud’s death drive is tied to elasticity – the return to – and if 
Brooks uses the death drive to argue that narrative is a return to an end that was 
already present at the beginning, the presence of dementia in Elizabeth is Missing 
almost literalises this concept. It is not just elasticity in the sense of returning to an 
inert state, of ending, it is elasticity in the sense of returning to the very beginning of 
the narrative. For instance, in Elizabeth is Missing the final sentence reads ‘so I must 
do something. I must, because Elizabeth is missing’, which takes the reader back to 
the book’s title and to the beginning.98  
 I term these ‘elastic narratives’, which, as Malabou notes of the formal 
attributes of elastic and plastic, are the opposite of the ‘plastic narrative’ analysed in 
Limitless. They are, borrowing from Freud and Brooks, repetitive, reflexive, and inert 
in their circular nature and do, elastically, return to previous states. This is unlike 
Limitless, which constantly drives forward in reformation, unable to snap backwards 
because the metamorphosis retains its shape until it changes again. Perhaps the main 
point of departure from Brooks is in his argument that ‘the reader experience[s] the 
fear – and excitation – of the improper end, which is symmetrical to – but far more 
 
96 Ibid. p.108. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Healey, p.274. See also the ending of Paul Cleave’s dementia crime novel Trust No One: ‘Madness 
Diary let me tell you how my life as a killer began . . .’ which, like Elizabeth is Missing, acts more as 
beginning than a formal ending. Paul Cleave, Trust No One (London: Mulholland Books, 2017), p.349. 
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immediate and present than – the fear of endlessness’.99 Brooks suggests that the 
imposition of ending allows the reader to reconsider the middle’s subplots and 
deviations; however, in Elizabeth is Missing there is a kind of ‘improper end’ and 
‘endlessness’, as the elliptical nature does not return the reader to the middle, but 
to the beginning. They are necessarily ‘improper’ inasmuch as they do not have the 
expected ‘tock’ of crime fiction.100 However, I argue that this is crucial to what the 
texts’ inclusion of dementias is trying to convey: that a different understanding of 
narrative is valid and not just a symptom of a neurological disease. Or, if it is to be 
understood as symptomatic, it forces the opposite consideration too: that plastic 
narratives are themselves a problematic symptom of the neuro-turn and its myriad 
investments in futurity, technology, and human advancement. I now look at how the 
elasticity of these novels helps identify that our typical view of dementias has 
become problematic, firstly in relation to their endings, and secondly through 
episodes of blacked-out memory.  
Maud and Jennifer: No Sense of an Ending? 
 
Crime fiction by its nature intends to make sense, to make sensible the crime 
established in the beginning; the culprit is announced and a narrative tock sounds. 
Through a model of elasticity, these novels work differently, not as representative of 
 
99 Brooks, p.296. 
100 In The Sense of an Ending Frank Kermode writes, ‘the clock’s tick-tock I take to be a model of 
what we call a plot, an organization that humanizes time by giving it form; and the interval between 
tock and tick represents purely successive, disorganised time of the sort that we need to humanize 
[…] They have to defeat the tendency of the interval between tick and tock to empty itself; to 
maintain within that interval following tick a lively expectation of tock, and a sense that however 
remote tock may be, all that happens happens as if tock were certainly following’. Frank Kermode, 
The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction, (Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.45-6. 
Kermode’s analogy argues the organised nature of fictional plotting pre-supposes and demands an 
expectation of the end, the tick ‘a humble genesis’ the tock ‘a feeble apocalypse’ (p.45). 
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the Freudian idea of the death drive that marks the end of the novel, but rather as 
an endless looping, stretching into the past and returning back to the present like an 
elastic band.101 Where for Malabou, the elastic band’s ability to regain its initial shape 
is problematic – because, she argues, the brain does literally change with dementias 
– in a literary analysis of Elizabeth is Missing elasticity works perfectly. Maud explores 
potential ‘crime’ scenes, discovers clues, and even uncovers her sister’s body, all the 
while repeatedly returning to the beginning having lost the memory of so doing.  
 Nearing the end of Elizabeth is Missing, Maud literally uncovers the mystery 
of her sister’s historic disappearance in Elizabeth’s garden. The novel has two parallel 
first-person narratives, one narrating Maud’s present search for Elizabeth, one 
narrating Maud’s historic search for her sister Sukey. Both, in their respective aims, 
are failures; however, as the past increasingly becomes present through the 
symptoms of her dementia, historic clues find an oxymoronic confused-clarity as her 
present search for Elizabeth leads her to Sukey’s body. The two narratives sometimes 
intertwine. For instance, when searching Elizabeth’s house for clues she hides in the 
larder having heard removal men. This act of hiding mirrors that which she did as a 
child, and the present narrative elastically gives way to the historic one. The present 
narrative details: ‘it’s a familiar position. I used to hide in our larder when I was a 
child’ which then cuts to the historic past-tense narrative explaining ‘ours was in a 
corner of the kitchen’.102 During this she remembers Douglas searching through 
 
101 Malabou uses the same elastic band metaphor as being antithetical to plasticity. Malabou, The 
New Wounded, p.178. 
102 Healey, p.113. 
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Sukey’s suitcase, which, to follow Brooks’ articulation of the narrative short-circuit, 
is a red herring designed to forestall revelation.  
This ongoing historic/present interaction culminates in the confused-clarity 
Maud achieves later, shortly after Elizabeth’s son Peter reveals why Elizabeth is in a 
stroke unit. Speaking in the hospital unit Elizabeth is in, he tells her: ‘it was digging in 
the garden that got her into this state […] You were digging, in the garden. Do you 
remember?’, to which Maud replies: ‘no […] I wouldn’t dig there. You never know 
what’s buried under the ground by those new houses’.103 The narrative then shifts to 
the past and when the present narrative returns Maud is in the car with Helen, having 
already forgotten that she has just seen Elizabeth. However, this forgetfulness is 
crucial to finding Sukey: 
‘Elizabeth is missing.’ 
‘Mum, we’ve just been to see her.’ 
‘She’s missing and it’s my fault.’ 
[…] ‘It is my fault because I looked in the wrong places, I collected rubbish from 
everywhere else, and all the time the real things were lying out there, waiting 
for me.’ 
‘What are you on about?’ 
‘She was buried in the garden.’ 
‘Who was?’104 
There are two things of note here. First, telling Maud that digging in the garden 
caused the stroke reminds the reader of the prologue in which Maud is talking to 
Elizabeth whilst digging in the garden ‘just looking for something’.105 Second, the 
 
103 Ibid. p.253. 
104 Ibid. p.258. 
105 Ibid. p.1. It goes beyond the scope of this thesis; however, it is striking that the AI hosts (the 
technological and teleological aspiration of certain aspects of the neuro-turn) in Westworld (Nolan, 
2016-present) see similar narrative patterns. Once they complete their pre-written narratives, they 
re-start from the beginning. However, the protagonists living with dementias write much of their 
own plot in these novels, an agential distinction to the AI hosts in Westworld.  
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memory shuffles the clues in her mind into a new expression, finally allowing Helen 
to understand Sukey is buried in the garden. Sukey’s remains are found, marking the 
end of the historic mystery and the suggestion is that the police will re-question 
Sukey’s partner Frank. This offers the reader a ‘proper’ resolution in agreement with 
Brooks’ Freudian reading of narrative. However, the novel’s actual ending comes in 
the form of a subsequent epilogue that has the effect of indefinitely delaying the 
arrival of the narrative tock. Here, the circular pattern previously experienced when 
the reader is reminded of the prologue after Peter tells Maud that it was her digging 
that caused Elizabeth’s stroke, becomes absolute. Indeed, that the novel ends with a 
call to action, ‘I must, because Elizabeth is missing’, and with the prologue detailing 
the moment when Elizabeth has a stroke in her garden, the narrative’s elastic looping 
is undeniable.   
 This circular ending initially reads tragically in a genre in which the wrapping 
up of narrative ends is paramount. However, there are different readings available 
such as David Orr’s more literal interpretation that Maud’s final ‘Elizabeth is missing’ 
can be read as a statement of fact. She is missing because she is now dead, a much 
more Freudian reading in line with Brooks.106 This is certainly true, however as Falcus 
and Sako argue ‘the mystery plot around the disappearance of Elizabeth also refuses 
the conclusive endings that is traditionally expected in the genre’ which creates a 
‘repetitive circularity’ resistant ‘to the linear decline narrative attached to 
dementia’.107 I agree completely, and respond to and extend their argument below 
by considering how this circularity informs the reader about the limitations of 
 
106 Orr, ‘Dementia and detectives: Alzheimer’s disease in crime fiction’. 
107 Falcus and Sako, Contemporary narratives of Dementia, p.132. 
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‘typical’ cognition, plotting and narratives. Yet, what must be realised is that it is 
Maud, not the reader, who does not get a narrative ‘tock’ because she keeps 
forgetting. Particularly true in detective narratives, fiction’s appeal is that it allows 
the experience of narrative endings which are phenomenologically unavailable in real 
life: our life stories end in a death we cannot truly experience in the way that we can 
experience the death/ending of a novel. Yet, problematising Maud’s own sense of an 
ending makes for a different readerly response; because her narrative lacks the 
realisation of conclusion, experiencing it as a reader is indeed unsettling, but Brooks 
himself offers a different way of reading the elliptical ending: 
The desire of the text is ultimately the desire for the end, for that recognition 
which is the moment of the death of the reader in the text. Yet recognition 
cannot abolish textuality, does not annul the middle which, in its oscillation 
between blindness and recognition, between origin and endings, is the truth of 
the narrative text.108 
Maud’s narrative is precisely this ‘oscillation between blindness and recognition, 
between origin and endings’. That the reader gets a ‘tock’ but Maud does not is a 
reworking of generic convention; her oscillation does not come to a full stop, but 
continues elastically. By going back to the beginning, and oscillating in the middle, it 
becomes clear that Maud’s perspective is sometimes tragic and suffocating because 
it goes against expected narrative convention. Reading the novel is emotionally 
draining not because dementia causes Maud to forget, which is the literary conceit 
of the book, but because she repeats. The adage goes that insanity is repeating the 
same task and expecting a different result, and if we find this dementia narrative 
uncomfortable, it is because it is a representation of atypicality, of a type of narrative 
 
108 Brooks, p.108. 
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different to our own. However, Maud proves herself to be far from senile. In fact, 
through metaphor Maud herself rejects the limiting model of destructive plasticity 
while talking to her granddaughter Katy: ‘a wet lump of tissues folds itself on the 
table. It looks like that Plasticine stuff the children used to play with […] She pushes 
the lump of Plasticine into the spill […] Brown seeps into the white like a sugar cube 
held on the surface of a cup of tea’.109 The work this novel does falls between the 
plastic and the elastic; Maud rejects a model of her brain that is a biopolitically 
informed  gaze of deterioration, preferring to forge her own atypical, agential, 
elliptical narrative. Repetition becomes Maud’s primary mode of subjectivity, which 
may be different, but should be acknowledged as perfectly viable and therefore 
accommodated.  
Turn of Mind does not have the same overtly elliptical ending, in fact it carries 
a superficial sense of closure absent from Elizabeth is Missing. Jennifer, now held in 
a much more secure facility, and having lost the phenomenological happiness she 
experiences during her escape, explains that ‘accepting what you have done. 
Accepting the visions. Waiting it out in their company. In the end, that is enough’.110 
That this statement looks and points towards an end is clear to read, there is none of 
the instinctive, propelling, agency of Maud’s final words, which being the words of 
the novel’s title create an elliptical repetition. Despite this, the elasticity of Jennifer’s 
narrative ending is evident through the use of present participle. She has not 
 
109 Healey, pp.210-11. 
110 LaPlante, p.305. 
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‘accepted’ the past in a religious sense of looking towards death but is still ‘waiting’ 
with her visions of the past. In many respects the book echoes Brooks’ argument:  
If at the end of a narrative we can suspend time in a moment where past and 
present hold together in a metaphor – which may be the very recognition 
which, said Aristotle, every good plot should bring – that moment does not 
abolish the movement, the slidings, the errors, and partial recognitions of the 
middle.111 
Here, past and present are held together for Jennifer and the reader through her 
visions. However, they do not provide the dead-stop expected by Brooks as the 
anticipation of ending is tempered by Jennifer explaining ‘each day slower than the 
one before it’.112 Indeed, the gothic imagery of the final few pages, ‘terrible tableaux’, 
‘the dark joy’, ‘horror’, ‘rattling her keys’, inverses the classical detective model 
inasmuch as it refuses to settle the ghosts – ‘the slidings, the errors’ Brooks identifies 
– of the beginning and middle by bringing them back in the final pages as visions.113 
Though at first glance ‘accepting what you have done’ is a near-stereotypical example 
of narrative recognition, the reader is unable to recognise or understand precisely 
what she is accepting. The reason this ending is elastic rather than plastic or aligned 
with the death drive is because the recognition/anagnorisis Brooks reaffirms as being 
crucial to a satisfying end does not occur, precisely because the reader realises it does 
not need to. Unlike Eddie, who parades his unethical characterisation to the extent 
that the possibility of anagnorisis cannot occur and with it no possibility of a 
suspension of time and plotting, the reader learns that Jennifer is innocent and, not 
 
111 Brooks, p.92. 
112 LaPlante, p.305. 
113 Ibid. p.304-5. 
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needing a mea culpa, should be able to find a satisfying ending, except for the fact 
that she is incarcerated. 
The novel’s detective element is atypical here because plotting remains 
ambiguous. Jennifer admits earlier in the novel that her ‘plots are simple: walk to the 
door. Wait until no one is looking […]’ mirroring the simple directions of Maud’s 
notes.114 However the plotting of the novel is far from simple. Jennifer is neither 
chronicler nor detective and meaning making is a private affair. Where Maud’s literal 
uncovering of the past is public (both in the novel and for the reader), Jennifer’s 
encounters with the past at the novel’s narrative close are private and ongoing. With 
no satisfying narrative recognition, with no arrival at the readerly death-drive, the 
reader leaves Jennifer institutionalised and continuing to repeat through the visions; 
indeed, it seems her fellow inmates are similarly used to this elastic-stasis. They 
complain: ‘nurse, she’s doing it again’, which is reminiscent not only of Maud’s 
repetitive actions in Elizabeth is Missing, but Jennifer’s own account earlier in the 
novel.115 The beginning of Part Two foreshadows the ending (which in turn elastically 
reflects backwards to it), when Jennifer details that ‘the unknown woman with no 
neck is screaming again’.116 Here, Jennifer is the listener rather than the screamer as 
at the end, but the elasticity of the narrative forces the two instances into 
conjunction, particularly given that the Jennifer of Part Two notes: ‘this has 
happened before, this descent from one circle of hell into the next. How many times? 
 
114 Ibid. p.187. 
115 Ibid. p.305.  
116 Ibid. p.143. 
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The days have morphed into decades in this place’.117 Such instances act as both 
foreshadowing and repetition, rendering Jennifer’s narrative elastic. 
Adding to the elastic structure, these final visions are pre-empted in Part Two. 
Jennifer describes a ‘vision’ of her mother that is ‘much more vivid than anything in 
[her] present life’, a calmness washes over her, stating: ‘as if she held my future in 
her girlish hands and that the smile on her face was an assurance that my story would 
have a happy ending after all’.118 Again earlier in Part One, Jennifer describes a vision 
of Amanda emerging from the shadows followed by numerous others to the extent 
that ‘the room is full of faces’ she recognises.119 These elastic visions, however, 
immediately give way to a return to a narrative presence that mirrors Jennifer’s 
situation at the end of the novel: ‘How long have I been incarcerated? […] I hug my 
body for warmth. If I lie here, still, I will be safe. If I revel in my chains I will be free’.120 
The chains here are metaphorical chains that anchor Jennifer elastically into her past 
like elastic bands. Thus, that the novel ends: ‘accepting the visions. Waiting it out in 
their company. In the end, that is enough’, is a reference to these previous instances 
in the novel, which allow her a kind of cognitive freedom away from her present 
reality of incarceration. 
The ‘clue’ to how to read the end of this elastic novel is already embedded 
within the narrative middle: like Maud, the reader has to read and move elastically 
in order to realise that neuro-atypicality demands and requires not a reconsideration 
 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid. p.204. 
119 Ibid. p.95. 
120 Ibid. pp. 95-96. 
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of subjectivity and personhood but a different form of temporal narrative.121 The 
reader knows that Jennifer does not have a happy ending; however given that in this 
earlier vision her mother does give her story a ‘happy ending after all’, the elasticity 
of the returned visions offers an alternative reading to this tragic ending. Her mother 
has returned to pacify, to close the narrative in an atypical sense of returning to an 
earlier part of the narrative, much as how Jennifer herself is able to gift her daughter 
‘a happy ending after all’ by taking the blame. 
Cut to Black?  
 
In my reading of Limitless I argued that blackouts represent voids in ethical 
responsibility. Blackouts are a bi-effect of the drug Eddie takes, but are manageable, 
as he explains with his flippant trademark brevity: ‘if I maintained an even dose, 
remembered to eat, drank no alcohol, the blackouts didn’t recur’.122 This is not so 
with dementia narratives where memory gaps and blackouts are unpredictable and 
work in a different way to the plastic narrative of Limitless. Where fading in and out 
of linear narrative acts to conceal truth, justice, morality, and ethical responsibility 
for Eddie, this effect in many respects illuminates truth in Elizabeth is Missing, both 
for Maud as a sleuth, and the reader as engaging in a dementia detective narrative. I 
 
121 This is something that recent fictional depictions of people living with dementia articulates. For 
instance, in an episode titled ‘The Queen’ in the television series Castle Rock (Shaw, 2018-present), 
Ruth, a woman living with dementia, uses chess pieces to ‘anchor’ herself back into the present. 
Ruth’s narrative bleeds elastically into past and present but both she and the viewer are 
directed/orientated by the presence of chess pieces, which remind that it is the present, and act like 
Maud’s notes. However, the symbolism of the chess piece is paramount. For one, this use acts 
differently to how chess/strategy games have long been touted as methods to prevent dementia. 
Secondly, chess pieces are ordinarily regimented and confined to strict direction on a board, echoing 
the lines of direction that try to order Jennifer in the facility. However, Ruth takes them outside the 
confines of the board, into pockets (as with Maud’s notes), and spaces around the house, and 
through this, like Maud and Jennifer, Ruth is able to navigate an atypical narrative with subjective 
agency.  
122 Limitless (Berger, 2011). 
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consider above how crucial the dual narrative of the present search for Elizabeth and 
the historic search for Sukey is in making this text a satisfying detective novel. I have 
argued the elasticity of the novel means it is a crime novel that is not primarily 
invested in the gratification of a delayed and resolved end. Rather, the continuous 
repetition of Maud’s actions, and her determined belief that Elizabeth is missing 
suggests this is a crime novel concerned with challenging the biopolitical limitations 
of a diagnosis of dementia through her continued subjective agency. Further, I have 
maintained that these challenges highlight the limitations of the plastic narratives 
circulating today, through its refusal to drive continually forward, and its 
determination to have meaning-making a revelatory conversation with the past, not 
a speculative future. 
I want to argue here that where Limitless uses imagery to convey blackouts 
as plastic, propelling (unethically) towards a never-end, Elizabeth is Missing uses 
images to more tacitly argue for the epistemological value of the elastic narrative. A 
simple black and white sketch (see figs. 46, 47, 48) heads each chapter, relating to 
some historic ‘clue’ or associative object resonating with present Maud. These often 
have the effect of a temporal ‘blackout’ from the present as the historic narrative 
temporarily takes hold. Crucial to their elastic properties is the fact that these images 
play the same role for the reader. In other words, an image may be proleptic of later 
textual references to that which they signify (e.g. ‘lipstick’), or they may work 
analeptically, as images referring to previous textual mentions of that which they 
signify.   
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For example, a picture of a suitcase (fig. 46) heads chapter fourteen, reminding the 
reader of the multiple previous times suitcases are textually mentioned in both 
present and past narratives. For example, in the historic narrative Maud recalls how 
somebody had seen ‘Frank leaving with a suitcase’, and later, a policeman during a 
conversation with her father says: ‘you said something about him having a suitcase’, 
suggesting the possibility that Sukey had run away.123 Later still, present Maud walks 
to the Oxfam where she used to volunteer, and the smell of old clothes brings the 
historic narrative to the fore: ‘it’s the smell from the suitcase I remember most. Dad 
was the one who brought it home, nearly three months after Sukey disappeared’.124 
When this brief historic interlude ends, Maud emerges back in the present explaining 
‘I’m halfway along Elizabeth’s road before I know where I’m going’.125 The implication 
is that Maud had blacked-out due to the memories elicited from the suitcase and re-
finds herself presently at Elizabeth’s (where Sukey is buried). She sees children and 
half-expects to see a ‘brown leather suitcase with a brown leather handle’.126 There 
are various other mentions of the suitcase, primarily in the historic narrative, so that 
 
123 Healey, p.56; p.79. 
124 Ibid. p.93. 
125 Ibid. p.95. 
126 Ibid. 
Figure 46 Figure 47 Figure 48 
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by the time we see the image of the suitcase, the reader of detective fiction is 
subconsciously primed to recognise it as significant; indeed, in this chapter past 
bleeds into the present much more vividly. In the present, Helen is packing up Maud’s 
belongings ready for Maud to move in with her, and Maud notes: ‘she closes a 
suitcase and snaps the clasps shut. The noise, the sharp secret-breaking noise, makes 
me think of another case […] ‘We got her case back,’ I say to Helen’.127 Here, the 
present suitcase’s lock mechanism makes a ‘secret-breaking’ noise and reminds 
Maud of another ‘case’. ‘Case’ has two meanings, first the present and past suitcase, 
but also ‘case’ in the sense of detection – the other ‘case’, not missing Elizabeth, but 
missing Sukey. Moreover, this ‘secret-breaking noise’ is the mechanism that decodes 
the prologue’s description of ‘an ancient noise, like a fox bar, makes an attempt at 
the edges of my brain. ‘Elizabeth?’ I ask. ‘Did you ever grow marrows?’.128 Images 
elastically evoking memories of ‘clues’ already read in the text create a ludic quality 
for the reader, who like Maud, find themselves mentally toing-and-froing within the 
narrative. 
 Chapter Three is headed by an image of a lipstick (fig. 47), and both past and 
present narratives continually refer to lipstick, marking it a significant ‘clue’ type item 
as is typical of the genre. Maud remembers having bought Sukey a decorative comb 
from Woolworth’s, and how Sukey kissed her in thanks leaving lipstick on her 
forehead. This is echoed later in the novel when Maud recounts the story of the gift 
in the present to Helen. Moreover, as mentioned above, both past and present Maud 
collect bits of ‘rubbish’ in the hope that they may help solve the mysteries, and in the 
 
127 Ibid. p.183. 
128 Ibid. p.2. 
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historic narrative we learn that Maud’s mother derided this practice. ‘‘Maud, you 
have to stop bringing this stuff home with you.’ She waved an old Coty lipstick lid 
around in her hand’.129 We see that these textual objects, which Maud gathers as 
clues, mirror the use of the chapter images for the reader: these become narrative 
clues for the reader to latch onto in the manner of classic detective fiction.130 
Chapters are headed with pictures of the same clues Maud gathers. For instance, that 
the lipstick is given such significance reminds the reader of the makeup compact that 
is crucial to solving the ‘case’. A compact (fig. 48) is the image that heads the prologue 
of the novel where we first meet Maud digging in Elizabeth’s garden prior to 
Elizabeth’s stroke, she says ‘I clutch at the compact lid in my hand […] I’ve missed this 
tiny thing for nearly seventy years’.131 This replaces the formalist need to have both 
fabula and syuzhet, which are missing from this novel given Maud’s narrative is an 
instinctual series of events without conjunctive plotting. This is to say that the reader 
makes the associations that elude Maud through the evocative elasticity playing 
between image and text, object and provenance, story and plot, in what Burke refers 
to as an ‘extra-textual prosthetic memory’.132 The very elasticity of how these 
significations work, weaving back and forth in blacked-out time, but within the 
overarching elastic elliptical narrative proper, makes for a different kind of mystery. 
The elasticity of Maud’s memory allows her to find Sukey’s body, and likewise, the 
constant elasticity of the narrative forces the reader to consider this detective 
plotting differently. In short, the properties of crime fiction do not just work to 
 
129 Ibid. p.151. 
130 See Hühn, p.455. 
131 Healey, p.2. 
132 Burke, ‘Missing Pieces’, p.99. 
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retranslate the medical gaze of dementia into a new ontology of difference, but in 
translating, the effects of Maud’s cognitive decline force a different experience of 
crime narrative itself.  
 In Turn of Mind, much as Jennifer’s ‘final’ visions are anticipated in the text, 
so too are her blackouts, as she explains in Part One: ‘it started a while ago. I noticed 
I was forgetting things. […] Then these gaps. One minute I’d be in my office, the next 
in the Jewel frozen foods section with no recollection of how I’d got there’.133 Where 
I argue that Maud’s present tense blackouts allow the historic narrative to come to 
the fore and create work and  meaning-making at the level of plotting for the reader 
to solve, Turn of Mind devotes an entire section to the phenomenological experience 
of blackouts. Part Three begins just after Jennifer escapes the facility, and, as 
mentioned above, crucially employs the second person ‘you’ to disassociate from the 
suspicion and prejudice of an ‘I’ subjectivity subsumed by the negative connotations 
of her dementia. As the above quotation shows, Jennifer would find herself instantly 
in a different setting with no memory of it happening. In this section, Jennifer goes 
from street, to bar, to park, to hospital, with only present experience and instinctive 
memory propelling her, in a similar way to the function Maud’s notes provide. The 
part is broken up by diamond symbols and each new section begins with a present 
tense statement: ‘you have been walking for miles’, ‘you wake up with a start’, ‘you 
are awakened by a crack of thunder’, ‘you are examining a five-year-old’, ‘you’re in 
the front seat’.134 As mentioned, this second-person is different to Maud’s first-
person present, which, for Burke, is ‘the most significant ethical component’ of the 
 
133 LaPlante, p.135. 
134 Ibid. p.239; p.255; p.267; p.274; p.276. 
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novel through the work it does in establishing a relational ethics between the reader 
and Maud.135 I agree in relation to Elizabeth is Missing, but in this novel it is the 
second person ‘you’ rather than the ‘I’ that performs a similar relational function. 
There is a dreamlike mix of present continuous, ‘you are examining’ and present 
perfect continuous ‘you have been walking’ that elides any temporal precision. In 
other words, the reader emerges and submerges into the present with Jennifer, and 
the section has a floating, kite-like quality in which Jennifer and the reader travel 
both geographically and temporally back and forth through her city, day, and life.136 
 Traversing these blackouts with Jennifer, the reader appreciates a different 
kind of experience. We float too, enjoying the elasticity of the present, often only 
latterly grasping her associative leaps. In this section the reader is encouraged, like 
Jennifer, to let go of complex plotting, and to enjoy the experience of presence. This 
becomes clear in the instances where the reader is brought back to materiality with 
her, such as when previous optimistic confusion – ‘when did day turn to night? The 
heat into deliciousness?’ – is ‘jolted back into a more solid world’.137 Key to this 
section is recognising the difference between the objectivity of the neuromolecular 
gaze and subjective experience as explored in the introduction. However, there is 
more going on than this too. Much as Maud’s blackouts challenge the problems of 
the plastic narrative of Limitless through the subjective circular narrative established 
in simultaneously solving the disappearance, forgetting having done so, and 
 
135 Burke, ‘Missing Pieces’, p.98.  
136 Compare this freedom to the terror and panic Maud experiences when being cut loose from the 
lack of notes in her pockets. What the differences in these two novels highlight is precisely the 
symptomatic difference that exists within ‘dementia’ as a diagnostic or epistemological umbrella 
label.  
137 LaPlante, p.252; p.278. 
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repeating the process, Jennifer strikes up a conversation in a bar that highlights and 
critiques the difference between elasticity and plasticity. A young man tells Jennifer: 
If I were really thirty-five, I’d want to slit my wrists […] I mean, if I were thirty-
five and were in the position I am now. Stupid job. Not getting on with anything. 
Not having written my novel. Things like that. […] No. That’s the point. Here I 
am, still in my twenties, so I have an excuse. But at thirty-five you don’t have 
any more. Excuses I mean.138 
The links to Eddie’s initial situation in Limitless are clear. Eddie is lazy, mid-thirties, 
and unable to write his novel.139 This quotation conveys the same pathetically comic 
quality of pre-NZT Eddie. The young man is eager to get to the next expected step 
but cannot be bothered to build the bridge, perfectly echoing Eddie’s rationale for 
taking the pill. This puncture of rapid-pace futurity, of the yearning for a plastic 
narrative in an otherwise elastic section, highlights how disappointing a strictly 
forward-looking perspective can be, and how artificial and hollow it is; to do it 
because of expectation, to be ordered and directed in a straight line are the very 
thing Jennifer escapes in leaving the facility. This elastic reading is not a call to 
indolence or listlessness, but to realise, especially given the backdrop of the criminal 
investigation looming over Jennifer’s present, the validity and use of slowing down, 
of breathing in the present. Here, the juxtaposition of Jennifer and this proto-Eddie 
interrogates not the societal position of dementias, but rather neuro-typicality, 
especially if it is aligned with the pursuit of a phantom neoliberal enhanced ideal. 
Seeing dementia narratives in this way, not as some form of biopolitical shame or 
cultural fear, but as a unique mode of perception, one that, for all its challenges and 
pains highlights everyday beauty is essential – such as Jennifer informing us that ‘You 
 
138 Ibid. p.249. Original italics.  
139 Eddie married Melissa straight after college, and it had been nine years since he last saw his 
brother-in-law. By regular educational standards he is likely mid-thirties.  
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have not lived until you have seen fish striving for the moon […] The perfect shining 
arc as they peak’ – that is so readily lost in typical, plastic, workaday cognition.140 
 Where Maud’s dementia perspective allows her and the reader, through the 
novel’s elastic narrative, to solve the mystery, Jennifer’s is more philosophical. 
Jennifer does not need to solve the case inasmuch as she needs to keep the secret in 
order to protect her daughter. The truth – that her daughter killed Amanda to stop 
their family secrets from emerging – is revealed at the end, but only to the reader 
and not to the authorities in the story. Like the elastic qualities of each of these 
novels, this is foreshadowed earlier in the narrative. When discussing her past with 
her son, Jennifer states, ‘some things shouldn’t be scrutinised too closely. Some 
mysteries are only rendered not solved’.141 This garners new significance in the 
realisation that she is protecting the truth to protect her daughter. In addition, given 
the amount of neurological language in the text, this might also be read as a criticism 
of the strictly pathological models of neural implantation. The intense scrutiny of the 
atypical brain today is, as mentioned throughout this thesis, problematic. Jennifer is 
first and foremost a medical doctor; however, the text also stresses her religious, 
philosophical, and historical research interests. It does not seem a stretch to suggest 
certain mysteries or potentials of the brain, often heralded as a scientific ‘final 
frontier’ do not need to be intensively scrutinised or solved either.142 Thus, Turn of 
 
140 LaPlante, p.252. 
141 Ibid. p.198. 
142 See, Fred Mendelsohn, ‘Understanding the brain and mind: science’s final frontier?’, The 
Conversation, 4 October 2013, <http://theconversation.com/understanding-the-brain-and-mind-
sciences-final-frontier-18331> [accessed 26 October 2018]; Joel Frohlich, ‘Consciousness: The Final 
Frontier’, Psychology Today, 16 April 2018, 
<https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/blog/consciousness-self-organization-and-
neuroscience/201804/consciousness-the-final-frontier> [accessed 26 October 2018].  
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Mind is a crime novel in which the significance of the elastic narrative and blackouts 
prove themselves to be an indictment of the ‘detective’ scrutiny places on the 
dementia brain. The mystery becomes not what happened to Amanda, but why 
Jennifer’s dementia is treated with an almost abject suspicion from the beginning. 
* 
This chapter began with a critique of the near-totalising pathological model and 
understanding of dementia in contemporary society and culture and explained that 
in a society that privileges plastic potentiality, dementia represents its antithesis: 
inertia or degradation. It considers  popular accounts and narratives of dementia 
subjects and suggests that these are often framed as figures of fear that create  a 
phantom implantation that drives the need to try to protect the self from a future 
implantation of dementia. Having established the dominant ways in which dementia 
is represented, I go on to look at how the formal properties of detective and mystery 
fiction can be put to work to frustrate these pathologically grounded implantations. 
 Utilising Peter Brooks’ Freudian reading of plotting which argues that 
narrative fiction inherently drives towards the ending – ‘reading for the plot’ – I argue 
that something unique occurs in some recent neuro-crime fiction that focusses on 
dementia. Both Elizabeth is Missing and Turn of Mind have plots that read against 
the expectation Brooks’ identifies. Rather, these employ elliptical, repetitive 
narratives which, in refusing to come to an end, symbolically eschew the biopolitical 
narratives underpinning how we understand dementia in society and culture – as 
representing declination, degradation, and death. This should be read not just as a 
criticism of dementia implantations that are framed solely pathologically in favour of 
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reclamations of subjective atypical experience. This reading of cognitive difference 
can be a lesson for ‘typical’ narratives that prioritise only futurity. Reading neural 
implantations of dementia and this subjective lesson teaches us much about the 
damaging limitations that normative mode of lived experiences produce and 
perpetuate.
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Conclusion: Neural Implantations Today and Tomorrow 
This thesis has considered the effects of the neuro-turn in contemporary society and 
culture. It began with three key research topics, the first of which sought to ascertain 
and understand the meaning and biopolitical underpinnings of the neuro-turn. 
Research from Littlefield and Johnson, Rose and Abi-Rached, Malabou, and Vidal and 
Ortega enabled me to recognise that there are multiple ways of understanding 
neuroscience’s interaction with contemporary culture. For Littlefield and Johnson 
the ‘neuroscientific turn’ is an academic phenomenon; they understand it as the 
ways in which neuroscience translates into the arts and humanities, and the kinds of 
epistemological effects this produces.1 For Rose and Abi-Rached, and building on 
what Rose has previously termed the ‘neurochemical self’, the neuro and the ‘new 
brain sciences’ reflect the flattening of psychological depth models of the mind in 
favour of neurological and surface readings of the brain.2 They take a sociological 
approach to understand how the brain is governed in contemporary society, and the 
effects such governmentality have at both biopolitical and individual levels. 
Malabou’s philosophical reading of neuroplasticity focusses more on the subjective 
changes and opportunities the neuro-turn affords.3 She sees a potential in plasticity’s 
metamorphic quality to free ourselves from the cognitive trappings of late capitalism. 
However, I have argued throughout this thesis that such a model ultimately 
subsumes into the very neoliberalisation her philosophy is attempting to escape, and 
 
1 Littlefield and Johnson, ‘Introduction’ in The Neuroscientific Turn, p.3. 
2 Rose, The Politics of Life Itself, p.187; Rose and Abi-Rached, Neuro, p.3. 
3 Malabou, What Should We Do With Our Brains, p.79.  
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I criticise her problematic reading that Alzheimer’s can represent a reduction in 
personhood.  
Similarly, Vidal and Ortega are interested in what they term the ‘cerebral 
subject’, which they understand as a historical construction based upon the 
longstanding belief that ‘we are our brains’.4 For them, neuroscience as a discipline 
must first be understood as a product of this pre-existing belief, rather than 
neuroscience necessarily ‘producing’ the cerebral subject, it validates existing 
thought. I made a critical intervention in their research by maintaining the specificity 
of the neuro-turn’s biopolitical underpinnings. I delineated the beginning of the 
neuro-turn as occurring post-1990, with the specific technological, economic, and 
political shifts of this period being crucial to understanding how neuro-models 
produce meaning in society and culture. Coupled with this, research from literary 
studies such as Salisbury’s work on Ian McEwan and Sebastian Faulks, or Vidal and 
Ortega’s chapter ‘Brains of Screen’ encouraged me to consider how fiction and 
narrative more generally similarly understand the neuro-turn.5 I extended such 
existing literary criticism by contributing a history of how specifically crime fiction has 
developed alongside biopolitics and how new sub-genres have emerged in reaction 
to the turn to material models and explanations. I have shown throughout this thesis 
that the neuro-turn is a wide-reaching phenomenon, entwined among others with 
medicine, technology, the law, philosophy, politics, and culture, and refers to the 
ways in which neuroscientific models come to influence these areas to form new 
ways of knowing or being. However, I found that the central concern surrounding the 
 
4 Vidal and Ortega, Being Brains. 
5 Salisbury, ‘Translating Neuroscience’; Vidal and Ortega, ‘Brains on Screen’ in Being Brains.  
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neuro-turn was the new medical identities and subjectivities it produces as a result 
of its preoccupation with pathologizing and medicalising the brain and its processes. 
Stemming from this, my second research area sought to identify the impact 
the neuro-turn has upon those who have or experience cognitive difference, and the 
kinds of ontological changes these produce. I took inspiration from what Rose and 
Abi-Rached term the ‘lessons from lesions’ approach, Davis’s work on the 
construction of the norm, and Foucault’s biopolitical theorisation of the ‘perverse 
implantation’ to construct a framework through which to tackle this question.6 I 
developed the concept of the neural implantation as a neurological extension of 
Foucault’s description of the emergence of new power/knowledge in the nineteenth 
century resulting in the widespread discourse, anxiety, and medicalised 
classifications of ‘perversions’ such as homosexuality, criminality, and hysteria. This 
‘perverse implantation’ produced the homosexual, criminal, and hysterical woman 
as ontological and subjective figures. I detailed four central elements of the neural 
implantation, in order to map the production and effects of categorisations of 
difference in society and culture today. 
First, I argued that implantations are founded on neuromolecular models and 
diagnoses that have proliferated since the end of the twentieth century. Dementias, 
particularly Alzheimer’s, autism, ADHD, OCD, schizophrenia, epilepsy, conduct 
disorder, depression, anxiety, and eating disorders dominate much of how we think 
about identity formation, subjectivity, and personhood today. Second, I 
 
6 Rose and Abi-Rached, Neuro, p.206; Davis, ‘Normality, Power, and Culture’; Foucault, The History of 
Sexuality Volume 1. 
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demonstrated how anxiety of, and interest in, such diagnoses sees cognitive 
difference become castigated, appropriated, and heralded increasingly in equal 
measure in what I described as neural accessories that can be worn or discarded by 
those considered cognitively normal without any real subjective or ontological 
change. However, these accessories exacerbate prejudice and stereotypes for those 
who truly do have diagnoses representing particular cognitive and brain differences. 
Such stereotypes find renewed expression alongside the neuropathological models 
in what I term ‘phantoms of the brain’. These phantoms can range from Old Wives’ 
Tales, superstition, outdated psychological paradigms, and, to borrow from Murray, 
cultural ‘events’ like Rain Man, that combine with the perceived objective legitimacy 
of medical models to produce a range of often damaging effects. An example of this 
is the association of ‘mental illness’, and a range of neural implantations therein, with 
criminality or a reduction in personhood, which leads to the emergence of the 
(autistic) lone shooter, or of dementia as representing a tragic and continual loss of 
selfhood. 
 Third, I showed how the neural implantation recognises the precarity of 
personhood and subjective changes resulting from diagnoses. As considered in 
chapter one through Limitless and Nexus, narratives imagining futures of cognitive 
enhancement fall between neoliberal hubris and post-human hierarchical structures 
that fail in their utopian hopes of empathy and parity. This is not to suggest that 
enhancement is automatically ethically problematic, but that enhancements 
zealously following a ‘progress’ narrative must be scrutinised, particularly if ‘normal’ 
cognition is a focal point of future enhancements. Chapter two considered how the 
identity of ‘autism’ and the subjectivities of those implanted with autism have seen 
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rapid change in the last decade as cultural representation has flourished. Biological 
models underscoring natural difference – neurodiversity – are coming to replace 
narratives and discourses seeking treatments or cures, and cultural figurations such 
as the autistic hacker provide vehicles to counter phantom narratives of dependence, 
anti-sociality, and lack of empathy. On the other hand, autism has become used, 
particularly in the media, as a clumsy and hollow rationale for some of America’s 
most notorious mass shootings. Clearly, implantations of autism still occupy heavily 
prejudicial spaces, but as chapter two argued, fictional narratives can provide 
alternative understandings that recognise cognitively different subjectivities. 
Chapter three acknowledged that autism’s cultural movement towards difference 
models has not extended to dementia diseases. The chapter began with the truism 
that today dementias remain predominantly a medical pathology to be fought and 
combatted: dementia ‘sufferers’ as they are imagined have a pathologized life-
narrative. At a cultural level this manifests itself through fear and a notion of 
dementia as a horrifying state that produces changes to subjectivity alongside a 
range of biopolitical imperatives that seek to understand it as an economic problem 
to be battled. These actual or phantom implantations of dementia create such 
anxiety and are thought to cause such substantive ontological effects that they rarely 
leave debates around personhood and euthanasia.   
 Fourth, I argued that the neural implantation highlights the importance of 
recognising the biopolitical and ideological imperatives underpinning diagnoses or 
recognitions of cognitive difference. In the introduction I note how the putatively 
objective methods of diagnosis and neuroscience in fact enmesh with cultural scripts 
such race and gender. This is particularly true for cognitive difference, as, despite the 
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rise of neuro-materiality in explaining the locus of the difference, tests largely remain 
observational and based on behaviour (e.g. a child’s erratic behaviour, or an adults 
failing memory). In regard to autism, Jeffrey Weeks’ criticism of neoliberal inclusion 
with reference to atypical sexualities facilitates an understanding of how and why 
certain cognitive differences have become more readily assimilated into society and 
culture. I argued that in seeming to have a productive economic worth, the autistic 
hacker aligns with the kinds of inclusion neoliberalism has shown itself to be 
cognition-blind towards. However, I counterposed this through my readings of Jesse 
and Salander who are both ethically opposed to neoliberalism and counter normative 
logic through their hacking abilities. 
The third research area looked at the impact these epistemologies and 
ontological changes effect in cultural representation. This thesis focussed on crime 
fiction because the development of the genre coincides with the shifts in biopolitical 
imperatives and technological advancements that underpin contemporary 
neuroscience. Because of this, I articulated an emerging subgenre, ‘neuro-crime 
fiction’, referring to texts in which an aspect of the neuro-turn, be it technology or 
cognitive difference, is central to plotting.  Thus, I argued that these are uniquely 
suited to exploring the ethical and legal ramifications, and the ontological effects, of 
contemporary medicine and neuroscience.7 I took this shared epistemological 
development as my critical starting point in producing novel readings of a variety of 
narratives that fit broadly into the category of crime fiction.  
 
7 Meeks, ‘Neuro-Crime Fiction’. 
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For instance, chapter one’s reading of Limitless shows how the ideology of 
neoliberalism coupled with the biopolitics of cognitive enhancement are imbibed by, 
and expressed in, the film’s narrative structure. I coined the term ‘plastic narrative’ 
to explain how the film represents a neoliberal version of enhancement in which 
individuality, a lack of ethics, and cognitive hierarchy culminate in the eschewal of 
narrative closure. Like neoliberalism, neither Eddie’s narrative or his enhancement 
ever attain a satisfactory level of production. As with my critique of Malabou’s 
plasticity, Eddie continuously metamorphosises without any ethical self-reflection 
eliding prototypical fictional elements like anagnorisis. However, I argued that read 
against the grain this marks a death-knell to neoliberalism – in producing an 
enhanced subject whose inability to come to narrative closure reflects 
neoliberalism’s hollow production and ideological reduction in the wake of populist 
ideologies as I explored in my subsequent reading of Nexus. 
In contrast, chapter three considered recent dementia fiction and identifies a 
surprising antithesis to the plastic narrative which, reading Malabou, Freud, and 
Brooks I termed the ‘elastic narrative’. Like Limitless, elastic narratives similarly reject 
the narrative desire and expectation of ending; however, rather than constantly 
adapting in the model of future oriented plasticity, these elastically stretch 
backwards. At a character level, for Elizabeth is Missing’s Maud and Turn of Mind’s 
Jennifer this backwardness results in subjective experiences of the past; at a plotting 
and narrative level, this is in the guise of an elliptical return to previous parts of the 
narrative that constantly forestall the ‘ending’. I argued that this elasticity figuratively 
eschews the medical and pathological model of dementia which views the dementia 
subject as only fighting against a diseased brain and ultimately death. Moreover, I 
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explained how, despite the often debilitating symptoms of dementia, this elastic 
quality offers an epistemological antidote to the problems of the neoliberal plasticity 
and enhancement. The circular quality of Elizabeth is Missing and the middle section 
of Turn of Mind where Jennifer experiences life in the present tense frustrates not 
only the medical gaze that only views them as de-agential ‘dementia sufferers’, but 
confronts readers with a narrative that goes in directions other than forwards: often 
backwards, repetitive, or in imaginative sideways leaps. 
 Chapter two articulated how neuro discourse, diagnoses, and phantom 
prejudice pertaining to autism produce new and emblematic figures of the autistic 
shooter and hacker. I argued that these figures personify the two primary ways 
autism is represented in culture and society today, as either asocial and 
unempathetic to the extent it causes a propensity to violence, or asocial but 
technologically gifted and talented and thus economically viable. With reference to 
the recent history of the fictional courtroom I have argued that while these hyperreal 
courts are typically spaces in which real biopolitical or ideological injustices can be 
‘corrected’, House Rules depicts a fictional court in which the machinations of legal 
protection that typify fictional courts are derelict in their narrative duty. There is no 
legal defence fighting for Jacob’s innocence and I argued the typically ‘feel-good’ 
generic triumph of a plucky law firm against the unjust legal machinations of the state 
becomes a ‘feel-bad’ narrative soaked in helplessness and the presumption of guilt. 
This is arguably reflective of dominant – and discriminatory - views of autism and 
typifies a pathological prejudice that too simplistically equates symptoms with 
subjectivity, rather than understanding subjectivity as resulting from unique 
individual experience. The chapter continued by considering the cultural figuration 
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of the hacker through characters such as Lisbeth Salander and Jesse Banks whose 
narratives counterpose the feel-bad reduction of autistic agency and subjectivity as 
depicted in House Rules through feel-badass radical embodiments of autistic 
subjectivity. I showed how theirs are not narratives of personal or public redemption 
as with Jacob’s trial, but rather they are nemeses hacking against the hubristic 
normalising biopolitics and technology that sought to monitor, counter, and 
manipulate them (and Jacob). 
 The arguments I have developed across this thesis maintain that the neural 
implantation offers a novel and necessary framework to understand the cultural and 
subjective effects of the neuro-turn and the identification and classification of brain 
and cognitive difference. However, it must be underlined that attempts to describe 
and capture how implantations act, move, and codify in society, culture, and lived 
experience has proven to be a difficult task. This is because implantations exist in 
extremely fast-moving biopolitical, technological, and discursive domains. Take for 
example autism, which I have argued today is culturally represented along the dual 
poles of the shooter and the hacker as emblematic of violence and brilliance. I 
thoroughly maintain this dichotomy and the way in which it has recently been 
implanted into one young woman, Greta Thunberg, is disconcerting in its accuracy. 
In introducing this thesis, I recommended holding in mind a quotation from Thunberg 
about how lived experiences of cognitive differences represent both immense 
challenges and forms of superpower. I wish to conclude by reflecting on this in light 
of my analysis, with a look to emerging questions raised by, but beyond the scope of, 
the thesis.  
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 Thunberg fits precisely into the aspects of the shooter/hacker dynamic and 
the kinds of autistic ontologies chapter two considered. On the one hand she is 
considered dangerous. Chapter two contains a quotation from Piers Morgan in which 
he accuses Thunberg of ‘terrifying millions of children to children to the extent that 
eco anxiety is now massively on the rise, which is a genuine stress condition now’ 
immediately after listing her own extensive diagnostic history.8 Putting to one side 
Morgan’s (presumably ideologically driven) ready acceptance of eco-anxiety as a 
medical classification in the face of his sustained denial of medical classifications and 
ontologies of non-binary gender difference, his belief that Thunberg is ‘terrifying’ in 
collocation with her cognitive difference is typical of the violent/danger narrative 
implanted into her – overwhelmingly by right-wing commentators.9 For example, 
populist US commentator Dinesh D’Souza pictorially compared Thunberg to Nazi 
propaganda, writing in a widely shared tweet that ‘Nordic white girls with braids and 
red cheeks – were often used in Nazi propaganda’.10 Elsewhere, in the UK journalist 
Jeremy Clarkson called Thunberg ‘mad and dangerous’, while populist troll Katie 
Hopkins was recorded calling Thunberg and ‘autistic fucking wench’.11 It is true that 
these represent somewhat isolated remarks; however, coupled with the shift from 
 
8 Morgan, ‘Is Greta Thunberg a Force for Change of Inciting Fear?’. 
9 In a guide detailing the effects our changing climate could and is having on mental health the 
American Psychological Association defines ‘eco-anxiety’ as ‘a chronic fear of environmental doom’. 
Susan Clayton, Christie Manning, and Kirra Krygsman, ‘Mental Health and Our Changing Climate: 
Impacts, Implications, and Guidance’, American Psychological Association, March 2017. 
10 Dinesh D’Souza, Twitter, 22 September 2019 
<https://twitter.com/DineshDSouza/status/1175848457191510016> [accessed 3 March 2020]. 
11 Jeremy Clarkson cited in James Brinsford, ‘Jeremy Clarkson brands Greta Thunberg ‘mad and 
dangerous’ in rant on Sunrise’, Mirror, 5 December 2019 < https://www.mirror.co.uk/3am/celebrity-
news/jeremy-clarkson-brands-greta-thunberg-21029959> [accessed 3 March 2020]; Katie Hopkins in 
Matt Novak, ‘YouTuber Gives Fakes Award to Far-Right Activist Who Calls Greta Thunberg as ‘Autistic 
Fucking Wench’, Gizmodo, 31 January 2020 < https://gizmodo.com/youtuber-gives-fake-award-to-
far-right-activist-who-cal-1841376254> [accessed 3 March 2020].   
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neoliberalism’s putative models of inclusivity (despite chapter one’s analysis of this 
model’s limitations) to populist rhetoric and realities of exclusion, such 
commentariat represents an insidious and emerging freedom of hate speech. Indeed, 
much like my reading of Lisbeth Salander the media – particularly social media – has 
proven to be an open forum through which to abuse Thunberg.12  
On the other hand, and representative of the hacker subject, Thunberg is 
heralded as an ecological saviour imbued with superhuman skills to save the planet. 
For example, Margaret Atwood called her the Joan of Arc of the environment, 
whereas the New Republic’s Osita Nwanevu more explicitly likens her to God in his 
article ‘sinners in the Hands of an Angry Greta Thunberg’, in which he describes her 
as a global figure to save, if not the planet, then our consciences.13 Thus, like The 
Code’s Jesse Banks or Salander, Thunberg is simultaneously derided and desired for 
her cognitive difference: capable of holding power to account, providing she is able 
to be controlled. 
 Thunberg is not the only instance in which ideologies and narratives of the 
climate crisis imbricate with neuroscience and the brain. Chapter one and three 
briefly considers how Eddie’s plastic narrative is reflective of the hubristic idea that 
 
12 After Thunberg spoke at rally in Bristol in 2020, the Bristol Post published public responses on 
their social media posts who were critical or hateful towards Thunberg, including calls to burn her at 
the stake. Tristan Cork, ‘The abuse and threats made to Greta Thunberg by people from Bristol’, 
Bristol Post, 29 February 2020 <https://www.bristolpost.co.uk/news/bristol-news/abuse-threats-
made-greta-thunberg-3897936> [accessed 3 March 2020]. 
13 Margaret Atwood cited in Olivia Petter, ‘Margaret Atwood Says Greta Thunberg is the ‘Joan of Arc’ 
of Environmentalism’, Independent, 7 November 2019 <https://www.independent.co.uk/life-
style/margaret-atwood-greta-thunberg-joan-of-arc-environmentalism-climate-change-
a9188841.html> [accessed 3 March 2020]; Osita Nwanevu, ‘Sinners in the Hands of an Angry Greta 
Thunberg’, The New Republic, 25 September 2019 
<https://newrepublic.com/article/155170/sinners-hands-angry-greta-thunberg> [accessed 3 March 
2020]. 
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a neuroscientific and technologically advanced society will be able to solve problems 
such as the climate crisis through thinking our way out of the issue, rather than 
engaging in direct and present action. Whereas, neuroscience is also being invoked 
to explain, in a manner like brain scanning mindfulness’ efficacy that introduced this 
thesis, why we are so apathetic towards the climate crisis.14 I conclude with this 
consideration the climate crisis because it highlights the extent and reach not only of 
the neuro-turn, but the myriad ways neural implantations entwine with some of the 
most pressing issues of the contemporary moment. Indeed, though this thesis 
provides a holistic framework through which to understand cognitive difference in 
society and culture today, how the brain and its differences interact with the climate 
crisis highlights that there is clearly much more work to be done in exploring the 
implantation phenomenon. This is particularly true when considered in conjunction 
with recent political and ideological shifts. 
 It is true that thesis has developed a cultural framework through which to 
think about cognitive difference in the contemporary moment. Much of this has 
focussed on the biopolitical imperatives of neoliberalism, which regarding the brain 
are bolstered through a belief in neuroscience and medicine and the legitimacy of its 
supposedly objective truth claims. Through my case studies I have deconstructed this 
objectivity and offered readings of cognitive difference that maintain the importance 
 
14 A 2014 Guardian article titled ‘Your brain on climate change: why the threat produces apathy, not 
action’ and accompanied by a large brain scan image is typical of the neuro-turn’s fascination with 
measuring how specifically brains respond to various stimuli or psychological situations. The article 
explains that the brain is not equipped to comprehend slowly-emerging threats such as incremental 
climate changes. Greg Harman, Your brain on climate change: why the threat produces apathy, not 
action’, Guardian, 10 November 2014 <https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-
business/2014/nov/10/brain-climate-change-science-psychology-environment-elections> [accessed 
3 March 2020]. 
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of subjective narrative. However, threaded throughout are references to a populist 
shift away from existing hegemonies of neoliberal claims to inclusion. Future 
research must look specifically at this shift, because, it is likely that despite 
neoliberalism’s failings, the putative belief in objective inclusivity is less damaging 
than emerging populist models. My reading of the speculative world of Nexus 
suggested that the shifts towards isolationism and scientific scepticism that are 
nascent in society today, may only entrench current the current normative problems 
associated with cognitive difference.   
For instance, future work must look at the emerging body of research and 
narratives of lived experiences pertaining to neurobiological models of violence. 
These seek to reframe violence as a public health issue, primarily evidenced through 
material models that claim to find violence at the site of the brain.15 The 
pathologisation of violence through diagnoses such as conduct disorder raise 
important ethical debates. On the one hand, this diagnostic intervention could 
provide respite for families who have endured years of problematic behaviour and 
 
15 For academic books on this subject see Michael H. Stone, The Anatomy of Evil (Amherst: 
Prometheus Books, 2009); Abigail Marsh, Good for Nothing: From Altruists to Psychopaths and 
Everyone in Between, (London: Robinson, 2017); Simon Baron-Cohen, The Science of Evil: On 
Empathy and the Origins of Cruelty (New York: Basic Books, 2011); Adrian Raine, The Anatomy of 
Violence: The Biological Roots of Crime (London: Penguin, Books, 2013). Raine in particular stresses 
his desire to reframe violence as a public health crisis, hoping that society can ‘think about it 
rationally and clinically; not infected by sin and evil’ (336). This couples with emotive parental 
experiences of violent children such as the mother of Columbine school shooter Sue Klebold who 
said during a TED talk: ‘The third challenge I have when I talk about my son’s murder-suicide is that 
I’m talking about mental health –excuse me – is that I’m talking about mental health, or brain 
health, as I prefer to call it, because it’s more concrete’. Sue Klebold, My son was a Columbine 
shooter. This is my story [online], TEDMED, 
2016.<https://www.ted.com/talks/sue_klebold_my_son_was_a_columbine_shooter_this_is_my_st
ory/details?language=en>. See also, Liza Long, ‘I am Adam Lanza’s Mother: It’s time to talk about 
mental illness’, The Blue Review [online], 15 December 2012 <https://thebluereview.org/i-am-adam-
lanzas-mother/>; Libby Brooks ‘Treat London’s Violence as public health crisis, say Scottish experts’, 
Guardian, 6 April 2018 <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/apr/06/treat-london-
violence-as-public-health-crisis-say-scottish-experts>. 
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abuse by violent children, as well as ontological implantations that may offer 
explanations for often irrational patterns of violence.16 On the other hand, nascent 
research I have begun on the diagnostic rates of conduct disorder statistically suggest 
it is far from immune to racial profiling, which could compound the differential and 
ontologically damaging ways in which poor behaviour is considered at the level of 
race.17 Worrisome are the compassions being drawn between populist exclusivity 
and the return of scientific racism, rebranded for the twenty-first century as ‘race 
realism’.18 Angela Saini, whose research tracks the return of scientific racism, argues 
that race realists ‘join the growing ranks of climate change deniers, anti-vaxxers, and 
flat-earthers in insisting that science is under the yoke of some grand master plan 
designed to pull the wool over everyone’s eyes’.19 Moreover, could the recent flurry 
of thriller novels centring around pathologized violent children help elucidate or 
compound neural implantations of violence or deviance.20 Such important and 
emerging questions lay beyond the scope of this thesis, but this troubling 
combination of populism, diagnostic medicine and national health policy, and Saini’s 
articulation of a kind of post-truth science could produce neural implantations of 
deviance – such as in the case of conduct disorder – at a macromolecular level. 
 
16 Liza Long, ‘I am Adam Lanza’s Mother: It’s time to talk about mental illness’. 
17 See introduction, footnote 103. 
18 Nancy LeTourneau, ‘Race Realism and the Election of Donald Trump’, Washington Monthly, 26 
March 2018 <https://washingtonmonthly.com/2018/03/26/race-realism-and-the-election-of-
donald-trump/> [accessed 17 September 2019]. 
19 See Angela Saini, ‘The Internet is a Cesspool of Racist Pseudoscience’, Scientific American, 29 July 
2019 <https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/voices/the-internet-is-a-cesspool-of-racist-
pseudoscience/> [accessed 17 September 2019]. 
20 See recent thriller novels exploring neurological models and explanations of childhood violence 
such as Ali Land’s Good Me Bad Me (London: Penguin, 2017); Herman Koch, The Dinner, trans. by 
Sam Garrett (London: Atlantic Books, 2012); Amanda Panitch, Damage Done (New York: Random 
House, 2015); Zoje Stage, Bad Apple (London: Bantam Press, 2018). 
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 Ultimately, this thesis has argued that there is a compact between the 
identification of brain and cognitive difference, biopolitical imperatives and 
geopolitics, the emergence of new subjectivities and states of personhood, and novel 
forms of cultural and narrative representation encapsulated in the framework of the 
neural implantation. I have shown the power and importance imbued and bound to 
notions of the norm but realised that current and proposed neurotechnology fits 
outside of what is historically understood through pathological models. This is why I 
dedicated a section to figurations and ontologies of the enhanced human in order to 
explore and ethically evaluate what its effects may be, finding particular critique with 
regard to the potential formation of a new social aspiration – no longer through 
internalised disciplinary normalcy – but through the image and potential of the ideal 
‘brain’. It also crucially considered the ways the dominant neurological categories of 
dementia and autism can be read, as examples of different – sometimes excitingly 
radically different – lived experiences through depictions in cultural narratives. 
 The neural implantation as underpinned by this contemporary turn to 
neuroscientific models and explanations is, relatively speaking, in its infancy. I have 
provided ways to think through, alongside, and beyond the medical models of 
cognitive difference to re-find or re-claim an individual subjectivity from within the 
implantation itself. This is a cultural and critical task that must continue. 
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